Skip to main content

Full text of "The "art" of rhetoric"

See other formats


/ 'A^- 



'Or^ / 



THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY 

EDITED HY 

E. CAPPS, PH.D., LI..D. T. E. PAGE, litt.d. 
W. H. D. ROUSE, LITT.D. 



ARISTOTLE 
THE "ART" OF RHETORIC 



ARISTOTLE 

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION 

THE "ART" OP" RHETORIC 

BY 

JOHN HENKY FREESE 

FORMERLY FELLOW OF ST. JOHN's COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 




LONDON: WILLIAM HEINEMANN 
NEW YORK: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

MCMXXVI 



PR 



587423 
5 7. S-'^ 



Printed t?i G'ceat Britain 



CONTENTS 





PAGE 


Introduction . 


vii 


Bibliography 


. xxviii 


Analysis 


. xxxi 


Book I. ... 


2 


Book II. ... 


108 


Book III. 


. 344 


Glossary 


. 472 


Index of Names 


. 483 


General Index 


. 487 



INTRODUCTION 

The beginnings of rhetoric — the Homeric poems — Themi- 
stocles and Pericles — the influence of the Sophists — Sicily 
the birthplace of rhetoric as an art — the Western or Sicilian 
school (Corax — Tisias— Gorgias — Agathon — Polus— Licym- 
nius — Evenus — Alcidamas — Lycophron — Polycrates — 
Callippus — Pamphilus) — Thrasymachus — the Eastern or 
Ionic school (Protagoras — Prodicus — Hippias — Theodoriis — 
Theodectes)— decay of rhetoric — Demetrius of Phalerum — 
treatment of rhetoric in Plato's Gorgias and Phaedrus — 
other rhetorical works by Aristotle — date of the Rhetoric — 
Aristotle and Demosthenes — Aristotle and Isocrates — the 
Rhetor ica ad Alexandrum — text of the Rhetoric. 

Rhetoric, in the general sense of the use of language 
in such a manner as to impress the hearers and in- 
fluence them for or against a certain course of action, 
is as old as language itself and the beginnings of 
social and political life. It was practised and highly 
esteemed among the Greeks from the earliest times. 
The reputation of Odysseus and Nestor as speakers, 
the reply of Achilles to the embassy entreating him 
to take the field again, the trial-scene represented on 
the shield of Achilles, bear witness to this, and justify 
the opinion of the ancient Greeks that Homer was 
the real father of oratory. After the age of Homer 
and Hesiod and the establishment of democratic in- 
stitutions, the development of industry and com- 
merce and the gradually increasing naval power of 



INTRODUCTION 

Athens compelled statesmen to become orators. 
Themistocles and Pericles were the foremost states- 
men of their time. The former, although not 
specially distinguished for eloquence, was regarded 
as a most capable speaker ; the latter was a great 
orator. It is much to be regretted that none of his 
speeches has survived ; but some idea of their lofty 
patriotism may be gained from those put into his 
mouth by Thucydides, while the genuine fragments, 
several of which have been preserved in Aristotle, 
are characterized by impressive vividness. 

The next step in the development of Greek prose 
and Rhetoric must be set down to the credit of the 
Sophists. Whatever opinion may be held, from a 
moral standpoint, of the teaching of these much- 
discussed professors of wisdom and of its effects on 
the national life and character, it is generally con- 
ceded that they have a claim to be considered the 
founders of an artificial prose style, which ultimately 
led to the highly-finished diction of Plato and Demo- 
sthenes. It is usual to make a distinction between 
eastern (Ionic) and western (Sicilian) sophistical 
rhetoric, the representatives of the former paying 
attention chiefly to accuracy (updoeTreia), those of 
the latter to beauty (cveTreta), of style. 

The birthplace of Rhetoric as an art was the island 
of Sicily. According to Cicero," Aristotle, no doubt 
in his lost history of the literature of the subject 
(^vvnyoiyrj tc^i'wi/), gives the following account of 
its origin. After the expulsion of the " tyrants " 
(467 B.C.), a number of civil processes were insti- 

" Cicero, Brutus, xii. 46. 



INTRODUCTION 

tuted by citizens, who had been previously banished 
and then returned from exile, for the recovery of 
property belonging to them which had been illegally 
confiscated by the tyrants. This made it necessary 
for the claimants to obtain assistance from others, 
and the Sicilians, " an acute people and born con- 
troversiaHsts," suppUed the want in the persons of 
Corax and Tisias (both of Syracuse), who drew up a 
system which could be imparted by instruction, and 
a set of rules dealing with such questions as were 
likely to arise. These two may therefore claim to 
have been the founders of technical Rhetoric, al- 
though Aristotle, in an early lost work called the 
Sophist, gives the credit to the philosopher Empedo- 
cles, whose pupil Gorgias is said to have been. 

CoRAX " was the author of the first of the numerous 
" Arts " (rexvai, handbooks of Rhetoric), and to 
him is attributed the definition of it as " the artificer 
of persuasion " (jreLdois 8r)[uovpy6<;). The speech 
was divided into three parts — exordium (Trpooi/uov), 
arguments constructive and refutative (dywves), and 
epilogue (eViAoyos), or into five, with the addition of 
narrative (Stvy-yr/o-ts), which followed the exordium, 
and TrapeKfSdaeisJ' It may be assumed that he 
also wrote speeches'' for his clients to learn and 
deliver in the courts, as it was no doubt the rule in 

" The sophists and rhetoricians here mentioned are limited 
(with the exception of Demetrius of Phalerum) to those whose 
names actually occur in the Rhetoric. 

* Apparently not to be understood in the more usual 
senses of " perversions " (of forms of government), or "digres- 
sions " (in a book or speech), but in that of "auxiliaries," 
subsidiary aids to the speech (irpb': einKovpiav tu>v Xeyofxifuv, 
quoted in vStephanus, Thesaurus, from the Prolegomena to 
Hermogenes). 

* Such writers were called " logographers " (see ii. 11. 7). 



INTRODUCTION 

Syracuse, as at Athens, that the Htigant should at 
least create the impression that he was conducting 
his own case. 

His pupil TisiAS, also the author of an " Art," is 
said to have tieen the tutor of Gorgias, Lysias, and 
Isocrates, and to have accompanied the first-named 
on his embassy to Athens. He laid even greater 
stress than his master on the argument from prob- 
abiUty (etKos) which he regarded as more valuable 
than truth " 

GoRGiAS of Leontini (c. 483-375 b.c.) first attracted 
the attention of Greece proper when he visited 
Athens as an ambassador (427 b.c.) from his native 
place, with the object of obtaining assistance against 
Syracuse. His view of rhetoric was that it was only 
a means of persuasion, and he was careful to explain 
that his only object was to make his pupils skilful 
rhetoricians, able to speak on every subject, either 
for or against, and not, like certain other sophists, 
to teach them virtue or wisdom. This made him 
pay greater attention to the style than to the subject 
matter of his discourses. In addition to fragments 
of these, from which there are several quotations 
preserved in the Rhetoric, two extant orations (En- 
comium of Helen and Defence of Palamedes) are now 
generally considered to be his. An " Art " of Rhe- 
toric has also been assigned to him. Regarded as 
the creator of artificial Greek prose, his writings were 
distinguished by flowery ornamentation, poetical 
colouring, unusual phraseology (as shown in the use 
of rare, compound, and poetical words), and many 

» On the relation of a fragment in Doric {Oxyrhynchus 
Papyri, iii. p. 27) to the r^x"**' of Corax and Tisias see W. 
R. Roberts in Classical Review, F'eb. 1904. 



INTRODUCTION 

new rhetorical figures, for the employment of which 
the contemptuous term " to gorgiaze " was invented. 
He further introduced an artificial and symmetrical 
structure of sentences and periods, which gave the 
impression of metre. According to Diodorus Siculus 
(xii. 53), the Athenians were astounded at his un- 
common style, his use of antitheses, his evenly 
balanced clauses of equal length, and the similarity 
of the (beginnings or) endings of words. Gomperz •* 
remarks that the English counterpart of the style of 
Gorgias is euphuism. In the Platonic dialogue, in 
the first part of which Gorgias takes a prominent 
part, it is noticeable that he is treated more leniently 
than might have been expected, considering Plato's 
opinion of rhetoric as taught and practised by him 
and his successors. 

Agathon (c. 447-401 B.C.), an Athenian, was by 
profession a tragedian. His beauty and affected 
manners made him the butt of the comic poets. '' A 
pupil of Gorgias, he imitated the flowery language, 
antitheses, and parallelisms of his master, and was 
fond of using the rhetorical figure antonomasia, the 
use of an epithet or patronymic instead of the name 
of a person. His first victory with a tragedy at the 
Lenaea is celebrated in the Platonic dialogue Sym- 
posium, in which he is one of the interlocutors. 

PoLUS, of Agrigentum, the favourite pupil of 
Gorgias, is one of the interlocutors in the Platonic 
Gorgias. In this he is attacked by Socrates, and the 
special attention paid by him to the ornamentation 
of his speeches and his affected style are severely 
criticized. He was the author of an " Art," of 

" Greek Thinkers, i. 478 (Eng. tr.). 
^ Aristophanes, Thesmophoriazusae, 100. 



INTRODUCTION 

which some fragments are preserved in Plato and 
Aristotle, 

LicYMNius, pupil of Gorgias and a dithyrambic 
poet, was the author of an " Art." He invented a 
number of unnecessary technical terms," and classified 
nouns under the heads of the proper, compound, 
synonymous or quasi-synonymous, and single words 
or periphrases intended to take the place of nouns 
(KvpLa, (rvvBera, uSeAf/)a, eiriOeTo). By some he is 
considered to be a different person from the dithy- 
rambic poet. 

EvENUs, of Paros, elegiac poet and sophist, contem- 
porary of Socrates, wrote an " Art " and rhetorical 
rules or examples in verse.'' 

Alcidamas, of Elaea in Aeolis in Asia Minor, was 
the pupil and successor of Gorgias, the chief and last 
representative of his rhetorical school. A rival and 
opponent of Isocrates, against whom his treatise On 
the Sophists (now generally accepted as genuine), is 
directed, he lays stress upon the superiority of ex- 
tempore speeches to those written out. His writings 
are characterized by a bombastic style, excessive use 
of poetical epithets and phrases, and far-fetched 
metaphors. They are drawn upon in the Rhetoric 
(iii. 3. 1) to illustrate the " frigid " or insipid style. 

Another critic " describes his style as rather coarse 
and commonplace {KOLvorepoy). He was also the author 
of an " Art " and of a show-speech Messeniacus,^ a 
reply to the Archidamus of Isocrates. 

Lycophron, pupil of Gorgias, and, like Alcidamas, 
condemned in the Rhetoric for the frigidity of his style. 

<• Rhetoric, iii. 12. 2 ; Plato, Phaedrus, 267 c. 

* Phaedrus, 267 b. 

" Dion. Halic, De Isaeo, xix. {v.l. Kevortpov, " emptier "). 

"^ Rhetoric, i. 13. 2. 



INTRODUCTION 

He appears to have specially affected the use of 
periphrases. He declared that the accident of noble 
birth was utterly valueless, and described law as 
merely a compact, " a mutual guarantee among men 
that justice will be preserved." " 

PoLYCRATES, of Athens, sophist and rhetorician, 
contemporary of Isocrates, whose displeasure he 
incurred by his Defejice of Busiris and Accusation of 
Socrates. The former is criticized by Isocrates in his 
Busiris and its defects pointed out. A Panegyric on 
Helen, formerly attributed to Gorgias, is by some 
considered the work of Poly crates. He also wrote 
eulogies on such trifling subjects as mice {Rhetoric, 
ii. 24. 6), pots, salt, pebbles. He appears to have at 
one time enjoyed a certain reputation as an orator, 
but Dionysius of Halicarnassus severely censures his 
style, describing him as " empty in things that 
matter, frigid and vulgar in epideictic oratory, and 
without charm where it is needed." ^ 

Of Callippus and Pamphilus, each the writer of 
an " Art," nothing more seems to be known than the 
reference to them in the Rhetorics^ They are said 
to have paid special attention to skill in drawing 
conclusions. 

Thrasymachus, of Chalcedon (c. 457-400 B.C.), 
sophist and rhetorician, was regarded as the inventor 
of the " mixed " style of oratory, half-way between 
the varied and artificially-wrought style of Antiphon 
and Thucydides and the plain and simple style of 
Lysias. Its excellence consisted in condensing the 
ideas and expressing them tersely, which was especi- 
ally necessary in genuine rhetorical contests. Al- 
though he rounded off his sentences in periods, 

« Politics, ill. 9. 8. " De Isaeo, 20. <= ii. 23. 21. 

xiii 



INTRODUCTION 

marked by a paeanic rhythm « at the beginning and 
the end, he by no means favoured the reduction of 
prose to rhythmical verse. He was the first to direct 
attention to the importance of deUvery (uTroKptcrts). 
In addition to an " Art," and a work on common- 
places (a(^o/3/xat, starting-points ; or, resources), he 
wrote " Compassion speeches," ^ intended to excite 
the emotions of the hearers, a method of persuasion 
to which he attached great importance. 

The rhetoricians mentioned above, with the ex- 
ception of Thrasymachus, may be regarded as repre- 
sentatives of the Sicilian or western school. A brief 
account may here be given of the best known sophists 
(the name by which they distinguished themselves 
from the mere rhetorician) belonging to Greece 
proper and the eastern colonies. 

Protagoras (c. 485-415 b.c), of Abdera, was a fre- 
quent visitor to Athens and a friend of Pericles. He 
was the author of the famous dictum, " Man is the 
measure of all things," that is, there is no such thing 
as absolute truth, but tilings are such as they appear 
to one who perceives them. He was the first to 
enter upon the scientific study of language, and 
wrote on accuracy of style (^opdoeireia) " ; he also 
distinguished the genders of nouns,<* the tenses and 
moods of verbs, and the various modes and forms of 
address (interrogation, response, command, entreaty). 
He taught his pupils to discuss commonplaces from 

" See Rhetoric, iii. 8. 4-6. 

* Rhetoric, iii. 1.7; cp. Plato, Phaedrus, 267 c. 

" Others take this to mean that he adopted a simple or 
straightforward style as contrasted with the affected Sicilian 
rhetoric (Thompson on Phaedrus, 267 c). 

<* See iii. 5. 5 note. 
xiv 



INTRODUCTION 

opposite points of view and the art of making 
the weaker (worse) cause appear the stronger, by 
which success in a case which otherwise appeared 
hopeless was frequently attained. The first to call 
himself a sophist, he was the first teacher who de- 
manded a fee for his instruction. His character is 
severely handled in the Platonic dialogue called afocr 
him, and his theory of knowledge attacked in the 
Theaetetus. 

Prodicus, of Ceos, an island in the Aegean, is best 
known for his moral apologue of the Choice of Her- 
cules (between virtue and vice). The date of his 
birth and death is uncertain, but he was at any rate 
junior to Protagoras. He paid special attention to 
the use of synonyms and the accurate distinction of 
words of kindred meaning. 

HiPPiAS, of Elis, depicted in the two Platonic 
dialogues (of doubtful genuineness), was a veritable 
polymath. His numerous studies embraced grammar 
and the cultivation of a correct and elevated style of 
expression. He also interested himself in political 
matters, and, by comparing the forms of government 
and institutions of different states, laid the foundation 
of political science. 

Theodorus (^. c. 412 b.c), of Byzantium, is men- 
tioned by Plato " as a most excellent " tricker-out " 
of speeches (AoyoSaiSaAos). He was the author of 
an " Art," and invented a number of new terms or 
" novelties " (/ctttva), introducing additional divisions 
of the speech. According to Cicero,^ Lysias once 
gave lessons in rhetoric, but abandoned it for writing 
forensic speeches for others, on the ground that 

* Phaedrus, 266 e ; Cicero, Orator, xii. 39. 
' Brutus, xii. 48. 

XV 



INTRODUCTION 

Theodorus was more subtle than himself in techni-^- 
calities, although feebler in ^^^f'^'J'...^ j^ Pam-^l; 
Theodectes (c. 380-344 B.C.), of Fhaselis m ran , 
ph^^G^ek Wgic poet and rhetoric.aj^s ^ ;. . 
iZn of Isocrates and an ^^^^^^l^^^^l^^' ^^f iX f 
He at first wrote speeches for l^^f ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ;■■ 
tu...ed his attention to trage^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^^, , 

:Sr :l r re^t'^^^nnsia^ widow of ^ ^ 

!! nf Caria to be recited at his funeral. Theo , 

prmce ot uaria, xo uc .< A^f " in both orose and ; 

metrical.' His extraordinary memory and skill m 
solving puzzles were celebrated. 

After Greece had lost her ^f dom ^d J*-^ 

!:itrscSf=S^jK-^' 

and exaggerated ^^J^^' ^^^J^^f Demktrxus of 
Mention may be "^^d^^^^!^^^f''?ruler of Athens 
Phalerum (o. 350-283 B..)app2edru^^^^^^^^^ ^.^^^^ 
by Cassander (31^-307 bc). A ^ ^^^ 

he was the author of historical, poi , 

a Demosthenes, 48 ; Quintihan, »• *• l^j ^ 
» For the Theodectea (Bhetortc, m. 9. 9) see later. 



XVI 



INTRODUCTION 

of a lost treatise on Rhetoric in two books." The 
work On Interpretation, dealing with the different 
kinds of style, the period, hiatus, and rhetorical 
figures, which has come down to us under his name, 
is really of much later date. According to Cicero,'' 
" he was the first who altered the character of oratory, 
rendering it weak and effeminate, and preferred to 
be thought agreeable rather than dignified. His 
flow of language is calm and placid, embellished by 
metaphor and metonymy. But his speeches seem 
to me to have a genuine Attic flavour." Quintilian 
says : " although he was the first to alter the style 
of oratory for the worse, I must confess that he 
was an able and eloquent speaker, and deserves to 
be remembered as almost the last of the Attic orators 
worthy to be called by that name." '^ 

The writers of the " Arts " which preceded the 
great work of Aristotle had almost entirely devoted 
their attention to forensic oratory, adapted to the 
requirements of the law courts, for which delibera- 
tive oratory, the language of the public assembly, 
although the nobler of the two, was neglected. Epi- 
deictic or display oratory '^ may certainly be said to 

" A list of his works is given in the life of him by Diogenes 
Laertius. * Brutus, ix. 38, Ixxxii. 285 ; Orator, xxvii. 92. 

" Inst. Orat. x. i. 80. 

^ The chief object of epideictic or show-speeches was to 
give pleasure to the hearers, whose function in regard to 
them is defined {Rhetoric, i. 3. 2) as that of " critics " of the 
intellectual performance and ability of the speaker, rather 
than that of "judges " of anything of serious importance, 
as in deliberative and forensic oratory. Funeral orations 
and speeches at the great public assemblies come under this 
head (see also iii. 12. 5). Quintilian {Inst. Orat. iii. 8. 7) 
says that the only result or gain in epideictic oratory is 
praise, not anything of practical value. 

b xvii 



INTRODUCTION 

have existed since tlie time of Gorgias, but it is not 
spoken of as being on an equality with the two other 
branches. The creator of a systematic and scientific 
" Art " of Rhetoric is Aristotle. The unsatisfactory 
character of previous productions, whose compilers 
had neglected the all-important subject of " proofs " 
and confined themselves chiefly to appeals to the 
emotions and things irrelevant to the matter in 
hand, induced him to attack the subject from the 
point of view of a philosopher and psychologist, not 
from that of the mere rhetorician, which assuredly 
Aristotle was not. 



Two of the Platonic dialogues, the Gorgias and the 
Phaedrus, deal more or less with the subject of 
rhetoric, although they differ as to the manner in 
which it is discussed and in the attitude adopted 
towards it. In the Gorgias, the earlier dialogue, the 
discussion mainly turns upon the meaning of the 
term — the nature of rhetoric not its value, and vari- 
ous definitions proposed are critically examined, 
amended, or narrowed down. Rhetoric is the arti- 
ficer of persuasion, and its function is to persuade the 
unintelligent multitude in the law courts and public 
assemblies in regard to justice and injustice. But 
the result of such persuasion is not the acquisition of 
knowledge ; it merely produces belief, which is 
sometimes false, sometimes true, whereas knowledge 
is always true. The time at the speaker's disposal is 
not sufficient for the thorough discussion of such im- 
portant subjects that leads to truth. Nevertheless, 
the practised rhetorician will be more successful than 
the expert in persuading his hearers on any subject 
whatever, even such matters as the building of walls 
xviii 



INTRODUCTION 

and dockyards, although he knows nothing about 
them. It is sufficient for him to have acquired the 
power of persuasion, which will enable him to con- 
vince an ignorant audience that he knows more than 
those who possess real knowledge. This is sufficient 
to show the great power of the rhetorician, which 
must not, however, be abused ; but if it is, the 
teacher cannot be blamed.** 

Socrates himself, being asked to give his definition 
of rhetoric, replies that it is not an art at all, but a 
mere knack of gratifying and pleasing the hearer. 
It is a species of the genus flattery, like cookery (the 
art of making dainties), cosmetic (of adorning the 
person), and sophistic. Mind and body have, each 
of them, a really healthy condition and a condition 
that is only apparently healthy. The art that is 
concerned with the mind is the political art, its 
branches are legislation and justice ; that which is 
concerned with the body has no special name, its 
branches are gymnastic and medicine. Each of 
these true arts has a sham counterpart ; sophistic 
corresponding to legislation, rhetoric to justice, 
cosmetic to gymnastic, cookery to medicine. The 
end of the true arts is what is good for mind or body ; 
of the false, immediate gratification. Rhetoric is 
not a true art, and the power of the rhetorician is of 
the slightest, since he can only carry out what seems 
to him to be best, not what he really wishes to attain 
— happiness and well-being. The paradoxes, that 
it is worse to do wrong than to suffer wrong, and that 
it is better for the wrongdoer to be punished than to 

" Aristotle {Rhetoric, i. 1. 13) points out that the objection 
that rhetoric may be abused is applicable to everything 
that is good and useful, except virtue. 



INTRODUCTION 

escape punishment, lead to the conclusion that the 
only use of rhetoric is, if we have done wrong, to 
enable us to accuse ourselves (and similarly our 
parents, children, friends, or country) and to bring 
our misdeeds to light, that we may be punished and 
healed ; but, if an enemy is the offender, to prevent 
his being punished, so that he may spend the rest 
of his life in misery. 

The difference between Plato's treatment of 
rhetoric in the Phaedrus and in the Gorgias and his 
attitude towards it are obvious." The latter dealt 
chiefly with various definitions of rhetoric and its 
nature as expounded by its professors ; the former 
is a philosophical theory of rhetoric as it ought to be, 
if it is to justify its claim to be considered a true art. 
It is not an out-and-out condemnation of sophistical 
rhetoric. Although the rules contained in the 
" Arts " of Thrasymachus, Theodorus, and others 
are rejected as absurd and useless, it is admitted that 
there is some practical benefit in its teaching.'' But 
it is unsystematic and, not being based upon truth, 
cannot be properly called an art, but is merely a 
preliminary training. 

The basis of the discussion is an erotic speech by 
Lysias (read by Phaedrus), which is criticized by 
Socrates with the object of showing the superiority 
of his own speech and method. According to him, 
this is chiefly shown in the due observation of the 
two great principles of generalization and division, 
which are effected by Dialectic, " the coping-stone 
of all learning and the truest of all sciences,"" to 

" Cope, however, does not admit this. 
* On this cp. Rhetoric, i. 1. I'-J. 

' Republic, 534 e. On the relation of Rhetoric to Dialectic 
see Glossary. 

XX 



INTRODUCTION 

which rhetoric is indebted for nearly everything of 
value that it contains. 

But the most important point is that the founda- 
tion of true rhetoric is psychology, the science of 
mind (soul), as already hinted in the definition here 
accepted by Plato {xpv\ayMyia ?>La. Adywi', " winning 
men's minds by words," as contrasted with the vague 
Tret 6'ovs ^rz/xtoupyov). The true rhetorician is as- 
sumed to have already settled the question whether 
all mind is one, or multiform. If it is multiforna, he 
must know what are its different varieties ; he must 
also be acquainted with all the different forms of 
argument, and know what particular forms of it are 
likely to be effective as instruments of persuasion 
in each particular case. But a merely theoretical 
knowledge of this is not sufficient ; he must have 
practical experience to guide him, and must be 
able to decide without hesitation to which class 
of mind his hearers belong and to seize the 
oppoi'tune moment for the employment of each 
kind of discourse. A knowledge of the various 
rhetorical styles and figures of diction is also a 
useful accessory. 

In view of these facts, the three (in particular the 
first two) books of Aristotle's Rhetoric have been 
described as " an expanded Phaedrus." °' Thus, the 
first book deals with the means of persuasion, the 
logical proofs based upon dialectic ; the second with 
the psychological or ethical proofs, based upon a 
knowledge of the human emotions and their causes, 
and of the different types of character. The ques- 
tions of style and arrangement (which are only 
cursorily alluded to in the Phaedrus in reference to 

" Thompson, Introduction, p. xx. 



INTRODUCTION 

the superiority of oral to written instruction) are 
treated, but less fully, in the third book. 

In addition to the Rhetoric, Aristotle was the author 
of several other rhetorical works, which have been 
lost. Six of these are mentioned in the Life of him 
by Diogenes Laertius : (1) A collection of previous 
" Arts " of Rhetoric (^vvajMyr] Te)(ywv), a kind of 
literary history of the subject « ; (2) a dialogue called 
Gryllus, written in commemoration of his friend of 
that name, who was the son of Xenophon and fell in 
the battle of Mantinea (362 B.C.) ; (3), (4), (5) simply 
called " Arts " of Rhetoric in two, one, and two books 
respectively ; (6) the Theodectea {Rhetoric, iii. 9. 9). 
There has been considerable discussion as to the 
authorship of the last, but it is now generally agreed 
that it is an earlier work of Aristotle, re-edited later, 
dealing mainly with style and composition, and that 
he named it after his friend and pupil. Its identifica- 
tion with the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum is rejected. 

The date of the Rhetoric, which was written at 
Athens, is assigned to his second residence there 
(335-322), about 330 b.c. (at the earhest SS5), al- 
though the exact year cannot be determined. The 
latest historical events which are referred to are : 
(ii. 23. 6) the embassy of Philip of Macedon to the 
Thebans, asking for a free passage for his army 
through their territory, so that he might attack 
Attica (Oct. Nov. 339) ; (ii- 23. 18) the peace con- 
cluded at Corinth soon after the accession of Alex- 
ander (autumn, 336) ; (ii. 24. 8) the attribution by 

" Cicero, De Oratore, xxxviii. 160: librum, in quo exposuit 
dicendi artes omnium superiorum. 
xxii 



INTRODUCTION 

Demades of the responsibility for the misfortunes of 
Greece to Demosthenes, but there is nothing to 
show whether the reference is to a time before or 
after Chaeronea. In this connexion it may be noted 
that the pohtical opponents of Demosthenes de- 
clared that all that was best in his speeches was 
borrowed from Aristotle, whereas Dionysius of Hali- 
carnassus ** endeavours to show that the Rhetoric was 
not written until after the delivery of the orator's 
most important speeches. 

It is remarkable that Aristotle, while freely draw- 
ing upon Isocrates, whose name is mentioned seve" al 
times, to illustrate points of style, never once quotes 
from Demosthenes. The name of the latter occurs 
three times in the Rhetoric : in iii. 4. 3 it is suggested 
that the Athenian general, not the orator, is meant ; 
in ii. 24. 8 it occurs in reference to the fallacy of 
treating as a cause what is not really so ; in ii. 23. 3 
it is also doubtful whether the orator is referred to. 
Nothing is known of Nicanor, and if necessary to con- 
nect Demosthenes with the affair, it has been suggested 
to read Nicodemus, in whose murder he was suspected 
of being concerned (Demosthenes, Midias, p. 549). 

Isocrates is most highly spoken of in the Phaedrus, 
but his relations with Aristotle were, according to 
ancient authorities, the reverse of friendly. The 
chief reason for this seems to have been that Aristotle 
had started a school of Rhetoric, which threatened to 
endanger the popularity of that of his older rival. 
According to Cicero,^ " Aristotle, seeing that Iso- 
crates was prospering and had a number of dis- 
tinguished pupils (the result of having removed his 

" First Letter to Amtnaeus (ed. W. R. Roberts), 1901. 
* De Oratore, iii. 35. 141. 



INTRODUCTION 

disputations from forensic and political causes and 
transferred them to an empty elegance of style), 
himself suddenly changed the form of his teacliing 
almost entirely, slightly altering a verse in the 
Philoctetes.^ The original has, ' It is disgraceful to 
remain silent and allow barbarians to speak,' v/here 
Aristotle substituted Isocrates for barbarians. And 
so he ornamented and embellished the entire system 
of teaching rhetoric and united a knowledge of 
things with practice in speaking." P'urther, Aristotle 
had attacked Isocrates, either in the Gryllus or the 
treatise on the different " Arts " of rhetoric, which 
called forth a lengthy reply from Cephisodorus, one 
of the pupils of Isocrates, in which various theories of 
Aristotle were criticized, and the philosopher himself 
stigmatized as a drunkard and a gourmandizer. Iso- 
crates himself is said to have entered the lists ; for 
the reference to " three or four sophists of the 
common herd who pretended to know everything," * 
is supposed to be meant for Aristotle, who is also 
attacked in the fifth Letter of Isocrates. The numer- 
ous citations from Isocrates in the Rhetoric have been 
explained by the assumption that, in a revised edition 
of his work, Aristotle retained the examples of an 
earlier ms., dating from a time (31-7) when Isocrates 
held the field and Demosthenes had not yet made 
his name. But the view is generally held that the 
Rhetoric was not published till at least ten years later, 
and in any case there seems no reason why a winter 
should not quote from the works of an unfriendly 
rival, if they seemed best suited for his purpose. 

A brief notice must here be given of the Rhetorica 

" A lost play of Euripides. ^ Panathenaicus, 20. 

xxiv 



INTRODUCTION 

ad Alexandrum, which gets its title from the admit- 
tedly spurious letter of dedication to the great 
Macedonian. More than half the length of our 
Rhetoric, it was formerly printed with Aristotle's 
works as his. Its genuineness was first doubted by 
Erasmus, followed by the well-known commentator 
Vittorio (Victorius), who did not hesitate to ascribe 
it to Anaximenes (c. 380-320), an historian and rhe- 
torician of the time of Alexander the Great, whose 
tutor and friend he was and his companion in his 
Persian campaigns. Anaximenes is said to have 
been the first to practise extempore speaking, to have 
devoted his attention to all three branches of Rhe- 
toric, and to have written an " Art." The question 
of authorship is generally regarded as settled in 
favour of Anaximenes by the arguments of Spengel 
(who certainly is obliged to take considerable liberties 
in some passages of the text without MS. authority) 
and Wendland. Cope, whose Introduction to Aris- 
totle's Rhetoric contains a detailed analysis of the 
work and its language, and a full discussion of the 
question, supports Spengel's view, while admitting 
that " the evidence for the authorship of Anaximenes 
is not quite all that could be desired." His opinion 
of the work itself, which he says may be fairly called 
" An Art of Cheating," is in the highest degree un- 
favourable. 

Other views are : (1) That it is a genuine work of 
Aristotle. This is supported by the former Presi- 
dent of Corpus Christi College, Oxford.** (2) That 
it is a compilation by two, or even three hands, dating 

o Thomas Case (president 1904-1924), in his article 
" Aristotle " in the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica. 

XXV 



INTRODUCTION 

at the earliest from the first or second century a.d., 
and showing such numerous and striking resemblances 
to the Rhetoric of Aristotle that it must have been 
based upon it.'* (3) That it is a hodge-podge of very- 
much later date. Other critics, however, maintain 
that the author (or authors) was unacquainted with 
Aristotle's work, and that the resemblances between 
the two are not sufficiently strong to justify the 
theory of dependence. Further, the historical 
allusions in the Ad Alexandrum (regarded chronologic- 
ally) are taken to show that it preceded the Rhetoric 
of Aristotle, and was written about 340 b.c. There is 
nothing about the relations of Athens with Philip 
and Alexander, but the Athenian naval league, 
Sparta, and Thebes are often mentioned. The 
latest event referred to is the defeat of the Carthagin- 
ians in Sicily by Timoleon (343). The beginning of 
the treatise is first definitely spoken of by Syrianus 
(In Hermogenem Commentaria, 133. 9) a Neo-Platonist 
of the fifth century a.d.* 

Full information concerning the Mss. of our 
Rhetoric and other matters connected with the text 
and arrangement of the work is given by A. Roemer 
in his critical edition (Teubner Series, 1899)- The 
oldest and by far the best of the first-class mss. is 
the Paris A" of the eleventh century, which also 
contains the Poetics ; those of the second class are 
all inferior. Midway between the two in point of 

" Barthelemy St. Hilaire, who includes it in his translation 
of the works of Aristotle, with a Preface in which he supports 
the above view. 

* For another account of the work consult Brzoska's 
article Anaximenes in Panly-Wissowa, Real-Encyklopddie. 
To the Bibliography P. Wendland, Anaximenes von Lam- 
psakos, lOO.j, may be added. 



INTRODUCTION 

value is placed the old Latin translation by William 
of Moerbeke (thirteenth century), which, being ex- 
tremely literal, is frequently of considerable service 
in determining the text of the original ms. from 
which the translation was made. It is not, however, 
to be taken for granted that this vetusta translatio 
(Vet. Tr.) reproduces the text of only one ms. ; 
further, it may represent in places a marginal gloss 
or conjectural reading ; also, Moerbeke 's knowledge 
of Greek is said to have been very limited. The 
conclusion arrived at by Roemer (p. Ixix) is that the 
present text represents the fusion of two copies of 
unequal length, the shorter of which contains a 
number of haphazard insertions by the copyist from 
the longer recension or alterations of his own. The 
original text has perished. 

The genuineness of the whole of Book III., which 
originally may have been an independent supple- 
ment, has been disputed, but it is now generally 
recognized as Aristotle's. The numerous gaps, lack 
of connexion and arrangement " (a common feature, 
indeed, of all the Aristotelian writings), and textual 
errors have been attributed to the unsatisfactory 
manner in which the reports of three different lectures 
were made and put together by his pupils and to the 
lecturer's own faulty enunciation. 

The present text (which makes no pretence of 
being a critical one) is based upon that of Bekker 
(Oxford, 1837), but numerous alterations, suggested 
by Roemer and others, have been incorporated. 
Several of these are also mentioned in the Notes to 
the Translation. 

" Such as the position of ii. 18-26, which should properly 
come before 1-17. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY » 

General. — L. Spengel, Artium Scriptores, 1828 ; A. 
Westermann, Geschichte der Beredtsamkeit, 1883-35 ; E. 
Ilavet, Etude sur la Rhetorique d'Aristote, 1846; E. M. 
Cope in the Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, i., ii., 
iii., Cambridge, 1854, etc., and translation, with Intro- 
duction, of Plato's Gorgias, 1864 ; W. H. Thompson, 
editions of Plato's Fhaedrus, 1868, Gorgias, 1871 ; G. 
Perrot, L'Eloquence politique et judiciaire a Athbnes, pt. i. 
1873 ; A. S. Wilkins, Introduction to his edition of Cicero, 
De Oratore, 1879 ; Grote's Aristotle, 1880 ; J. E. Sandys, 
Introduction to his edition of Cicero, Orator, 1885, and 
History of Classical Scholarship, i. pp. 76-82, ed. 3, 1921 ; 
Grant's Ethics of Aristotle, i. 104-153 (1885) ; R. Volk- 
mann, Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Romer, ed. 2, 1885 ; 
F. Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit, ed. 2, 1887-98 ; E. 
Norden, Die antike Kunstprosa, 1898 ; R. C. Jebb, The 
Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus, 1893 ; Octave 
Navarre, Essai sur la rhetorique grecque avatit Aristote, 
Paris, 1900; W. Suess, Ethos. Studien zu der alten grie- 
chischen Rhetorik, 1910 ; T. Gomperz, Griechische Denker, 
Eng. trans., i. pp. 412-490, iv. pp. 435-460 (1901-1912) ; 
Aristotle, Politics, ed. W. L. Newman, 1887-1902 ; W. R. 
Roberts, The Literary Letters ofDionysius of Halicarnassus, 
1901, and On lAterary Composition, 1910, Demetrius, On 
Style, 1902, Longinus, On the Sublime, 1907 (text, Eng. 
trans., notes, and glossaries) ; Aristotle's Poetics, ed. 

" To most of the books here mentioned the translator, in 
one way or another, desires to acknowledge his obligations. 
He ought, perhaps, to mention that his translation was 
completed before he consulted tliose of Jebb and Weildon. 

xxvili 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

By water, 1909 ; Histories of Greek Literature : Muller 
and Donaldson, ii., 1858; M. Croiset, 1887-1899, abridged 
ed. (Eng. trans.), 1904 ; J. P. MahafFy, ed. 3, 1895 ; 
Gilbert Murray, 1897 ; W. Christ, ed. 6, 1912, i. pp. 541- 
607 ; numerous articles in German periodicals, the most 
im])ortant of Avhich are given by Roemer and Christ. In 
addition to the glossaries in W. R. Roberts' works, consult 
also J. C. G. Ernesti, Lexicon Technologiae Graecorum 
Rhetoricae, 1795, the only separate work of the kind ; 
Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, will also be found useful. 

Editions. — Text only : I. Bekker, Oxford, 1837 ; A. 
Roemer, ed. 2, 1898, with long critical Introduction and 
Notes, references to the source of quotations, and full 
Apparatus Criticus (see also Zur Kritik der lihetorik des 
A., an article by him in Rheinisches Museum, xxxix. 1884, 
pp. 491-510). With Notes: P. Victorius (Vittorio, 
Vettori), 1579 ; E. M. Cope, an exhaustive commentary 
in 3 vols., ed. J. E. Sandys, 1877. The last, together with 
Cope's Introduction to the Rhetoric of Aristotle, 1867, 
stands first and foremost (in fact, almost alone) as a help 
to the English reader of the original. It must be ad- 
mitted, however, that the diifuseness, lengthy parentheses, 
and wealth of detail sometimes make it difficult " to see 
the wood for the trees," while many of the purely gram- 
matical notes might have been shortened or omitted." 
Spengel's edition, 1867, with notes in Latin and containing 
William de Moerbeke's old translation, is strongest on 
the critical side and in illustrations from the ancient 
orators, but less helpful exegetically ; Variorum Edition, 
Oxford, 1820 (the name of Gaisford, the real editor, does 
not appear) ; F. J. Parsons, Oxford, 1836. 

Translations. — Barthelemy St. Ililaire (including 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum) in his translation of A.'s works ; 

" It may be noted that Prof. W. R. Roberts, of Leeds, well 
known for his work in kindred fields, in the Preface to his 
edition of the Literary Letters of Halicarnassus, promises a 
critical and annotated edition of the Rhetoric with notes. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

T. A. Buckley (including the Poetics), 1850 (Bohn's 
Classical Library) ; N. Bonafous, Paris, 1856 ; J. E. C. 
Welldon, 1886, with notes and full analysis ; R. C. Jebb 
(edited by J. E. Sandys with Introduction and additional 
notes), 1909. 

The following abbreviations have been used in the 

Notes : 

P.L.G. — T. Bergk, Poetae Lyrici Graeci, ii. (1915), iii. 
(1914)." T.G.F. — A. Nauck, Tragicorum Graecorum Frag- 
menta, 1889. C.A.F. — T. Kock, Comicorum Atticorum 
Fragmenta, 1880-88. 

° Reference should also be made to Lyra Graeca (J. M. 
Edmonds, 1922, in the Loeb Classical Library). 



ANALYSIS 

Book I 

(i) Rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic, which 
it resembles in being concerned with matters of 
common knowledge, and not with any special science. 
Rhetoric is also an art ; since it is possible to reduce 
to a system the means by which the rhetorician 
obtains success. Previous compilers of " Arts " of 
Rhetoric have neglected enthymemes, which are " the 
body " of proof, and have confined themselves to 
appeals to the passions, which are irrelevant and only 
have the effect of biasing the judge. 

Although deliberative oratory is nobler than foren- 
sic, men prefer the latter, because it offers more 
opportunity for irrelevance and chicanery. 

The rhetorical (as contrasted with the strictly 
scientific) method of demonstration is the enthy- 
meme, which is a kind of syllogism. Therefore one 
who is thoroughly acquainted with the nature of the 
logical syllogism will be most likely to prove a master 
of enthymemes. 

However, notwithstanding the unsatisfactory 
nature of previous " Arts," rhetoric is undoubtedly 
useful : (1) when truth and justice fail through in- 
efficient advocates, the skilled rhetorician will set 
this right ; (2) it enables a man to state his case in 

xxxi 



ANALYSIS 

popular, not in scientific language, which would be 
unintelligible to some of his hearers ; (3) it enables 
him to prove opposites, and to refute an opponent 
who makes an unfair use of arguments ; (4) it pro- 
vides an efficient defence. If it be objected that it 
does much harm when unfairly used, this applies to 
every good thing, except virtue, 

(ii) Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of 
discerning the possible means of persuasion in each 
particular case. These consist of proofs, which are 
(1) inartificial (see xv.) ; (2) artificial. The latter 
are of three kinds : (1) ethical, dei-ived from the 
moral character of the speaker ; (2) emotional, the 
object of which is to put the hearer into a certain 
frame of mind ; (3) logical, contained in the speech 
itself when a real or apparent truth is demonstrated. 
The orator must therefore be a competent judge of 
virtue and character ; he must have a thorough 
knowledge of the emotions (or passions) ; and lie must 
possess the power of reasoning. This being so, 
rhetoric must be considered as an offshoot of dialec- 
tic and of politics (including ethics). 

There are two kinds of logical proof: (1) deduc- 
tive — the enthymeme ; (2) inductive — the example. 
Enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism, example a 
rhetorical induction. 

Rhetoric does not consider what is probable for 
individuals, but for certain classes of individuals ; 
and derives its material from the usual subjects of 
deliberation, which are necessarily contingent, for 
no one deliberates about what is certain. Hence 
enthymeme and example are concerned with things 
which, generally speaking, admit of being otherwise 
than they are. 

xxxii 



ANALYSIS 

Enthym ernes arc formed from (1) probabilities ; 
(2) signs. Signs are of two kinds : (1) necessary 
(tekmeria) ; (2) unnecessaiy, which have no distinctive 
name, and are related (a) as particular to universal, 
(b) as universal to particular. The example defined. 
Enthymemes are of two kinds : those which are de- 
duced from (1) general truths, (2) special truths — 
from general or special " topics " or commonplaces. 

(iii) There are three kinds of rhetoric, correspond- 
ing to the three kinds of hearers ; for the hearer 
must be either (1) a judge of the future ; or (2) a 
judge of the past ; or (3) a mere " spectator " (critic) 
of the orator's skill. Hence the three kinds of rhe- 
toric are : (1) deliberative ; (2) forensic ; (3) epi- 
deictic, 

~The business of the deliberative kind is to exhort 
or dissuade, its time the future, its end the expedient 
or the harmful : of the forensic to accuse or defend, 
its time the past, its end the just or the unjust ; of 
the epideictic praise or blame, its time the present 
(sometimes the past or the future), its end the noble 
or the disgraceful. 

All orators must, in addition, have ready for use a 
stock of propositions relating to the possible and the 
impossible ; to the truth (or the contrary) of a past 
or a future fact ; to the great and small, and the 
greater and less. 

(iv) Deliberative oratory deals with contingent 
things, not with all, but only with such as are within 
our control ; that which necessarily happens, or 
cannot possibly happen, is not a subject for con- 
sideration. Its most important topics are : (1) ways 
and means ; (2) war and peace ; (3) defence of the 
country ; (4) imports and exports ; (5) legislation. 



ANALYSIS 

(v) The aim of all men is happiness, wliich is the 
subject of all exhortation and dissuasion. Definition 
of happiness. Its component parts are : noble birth ; 
many and good friends ; wealth ; the blessing of 
many and good children ; a good old age ; health ; 
beauty ; strength ; statui-e ; athletic skill ; a good 
reputation ; good fortune ; virtue. 

(vi) The special end of the deliberative orator 
is that which is expedient ; and since that which 
is expedient is a good, he must establish the 
general principles of the good and the expedient. 
Definition of the good. Indisputable and disputable 
goods. 

(vii) The greater and less degree of the expedient 
and the good. 

(viii) The deliberative orator must also be ac- 
quainted with the different forms of government : 
democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, the 
ends of which are freedom, wealth, education in 
accordance with the constitution. An unrestricted 
monarchy is called a tyranny, and its end is personal 
protection. 

(ix) Epideictic oratory deals with praise or censure, 
the objects of which are the noble and the disgraceful, 
virtue and vice. (In discussing these, incidentally 
the orator will be able to produce a certain impres- 
sion as to his own moral character, the ethical kind 
of proof mentioned in ii.) 

The component parts of virtue are : justice, 
courage, self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, 
liberality, mildness, wisdom (both practical and 
speculative). 

For purposes of praise or censure qualities which 
are closely akin may be regarded as identical. We 

xxxiv 



ANALYSIS 

should consider our audience, and praise that to 
which they attach special importance ; and also 
endeavour to show that one whom we praise has 
acted with deliberate moral purpose, even in the 
case of mere coincidences and accidents. 

Praise and encomium differ, in that the former com- 
mends the greatness of a virtue, while the latter is 
concerned with the things actually achieved. 

Amplification also should be frequently made use 
of, and the person whom it is desired to praise should 
be compared with men of renown, or at any rate with 
other men generally. Amplification is most suitable 
to epideictic oratory ; example to deliberative ; 
enthymeme to forensic. 

(x) Forensic oratory, which deals with accusation 
and defence, requires the consideration of (1) the 
motives of wrongdoing ; (2) the frame of mind of 
the wrongdoer ; (3) the kind of people to whom he 
does wrong. Wrongdoing is defined as voluntarily 
inflicting injury contrary to the law. A voluntary 
act is one committed with full knowledge and without 
compulsion, and as a rule with deliberate purpose. 
The causes of wrongdoing are depravity and lack of 
self-control. Its motives arise from human actions 
generally, which are voluntary or involuntary. There 
are four causes of voluntary action : habit, reason, 
anger, desire ; of involuntary action, three : chance, 
nature, compulsion. The motives of the first are 
the good or the apparently good, and the pleasant or 
the apparently pleasant. The good has been already 
discussed (vi.), so that it only remains to speak of 
the pleasant. 

(xi) Definition of the pleasant and a list of 
pleasant things. 

XXXV 



ANALYSIS 

(xii) The frame of mind of the wrongdoer, and the 
classes of people liable to suffer wrong. 

(xiii) Laws being special or general, so also are 
just and unjust acts, according as they affect the in- 
dividual or the community. Hence it is necessary 
to have an exact definition of acts of injustice, be- 
cause it often happens that a person, while admitting 
the commission of an act, will deny the description 
of it and its application. 

There are two kinds of rules in regard to just and 
unjust acts, written (prescribed by the laws) and un- 
written. The latter refer to the excess of virtue or 
vice, involving praise or disgrace, honour or dis- 
honour ; or they supply the omissions, voluntary or 
involuntary, in the written law. This supplementary 
justice is equity, defined as justice independent of 
the written law. " Equitable " acts are such as may 
be treated with leniency, and equity considers the 
intention or moral purpose of the agent rather than 
the act itself. 

(xiv) The degrees of wrongdoing. 

(xv) Inartificial proofs, which are specially adapted 
to forensic oratory, are five in number : laws, wit- 
nesses, contracts, torture, oaths. 



Book II 

(i) Since, in both deliberative and forensic oratory, 
it is a question of a decision being reached, the orator 
should consider, not only how to convince or persuade, 
but also how to create a certain impression of him- 
self, and to put the judge into a certain frame of 
xxxvi 



ANALYSIS 

mind. The former is more important in the assembly, 
the latter in the law courts. The three qualities 
necessary to enable the speaker to convince the 
audience of his trustworthiness are : practical tvisdom, 
virtue, and goodwill. How to obtain a reputation for 
wisdom and virtue will be clear from what has already 
been said concerning the virtues (i. 9) ; goodwill 
requires a knowledge of the emotions. Each of 
these falls under three heads : (1) the frame of mind 
which produces it ; (2) those who are the objects of 
it ; (3) the usual occasions of it. 

(ii) Anger and Slight. There are three kinds of 
the latter : contempt, spite, and insolence. The 
frame of mind in which, and towards whom, men feel 
anger. 

(iii) Mildness. The frame of mind and the situa- 
tions in which, and the persons towards whom, men 
feel mildness. 

(iv) Love or friendship. The persons for whom 
men feel friendship, and for what reason. Its 
opposite is hatred, the causes of which are anger, 
spite, and slander. Anger and hatred compared. 

(v) Fear. Things which are objects of fear, and 
the feelings of those affected by it. Its opposite is 
boldness or confidence. 

(vi) Shame and shamelessness. Persons in whose 
presence men feel shame, and the frame of mind in 
which they feel it. 

(vii) Favour or benevolence. The means of dis- 
posing the hearer favourably or the reverse in regard 
to acts of benevolence. 

(viii) Pity. Persons who are inclined to pity or 
the reverse. Things and persons that arouse pity. 
The difference between pity and horror. 



\ 



ANALYSIS 

(ix) The particular opposite of pity is virtuous in- 
dignation. Envy also is an opposite of pity, but in a 
different way, being a pain at the good fortune of 
others (not because they are undeserving of it) who 
are our likes and equals. Those who arouse virtuous 
indignation, those who are likely to feel it, and on 
what occasions. 

(x) Envy defined more at length. Persons who 
are liable to be the objects of envy, and the things 
which excite it. 

(xi) Emulation. How it differs from envy. 
Persons likely to feel it, and the things which arouse 
it. Its opposite is contempt. 

(xii) The characters of men must be considered 
with reference to their moral habits (i. 9) and their 
emotions (ii. 1), and their ages : youth, the prime of 
life, old age. Character of the young. 

(xiii) Character of the old. 

(xiv) Character of those in the prime of life. 

(xv-xvii) Character as affected by the goods of 
fortune, such as noble birth, wealth, power, and good 
fortune. 

(xviii, xix) The topics common to all three kinds 
of rhetoric are : (1) the possible and the impossible ; 
(2) whether a thing has happened or not ; (3) whether 
a thing will happen or not ; (4) greatness or small- 
ness, izicluding amplification and depreciation. 

(xx) The proofs common to all three kinds of 
rhetoric are : example and enthymeme (maxims being 
included under the latter). Examples are either (1) 
statements of things that have actually happened ; 
or (2) invented by the speaker, consisting of [a) com- 
parisons, (6) fables. 

(xxi) Maxims are general statements relating to 



ANALYSIS 

human actions, and teach what should be chosen 
or avoided. Maxims are the conchisions and 
premises of enthymemes, when the form of the 
syllogism is absent ; when the why and the wherefore 
are added, the result is a true enthymeme. The 
four kinds of maxims. Directions for their use. 

(xxii) Enthymemes must be neither too far- 
fetched nor too general ; they must not be drawn 
from all opinions, but from such as are defined (e.g. 
by the judges) : and conclusions must not be drawn 
only from necessary, but also from probable, pre- 
mises. The speaker must also be acquainted with 
the special elements of the case. Enthymemes are : 
(1) demonstrative, which draw a conclusion from 
acknowledged premises ; (2) refutative, which draw 
a conclusion which is not admitted by the opponent.. 

(xxiii) Twenty-eight topics or elements (for the 
two are identical) of demonstrative and refutative 
enthymemes. 

(xxiv) Ten topics of apparent enthymemes 
(fallacies). 

(xxv) Solution (refutation) of arguments may be 
effected by (1) counter-conclusions, (2) objections. 
The latter are obtained : (1) from the thing itself 
(the opponent's enthymeme) ; (2) from an opposite ; 
or (3) similar thing ; (4) from previous decisions of 
well-known persons. There are four sources of 
enthymemes : the probable ; the example ; the 
necessary, and the fallible, sign. As the probable is 
that which happens generally, but not always, an 
enthymeme from probabilities and examples may 
always be refuted by an objection, not always real 
but sometimes fallacious ; falhble signs also may be 
refuted, even if the facts are true (1. 2. 18). Infallible 



1 



ANALYSIS 

signs cannot be i-efuted, unless the premises can be 
shown to be ftilse. 

(xxvi) Amplification and depreciation are not 
topics of enthymemes, but are themselves enthy- 
memes, intended to show that a thing is great or 
small, Refutative and constructive enthymemes are 
of the same kind, for each infers the opposite of what 
has been demonstrated by another. An objection 
is not an enthymeme ; it consists in stating a gener- 
ally received opinion, from which it appears either 
that the argument is not strictly logical or that a 
false assumption has been made. 

Examples, enthymemes. and, generally speaking, 
everything connected with " the intellect " (Stai'ota), 
the inventive part of rhetoric (inventio), having been 
discussed, there only remain the questions of style 
and arrangement. 



Book III 

(i) St^. It is not sufficient to know what to say ; 
we must also know how to say it. Delivery (declama- 
tion, oratorical action) is cliiefly concerned with the 
management of the voice, and the employment of 
the tones and rhytluns. It has hitherto been 
neglected, and has not yet been reduced to a system. 

(ii) The two chief excellences of style are (1) 
clearness, (2) propriety. The first is attained by the 
use of terms in their proper sense ; the other terms 
enumerated in the Poetics (xxii.) contribute to eleva- 
tion and ornamentation. 

The language should have a " foreign " air, some- 
xl 



ANALYSIS 

thing removed from the commonplace. In prose — 
and indeed, in poetry also — the appearance of arti- 
ficiality must be concealed, and that of naturalness 
maintained. In prose the only terms suitable are 
those in general use and those used in their ordinary 
meaning ; also metaphors, for all use metaphors in 
ordinary conversation. They produce clearness and 
a " foreign " air. They should be proportional, and, 
if the object be adornment, taken from the better 
things in the same class, if censure, from the worse ; 
they should be euphonious ; not too far-fetched ; 
and taken from things beautiful to the ear or other 
senses. Epithets may be taken from the worse or 
from the better side. 

(iii) Frigidity of style is due to the use of (1) com- 
pound words ; (2) uncommon words ; (3) long, mis- 
placed, or heaped up epithets ; (4) unsuitable meta- 
phors — ridiculous, too pompous, or too tragic. 

(iv) Simile is metaphor enlarged by a particle 
of comparison prefixed. Simile is useful in prose, 
but must not be used too frequently, for this gives 
an air of poetry. 

(v) In regard to composition (as contrasted with 
the use of single words), the first consideration is 
purity ; which is obtained by (1) the proper use of 
connecting particles or of clauses ; (2) the use of 
special, not general terms ; (3) of unambiguous 
terms ; (4) correct use of genders ; and (5) of numbers. 

Written compositions should be easy to read and 
easy to utter ; they should neither contain too many 
connecting particles, nor be badly punctuated ; if 
there are two words referring to different senses, 
connecting them with a verb which denotes the 
operation of only one of these senses should be 

xli 



ANALYSIS 

avoided ; the meaning should be stated at the out- 
set, if a number of parentheses are to be inserted, 
otherwise obscurity results. 

(vi) To secure dignity of style, one should (1) use 
definitions instead of names, or vice versa for concise- 
ness ; (2) if there is anything indecent in the de- 
finition, use the name, and vice versa ; (3) illustrate 
by metaphors and epithets (but avoiding the poetical) ; 
(4) use the plural for the singular ; (5) avoid joining 
several terms with one article ; (6) use connecting 
particles or omit them for conciseness, but without 
destroying the connexion of ideas ; (7) amplify by 
using negative epithets to describe anything. 

(vii) Propriety oi ^ty\e consists, in its being emotional, 
ethical, and proportionate to the subject. The first 
creates a feeling of sympathy ; the second expresses 
character, because every condition of life and moral 
habit has a language appropriate to it ; the third is 
a caution against treating important subjects offhand 
or trivial matters in the grand style ; nor should 
voice and gesture agree too exactly, for then the 
artifice is obvious. Compound words, a fair number 
of epithets, and " foreign " words should only be 
used by one who is under the influence of passionate 
emotion. 

(viii) Prose should not be metrical, but must have 
rhythm. Metre distracts the liearer's attention, 
while the absence of rhythm creates unpleasantness 
and obscurity. The different kinds of rhythm are : 
the heroic, which is too dignified ; the iambic, which 
is too ordinary ; the trochaic, which is too like a 
comic dance ; and the paean, which is of two kinds, 
— one ( - y^^jJ) suitable to the beginning, the other 
(w ^ w - ) to the end of the sentence. 

xlii 



ANALYSIS 

(ix) Style must be (1) continuous or (2) periodic. 
The former is unpleasing, because it has no end in 
itself ; whereas in the latter the period has a begin- 
ning and end in itself and its length can be taken in 
at a glance, so that it is pleasant and easily imparts 
information. The period must end with the sense, 
and must not be cut off abruptly. Periods contain 
either several members (clauses) or one only (simple 
periods). But neither members nor periods must 
be too short or too prolix. The period of several 
members is (1) divided by disjunctives, or (2) anti- 
thetical ; in which there is a contrast of sense (there 
are also false antitheses). Parisosis is equality of 
members, Paromoiosis similarity of sound, either at 
the beginning, "■ or end (Homoeoteleuton) of the 
sentence. All three (or fom*) may occur in the same 
sentence. 

(x) Easy learning is naturally agreeable to all, 
and is the result of smartness of style and argument. 
Those arguments are most approved, which are 
neither superficial (obvious at once) nor difficult to 
understand, but are understood the moment they 
are uttered, or almost immediately afterwards. 
Smart sayings and arguments depend upon anti- 
thesis, metaphor, and actualization. Metaphors are 
of four kinds, the most approved being the propor- 
tional. 

(xi) Actualization (putting things before the eyes) 
consists in representing things in a state of activity 
{e.g. representing inanimate things as animate). It 
is produced by metaphors and similes, wliich must 
be taken from things that are familiar, but not 

" The technical term is Homoeokatarkton, not mentioned 
by Aristotle. 

xliii 



ANALYSIS 

obvious. Apophthegms, well-constructed riddles, 
paradoxes, jokes, play upon words, proverbs (which 
are metaphors from species to species) and hyperbole 
are also smart and pleasant. 

(xii) Each kind of rhetoric has its own special 
style. The written style is most refined ; the 
agonistic (that of debate) is best suited for declama- 
tion, and is ethical or emotional (pathetic). The 
deliberative style resembles a rough sketch ; the 
forensic is more finished ; the epideictic is best 
adapted for writing and, next to it, the forensic. 
Unnecessary classifications of style. This concludes 
the treatment of the subject of style. 

(xiii) Arrangement. There are two necessary 
parts of a speech : (1) stateynent of the case ; (2) 
proof. To these may be added exordium and epilogue. 
Further divisions are absurd ; even the epilogue is 
not always necessary. 

(xiv) Exordium is the beginning of a speech, re- 
sembling the prologue in poetry and the prelude in 
flute-playing. In an epideictic speech it resembles 
the musical prelude, and is connected with the body 
of the speech by the key-note ; it is derived from 
topics of praise or blame. In a forensic speech, it 
resembles the prologue of a play or epic poem ; 
hence it must declare the object of the speech. In 
a deliberative speech, the proems are derived from 
those of the forensic, but they are rarest in this kind 
of rhetoric (deliberative), being only needed (1) ori 
account of the speaker himself, or (2) of his op- 
ponents ; (3) to impress the hearer with the im- 
portance or otherwise of the case ; (4) for ornament. 

Other exordia are collective and general. They 
are derived (1) from the speaker, or (2) from the 

xliv 



ANALYSIS 

opponent ; (3) from the hearer, to make him well- 
disposed towards us or ill-disposed towards the op- 
ponent ; (4) from the subject, making it out to be 
important or unimportant. Arousing the hearer's 
attention belongs to any part of a speech. 

(xv) The topics that may be employed in dealing 
with slander or prejudice. 

(xvi) Narrative, in epideictic speeches should not 
be continuous, but disjointed. In forensic, it must 
make the subject clear, and the speaker should 
narrate what tends to show his own good character 
or the opposite in the adversary, or is agreeable to 
the judges. 

It is of less importance to the defendant, who 
should only give a summary of past events unless an 
account of them as actually taking place produces 
horror or pity. The narrative should also be ethical 
and show the moral purpose, and the various naoral 
traits that accompany each particular character. 
The speaker should also use emotional features. 

Narration finds least place in deliberative oratory. 

(xvii) Proof, in deliberative oratory, has reference 
to (1) the fact, (2) the harm done, (3) the degree 
of harm, (4) the justification. In epideictic oratory, 
where there is little dispute as to the fact, amplifica- 
tion is the chief means of proof. In deliberative 
oratory, we must contend that what is predicted by 
the adversary will not take place ; or, if it does, that 
it will be unjust or inexpedient, for which the re- 
sponsibility will rest with him ; or that it will be of 
less importance than he asserts. We must also look 
out for any false statement of his, for they are part 
of our proof. 

Examples are best suited to deliberative, enthy- 

xlv 



ANALYSIS 

memes to forensic oratory. Enthymemes should 
not be used in a series, nor on all subjects, nor to 
appeal to the emotions. Maxims may be used in 
both proof and narrative, for maxims are ethical. 

Deliberative oratory is harder than forensic, for it 
deals with the unknown future, while forensic deals 
with the past, and has law for a foundation ; nor does 
deliberative oratory offer so many opportunities for 
digression. If you have enthymemes, you should 
speak both ethically and demonstratively ; if not, 
only ethically. 

Refutative enthymemes are more highly thought 
of than demonstrative . In dealing with an adversary , 
the first speaker should give his proofs and anticipate 
the arguments of the other side ; the second speaker 
should attack the arguments of the first and draw 
counter-syllogisms . 

The character of the speaker, since statements 
may be made by him that are tactless, offensive, or too 
favourable to himself, is best conveyed by putting 
them into the mouth of some other person. 

Enthymemes may sometimes be stated in the form 
of maxims. 

(xviii) Interrogation and Ridicule. The first should 
be used when the adversary has already made an 
admission of such a kind that, when one more ques- 
tion is asked, the absurdity will be complete ; when 
your conclusion will be established by it ; when his 
arguments are shown to be self-contradictory or 
paradoxical ; when he is reduced to giving sophis- 
tical answers. An ambiguous question should be 
answered by a regular definition, not too concise ; 
by a direct answer before the adversary has finished ; 
and by adding the reason for our action at the con- 

xlvi 



ANALYSIS 

elusion. Ridicule is of some use in debate, but the 
jokes must be such as befit a gentleman. 

(xix) The peroration (epilogue) is composed of 
four elements : (1) making the hearer favourable 
to yourself and unfavourable to the adversary ; (2) 
amplification or depreciation ; (3) putting the hearer 
into an emotional frame of mind ; (4) recapitulation. 
The speaker must begin by asserting that he has done 
what he promised ; he must compare his arguments 
with those of the adversary, by irony or by interroga- 
tion. At the end of a speech connecting particles 
may be omitted, to show that it is not an oration, but 
a peroration. 



xlvii 



ARISTOTLE'S 
''ART" OF RHETORIC 



APISTOTEAOTS 
TEXNHS PHTOPIKHS 

A 

1354 a 1 1. 'H p7)TopLKi] icTLV avrLGTpo(f)OS rfj SiaAe/c- 
TLKrj' dfj,<f)6T€pai yap ncpi tolovtiov tlvcov elalv d 
KOLvd rpoTTOv rivd aTTavTOiV ecrrl yvcopi^eiv Kal 
ouSe/xia? imar'qiJirjS d(j)0)piup,€vr]£. 8to Kal Trdvrcs 
rpoTTOv TLvd fjierexovariv dfjicf)oiv TTOures yap fi^xpi- 
nvos Kal e^€rdl,eLV /cat vnex^iv Xoyov Kal dno- 

2 Aoyetcr^ai /cat KarrjyopeXv iyx^i^povcnv . tojv p.kv ovv 
TToX\ci)v ol fiev cIkt] ravra Spcoaiv, ol he hid avv- 
-qdeiav aTro e^eco?, €7ret 8' dfji(f)or€p(jos ivSexerai, 
BijXov on elrj dv avrd Kal oSoTTOtetv St' o yap 
eTTLTvyxdvovaLV ot re 8ta crwqdeLav Kal ol diro rav- 
ropbdrov, rrjv alriav OeoipeZv ivSex^raL, to 8e 
roLovrov -qhr] Trdvres dv op.oXoyqaaiev rexyr^g epyov 
elvai. 

3 Nvv p,ev ovv ot rds rexvag rwv Xoycov avvridivTeg 

dXiyov TTenopLKaaiv avrrjs poptov at ydp Trtcrret? 

^ These figures refer to the pages of Bekker's Berlin 
edition (1831). 

" Not an exact copy, but making a kind of pair with it, 
and corresponding to it as the antistrophe to the strophe in a 
choral ode. 
2 



ARISTOTLE'S 
"ART" OF RHETORIC 

BOOK I 

1 , Rhetoric is a counterpart ** of Dialectic ; for 
both have to do with matters that are in a manner 
within the cognizance of all men and not confined ^ 
to any special science. Hence all men in a manner 
have a share of both ; for all, up to a certain point, 
endeavour to criticize or uphold an argument, to 
defend themselves or to accuse. Now, the majority 
of people do this either at random or with a famili- 
arity arising from habit. But since both these 
ways are possible, it is clear that matters can be 
reduced to a system, for it is possible to examine 
the reason why some attain their end by familiarity 
and others by chance ; and such an examination all 
would at once admit to be the function of an art." 

Now, previous compilers of " Arts " ** of Rhetoric 
have provided us with only a small portion of this 
art, for proofs are the only things in it that come 

* Or " and they (Rhetoric and Dialectic) are not confined." 

* The special characteristic of an art is the discovery of a 
system or method, as distinguished from mere knack 
(ifxireipia), 

■* Manuals or handbooks treating of the rules of any art 
or science. 

3 



ARISTOTLE 

evTe^vov icrri fiovov, to. 8' aAAa TrpoadrJKaL, ol Se 
TTepl fJbev ivdvfxrjfidTCov ovSev Xeyovaiv, orrep iari 
(Tcofxa ryjs TTiarecos;, Trepl he rtov e^co rod Trpdy- 

4 fiaros rd TrXelara TTpaypLarevovTaf Sia^oXr] yap /cat 
eXeos /cat opyr] /cat rd roiavra Trddr] rrjs ^fjvxrjs ov 
TTepl rov TTpdyfjiaros eartv aAAa irpos rdv SiKaar')jv. 
oior el TTepl TTdcras "^v rds Kpiaeis KadaTTep ev 
evtats" re vvv earl rcov voXecov /cat fidXccrra rat? 

5 evvo[j,ovp,evai.s , ovSev dv el^ov d n Xeyojcnv aTravres 
ydp ol {Jiev o'lovrat helv ovrcu rovs vopiovs dyopeveiv , 
ol he /cat xpd>vraL /cat KcoXvovaiv e^co rov vpdy- 
fxaros Xeyeiv, KaOaTTep /cat iv 'Apeta» TTaycv, opdojs 
rovro vofxit^ovres' ov ydp Set rdv hiKaarrjv Sta- 
arpe^eiv els opyrjv TTpodyovras rj (f)ddvov 7] eXeov 
ofMOLOv ydp Kou e'i ns, a> /xe'AAet XPV^^^^ kovovl, 

6 rovrov TTon^aeie arpe^Xov. en he (fyavepov on rov 
fiev diJi(f)La^r]rovvros ovhev eanv e^o) rov Set^at to 
TTpdyfjua on eanv •^ ovk eanv -^ yeyovev -q ov 
yeyovev el he fieya t] fjuKpdv •») St/catot" •^ dhiKov, 
daa p^T) 6 vop.oderrjs hicopiKev, avrdv hn] ttov rdv 
hiKaarrjV Set yiyvwaKeiv /cat ov p,avddveLv napd 
rdJv dp,(f)ta^r)rovvra)v . 

7 MaAtcrra /xev ovv TTpoatJKei, rovg opdws Keifxevovs 
v6p,ovs, daa evhixerai, TTavra hiopit^etv avrovs, /cat 
on eXaxt-CTTa KaraXeiTTeiv cttI rolg Kpivovai, Trpdjrov 
fxev on eva Aa^eiv /cat dXlyovs paov t] ttoXXovs ev 

1354b <j)povovvras /cat hvvap,evovg vofioderelv /cat St/ca^etv 
CTret^' at /xer vop^odeaiai e/c ttoXXov ;)^/30vou OKe- 

" His functions were a combination of those of the modern 
judge and juryman. 

* That is, forbid speaking of matters that have nothing 
to do with the case. 
4 



RHETORIC, I. I. 3-7 

within the province of art ; everything else is merely 
an accessory. And yet they say nothing about 
enthymemes which are the body of proof, but chiefly 
devote their attention to matters outside the sub- 
ject ; for the arousing of prejudice, compassion, 
anger, and similar emotions has no connexion with 
the matter in hand, but is directed only to the 
dicast.** The result would be that, if all trials were 
now carried on as they are in some States, especially 
those that are well administered, there would be 
nothing left for the rhetorician to say. For all men 
either think that all the laws ought so to prescribe,'' 
or in fact carry out the principle and forbid speaking 
outside the subject, as in the court of Areopagus, 
and in this they are right. For it is wrong to warp 
the dicast's feelings, to arouse him to anger, jealousy, 
or compassion, which would be like making the rule 
crooked wliich one intended to use. Further, it is 
evident that the only business of the litigant is to 
prove that the fact in question is or is not so, that it 
has happened or not ; whether it is important or 
unimportant, just or unjust, in all cases in which the 
legislator has not laid down a ruling, is a matter for 
the dicast himself to decide ; it is not the business 
of the litigants to instruct him. 

First of all, therefore, it is proper that laws, 
properly enacted, should themselves define the issue 
of all cases as far as possible, and leave as little as 
possible to the discretion of the judges ; in the first 
place, because it is easier to find one or a few men 
of good sense, capable of framing laws and pro- 
nouncing judgements, than a large number ; secondly, 
legislation is the result of long consideration, whereas 



ARISTOTLE 

j/ra/xevcDV ytvovrai, al he Kpiaeis ef vrroyviov, ware 
XO-XeTTOv (XTToStSovat ro hiKaiov koX to avfxcjiepov 
KaXojs Toijs Kpivovr as. to he ttolvtcov fieyicrrov, 
oTi 7) fiev rov vofioderov Kplais ov Kara p,epos, 
aXXa TTepl jxeXXovrcov re /cat KadoXov eariv, 6 8' 
eKKXr}aLacrrr)s /cat hiKaarrjs rjhr] irepl irapovroiv 
/cat d(f)copiafj.evojv Kpivovaw Trpos ovs /cat ro (f)iXeZv 
7]hr) /cat ro fxiaetv /cat ro ihiov avp.(j)epov avvrjprrjrai 
TToAAa/cis", coare fjLTjKeri hvvaadat decopelv iKavaJs 
ro aXrjdes, dAA' eTTiaKoreZv rrj Kpiaei ro Ihiov r)hv 
•^ XvTTrjpov. 

8 Ilept p,ev ovv rcbv aXXojv, coairep Xeyofxev, Set (Ls 
eXaxioroiV TToieZv Kvpiov rov KpirrfV' rrepl he rod 
yeyovevai ^ [mtj yeyovevai, rj eaeadai Xj fxrj eaeadai, 
7) elvai 7] nr) etvat,, dvdyKrj eTTi rots Kpirals Kara- 
XeLTreiv ov yap hvvarov ravra rov voixoderrjv rrpo- 

9 iSetv. et hrj ravO^ ovrtos ^X^^> 4"^vep6v on rd e^co 
rod TTpay/xaros rexvoXoyovaiv oaoi rdXXa hiopi- 
L,ovaLV, otov ri heZ ro rrpooip.iov rj rrjv hLn^yrjatv 
e;\;€tv, /cat raJv dXXtov eKaarov p.opicov' ovhev yap ev 
avroZs dXXo Trpay/Marevovrai ttXtjv ottcjs rov Kpurrjv 
TTOLOV riva TTOcqaojaiv . Trepl he rdJv evre^voiv 
Tnarecov ovhev heiKviJovaiv rovro 8' ecmv, o9ev dv 
rLS yevoiro evdvfirjfxarLKos . 

10 Ata yap rovro rrjs avrrjs ovarjs fxedohov rrepl rd 
hrjfjbrjyopiKa Kal hiKavLKa, /cat KaAAtovo? /cat TroAt- 
rLKiorepas rrjs hrjfxrjyopLKrjs Trpayfjiareias ovarjs ^ 

" Systematic logical proofs (enthynieme, example), includ- 
ing testimony as to character and appeals to the emotions 
(2. 3), which the rhetorician has to invent {evpetf, inventio) 
for use in particular cases. They are contrasted with " in- 
artificial " proofs, which have nothing to do with the rules of 
the art, but are already in existence, and only need to be 
6 



RHETORIC, I. I. 7-10 

judgements are delivered on the spur of the moment, 
so that it is difficult for the judges properly to decide 
questions of justice or expediency. But what is 
most important of all is that the judgement of the 
legislator does not apply to a particular case, but is 
universal and applies to the future, whereas the 
member of the public assembly and the dicast have 
to decide present and definite issues, and in their 
case love, hate, or personal interest is often involved, 
so that they are no longer capable of discerning the ^ 
truth adequately, their judgement being obscured 
by their own pleasure or pain. . _ 

All other cases, as we have just said, should be 
left to the authority of the judge as seldom as 
possible, except where it is a question of a thing 
having happened or not, of its going to happen or 
not, of being or not being so ; this must be left to 
the discretion of the judges, for it is impossible for 
the legislator to foresee such questions. If this is 
so, it is obvious that all those who definitely lay 
down, for instance, what should be the contents of 
the exordium or the narrative, or of the other parts 
of the discourse, are bringing under the rules of art 
what is outside the subject ; for the only thing to 
which their attention is devoted is how to put the 
judge into a certain frame of mind. They give no 
account of the artificial proofs ,<* which make a man 
a master of rhetorical argument. 

Hence, although the method of deliberative and 
forensic Rhetoric is the same, and although the 
pursuit of the former is nobler and more worthy of 
a statesman than that of the latter, which is limited 

made use of. The former are dealt with in chs. iv.-xiv., the 
latter in ch. xv. of this book. 

7 



ARISTOTLE 

rrjs Trepl ra avvaXXdyfiara, irepl p.kv eKeivrjs ovSev 
Xeyovai, rrepl 8e rov hiKat^eaOai Travres Treipwvrai 
rexvoXoyetv , on rjrrov icm irpo epyov ra e^co rov 
TTpdyfiaros Xiyeiv iv roXs Sr]iJi7]yopiKOLs Kal -^rrov 
ecTTt KaKovpyov rj SrjfjLrjyopia SiKoXoytas, on Koivo- 
repov. ivravda fiev yap 6 KpLrrjs Trepl olKeioiv 
KpLvei, coar ovSev aAAo Set ttXtju (XTroSetfat ort, 
ouTcos €X€t, ws (fiTjaLV 6 af/x^o uAeuojv iv 8e rots 
8i,KaviKOLs ovx iKavov rovTo, dXXd irpo epyov ecerlv 
avaXa^elv rov aKpoarrjv Trepl dXXorpicov yap "fj 
KpiOLS, ware rrpos ro avroJv aKOTTOvfievoL Kal rrpos 
Xapi'V dKpocojjievoL StSoacri rot? a/x^tcr^TyrouCTtv, 

1355 a dAA' OV KplvOVGLV . StO /Cttt TToAAap^OU, OXTTTep Kal 

nporepov cIttov, 6 vofjbog KCoXvet Aeyetv e^co rov 
7Tpdyp,aros' €K€l S' avrol ol Kptral rovro rrjpovcriv 
LKavcos. 
11 'Evrei 8e ^avepov eanv on 'q fxev evre^yos 
fiedoSos 7T€pl rds rriareis iarlv, rj Se Trians dno- 
Set^tV Tt? {rore yap 7narevop,€v p.dXi,ara orav drro- 
SeSelxdaL VTToXd^copiev) , ean 8' arroSeil'ts" prfropiKr^ 
evdvp.rjp,a, Kal ean rovro d)s elrrelv aTrXcos Kvpio)- 
rarov rcov Triarecov, ro 8' evdvjjbrjpia avXXoyiafMos 
ns, TTepl he avXXoyLap.ov opbotws aTravrog rrjg 
SiaXeKrLKrjs iarlv ISelv, 7] avrrjs oXrjg t] p,epovg 
nvog, bijXov 8' on 6 fidXiara rovro Svvdp,evos 



" KOLvbrtpov : or, " more intelligible to the ordinary man." 

'' The case as a rule being a matter of personal indifference, 
the judges are likely to be led away by the arguments which 
seem most plausible. 

" Exact scientific proof {airb5ei^i%), which probable proof 
(Triarij) only to a certain extent resembles. 

•^ Dialectic here apparently includes logic generally, the 

8 



RHETORIC, I. I. 10-11 

to transactions between private citizens, they say 
nothing about the former, but without exception 
endeavour to bring forensic speaking under the rules 
of art. The reason of this is that in public speaking 
it is less worth while to talk of what is outside the 
subject, and that deliberative oratory lends itself to 
trickery less than forensic, because it is of more 
general interest." For in the assembly the judges 
decide upon their own affairs, so that the only thing 
necessary is to prove the truth of the statement of 
one who recommends a measure, but in the law 
courts this is not sufficient ; there it is useful to win 
over the hearers, for the decision concerns other 
interests than those of the judges, who, having only 
themselves to consider and listening merely for their 
own pleasure, surrender to the pleaders but do not 
give a real decision.^ That is why, as I have said 
before, in many places the law prohibits speaking 
outside the subject in the law courts, whereas in the 
assembly the judges themselves take adequate pre- 
cautions against this. 

It is obvious, therefore, that a system arranged 
according to the rules of art is only concerned with 
proofs ; that proof is a sort of demonstration,'' since 
we are most strongly convinced when we suppose 
anything to have been demonstrated ; that rhetorical 
demonstration is an enthymeme, which, generally 
speaking, is the strongest of rhetorical proofs ; and ^ 
lastly, that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism. 
Now, as it is the function of Dialectic as a whole, or 
of one of its parts ,^ to consider every kind of syllogism 
in a similar manner, it is clear that he who is most 

"part" being either the Analytica Priora, which deals 
with the syllogism, or the Sophistici Elenchi, on Fallacies. 

9 



ARISTOTLE 

deojpelv, €K TLvojv Kal ttcus" ytverat auAAoytCT/xos", 
ovTos /cat evOvfirjixarLKos av eirj fxaXiara, vpoa- 
Xa^cbv TTcpl TToZa, t' earl ra ivdv[jbij[jiara /cat rlvas 
kx^i SLa(f)opas irpos tovs XoyiKovs avWoyiajxovs' 
ro re yap aX'qdes /cat to ofMotov ra> dXiqde'i rrjs 
avrrjs iari Swa/xecu? tSetv, d/xa 8e /cat ot dvOpcoiTOL 
TTpos ro aXriOe? Tre^vKaaiv LKavdjs Kal ra TrXeioi 
rvyxoLVOVcTL rrjs dXrjOeias' 8l6 TTpos rd eVSo^a crro- 
XO-crriKcos ex^LV rod ofxolcos exovros Kal Trpos rrjv 
dXi^deidv ianv. 

"Ort fiev oSv rd e^co rov Trpdyfjuaros ot aAAot 
rexvoXoyovai,, Kal Stort fJuaXXov dTTOvevevKaoL Trpos 
12 TO 8t/coAoyetv, (j>avep6v' p^pTyat/xo? 8' iarlv 7] p7]ro- 
pLKTj 8ta re ro (jivaei elvai Kpetrrco rdXrjOrj Kal 
rd 8t/cata rcou evavrioiv, ware edv jx'q Kard ro 
TTpoarJKOv at KpiaeLS yiyviovrai, dvdyKrj St' avrwv 
r]rrda6aL' rovro 8' iarlv d^iov eTnrtfMijaeajs . en 
8e npos eviovs oyS' et rriv dKpt^eardrrjv exoLfiev 
eTnarr^fxrjv, pdSiov (ztt' eKeivqs TreZaai Xeyovras' 
SiSaaKaXias yap eariv 6 Kard rrjv eTnar'qp,r]v Xoyos, 
rovro 8e dSvvarov, dXX* dvdyKr] 8ta ra)v kolvojv 
TTOieZadai rds Triareis /cat rovs Xoyovs, coaTrep Kal 
ev rols roTTLKols eXeyofiev rrepl rrjs Trpos rovs ttoX- 
Xovs evrev^eojs ' ere 8e rdvavria Set Svvaadai 
TTeiOeiVy Kaddrrep Kal ev rols avXXoy La fio is , ovx 
OTTios dp,^6repa Trpdrrcjo/jLev {ov ydp Set rd (f)avXa 

" ?;'5o|a, " resting on opinion " ; defined in the Topics 
(i. 1) as " things generally admitted by all, or by most 
men, or by the wise, and by all or most of these, or by the 
most notable and esteemed." 

* Stort either=STi, '* that " ; or, (it is clear) " why." 
« Almost equivalent to demonstration or strictly logical 
proof. 

10 



RHETORIC, I. I. 11-12 

capable of examining the matter and forms of a 
syllogism will be in the highest degree a master of 
rhetorical argument, if to this he adds a knowledge 
of the subj ects with which enthymemes deal and the 
differences between them and logical syllogisms. 
For, in fact, the true and that which resembles it 
come under the purview of the same faculty, and at 
the same time men have a sufficient natural capacity 
for the truth and indeed in most cases attain to it ; 
wherefore one who divines well in regard to the 
truth will also be able to divine well in regard to 
probabilities.* 

It is clear, then, that all other rhetoricians bring 
under the rules of art what is outside the subject, 
and * have rather inclined to the forensic branch of 
oratory. Nevertheless, Rhetoric is useful, because 
the true and the just are naturally superior to their 
opposites, so that, if decisions are improperly made, 
they must owe their defeat to their own advocates ; 
which is reprehensible. Further, in dealing with 
certain persons, even if we possessed the most 
accurate scientific knowledge, we should not find it 
easy to persuade them by the employment of such 
knowledge. For scientific discourse is concerned 
with instruction,*' but in the case of such persons 
instruction is impossible ; our proofs and arguments 
must rest on generally accepted principles, as we 
said in the Topics,^ when speaking of converse with 
the multitude. Further, the orator should be able 
to prove opposites, as in logical arguments ; not 
that we should do both (for one ought not to persuade 
people to do what is wrong), but that the real state 

^ i. 2. The Topics is a treatise in eight books on Dialectic 
and drawing conclusions from probabilities. 

11 



ARISTOTLE 

TTCiOeLv) aAA' tva n'qre Xavddvrj ttcos ^X^''> '^'^'' ottcos 
aXXov ;!^pcu/xeVou rols Aoyots" {J'r) SiKataJS avrol Xveiv 
exojfji'^v. Twv fxev ovv dXXojv re-xycx)v oi58e/xta rd- 
vavria avXXoyil,erai, rj Se SiaXeKrtKrj /cat r} p-qropiKr] 
[jLovaL rovTO ttolovolv ofMOLOJS yap elatv dpi(l>6repaL 
Tcov ivavTLWV, rd fxevrot, VTroKetfieva Trpay/xara 
ovx opLOLWS ^X^''> ^'^ ^^^ raAT^or) Kai ra peArLCO rj] 
(f>va€i, evavXXoyLarorepa koL TTidavcLrepa ws aTrXdjs 
eLTTeXv. Tvpos Se tovtols droTTOV, et rep aMpLart 
p,€V alaxpov pLTj Svvaadai ^orjdeiv eavrw, Xoyip 8' 
1355 b ovK alaxpov o pidXXov tSiov ecrnv dvdpcoTTOV rrjs rov 

13 acopuaTos p^peiaj. el S' ort pieydXa ^Xdipeiev dv 6 
Xpd)pt,€Vos dSiKCDS rfj roiavrrj SwdpueL rajv Xoytov, 
TOVTo ye KOLVov ear I Kara rravroiv tcov ayaddjv 
TrXrjv dperrjs, /cat pidXiara Kard rcvv xp'^^^^h'^^'^droiv , 
olov laxvos yyteta? TrXovrov arparrjyia^' rovroL? 
ydp dv Tis" (I)(f>eXrja€L€ rd pbeycara ;^pa>/x.evos" St/caicu? 
/cat ^Xdipetev aSt/cco?. 

14 "On piev ovv ovk eartv ovre ivos rivog yevov? 
d(f)(DpLapievov rj piqropiKri, dXXd Kaddnep r) Sta- 
Ae/CTt/C7y, /cat ort p^pT^crtjLtos', (f)avep6v, /cat oti ov 
ro TTelaai epyov avrrjs, aAAa to tSetv rd tnrapxovra 
TTidavd rrepl eKaarov, KaOdirep /cat iv rats a'AAats- 
rexvais vdaats' ovSe ydp larpiKTJs ro vyid 7Toi.rjaat, 
aAAa P'^xp^ ov ivSexerai, p-^xpi' rovrov Trpoayayeiv 
eWt ydp Kal rovs dhvvdrovs pieraXa^elv uyteta? 
op-cos OepaTTevaat, KaXcos. Trpos Se TOUTot? oTt rrjs 
avrrjs ro re mdavov /cat ro (f)aiv6p,evov ISelv TTidavov, 
warrep /cat eVt rfjs BiaXeKrLKrjs avXXoyiapiov re /cat 
(f)aLv6p,evov avXXoyiapiov . 6 ydp ao(fiiariKos ovk 

" The early sophistical definition was " the art of per- 
suasion." 

12 



RHETORIC, I. I. 12-14 

of the case may not escape us, and that we ourselves 
may be able to counteract false arguments, if another 
makes an unfair use of them. Rhetoric and Dialectic 
alone of all the arts prove opposites ; for both are 
equally concerned with them. However, it is not 
the same wdth the subject matter, but, generally 
speaking, that which is true and better is naturally 
always easier to prove and more likely to persuade. 
Besides, it would be absurd if it were considered 
disgraceful not to be able to defend oneself with the 
help of the body, but not disgraceful as far as speech 
is concerned, whose use is more characteristic of man 
than that of the body. If it is argued that one 
who makes an unfair use of such faculty of speech 
may do a great deal of harm, this objection applies 
equally to all good things except virtue, and above 
all to those things which are most useful, such as 
strength, health, wealth, generalship ; for as these, 
rightly used, nxay be of the greatest benefit, so, J 
wrongly used, they may do an equal amount of harm. ^ 
It is thus evident that Rhetoric does not deal with I 
any one definite class of subjects, but, like Dialectic, 
[is of general application] ; also, that it is useful ; 
and further, that its function is not so much to 
persuade, as to find out in each case the existing 
means of persuasion." The same holds good in re- 
spect to all the other arts. For instance, it is not 
the function of medicine to restore a patient to 
health, but only to promote this end as far as possible ; 
for even those whose recovery is impossible may be 
properly treated. It is further evident that it belongs 
to Rhetoric to discover the real and apparent means 
of persuasion, just as it belongs to Dialectic to dis- 
cover the real and apparent syllogism. For what 



ARISTOTLE 

€U rfj hvvafiet dX\ iv rfj TrpoacpeaeL' vXrjv ivravOa 
fiev eWat o fiev Kara rrjv iTnarrniiqv 6 he Kara ttjv 
irpoaipeatv pryrixip, e/cet 8e cro(f)iar'r]s p^^v Kara rrjv 
Trpoaipcacv, StaAe/crt/co? Se ov Kara rrjv vpoaipecrLV 
dXXa Kara rrjv Bvvap.LV. 

Ilepl 8e avrrjs rjht] rfjs p^edoBov TreipcLpbeOa Xeyew, 
TTCtJ? re Kal eK rivtov Swrjaop^eda rvyxoivetv rcov 
TrpOK€ip,€VO)v. TToKiv ovv olov i^ VTrap)(rjs opiad- 
p.€VOL avrrjv ris ean, Xeycop,€v rd XocTrd. 

2. "Ecrrct) Brj p-qropiKr] Bvvap,LS rrepl CKaarov rov 
decoprjaai ro ivSexop.evov mdavov. rovro yap 
ovBep^ids irepag earl rexvrjs epyov rcov ydp dXXojv 
eKaarri rrepl ro avrfj V7TOK€lp,€v6v iari SiBaaKaXiKyj 
Kal TTeLariK-q, olov larpLKrj rrepl vyteLvov Kal vocrcpov 
Kal yeoop^erpia irepl rd avpi^e^rjKora rrddr] rocs 
pbcyedeai, Kal dpi6p,rjriKr] irepl dpidp,6v, 6p,ol,a)s Be 
Kal at Aoivrat rwv re)(vdjv Kal eTnarrjpicov rj Be 
prjropiKrj rrepl rov Bodevros cos elireZv BoKel Bvvaadai 
decopelv ro Tndavov. 8 to /cat (f)ap,ev avrrjv ov rrepi 
n yevos lBlov d(f)a)pLap,evov ex^iv ro rexviKov. 
2 Toiv Be rriarecjv at p,ev drexyoi elaiv at S' evrexvoi. 
drexvo. Be Xeyco daa p,7] 8t' 'qp,d>v ireTTopiarai dXXd 
TTpovTTTJpx^v, olov p,dprvpes ^daavot avyypa(f>al Kal 
oaa roiavra, evrexyo- Be ocra 8ta rrjs p.ed6Bov Kal Bi 
rjpbdjv KaracrKevaadrjvat Bvvarov. axxre Set rovra)v 
rots' piev ;^/37^o-aa^at rd Be evpeZv. 

" The essence of sophistry consists in the moral purpose, 
the deliberate use of fallacious arguments. In Dialectic, 
the dialectician has the power or faculty of making use of 
them when he pleases ; when he does so deliberately, he is 
called a sophist. In Rhetoric, this distinction does not exists 
he who uses sound arguments as well as he who uses false 
ones, are both known as rhetoricians. 

14 



RHETORIC, I. I. 14—11. 2 

makes the sophist is not the faculty but the moral 
purpose. But there is a difference : in Rhetoric, one 
who acts in accordance with sound argument, and 
' one who acts in accordance with moral purpose, are 
both called rhetoricians ; but in Dialectic it is the 
moral purpose that makes the sophist, the dialec- 
tician being one whose arguments rest, not on moral 
purpose but on the faculty." 

Let us now endeavour to treat of the method 
itself, to see how and by what means we shall be 
able to attain our objects. And so let us as it were 
start again, and having defined Rhetoric anew, pass 
on to the remainder of the subject. 

2. Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of 
discovering the possible means of persuasion in 
reference to any subject whatever. This is the 
function of no other of the arts, each of which is 
able to instruct and persuade in its own special 
subject ; thus, medicine deals with health and sick- 
ness, geometry with the properties of magnitudes, 
arithmetic with number, and similarly with all the 
other arts and sciences. But Rhetoric, so to say, 
appears to be able to discover the means of per- 
suasion in reference to any given subject. That is 
why we say that as an art its rules are not applied 
to any particular definite class of things. ^^-- 

As for proofs, some are artificial, others inartificial. | 
By the latter I understand all those which have not \}3J^\ 
been furnished by ourselves but were already in ex- ( ' Q}t^\ 
istence, such as witnesses, tortures, contracts, and \ c "^ 
the like ; by the former, all that can be constructed \ 

by system and by our own efforts. Thus we have 
only to make use of the latter, whereas we must 
invent the farmer. 

15 



ARISTOTLE 

3 Tctiv 8e 8ta rov Xoyov TTopil^ofievajv TTLcrreojv rpia 
^ etory ecTTtt'' at /xei^ yap €lc7lv ev rco rjUei rov Aeyovrog, 

at Se ev rai rov OLKpoarrjv biaOetvai ttcos, at Se ev, 
arJro) to) Adyoj, Sta rov SeiKVVvat rj (f>al.veadaL 
BeiKvvpat. 

4 Ata fjiev ovv rov 7]dovs, orav ovrco X^x^V ° ^oyos 
ware a^ioinarov TTOirjaaL rov Xeyovra' rots yo.p 
eTTLeLKeai Tnarevofiev fxdXXov /cat ddrrov, irepl 
TTOvrcjov fj,€v drrXajs, ev ols §e ro a/cptjSes" /xry iariv 
dXXd ro dii<j)iho^eZv , Koi rravreXcos. Set 8e /cat 
rovro (jvfjb^aLveiv Sid rov Xoyov, aAAa p.r} Sid ro 
TTpoheho^dadai ttolov riva etvai rov Xeyovra- ov 
ydp oiairep eVtot rwv rexvoXoyovvrcov rideaatv iv 
ri] Tcxyr) /cat rrjv eTTtet/cetav rov Xeyovro? cos ovSev 
avfA^aXXofJievrjv Trpos ro TTidavov, dXXd a^eSdv cos 

5 eL7T€LV KvpLOjrdrr)v e^ei iriarLV ro rjdos. Bid Se 
rwv aKpoarcov, orav els nddos vrro rov Xoyov rrpo- 
axOcoaLV ov ydp ofMolcos aTToStSo/xcv rds Kpiaeis Xv- 
TTOV/Jievoi /cat ;)^at/90i/Te? ■^ (f>iXovvres Kal /xiaovvres' 
TTpos o Kal fMovov TTeipdadai (f}aixev TTpayfjuareveadac 
rovs vvv rexyoXoyovvras . {jrepi /xev ovv roiJTCov 
B-qXcody^aeraL /ca0' eKaarov, orav rrepl rtov TraOcbv 

6 Xeycofiev) Bid Be rcov Xoycov marevovaiv , orav 
dXrjdes rj (f>aLv6fX€vov Bel^cofxev e/c rcov Trepl eKaarra 
TTidavcov . 

7 'Erret 8' at Triarets Bid rovrcov elai, (f>avepdv on 
ravras iorri Xa^elv rod crvXXoyicraad at Bvvafxevov 
Kal rov decoprjaat irepl ra 'qdrj Kal ras dperas Kal 
16 



RHETORIC, I. II. 3-7 

Now the proofs furnished by the speech are of three^ 
kinds. The first depends upon the moral character '■ 
of the speaker, the second upon putting the hearer 
into a certain frame of mind, the third upon the 
speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove. 

The orator persuades by moral character when his 
speech is delivered in such a manner as to render 
him worthy of confidence ; for we feel confidence in 
a greater degree and more readily in persons of 
worth in regard to everything in general, but where 
there is no certainty and there is room for doubt, 
our confidence is absolute. But this confidence must 
be due to the speech itself, not to any preconceived 
idea of the speaker's character ; for it is not the 
case, as some writers of rhetorical treatises lay down 
in their " Art," that the worth of the orator in no 
way contributes to his powers of persuasion ; on the 
contrary, moral character, so to say, constitutes the 
most effective means of proof. The orator persuades f 
by means of his hearers, when they are roused to 
emotion by his speech ; for the judgements we 
deUver are not the same when we are influenced by 
joy or sorrow, love or hate ; and it is to this alone 
that, as we have said, the present-day writers of 
treatises endeavour to devote their attention. (We 
will discuss these matters in detail when we come to 
speak of the emotions.) Lastly, persuasion is pro- 
duced by the speech itself, when we establish the 
true or apparently true from the means of persuasion 
applicable to each individual subject. 

Now, since proofs are effected by these means, it 
is evident that, to be able to grasp them, a man 
must be capable of logical reasoning, of studying 
characters and the virtues, and thirdly the emotions 

c 17 



ARISTOTLE 

rpirov rod Trepl ra ttolOt], tl re eKaarov eari tcov 
Tradcov /cat ttoIov ri, Koi ck rivojv eyytVerat kol 7tu>s. 
cooTe (7V[jt,^aLV€L rrjv prjTopiKrjv olov Trapa(f)V€s tl 
TTJs StaAe/CTi/CT^S" etvat /cat rrjs Trepl ra 'qdrj irpay- 
fiareias, rjv St/catov eart Trpoaayopeveiv TToXiTLKr^v . 

8t6 /cat VTTohveT(XL VTTO TO OX^jp-O. TO Trjs TToXtTLKTJS Tj 

pr^ropiKrj /cat ot avTL7TOLovp,evot ravTiqs Ta pev 8t' 
drraiSevaLav ra 8e St' dAa^ovetav to. Be /cat St' aAAaj 
aiTias avOpcoTTLKOLS' ecrrt yap p,6pi,6v ri t7]s StaAe/c- 
TiKTJs Kal 6p,OLCop,a, Kadarrep /cat dpxop^evoi eL7Top,ev 
TTepl ovhcvos yap (hpiapevov ovSeTcpa avTcov ecrTLv 
eTnaTrjp-Y], ttojs ^X^^> dXXd Svvdp,eLS Tives tov 
TTopiaai Xoyovs. Trepl pev ovv rrjs Svvdpea>s avrcvv, 
Kal TTCos exovai Trpos aAATyAay, eiprjrat, axehov 
iKavcos . 
8 Tcov Se Sia tov Set/cvwai rj <j)aiveadai heiKvvvai, 
KadaTTep Kal ev rot? StaAe/CTt/cot? to p,€v eTraycoyrj 
1356 b ecrrt to Se avXXoycap^os to Se (f)aLv6p,evos crvAAoyt- 
ap.6s, /cat evravQa o/xoto)? e;)^€t' eWt yap to p.ev 
TTapdSeiypa eTTayoiyr\, to 8' €vdvp,rjpa avX\oyi(jp.6s , 
\t6 Se <f)aLv6p.evov evdvp.7]p,a (j>aLv6p,evos avXXoyt- 
CT/Lios"].^ KaAcD S' €v6vp,r)p,a pev prjTopiKov crvX- 
Xoyiapuov, TrapdSeiypia Se eTraycoyriv pif]TopiKrjv. 
TrdvTes Se Tas TTLcrreis TroiovvTai Sta tov SecKvvvaL 
•^ TTapaSeiypiaTa XeyovTes t] evdvp,i]p.aTa, Kal Trapd 
ravra ovSev ttws' (Zgt' e'tTrep Kal oXais avayKT] iy 

^ Inserted by Spengel from Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
(first letter to Animaeus, vi.). 

" Rhetoric, as dealing with human actions, characters, 
virtues, and emotions, is closely connected with Politics, 
which includes Ethics. The two latter treat of the same 
subject from a different point of view. Both deal with 
happiness and virtue, but the object of Politics is, by com- 

18 



RHETORIC, I. 11. 7-8 

— the nature and character of each, its origin, and 
the manner in which it is produced. Thus it appears 
that Rhetoric is as it were an offshoot of Dialectic 
and of the science of Ethics, which may be reasonably 
called Politics.'* That is why Rhetoric assumes ^ the 
character of Politics, and those who claim to possess 
it, partly from ignorance, partly from boastfulness, 
and partly from other human weaknesses, do the 
same. For, as we said at the outset, Rhetoric is a 
sort of division or likeness of Dialectic, since neither 
of them is a science that deals with the nature of 
any definite subject, but they are merely faculties 
of furnishing arguments. We have now said nearly 
enough about the faculties of these arts and their 
mutual relations. 

But for purposes of demonstration, real or apparent, 
just as Dialectic possesses two modes of argimtient, 
induction and the syllogism, real or apparent, the 
same is the case in Rhetoric ; for the example is 
induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, and the 
apparent enthymeme an apparent syllogism. Ac- 
cordingly I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, 
and an example rhetorical induction. Now all 
orators produce belief by employing as proofs either 
examples or enthymemes and nothing else ; so that 
if, generally speaking, it is necessary to prove any 

parison of the different forms of States to find the one in 
which man will be most virtuous. Lastly, Rhetoric, as an 
important factor in the training: and education of the individual 
citizen and of the members of the State as a whole, may be 
described as an offshoot of Politics, with which the sophistical 
rhetoricians identified it. For the relation of Rhetoric to 
Dialectic see Glossary. 

'' Or, "slips into the garb of" (Jebb). Probably a stage 
metaphor. 

19 



ARISTOTLE 

cruXXoyi^ofievov rj eTrdyovra Seitcwvai otlovv {brjXov 
8' rjiJLLV Tovro ck t&v avaXvTLKcJov) , dvayKoiov 
cKarepov avraJv e/carepoj rovr ojv to avTo etvai,. 
9 Tt? S' earl hiaSopd TrapaScLyfiaros Kal evdvp^iq- 
[xarog, ^avepov €K tojv tottlkwv e/cet ydp irepl 
avXXoyiafMov Kal iTraycoyfjs eiprjTai rrporepov, ore 
ro fxev TO eirl ttoXXiov koL ofMOLCOv SeiKvvadai on 
ovTcos €X€L €.KeZ p.kv eTTaycoyrj ecrrti/ ivTavOa 8e 
TTapaSetyfia, to §e tlvcov ovtcov eTepov tl 8ia raura 
avpi^aiveLv Trapd raura roi raura etvai, rj KadoXov t] 
(vs €7TL TO TToXv, eKel fj.€v avXXoyiafJbos ivravda 8e 
€vdvp.rjiMa KoXeiTai. 

10 (^avepov 8' otl koI eKO/repov €)(€i dyadov to efSos" 
TTJs prjTopiKTjs' Kaddrrep ydp Kal ev tols ixeOoSiKois 
etpr^Tai, Kal iv tovtols ofxotcog ep^et • etcrt yap at fiev 
TTapaSeLyfiaTwSeLs prjTopetai at 8e ivdvfirjfiaTiKat,, 
Kal prjTopes o/xolcos ol p,€v TrapaSeiyfjiaTcoSeLS ol 8e 

iv6vfJL7]p,aTLKOL. TTldaVol fieV OVV OVX rJTTOV ol 

XoyoL ol Sid Tcbv TTapaheiypidTayVy Oopv^ovvTai 8e 

11 p^dXXov ol ivdvfXTjfxaTLKot . TTjv 8' aiTiav avTcbv, Kal 
TTws CKaTepo) XPV^'^^^^> ^povfiev vcnepov vvv 8e 
TTepl avT(x>v TOVTCOV pidXXov hiopiaoipiev Kadapcbs- 

*E7ret yap to Tndavov tlvI indavov icm, Kal to 



" Anal. Priora, ii. 23 ; Anal. Posteriora, i. 1. 

* That is, enthymeme and example must be the same as 
syllogism and induction. 

' From the definitions of syllogism (i. 1) and induction 
(i. 12). No particular passage, however, explains the 
diiference here mentioned. 

■* The employment of syllogism and induction, t6 eI5oy 
TTJs prjTopiKTjs being taken as simply = i) prjTopiKr). Another 
rendering is : " that each kind of Rhetoric (that which de- 
20 



RHETORIC, I. II. 8-11 

fact whatever either by syllogism or by induction — 
and that this is so is clear from the Analytics "* — each 
of the two former must be identical with each of the 
two latter.^ The difference between example and 
enthymeme is evident from the Topics," where, in 
discussing syllogism and induction, it has previously 
been said that the proof from a nunaber of particular 
cases that such is the rule, is called in Dialectic 
induction, in Rhetoric example ; but when, certain 
things being posited, something different results by 
reason of them, alongside of them, from their being 
true, either universally or in most cases, such a 
conclusion in Dialectic is called a syllogism, in 'r 
Rhetoric an enthymeme. ^ 

It is evident that Rhetoric enjoys both these ad- 
vantages ^ — for what has been said in the Methodica " 
holds good also in tliis case — for rhetorical speeches 
are sometimes characterized by examples and some- 
times by enthynaemes, and orators themselves may 
be similarly distinguished by their fondness for one 
or the other. Now arguments that depend on exr / 
amples are not less calculated to persuade, but those 
which depend upon enthymemes meet with greater 
approval. Their origin and the way in which each 
should be used will be discussed later f ; for the 
moment let us define more clearly these proofs 
themselves. 

Now, that which is persuasive is persuasive in 

pends upon example or upon enthymeme) enjoys some 
special advantage." 

* A lost treatise, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius in his 
Life of Aristotle, xxiv., and by Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
in the first letter to Ammaeus, vi. It is supposed to have 
dealt with some branch of Logic. 

' ii. 20-24. 

21 



ARISTOTLE 

jxev evdvs VTrapx^t 8t' avro TnOavov /cat TTiarov ro 
8e Toj heiKwadai Sokclv 8ta roLovrojv, oySe/xta Se 
re-xyt) aKOTret ro Kad^ eKaarov, otov 7] taTpiK-rj tl 
Sco/cparet to vyteivov euriv 7] KaAAta, aAAa tl tco 
ToioiSe 'q Tols TOLolaBe {tovto fiev yap evrexvov, ro 
8e Kad^ eKacTTOV (XTretpov /cat ovk iTnaTrjrov) , ovBe 
Tj prjTopcKrj TO /ca^' CKaaTov evSo^ov decop'qcreL, 

otov TiCOKpOLTeL ^ 'iTTTTtO., dAAo. TO TOLoloBe, Kad- 

drrep /cat 17 8taAe/CTt/C7^. /cat yap eKelvr] avXXoyi- 
t,€Tai OVK i^ (hv eTVX^v (^atVcrat yap arra /cat Totj 
1357a TTapakqpovaiv) , dAA' eKelvi] fj,€V e'/c toji' Aoyou 
heopjivoiv, rj 8e prjTopLKri e/c rcoi^ •^'817 ^ovXeveadat 
elojOorojv. 

12 "EoTi 8e TO epyov avTrjs TrepL re toioutco;/ Trept 
cSv ^ovXevofMeda /cat Texvas /X17 exofxev, /cat ei/ rots 
TOtouTot? d/cpoarat? ot ou 8wai'Tat 8td TroAAoiv 
avvopdv ovhk Xoyit,eadai TToppojdev. ^ovXevofieda 
8e Trept rail' ^atvofxevojv ivSex^adai, afX(f)OT€pa}s 
ex^i'V Trept ydp tcDi^ d8uvdTajv ctAAo)? rj yevecrdaL tj 
eaeaOai 7] ex^iv ovSels ^ovXeveTat ovtojs viroXap.- 

13 pdviov ovSev ydp rrXeov. ev8e';^eTat 8e crvXXoyi- 
^ecr^at /cat avvdyeiv Ta p.kv e'/c avXXeXoytcrfMevcov 
TTpoTcpov, Ta 8' e'f d.CTuAAoyt'crTCuv' p.ei' heop.iv(DV 8e 
CTuAAoytCT/Ltou 8td TO pA) elvai evSofa. dvdyKT] 8e 
Toi^wv TO jLtev jLti) efj'at evenaKoXovdrjTov 8id to 

" Or, " by persons who are so " (Jebb). 

* Certain propositions, which seem paradoxical and im- 
probable to a popular audience, must be proved before it is 
able to understand them. 

22 



RHETORIC, I. II. 11-13 

reference to some one, and is persuasive and con- 
vincing either at once and in and by itself, or because 
it appears to be proved by propositions that are 
convincing " ; further, no art has the particular in 
view, medicine for instance what is good for Socrates 
or Callias, but what is good for tliis or that class of 
persons (for this is a matter that comes within the 
province of an art, whereas the particular is infinite 
and cannot be the subject of a true science) ; 
similarly, therefore. Rhetoric will not consider what 
seems probable in each individual case, for instance 
to Socrates or Hippias, but that which seems probable 
to this or that class of persons. It is the same with 
Dialectic, which does not draw conclusions from any 
random premises — for even madmen have some 
fancies — but it takes its material from subj ects which 
demand reasoned discussion, as Rhetoric does from 
those which are common subjects of deliberation. 

The function of Rhetoric, then, is to deal with 
tilings about which we deliberate, but for which we 
have no systematic rules ; and in the presence of 
such hearers as are unable to take a general view of 
many stages, or to follow a lengthy chain of argu- 
ment. But we only deliberate about things which 
seem to admit of issuing in two ways ; as for those 
things which cannot in the past, present, or future 
be otherwise, no one deliberates about them, if he 
supposes that they are such ; for nothing would be 
gained by it. Now, it is possible to draw conclusions 
and inferences partly from what has been previously 
demonstrated syllogistically, partly from what has 
not, which however needs demonstration, because it 
is not probable.'' The first of these methods is 
necessarily difficult to follow owing to its length, for 

23 



ARISTOTLE 

firJKog (o yap Kpirrjs VTroKetrat etvaL olttXovs), ra 
0€ fj,7] mOava Sta to fji-fj i^ oixoXoyovfxevcov elvat 
lJi7]8 ivho^oiv oiOT* avayKoiov to re evdviMTfixa 
€LvaL Kai TO TTapdSeLyna irepl tcov evhexop-evcov cos 
ra TToAAa ex^tv Kat dXXoJS, to pev TrapdSeiypa 
eTTayojyrjv to S' ivdvprjjxa avXXoytapov , /cat e^ 
oXiyijov re Koi noXXaKis iXaTTovcov rj e^ u)V 6 
TTptoTOS crvXXoyLap,6s' idv yap ^ rt tovtcov yvcopi- 
p,ov, ovSe Set Xeyeiv avTos yap tovto TrpooTLdrjcrtv 
o aKpoaTrjs. olov otl Acopcevs aTe(/)avLTr]v dyoJva 
vevLKTjKev, LKavov eLTTetv otl '0Au/x7rta vevLKrjKev 
TO o otl aTe^avLTTjs to. 'OAu/x77ta, ovSe Set irpoa- 
delvaL' yLyvcoaKOVOL yap vavTes. 
14 ETret S eaTLV oXlya p,€v tcDv dvayKaiwv i^ Jjv ol 
prjTopLKOL avXXoyLapoL eloL {to. yap ttoXXo. irepl a)v 
aL KpLoeLs /cat at aKeiheLs, ivSex^Tai /cat aAAojs" 

€X€LV 7T€pL (hv p,€.V ydp TTpaTTOVOL, ^OvXcVOVTaL 
/cat (JKOTTOVCTL, TO. Sc TTpaTTOp^eva TTOVTa TOLOVTOV 

yevovs eoTL, /cat ovSev cbs' eVo? €L7T€lv i^ dvdyKrjs 
tovtcov), Ta S cos cttl TO TToXv avp^^aivovTa /cat 
evhexopeva e/c tolovtcov dvdyKrj eTepcov avXXoyl- 
L,eadaL, Ta S' dvayKala i^ dvayKalcou {SrjXov 8' 
7]fuv /cat TOVTO e/c tcov dvaXvTLKcov) , <f)av€p6v otl 
€^ cbv Ta ivdvfj,ijp,aTa Aeyerai, ra fiev dvayKala 
€OTat, ra Se TrAeicrra cos ctti to ttoXu. Ae'yerai 
yap €v6vp.-qp,aTa i^ clkotcov /cat arjfxeLOJV, iLgtc 

" TTpwTos : the primary, typical syllogism of the first figure. 

* Son of Diagoras of Rhodes, and like his father celebrated 
for his victories in the Greek athletic contests. He played 
a considerable part in political and naval affairs in support 
of the Spartans (412-407 b.c), whom he afterwards offended, 
and by whom he is said to have been put to death. 

' Anal. Prlora, i. 8, 13-14. 
24 



RHETORIC, I. 11. 13-14 

the judge is supposed to be a simple person ; the 
second will obtain little credence, because it does 
not depend upon what is either adnaitted or probable. 
The necessary result then is that the enthymeme 
and the example are concerned with things which 
may, generally speaking, be other than they are, 
the example being a kind of induction and the 
enthymeme a kind of syllogism, and deduced from 
few premises, often from fewer than the regular * 
syllogism ; for if any one of these is well known, 
there is no need to mention it, for the hearer can 
add it himself. For instance, to prove that Dorieus ^ 
was the victor in a contest at which the prize was 
a crown, it is enough to say that he won a victory 
at the Olympic games ; there is no need to add that 
the prize at the Olympic games is a crown, for every- 
body knows it. 

But since few of the propositions of the rhetorical 
syllogism are necessary, for most of the things which 
we judge and examine can be other than they are, 
human actions, which are the subject of our delibera- 
tion and examination, being all of such a character 
and, generally speaking, none of them necessary ; 
since, further, facts which only generally happen or 
are merely possible can only be demonstrated by 
other facts of the same kind, and necessary facts by 
necessary propositions (and that this is so is clear 
from the Analytics "), it is evident that the materials 
from which enthymemes are derived will be some- 
times necessary, but for the most part only generally 
true ; and these materials being probabilities and 
signs, it follows that these two elements must corre- 

25 



ARISTOTLE 

avayKT] rovrcov eKarepov eKarepco ravro clvat. 

15 TO fjbev yap clkos iomv co? errt to ttoXv yiv6p,€vov, 
ovx aTrXcbs Se, KadaTrep 6pil,ovTai Ttves, aAAa to 
■nepi Ta ivSexopbeva aAAo)? ^x^tv, ovtcos ^^ov Trpos 

1357 b eKeZvO TTpoS 6 etKOS, cos TO KaOoXoV TTpOS TO KaTO, 

16 fiepos' T(x)v he arjfjLeiOjv to fxev ovtcjs e^ei dis tcov 
Kad CKaoTov tl rrpos to KaOoXov, to Se ws tcui^ 

KadoXoV TL TTpOS TO KaTO, fXepO?. TOVTCOV 8e TO 

fxev avayKOiov TeKfM'qpLov, to Be [jltj dvayKalov 

17 avcovvpiov ecrrt /caret ttjv Bia(f>opdv. dvayKOia p.ev 
ovv Xeyo) e^ oiv ytVerai avXXoyiaiios , Sto koI 

T€KfJb7]piOV TO TOLOVTOV TCOV Grjp,eLCx)V icTTLV OTOV 

yap firj evSexecrOat otcovrat Xvaat to Xexdev, Tore 
(f>ep€LV otovTac TeKixrjpLov cos SeSeiyfievov /cat Trene- 
paafxevov to yap TCKfiap /cat irepas TavTOV eoTi 
/cara tt^v dpxaiav yXojTTav. 

18 'EcTTt 8e Tojv ar]p,eio}V to jxev cos to KaS^ e/ca- 
(jTov Trpos TO KadoXov cSSe, olov et tls eiTretev 
cq/xelov etvat. otl ol ao<f)ol 8t/catot, Sco/cparTys" yap 
ao(f)6s rjv /cat Si/cato?. tovto [jbev ovv arnxelov 
eaTL, XvTov Se, Koiv dXrjOes 77 to elp'qjxevov davX- 
XoyicTTov yap. to 8e, olov et tls etTretev' arjfxeXov 
OTt, voaeZ, nvpeTTei yap, -iq TeTOKev otl ydXa exei, 
avayKalov. oirep tcov arj/jbetcov TeKfi'qpLov piovov 
eoTiv p.6vov yap, dv dXrjdes fi, dXvTov eoTiv. to 
Se cos TO KadoXov Trpos to /cara p.epos ^xov, olov 
et TLS eLTrecev, otl TTvpeTTeL, arjp,eLOV elvat, ttvkvov 
yap dvaTTveZ. Xvtov Se /cat tovto, Kav dAr^Oes fl' 

" That is, probabilities and signs correspond to general 
and necessary propositions. This is not strictly correct ; 
only the reKix-npia correspond to the necessary propositions, 
the other signs and the probabilities to the general or con- 
tingent propositions. 
26 



RHETORIC, I. II. 14-18 

spond to these two kinds of propositions, each to 
each.** For that wliich is probable is that which 
generally happens, not however unreservedly, as 
some define it, but that which is concerned with 
things that may be other than they are, being so 
related to that in regard to which it is probable as 
the universal to the particular. As to signs, some 
are related as the particular to the universal, others 
as the universal to the particular. Necessary signs 
are called tekmeria ; those which are not necessary 
have no distinguishing name. I call those necessary 
signs from which a logical syllogism can be con- 
structed, wherefore such a sign is called tekmerion ; 
for when people think that their argmnents are 
irrefutable, they think that they are bringing forward 
a tekmerion, something as it were proved and con- 
cluded ; for in the old language tekmar and peras 
have the same meaning (limit, conclusion). 

Among signs, some are related as the particular 
to the universal ; for instance, if one were to say 
that all wise men are just, because Socrates was both 
wise and just. Now this is a sign, but even though 
the particular statement is true, it can be refuted, 
because it cannot be reduced to syllogistic form. 
But if one were to say that it is a sign that a man is 
ill, because he has a fever, or that a woman has had 
a child because she has milk, this is a necessary 
sign. This alone among signs is a tekmerion ; for 
only in this case, if the fact is true, is the argument 
irrefutable. Other signs are related as the universal 
to the particular, for instance, if one were to say 
that it is a sign that this man has a fever, because 
he breathes hard ; but even if the fact be true, this 
argument also can be refuted, for it is possible for 

27 



ARISTOTLE 

ivSex^TaL yap /cai firj TTvperrovTa TTVcvaTtdv. ri 
fxkv ovv cIkos iart, /cat ti arjfielov koI TeKfM'^pLov, 
/cat Tt hia^epovaiv , eip-qrai fxev /cat vvw fiaXXov Se 
(fyavepaJs /cat rrcpl toxWojv, /cat Sta rtV alriav ra 
fiev davXXoyLard icm rd Se avX\eXoyLap,eva, iv 
Tols dvaXvTiKoZs Stcuptarat irepl avrtov. 

19 na/9aSetyjLta 8e ort yiteV iariv eTraycDyr] /cat 77e/3t 
TTOia eTTaycoyi^, e'bprjTat. ecrrt 8e oy're ois" [xepog 
Ttpog oXov ovd^ COS" oAoi' Trpo? P'^po's ov6^ (hs oXov 
vpos bXov, aXX ws fJiepos Trpos p^epos, opboiov npo? 
bpoLoVy orav dp^cfxx) p,cv fj vtto to avro yevog, yvco- 
pLp,d)T€pov Se ddrepov fj darepov, TrapdheLypud 
eartv. olov on eTn^ovXevei, rvpawihi Aiovvatos 
alrd)v TTjv (j)vXaKr]v /cat yap Yieiaiarparos Trporepov 
eTTi^ovXevojv T^Vet cf)vXaKr]v /cat Xa^cov irvpdv- 
vevae, /cat Qeayevrjs eV Meyapots" /cat d'AAot oaovs 
taaat, TrapaSeiyp^a Trdvres yiyuovrai rod ALovvuiov, 
ov ovK taaai ttco et Sta rovro aiVet. Trdvra 8e 
raura vtto to avro KaOoXov, on 6 eTTi^ovXevcov 
Tvpavvlhi (f)vXaK'Y]v atret. 

1358 a E^ <Lv p,ev ovv Xeyovrat at SoKovaai €Lvai Triareis 

20 dTToheiKTiKai , eLprjraL. rcov Se ivdvpbr]p,dra)P /xeyt- 
OTTj SLa(f)opd /cat pdXtara XeXrjdvZa a^^hov Trdvras 
ianv 'qTTep /cat Trept rr^v hiaXeKnKrjv pi,4.dohov rcov 
avXXoyLcrpjdJv rd p,€V yap avrcjv iart Kara rrjp 
prjropiKrjv wairep /cat /caret rr\v ScaXcKnKrjv puedoSov 
Tcbv (jv/\XoyLap,d)v , rd 8e /car' aAAa? Tc^vas /cat 
Svvdp€is, ras" pev ovaas rds 8' ovttoj Kar- 
€LXrjp,p€vas' 8t6 /cat Xavddvovai re, /cat pudXXov 
aTTTopicvoi /caret rponov piera^aivovaiv i^ avrcov. 

" Anal. Priora, ii. 27. 
?8 



RHETORIC, I. II. 18-20 

a man to breathe hard without having a fever. We 
have now explained the meaning of probable, sign, 
and necessary sign, and the difference between them ; 
in the Analytics °' we have defined them more clearly 
and stated why some of them can be converted into 
logical syllogisms, while others cannot. 

We have said that example is a kind of induction 
and with what kind of material it deals by way of 
induction. It is neither the relation of part to whole, 
nor of whole to part, nor of one whole to another 
whole, but of part to part, of like to like, when both 
come under the same genus, but one of them is better 
known than the other. For example, to prove that 
Dionysius is aiming at a tyranny, because he asks for 
a bodyguard, one might say that Pisistratus before 
him and Theagenes of Megara did the same, and 
when they obtained what they asked for made them- 
selves tyrants. All the other tyrants known may 
serve as an example of Dionysius, whose reason, 
however, for asking for a bodyguard we do not yet 
know. All these examples are contained under the 
same universal proposition, that one who is aiming 
at a tyranny asks for a bodyguard. 

We have now stated the materials of proofs which 
are thought to be demonstrative. But a very great 
difference between enthymemes has escaped the 
notice of nearly every one, although it also exists in 
the dialectical method of syllogisms. For some of 
them belong to Rhetoric, some syllogisms only to 
Dialectic, and others to other arts and faculties, some 
already existing and others not yet established. 
Hence it is that this escapes the notice of the 
speakers, and the more they specialize in a subject, 
the more they transgress the limits of Rhetoric and 

29 



ARISTOTLE 

fjidXXov Se aa<f)es earai ro XeyofMcvov 8td TrXeiovwv 
prjdev. 

21 Aeyco yap SiaXcKTiKovs re Kal prjToptKovs avX- 
XoyLcr/Jiovs elvai irepl c5v rovs tottovs Xiyop,ev 
ovroL 8 elcTLV ol Koivfj rrepl hiKalcxiv Kal (f)vaLKa)V 
Kal TTcpL ttoXltlkcov Kal 7T€pl TToXXcov SLa(f)€p6vra)V 
etSei, otov 6 rod fidXXov Kal rjrrov r ottos ' ovSev 
yap p,dXXov earai €k rovrov avXXoyiaaadaL « 
ivdv[j,7]p.a eiTTeZv nepl SiKaicov •^ <f>v(nKa>v ^ rrepi 
orovovv Kairoi ravra etSei Sta^epet. I'Sta Se 
oaa €K rcov irepl eKaarov etSo? Kal yevos irpora- 
aeciiv iariv, olov irepl (f)vaiKcov elal Trpordaets i^ 
djv ovre ivdvfir]p,a ovre avXXoytap^os iarc Trepl raJv 
rjdLKcbv, Kal Trepl rovrcov aAAat e^ cLv ovk earai 
TTepl rGiv <f>vaLKa)v ofiotcog 8e rovr' e^ei errt TrdvrcDV. 
KaKeXva /Jbev ov TTon^aet, Trepl ovSev yevos eix(f>pova' 
TTepl ovhev yap VTTOKeiixevov eartv ravra he, ocrcp 
ris av ^eXriov eKXeyrjrai, rds irpordaeis, X-qaet 
TTOiTjaas dXXrjv eTTLarrip,riv rrjs 8iaAe/CTt/c7ys" Kal 
prjropiKTjS' dv yap evrvxj) apxcus, ovKeri hiaXeK- 
riKrj ovSe prjropiKrj aAA' eKeivrj earai rjs e^eL rds 

22 dpxds' ear I he rd TrXeZara rd)v evdvpi'r)p.dr<x)v e/c 
rovroiv rdv elhGiv Xey6p.eva rG)v Kard [lepos kox 
IhloiV, e/c he rcov kolvcov eXdrro). KadaTTep ovv 
Kal ev roLs roTTLKols, koI evravda hiaipereov rdjv 
€v9vfir]iJ,drcov rd re ethr) Kal rovs roiTovs e^ (Lv 

" The common topics do not deal with particular subject 
matter, as the specific topics do. In making use of the latter, 
the "better" (that is, in regard to a special science) the 
propositions chosen by a man, the more he will without 
knowing it quit the domain of Rhetoric and Dialectic, and 
become a professor of that special science whose first principles 
he has hit upon. 

30 



RHETORIC, I. II. 20-22 

Dialectic. But this will be clearer if stated at 
greater length. 

I mean by dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms 
those which are concerned with what we call " topics," 
which may be applied alike to Law, Physics, Politics, 
and many other sciences that differ in kind, such as 
the topic of the more or less, which will furnish 
syllogisms and enthymemes equally well for Law, 
Physics, or any other science whatever, although 
these subjects differ in kind. Specific topics on the 
other hand are derived from propositions which are 
peculiar to each species or genus of things ; there 
are, for example, propositions about Physics which 
can furnish neither enthymemes nor syllogisms about 
Ethics, and there are propositions concerned with 
Ethics which will be useless for furnishing conclusions 
about Physics ; and the same holds good in all cases. 
The first kind of topics will not make a man practically 
wise about any particular class of things, because 
they do not deal with any particular subject matter ; 
but as to the specific topics, the happier a man is in 
his choice of propositions, the more he will uncon- 
sciously produce a science quite different from 
Dialectic and Rhetoric. For if once he hits upon 
first principles, it will no longer be Dialectic ox 
Rhetoric, but that science whose principles he has 
arrived at." Most enthymemes are constructed from 
these specific topics, which are called particular and 
special, fewer from those that are common or uni- 
versal. As then we have done in the Topics,^ so 
here we must distinguish the specific and universal 
topics, from which enthymemes may be constructed. 

'' Sophistici Elenchi {Fallacies), 9. This treatise is really 
the ninth and concluding part of the Topics. -, 

(3^ 



ARISTOTLE 

XrjTTTeov. Aeyu) S e'lSr] fiev rds" /ca^' eKaarov yivos 
iotas' ■nporaaei's, tottovs 8e rovs koivovs oixoitus 
travrixiv. irporepov ovv etTTCOfiev Trepi rcov etowv 
TTpcorov oe Xd^cop^ev ra yevq rrjs pr^ropLKrjs, ottojs 
oLeAop,€VOL TToaa eari, irepl rovrojv )(cijpls Xap.- 
PavajjJiev to. aroL)(^eia koL to.? Trpordcrets. 

3. 'EcTTt 8e rr^s prjropLKrjs e'tSr] rpia rov dpidp,6v 

roaovTOL yap /cat ol aKpoaral rojv Xoyoju vtt- 

dpxovGLV 6vT€S. crvyKetTaL p,€V yap e/c rpicJov 6 

Xoyos, e/c re rod Xeyovrog /cat Tre/at ov Ae'yet /cat 

1358 b TTpog ov, Kal TO TeXos TTpos TovTov icTTL, Xeycx) Se 

2 rov aKpoartjv. dvdyKrj Se rov aKpoarrjv rj decopov 
eivai 7] Kpirrjv, Kpcrrjv Se -^ riov y€yevrjp.€vajv ^ rcov 
p,eXX6vrcov. eari 8' o p,ev Trepi rcov p.€XX6vrcov 
Kpivcov olov eKKXrjCTLacrrijg, 6 Se Trepi rcov yeyevq- 
p,evcov olov 6 StKacrr-qs , 6 Se Trepi rrjs Svvdp^ecog 6 

3 decopos' (oar e^ dvdyKrjs dv e'irj rpia yevrj rcov 
Xoycov rcov pr]ropLKCov, cyvp-^ovXevriKov , hiKoviKov, 
eTTiheiKriKov. 

J!ivp,^ovXrjs Se ro p,ev TTporpoTrr) ro Se aTTorpOTrrj' 
aet yap /cat ol tSta ovp,^ovXevovres Kal ol Kotvjj 8rj- 
p,riyopovvres rovrcov ddrepov ttolovglv. BtKrjs Se 
ro p,ev Karrjyopia ro S' aTToXoyla- rovrcov yap 
OTTorepovovv TTOielv avayKt] rovs diJicl)LaPrjrovvras . 
eTTtSet/CTi/cou Se ro p,ev eTtatvos ro Se tpoyos. 

4 X/3ovot Se CKdarov rovrcov elal rco p,ev crvpL^ov- 
Xevovri 6 jLte'AAtot' (vrept yap rcov eaop.evcov avp,^ov- 

" Propositions (or premises), the name given to the two first 
statements in a syllogism from which the conclusion is drawn : 
All men are mortal (major premise) ; Socrates is a man 
(minor premise) ; therefore Socrat»s is mortal. 

* All three kinds of hearers ani regarded as judges (the 
32 



RHETORIC, I. 11. 22— in. 4 

By specific topics I mean the propositions peculiar 
to each class of things, by universal those common 
to all alike. Let us then first speak of the specific 
topics, but before doing so let us ascertain the 
different kinds of Rhetoric, so that, having deter- 
mined their number, we may separately ascertain 
their elements and propositions." 

3. The kinds of Rhetoric are three in number, 
corresponding to the three kinds of hearers. For 
every speech is composed of three parts : the speaker, 
the subject of which he treats, and the person to 
whom it is addressed, I mean the hearer, to whom 
the end or object of the speech refers. Now the 
hearer must necessarily be either a mere spectator 
or a judge, and a judge either of things past or of 
things to come.** For instance, a member of the 
general assembly is a judge of things to come ; the 
dicast, of things past ; the mere spectator, of the 
abihty of the speaker. Therefore there are neces- 
sarily three kinds of rhetorical speeches, deliberative, 
forensic, and epideictic. 

The deliberative kind is either hortatory or dis- 
suasive ; for both those who give advice in private 
and those who speak in the assembly invariably 
either exhort or dissuade. The forensic kind is either 
accusatory or defensive ; for litigants must neces- 
sarily either accuse or defend. The epideictic kind 
has for its subject praise or blame. 

Further, to each of these a special time is appro- 
priate : to the deliberative the future," for the 

mere spectator as a " critic "), although strictly KpiT-qs should 
be limited to the law courts. 

" In i. 6. 1 and 8. 7 the present is also mentioned as a 
time appropriate to deliberative Rhetoric. 

D S3 



ARISTOTLE 

Xcvet, T] TTporpeTTCOv rf aTTOTpeTTCov) , ro) Se 8t/ca- 
t,ofjLevcp 6 yevofxevos [nepl yap rcbv TTeirpayixivuiv 
det o pikv Kar-qyopec 6 8e aTroAoyetrat), roi 8' 
imSeLKTLKcp KvpLcvraros fiev 6 TrapcLv Kara yap 
TO, VTrdpxovra eTraivovaiv -^ ipeyovai Trdvres, Trpocr- 
j^pcDvrat 8e TroAAaK'ts" /cat to, yevofxeva dvafJUfMVT^a- 
Kovres Kal rd fxeXXovra Trpoei/cct^ovres . 

5 TeAo? 8e eKdaroLS tovtcov erepov iari, /cat 
rptalv ovat rpia, rw p,ev avfJL^ovXevovTi ro arvfi- 
(j)€pov /cat ^Xa^epov 6 p.ev yap Trporpencov cos 
jSeArtov ovfM^ovXevet, 6 Be dirorpiTTajv (Ls x^^P^^ 
dTTorpenei, rd 8' d'AAa irpos rovro (yvp.TrapaXap.- 
^dvei, rj SiKaLOV rj dStKov, t] KaXdv t^ alaxpdv rois 
8e St/ca^OjLtet'ois" ro BiKaiov /cat ro dSiKov, rd 8' 
dAAa /cat ovroL avfnrapaXafx^dvovat Trpos ravra' roXs 
8' eTTaivovai /cat ijiiyovaL rd koXov /cat rd alaxpov, 
rd 8' dAAa /cat ovroL irpos ravra eTTava<f)epovaLV . 

6 arjixelov 8' on to elpiqp.ivov eKaaroLS reXos' trepl 
(juev ydp rcbv dXXcov evLore ovk dv dp.<l>La^rirriaaL€V , 
OLOV 6 8t/ca^o/xevos" cos" ov yiyovev rj ws ovk e)3Aa- 
tjjev on 8' d8t/cet, oi)8e ttot dv ofioXoyqcretev 
ovSev ydp dv e8ei Slktjs. ofxoiws 8e /cat ot avp,- 
^ovXevovreg rd fxkv dAAa TroAAd/ctj Trpotevrai, ojs 
8e davix(f)opa avfi^ovXevovaiv ^ aTr' (h(f)€XijMCov 
aTTorpeTTOvaiv ovk dv 6fj.oXoyij(jai,ev' (Ls 8' oi)/c 
34 



RHETORIC, I. III. 4-6 

speaker, whether he exhorts or dissuades, always 
advises about things to come ; to the forensic the 
past, for it is always in reference to things done that 
one party accuses and the other defends ; to the 
epideictic most appropriately the present, for it is 
the existing condition of things that all those who 
praise or blame have in view. It is not uncommon, 
however, for epideictic speakers to avail themselves 
of other times, of the past by way of recalling it, or 
of the future by way of anticipating it. 

Each of the three kinds has a different special end, 
and as there are three kinds of Rhetoric, so there 
are three special ends. The end of the deliberative 
speaker is the expedient or harmful ; for he who 
exhorts recommends a course of action as better, 
and he who dissuades advises against it as worse ; 
all other considerations, such as justice and injustice, 
honour and disgrace, are included as accessory in 
reference to this. The end of the forensic speaker 
is the just or the unjust ; in this case also all other 
considerations are included as accessory. The end 
of those who praise or blame is the honourable and 
disgraceful ; and they also refer all other considera- 
tions to these. A sign that what I have stated is 
the end which each has in view is the fact that 
sometimes the speakers will not dispute about the 
other points. For example, a man on trial does not 
always deny that an act has been committed or 
damage inflicted by him, but he will never admit 
that the act is unjust ; for otherwise a trial would 
be unnecessary. Similarly, the deliberative orator, 
although he often sacrifices everything else, will 
never admit that he is recommending what is inex- 
pedient or is dissuading from what is useful ; but 

35 



ARISTOTLE 

ahiKov Tovg darvyeCrovas KaraSovXovadai Kot 
rovs ixrjhev dhiKovvras, ttoXXolkls ovdev (j>povri- 
1359 a t^ovaiv. ofxolois 8e /cat ol eVaivowTe? koL ol 
ifjeyovres ov aKOTTOvaiv el avix^epovTa errpa^ev rj 
j^Xa^epd, dXXd /cat iv eiraivcp ttoXXolkls ndeacnv 
ore oXiyoiprjaas rod avra> XvaireXovvros enpa^d tl 
KoXov, olov 'A;(tAAea eTraivovatv on e^o-qdriae rw 
iraiptp IlarpoKXcp etSco? on Set avrov aTTodaveZv, 
i^ov tw- '^ointp Se o fxev tolovtos davaros KaX- 
Xlov, to Se !l,rjv avixcfyepov. 

7 ^avepov Se e/c tcov elprjixevcvv otl dvayKt] Trepl 
Tovrojv ex^LV Trpcbrov rds Trporaaets' ra yap tck- 
IM-qpia /cat rd eLKora koX rd a-q/xela Tvpordaeis elcrl 
prjropLKat' oXcog jxev ydp avXXoyicrfxos Ik Trpo- 
rdaewv can, to S' ivdvfji,r]p.a avXXoycajJLos icrri, 

8 avv€(Trr]Kco9 e'/c rdjv €lpr]iJ,€vcov TTpordaeaiv. errel 
he ovre TrpaxGrjvai olov re ovre TrpaxQrjueaOaL rd 
dhvvara dXXd rd hvvard, ovhe rd fj,rj yevofxeva •^ 
[XTj eaofxeva ovx olov re rd p.ev TreTrpdxOai rd Be 
7Tpaxdr]<yea6ai , dvayKolov /cat ra> arvfi^ovXevovri, 
/cat ro) hiKat^oixevw /cat ro) eTTiSet/crt/Cfo ex^f-v vpo- 
rdaeis Trepl Bvvarov /cat dSvvdrov, /cat et yeyovev rj 

9 jLtT^, /cat et earai rj iirf. eVt S eVet drravres /cat 



"» The omission of ovk before S.8tKov has been suggested. 
The sense would then be : " As to the injustice of enslaving 
... he is quite indifferent." There is no doubt a reference 
to the cruel treatment by Athens of the inhabitants of the 
island of Melos (416 b.c.) for its loyalty to the Spartans 
during the Peloponnesian war (Thuc, v. 84-116). The 
Athenian envoys declined to discuss the question of right or 
wrong, which they said was only possible between equal 

Sowers, and asserted that expediency was the only thing that 
ad to be considered. The question of justice or injustice 

36 



RHETORIC, I. III. 6-9 

often he is quite indifferent about showing that the 
enslavement of neighbouring peoples, even if they 
have done no harm, is not an act of injustice.** 
Similarly, those who praise or blame do not con- 
sider whether a man has done what is expedient or 
harmful, but frequently make it a matter for praise 
that, disregarding his own interest, he performed 
some deed of honour. For example, they praise 
Achilles because he went to the aid of his comrade 
Patroclus,* knowing that he was fated to die, although 
he might have lived. To him such a death was more 
honourable, although life was more expedient. 

From what has been said it is evident that the 
orator must first have in readiness the propositions 
on these three subjects." Now, necessary signs, 
probabilities, and signs are the propositions of the 
rhetorician ; for the syllogism universally ** consists 
of propositions, and the enthymeme is a syllogism 
composed of the propositions above mentioned. 
Again, since what is impossible can neither have been 
done nor will be done, but only what is possible, and 
since what has not taken place nor will take place 
can neither have been done nor will be done, it is 
necessary for each of the three kinds of orators to 
have in readiness propositions dealing with the 
possible and the impossible, and as to whether any- 
thing has taken place or will take place, or not. 
Further, since all, whether they praise or blame, 

(in the Melian case entirely disregarded), even when taken 
into account, was merely accessory and intended to serve as 
a specious justification for the policy of might. 

* To protect his body and avenge his death (Iliad, xviii.). 

" The expedient, the just, the honourable, and their con- 
traries. 

"^ 6'\w! : or, reading 6\os, " the syllogism as a whole." 

37 



ARISTOTLE 

eTraivovvres Kai ipeyovres Kal TrporpeTTOvres Kal 
aTTorpeTTOvres Kat Karr^yopovvTes Kal aTToXoyov- 
fjievoi ov fiovov ra €lpr]fMeva SeiKvvvai Treipwvrai 
aAAa /cat on jxeya tj puKpov ro dyadov rj to KaKOV 
Tj TO KaXov r^ ro aluxpov rj ro SiKaiov 7) ro dSiKov, 
7} Ka6^ avrd Xeyovres r^ Trpos dXXrjXa dvrnrapa^dX- 
Xovres, hrjXov on 8eoi dv Kal rrepl [Meyedovs Kal 
jjiiKporrjrog Kal rod fieil^ovos Kal rod eXdrrovos 
TTporaoeis e)(eLV, Kal KadoXov Kal irepl eKdarov, 
olov n jxeX^ov dyadov ■^ eXarrov t] aSi/ciy/ia ^ 
St/catcu/xa' ojxolojs 8e /cat irepl ruiv dXXa>v. irepl 
(bv fxev ovv e^ dvdyKrjs Set Xa^elv rds 7Tporda€i?, 
elprjrai' fierd Se ravra Stacpereov tSia Trepl CKaarov 
rovroiVy olov rrepl (Lv avp,^ovXrj Kal Trepl wv ol eTrt- 
Sei/CTt/cot XoyoL, rpirov Se irepl Sv at 8t/cat. 

4. Ilpcijrov fiev ovv XrjTrreov Trepl TTola dyadd ^ 
/ca/ca o avp,^ovXeva)v arvp,^ovXev€i, eTreiSr) ov Trepl 
dvavra dXX' oaa ivSex^rai Kal yeveadai Kal fXTj. 

2 baa he e^ dvdyKTjs ■^ ecrrlv 7^ earac rj dSvvarov efvai 
rj yeveadat, Trepl he rovrojv ovk can avfx^ovXij. 

3 ovhe hrj Trepl rdjv ivhexofMevcov aTTavrcov ean yap 
Kal (f)vaei evia Kal (xtto rv^yis ytvofxeva dyaOd rwv 
ivhexofjLevcjv Kal yiyvecrOai Kal fji-q, Trepl iov ovhev 
npo epyov ro av^ifiovXeveiv dXXd hrjXov on Trepl 
oacov earl ro ^ovXeveadai. roiavra S' iorlv oaa 
TT€(f)VKev dvdyeadai els yjP'ds, Kal wv rj dp^rj rrjs 
yeveaeojs i(f>^ rjfxlv eariv P'^xpi' ydp rovrov okottov- 

1359 b /xev, eojs dv evpa>fjiev el rjp.iv hvvard tj dhvvara 
TTpd^ac. 
88 



RHETORIC, I. III. 9— IV. 3 

exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, not only en- 
deavour to prove what we have stated, but also that 
the same things, whether good or bad, honourable 
or disgraceful, just or unjust, are great or small, 
either in themselves or when compared with each 
other, it is clear that it will be necessary for the 
orator to be ready with propositions dealing with 
greatness and smallness and the greater and the less, 
both universally and in particular ; for instance, 
which is the greater or less good, or act of injustice 
or justice ; and similarly with regard to all other 
subjects. We have now stated the topics concern- 
ing which the orator must provide himself with 
propositions ; after this, we must distinguish between 
each of them individually, that is, what the three 
kinds of Rhetoric, deliberative, epideictic, and 

for ensiC j^e^ncerned with. _ 

i. We^ust first ascertain about what kind of good 
or bad things the dehberative orator advises, since 
he cannot do so about everything, but only about 
things which may possibly happen or not. Every- 
thing which of necessity either is or will be, or which 
cannot possibly be or come to pass, is outside the 
scope of deliberation. Indeed, even in the case of 
things that are possible advice is not universally 
appropriate ; for they include certain advantages, 
natural and accidental, about which it is not worth 
while to offer advice. But it is clear that advice is 
limited to those subjects about which we take 
counsel ; and such are all those which can naturally 
be referred to ourselves and the first cause of whose 
origination is in our own power ; for our examination 
is limited to finding out whether such things are 
possible or impossible for us to perform. 

39 



ARISTOTLE 

4 Ka^' cKaarov fjuev ovv aKpi^ws BiapiOjji'qcraadai 
/cat BiaXa^Belv els etSr] irepl cLv elcodaai ■x^prjixarit,eLV , 
€TL o oaov evSep^erat irepl avrcjv hiopiuai Kara ttjv 
aArjOetav, ov Set Kara rov rrapovra Kaipov trirelv 
Ota ro pLrjre riqs prjropiKrjs eivai rexvrjs aAA ep,- 
(ppovecrrepas /cat p.dXXov aXrjdivrjs, ttoAAoj 8e ttXcio) 
oeooaOaL /cat vvv avrfj rcov oiKeicov deoprfp^aroiv 

5 OTTep yap /cat Trporepov elp'qKores rvyxo.vop.ev, 
aArjdes iariv, on rj prjropLKr] avyKcirai p,ev e/c re 
rrjs avaXvrLKTJs eTnar-qpirjs /cat rrjs Trepl ra rjdrj. 
TToXirLKrjs, oftoia 8' iarrl ra p,ev rfj 8taAe/cTt/c^ ra 

6 oe rolg ao^LariKots Aoyots". oacp S' av ris t] rrjv 
BiaXeKriKTjv t] ravrrjv /jltj KaOaTrep av SvvdpieLs aAA' 
€7narrip,as TTeipdraL KaraaKevdt^eiv , Xrjaerai rrjv 
<f>vaiv avro)v ddiaviaas rw aeraBaiveiv emaKevd- 
L,oiv €LS eTTLarrjpiag VTroKeip^evcuv rivcov 7rpayp,arajv, 

7 aAAa /jbTj p,6vov Xoycov. opbcos 8' oaa rrpo epyov 
p,€v ecrri 8teAetv, ert 8' UTToAetVet aKiibiv rrj rroXiriKr} 
€-7TLarrjp,r], enrcop^ev /cat vvv. 

S;^e8oj/ ydp, irepl Jjv ^ovXevovrai irdvres /cat 
TTept a ayopevovaiv ol avp,^ovXevovr€s , ra /xeytcrra 
rvyxavcL rrevre rov dpi,6p,6v ovra- ravra 8' iarl 
rrepi re TTopwv, /cat noXepLov /cat elpijvTjs, en 8e 
TTepi cf)vXaK-fjs rrjs ^cupa?, /cat rujv elaayopievcov 
/cat e^ayop^evcov, /cat Trept vopLodeaias. 

8 l^crre Trept /xev TTopcov rov pueXXovra crvp,^ov- 
XevcreLv 8eot at' ra? TrpoaoSovs rrjs ttoXccos elSevai 
rLves /cat Troaat, OTro)? etre rt? TrapaAetTrerat rrpoa- 
redfj /cat 6t rt? eXdrrcov av^r]6fj, en he rds 8a- 

* The analytical science is Dialectic, incorrectly regarded 
as a branch of Analytics, which properly implies scientific 
demonstration. 

40 



RHETORIC, I. IV. 4-8 

However, there is no need at present to endeavour 
to enumerate with scrupulous exactness or to classify 
those subjects which men are wont to discuss, or to 
define them as far as possible with strict accuracy, 
since this is not the function of the rhetorical art 
but of one that is more intelligent and exact, and 
further, more than its legitimate subjects of inquiry 
have already been assigned to it. For what we have 
said before is true " : that Rhetoric is composed of 
analytical science and of that branch of political 
science which is concerned with Ethics, and that it 
resembles partly Dialectic and partly sophistical 
arguments. But in proportion as anyone endeavours 
to make of Dialectic or Rhetoric, not what they are, 
faculties, but sciences, to that extent he will, without 
knowing it, destroy their real nature, in thus altering 
their character, by crossing over into the domain of 
sciences,'' whose subjects are certain definite things, 
not merely words. Nevertheless, even at present 
we may mention such matters as it is worth while 
to analyse, while still leaving much for political 
science to investigate. 

Now, we may say that the most important subjects 
about which all men deliberate and deliberative 
orators harangue, are five in number, to wit : ways 
and means, war and peace, the defence of the 
country, imports and exports, legislation. 

Accordingly, the orator who is going to give advice 
on ways and means should be acquainted with the 
nature and extent of the State resources, so that if 
any is omitted it may be added, and if any is in- 

*" Taking eis eTnarrjfjLas with pLeTa^aifuv. If taken with 
ewLo-Kevd^iov, the sense will be : " by changing his ground 
{/xeTajSaiveLv being used absolutely) while altering their char- 
acters from faculties to sciences." 

41 



ARISTOTLE 

TTavas rrjg ttoXccds airdaas, onois el ris irepUpyos 
a^aipeOfj kciI et ns ixeit^oov iXdrrajv yevrjr at' ov 
yap fjbovov Trpos ra virdpxovra TrpoariOevres ttXov- 
attorepoL yivovrai, aAAa /cat d(f)aLpovvres roJv Ba- 
iravrjiJbdrcov . ravra 8' ov piovov eK r-qs Trepl ra 
iOLa ep,TTeipias evhex^rai avvopdv, aAA' dvayKoiov 
/cat Tcov TTapa rot? aAAots" evpr]p,€va)v laropiKov elvai 
TTpos TTjv Trepi rovTcov avfi^ovX-^v . 
9 Ilept Se TToXefJLOv /cat elp-qvrjs rr)v Svvafxiv etSevat 
rrjs TToXecos, OTToarj re V7Tdp)(€t, tJBt] /cat iroarjv iv- 
hex^TCiL virdp^ai, /cat Trota rt? t) re virdp^ovad icrri 
/cat i^Tt? ivSex^TaL Trpoayeviadai,, eVt Se TToXepLOVS 
TLvas /cat TTcDs" TreTroXep.'qKev. ov p,6vov Be rrjs 
ot/cetas" TToXecos dXXd /cat rcov op^opcov ravra dvay- 
Kaiov eiBevai, /cat Trpos ovs erriBo^ov TroXepbelv, ottcos 
TTpos pt.ev rovs Kpetrrovs elprjvevrjraL, Trpos Be rovs 
1360 a jjrrovs eri' avrols rj ro TToXe/JbeXv. /cat ra? Bvvdp,€LS, 
TTorepov ofxoLai rj avo/xotaf cctti yap /cat ravrrj 
TrXeoveKreXv t] eXarrovadac. dvayKalov Be /cat 
TTpos ravra pbrj p^ovov rovs oiKeiovs TToXcfxovs reOeco- 
prjKevai aAAa /cat rovs rcov dXXcov, ttcos aTTo^ai- 
vovaiv aTTO yap rcov 6p.oi(x}v ra o/xota yiyveadai 
TTe^VKev. 
10 "Ert Be TTepl (f)vXaKrjs rrjs x^P^^ I^V Xavddveiv 
TTcbs (j)vXdrrerai, aAAa /cat ro ttXtjOos elBevat rrjs 
<f)vXaKrjs /cat ro elBos /cat rovs roTTOvs rcov (f>vXaK- 
42 



RHETORIC, I. IV. 8-10 

sufficient, it may be increased. Further, he should 
know all the expenses of the State, that if any is 
superfluous, it rnay be removed, or, if too great, may 
be curtailed. For men become wealthier, not only 
by adding to what they already possess, but also by 
cutting down expenses. Of these things it is not 
only possible to acquire a general view from in- 
dividual experience, but in view of advising concern- 
ing them it is further necessary to be well informed 
about what has been discovered among others. 

In regard to war and peace, the orator should be 
acquainted with the power of the State, how great 
it is already and how great it may possibly become ; 
of what kind it is already and what additions may 
possibly be made to it ; further, what wars it has 
waged and its conduct of them. These things he 
should be acquainted with, not only as far as his 
own State is concerned, but also in reference to 
neighbouring States, and particularly those with 
whom there is a likelihood of war, so that towards 
the stronger a pacific attitude may be maintained, 
and in regard to the weaker, the decision as to 
making war on them may be left to his own State. 
Again, he should know whether their forces are like 
or unlike his own, for herein also advantage or dis- 
advantage may lie. With reference to these matters 
he must also have examined the results, not only of 
the wars carried on by his own State, but also of 
those carried on by others ; for similar results 
naturally arise from similar causes. 

Again, in regard to the defence of the country, he 
should not be ignorant how it is carried on ; he 
should know both the strength of the guard, its 
character, and the positions of the guard-houses 

43 



ARISTOTLE 

TTjplayv {tovto S' aStJvarov fjur) cfXTretpov ovra rrjs 
Xiopas), IV etV eXdrrwv rj (f)vXaKrj TrpocrreOfj /cat 
€1 Tis" TTcpiepyos a<j)aipedfj /cat rovs eTTLrrjheiovs 
roTTOVs TTjpcbaL p.dXXov. 

11 "Ert 8e Trepl rpo(f>'fjs, ttout] SaTrdvr] iKavr] rrj ttoXci 
/cat TTOta T) avrov re ycyvofjievrj /cat elaaycoyL/Jbos, 
/cat TLVCov T e^aycoyrjs Seovrat /cat rivcov elaayojyrjs , 
cva 77/30? TOUTOi;? /cat avvdrJKai /cat avfx^oXal yi- 
yvcovr ai' rrpos hvo yap ht,a<f>vXdrreiv dvayKolov dv- 
eyKX-qrovs rovs TToXiras, Trpos re rovs Kpeirrovs /cat 
trpos rovs els ravra xp''^<^^H'OVs • 

12 EtV 8' da(j>dXeiav arravra jxev ravra dvayKalov 
hvvaadai Oecopelv, ovk eXaxicrrov he Trepl vofxo- 
deaias eTratew ev yap rots vofiois earlv 'q GorrrjpLa 
rrjs TToXecos, <l)crr dvayKalov elhevai rroaa r earl 
TToXireccov eLSrj, /cat TTOta avfx(f)epeL eKacrrr], /cat vtto 
nvojv (j)deipeadai rre^vKe /cat olKeccov rrjs TToXireias 
/cat evavricov. Xeyio 8e ro vrro olKeicov (f>6elpea9ai, 
on e^co rrjs ^eXriarrjs TToXireCas at aAAat Trdcrat /cat 
avLefievat /cat €7nrei,v6p,evai, ^0 eipovr ai, olov Srjfxo- 
Kparla ov fxavov dviefMcvrj daOevearepa yiverat axxre 
reXos '^i^L els dXtyapxlo-v, dXXd /cat emretvofjievrj 
cr<f)6hpa, wairep /cat rj ypvTTorrjs /cat r) aLfiorrjs ov 
fMovov dvLep,eva epx^rai els ro i^eaov, dXXd /cat a^o- 
Spa ypvTTO. ytvofieva •^ crt/xa ovrco Siariderai, ware 

" rovTovi : those who will receive exports and send im- 
ports. 

44 



RHETORIC, I. IV. 10-12 

(which is impossible for one who is unacquainted 
with the country), so that if any guard is insufficient 
it may be increased, or if any is superfluous it may 
be disbanded, and greater attention devoted to 
suitable positions. 

Again, in regard to food, he should know what 
amount of expenditure is sufficient to support the 
State ; what kind of food is produced at home or 
can be imported ; and what exports and imports are 
necessary, in order that contracts and agreements 
may be made with those °' who can furnish them ; 
for it is necessary to keep the citizens free from 
reproach in their relations with two classes of people 
— ^those who are stronger and those who are useful 
for commercial purposes. 

With a view to the safety of the State, it is 
necessary that the orator should be able to judge of 
all these questions, but an understanding of legisla- 
tion is of special importance, for it is on the laws 
that the safety of the State is based. Wherefore 
he must know how many forms of government there 
are ; what is expedient for each ; and the natural 
causes of its downfall, whether they are peculiar to 
the particular form of government or opposed to it. 
By being ruined by causes peculiar to itself, I mean 
that, with the exception of the perfect form of 
government, all the rest are ruined by being relaxed 
or strained to excess. Thus democracy, not only 
when relaxed, but also when strained to excess, 
becomes weaker and will end in an oligarchy ; 
similarly, not only does an aquiline or snub nose 
reach the mean, when one of these defects is relaxed, 
but when it becomes aquiline or snub to excess, it 
is altered to such an extent that even the likeness 

45 



ARISTOTLE 

13 fiTjSe fxVKTTJpa Bokclv ctvai. ;Yp7^CTi/xov Se rrpos ra^ 
vojxodeaias to firj jjiovov enatew rls TroAtreta ctw/x- 
(f)€p€L eK TOJV TTapeXrjXvdoTojv deojpovvTL, dXXa xrat 
ras" TTapa roTs aAAots" clSevat, at TTolaL rois ttoiols 
dpfMOTTOVGiv . (x)CTTe SrjXoi' oTt TTpos jJikv rrju vop-o- 
deaiav at tt^s" yrjs TrepioSot xP'^'^t'H'OL {ivrevdev yap 
Aa^etv ecTTi rovs tcov idvcov vofjbovs), -npos Se rd? 
TToXiTLKas avfx^ovXds at tcov Trepl rots' Trpd^eis 
ypa^ovTCov laTopiai' drravTa Se ravra ttoXltlktjs 
aAA' ov prjTopLKTJs 'ipyov iaTLV. 
iSGOb Ilept Sv fjL€V odv e^eiv Set tov fjueXXovTa avfi^ov- 
Aeuetv, Ta /xey terra ToaavTd iaTiv i^ cov 8e Set /cat 
TTept TOVTCov /cat Trepl twv dXXcov TrpoTpeTreiv ■^ 
drroTpeTTeiv, Xeyojixev TrdXiv. 

5. 2;)^eSov Se /cat tSta eKdcrTCp /cat KOivjj irdat, 
(TKOTTOS TLS ecTTtV, o5 aToxo-^ofMevoc /cat atpovvTai 
/cat (f)€vyov(nv /cat tovt* €<ttlv iv Kc^aXaico €L7T€lv 
2ri T* evSaifiovia /cat to, fiopia avTrjs. cocrre irapa- 
SeCyfiaTog p^ctpti' Xd^cop,ev rt eaTti/ to? aTrAcDs' etVett' 
1^ euSat/xovta, /cat e/c tlvcov Td fiopia TavTrj?' Trepl 
ydp TavTfjs /cat tcDv et? TavTrjv avvT€Lv6vTOiv /cat 
Tcijt' ivavTLCOv TavTT) at re TrpoTpoTral /cat at aTio- 
TpoTTat Trdaai elaiv to, //,ej/ yap 7TapaaK€vdt,ovTa 

raiJT7]V T^ TU)V pLOpicDV TL, T) fJb€t^OV dvT^ iXaTTOVOS 

TTOLovvTa, Set TTpaTTCLV, Td Se ^deipovTa rf ip,- 

TToBl^OVTa T] TO, ivaVTLa TTOLOVVTa fXT) TTpaTTeiV. 

3 "Ecttco St^ evSaifMovla evTTpa^la p,€T* dp^Trj^, rj 
avTapKeta ^cd?^?, "^ o jSto? o /xer' aCT^aAeta? rj^LGTOs, 

" This rendering, although convenient, hardly represents 

46 



RHETORIC, I. IV. 13— V. 3 

of a nose is lost. Moreover, with reference to acts 
of legislation, it is useful not only to understand 
what form of government is expedient by judging 
in the light of the past, but also to become acquainted 
with those in existence in other nations, and to 
learn what kinds of government are suitable to what 
kinds of people. It is clear, therefore, that for 
legislation books of travel are useful, since they help 
us to understand the laws of other nations, and for 
political debates historical works. * All these things, 
however, belong to Politics and not to Rhetoric. 

Such, then, are the most important questions upon 
which the would-be deliberative orator must be well 
informed. Now let us again state the sources whence 
we must derive our arguments for exhortation or 
discussion on these and other questions. 

5. Men, individually and in common, nearly all 
have some aim, in the attainment of which they 
choose or avoid certain things. This aim, briefly 
stated, is happiness and its component parts. There- 
fore, for the sake of illustration, let us ascertain 
what happiness, generally speaking, is, and what its 
parts consist in ; for all who exhort or dissuade dis- 
cuss happiness and the things which conduce or are 
detrimental to it. For one should do the things 
which procure happiness or one of its parts, or in- 
crease instead of diminishing it, and avoid doing 
those things which destroy or hinder it or bring 
about what is contrary to it. 

Let us then define happiness as well-being com- 
bined with virtue, or independence of life, or the 
life that is most agreeable combined with security, or 

the Greek, which, literally translated, is " the investigations 
of those who write about human actions " (c/. la-TopiKds, § 8). 

47 



ARISTOTLE 

■^ evOrjvta Krr]jxdrcx>v koL aoj/Jbdrctiv jxera Swdijuewg 
<f}vXaKriKrjs re /cat TrpaKTiKrjs tovtcov ax^hov yap 
TOVTCov ev r} TrXeico rrjv evSaifiovlav ofjboXoyovatv 

4 elvat, drravres. el hrj ianv rj evSaifMovta rotovrov, 
dvdyKT] avrrjs elvat fJ-eprj evyeveiav, TroXv^tXiav, 
Xpi)(yTO(j>iXiav , ttXovtov, evreicviav , TToXvreKviav , 
evyrjpiav, en ras rov uMfxaros dperds, olov vyieiav, 
KoXXos, laxvv, jjieyedos, SvvafjLLv dyoiviaTLKTjV, So^av, 
rt,p,rjv, evrvx^o-v, dperrjv ovtoj yap dv avrapKea- 
rarog elrj, el VTrdp^ot avrcp rd r' ev avro) Kal rd 
eKTOs dyada' ov ydp eariv dXXa napd ravra. 
ecrrt 8 ev avrcp fieu rd Trepl ijjvx^v Kal rd ev 
crcu/xaTi, e^o) Se evyeveca Kal ^iXoi /cat ^^piy/xara 
/cat rifxij. en he TrpoarjKeiv olo/jbeda Swdixets 
VTrdpx^iv Kal rvx^jv ovrco ydp dv da(f)aXeararos 
6 ^Los e'lrj. Xd^cojjiev roivvv ofiotcos Kal rovrtov 
eKaarov ri eariv. 

5 Euyeveta p^ev ovv eanv eOvet p,ev /cat TroAet rd 
^vroxOovas •^ dpxatovs elvai, Kal rjyep,6vas rovs 
TTpcorovs eTTKJyavelg, Kal rroXXovs e7n<l>avels yeyo- 
vevai e^ avrcov enl roZs l,r)Xovp,evoLS' tSta Se ev- 
yeveia rj dir dvhpcov rj diro yvvaiKcov, Kal yvrjaioriqg 
diT dp,(f)olv, Kal looTrep etrl TToXecos rovg re irpcorovs 
yvoipip^ovs rj err' dperfj r) TrXovrcp rj dXXtp rep rdiv 
ripicopbevcov, /cat ttoXXovs eTn(j>aveLs e/c rov yevovs 
Kal dvhpas /cat yurat/ca? /cat veov; Kal irpea- 
^vrepovs. 

" This is the usual rendering, although it is hardly satis- 
factory. Jebb translates " a flourishing state . . . of body." 

" Or, "bring about," "effect them." 

" i.e. of mind and body ; or dvvdfj.€is may mean " positions 
of authority and influence." 

* This was a favourite boast of the Athenians. 

48 



RHETORIC, I. V. 3-5 

abundance of possessions and slaves," combined with 
power to protect and make use of them ^ ; for nearly- 
all men admit that one or more of these things con- 
stitutes happiness. If, then, such is the nature of 
happiness, its component parts must necessarily be : 
noble birth, numerous friends, good friends, wealth,*^ 
good children, numerous children, a good old age ; 
further, bodily excellences, such as health, beauty, 
strength, stature, fitness for athletic contests, a good 
reputation, honour, good luck, virtue. For a man 
would be entirely independent, provided he pos- 
sessed all internal and external goods ; for there are 
no others. Internal goods are those of mind and 
body ; external goods are noble birth, friends, 
wealth, honour. To these we think should be added 
certain capacities " and good luck ; for on these 
conditions life will be perfectly secure. Let us now 
in the same way define each of these in detail. 

Noble birth, in the case of a nation or State, 
means that its members or inhabitants are sprung 
from the soil,'* or of long standing ; that its first 
members were famous as leaders, and that many of 
their descendants have been famous for qualities that 
are highly esteemed. In the case of private in-^ 
dividuals, noble birth is derived from either the 
father's or the mother's side, and on both sides there 
must be legitimacy ; and, as in the case of a State, 
it means that its founders were distinguished for 
virtue, or wealth, or any other of the things that 
men honour, and that a number of famous persons, 
both men and women, young and old, belong to the 
family. 



ARISTOTLE 

6 EuTCKvia 8e Kal TToXvreKvia ovk dSrjXa' eari Se 
1361a Tq) KOLVO) fjicv, veoTTjs oiv rj TToXXrj Kal dyad-q, dyadrj 

8e /car' dperrjv acofxarog, olov jxeyedos KaXXog laxvv 
BvvafMLV dycovtariKTqv if^vxrjs 8e a(0(f)poauv7] /cat 
dvhpla viov dperai. ISia 8e eure/cvta Kal ttoXv- 
TCKvia ro rd t'Sta reKva TToXXd Kal roiavra elvai, 
Kal dy'jXea Kal dppeva- driXeiojv 8e dperr] acvfiaros 
fjiev KdXXos Kal [xeyedos, ifjvx'r]? 8e (Jojrf>poavvrj Kal 
(fiiXepyia dvev dveXevdeplag. o/xotco? 8e Kal IBia 
Kal KOLvfj Kal /car' dvdpas Kal Kara yvvaiKas h^Z 
l,rjre1v CKaarov vndpx^tv rcov roiovrcov ocrots yap 
rd Kard yvvaiKas (fiavXa waTvep AaKeSaifJiovioLs , 
ax^Bov Kard to rjixiau ovk evSatfiovovcnv . 

7 UXovrov Se /xe/37y voixLa/xaros TrXrjdos, yrjs, 
Xcopi'(Jiiv KTTJaLS, en 8e emTrAcov KTrjcris /cat ^octkt]- 
fidroiv Kol dvSpaTToSojv ttXtjOcc Kal fxeyedei Kal 
KaXXet Sia(f)ep6vr(jov, ravra 8e Trdvra Kal aa(j>aXrj 
Kal iXevOepia Kal XPV^'-H'^- '^(^'ti 8e ;\;p7yCTt/>ta p.kv 
pbdXXov rd KdpTTLfxa, eXevdepia 8e rd rrpos airo- 
Xavaiv KapTTLfxa 8e Xeyco dcf)^ atv at Trpoaoooi, airo- 
XavariKd 8e dcf)* Sv fxr^hev Trapd rrjv xp'fjf^'-v yiyverai, 
6 Tt Kal d^iov. opos 8e da^aXeias p^ev to evTavda 
Kal ovroi KCKTrjadaL coctt' e^' aura) ett'at ttjv xP^^^v 
avTcbv rod Be oiKeZa elvai drav €<f)^ avrco fj djraX- 
XorpLwaai t) /X7y, Xdyco Se aTraXXorpLcoaLv Soglv /cat 

<» affXevOepla : literally, qualities unbecoming to a free 
man or woman, ungentlemanly, unladylike ; hence, mean, 
servile, sordid. 

* A similar charge against the Spartan women is made in 
the Politics (ii. 9. 5) : " Further, the looseness (dvecris) of the 
Spartan women is injurious both to the purpose of the con- 
stitution and the well-being of the State . . . their life is one 
of absolute luxury and intemperance " (compare Euripides, 
Andromache, 595-6 "even if she wished it, a Spartan girl 

50 



I 



RHETORIC, I. V. 6-7 

The blessing of good children and numerous chil-^ 
dren needs little explanation. For the common- 
wealth it consists in a large number of good young 
men, good in bodily excellences, such as stature, 
beauty, strength, fitness for athletic contests ; the 
moral excellences of a young man are self-control 
and courage. For the individual it consists in a 
number of good children of his own, both male and 
female, and such as we have described. Female 
bodily excellences are beauty and stature, their 
moral excellences self-control and industrious habits, 
free from servility.* The object of both the in- 
dividual and of the community should be to secure the 
existence of each of these qualities in both men and 
women ; for all those States in which the character 
of women is unsatisfactory, as in Lacedaemon,'' may 
be considered only half-happy. 

Wealth consists in abundance of money, ownership 
of land and properties, and further of movables, 
cattle, and slaves, remarkable for number, size, and 
beauty, if they are all secure, liberal, and useful. 
Property that is productive is more useful, but that 
which has enjoyment for its object is more hberal. 
By productive I mean that which is a source of 
income, by enjoyable that which offers no advantage 
beyond the use of it — at least, none worth men- 
tioning. Security may be defined as possession of 
property in such places and on such conditions that 
the use of it is in our own hands ; and ownership as 
the right of alienation or not,*^ by which I mean giving 

could not be chaste "). The opinion of Xenophon and 
Pkitarch is much more favourable. 

" fj /ULT] : in the ms. readings these words follow roO 
oiKtla elvai : " ownership or non-ownership." The altera- 
tion is Spengel's. 

51 



ARISTOTLE 

TTpaOLV. oXcOS 8e TO TrXoVTcXv ioTLV eV TO) p^pT^CT^at 

fidXXov T] iv Tcp KeKTrjadai- Kal yap rj evepyetd 
cart rcov roiovrcov /cat rj XP'^^^^ ttXovto?. 

8 EuSo^ta S' iarl to vtto ttolvtcov aTTovBaXov vtto- 
XajJiPdveaOac, t] tolovtov tl e^^iv ov Travres icfx.evTai, 
7] OL TToAAoL rj OL ayauoL i] ol <ppovip,oi. 

9 T1/X17 S' earl /xev arjixelov evepyeriKrjs So^rjs, 
TLfMcovrat 8e StKrat'oi? fxev /cat ixdXicrra ol cvepyerr]- 
Kores, ov [JbTjv dXXd rt/xarat /cat o Svvdpbevos evepye- 
relv evepyecrta 8e -^ et? acjrrjpiav Kat ocra atrta rov 
elvai, rj els ttXovtov, rj ets tl rojv dXXcov dyadoiv, 
ajv /JbT) paSta rj Krrjaig rj oXcos ^ evravda rj TTore' 
TToAAot ydp hid p.LKpd hoKovvra rtfjirjs rvyxdvovatv, 
aAA' OL roTTOt /cat ol Kaipol atrtot. p-^p^j Se ri,p,rjs 
dvaiai, fjivrjp,at ev perpois koL dvev p,erpoiv, yepa, 
repbevTj, TTpoehplai, rd(f)OL, et/cdve?, rpo(f)aL Stj- 
poaiai, rd ^ap^apiKd, olov TxpoaKwrjcjeis Kat 
eKardaeis , Sa>pa rd rtap eKdarois rip.ia. /cat yap 
rd Scvpov eari Krrjp-aros Soo-t? /cat riprjg (rrji-ieiov, 
Sto /cat ol (f>i,Xoxp'^P'Oiroi /cat ol (fiiXoripoL e(j}ievrai 

1361b ctUTcot'- dp,(f)or€poLs ydp exet cx)V heovraf Kat yap 
Krrjjxd eariVy ov e^ievrai ol ^lXoxp^P'^'Toi, /cat 
nprjv exei, ov ol (f)iX6rip,oi. 
10 Yiio[JLaros 8e dperrj vyleia, ax'rrrj he ovrcos coare 
dvoaovs elvai xp^J^l^^vovs rot? au>p,aaiv' ttoXXol yap 
vyiaivovaiv oiarrep 'H/aoSt/co? Xeyer at, ovs ouSet? 



" ivipyeia : realization in action or fact. 

* Of Selymbria, physician and teacher of hygienic gym- 
nastics (c. 420 B.C.)- He is said to have made his patients 
walk from Athens to Megara and back, about 70 miles. 
He was satirized by Plato and by his old pupil Hippo- 

52 



RHETORIC, I. V. 7-10 

the property away or selling it. In a word, being 
wealthy consists rather in use than in possession ; 
for the actualization" and use of such things is wealth. 

A good reputation consists in being considered a 
man of worth by all, or in possessing something of 
such a nature that all or most men, or the good, or 
the men of practical wisdom desire it. 

Honour is a token of a reputation for doing good ; 
and those who have already done good are justly 
and above all honoured, not but that he who is 
capable of doing good is also honoured. Doing good 
relates either to personal security and all the causes 
of existence ; or to wealth ; or to any other good 
things which are not easy to acquire, either in any 
conditions, or at such a place, or at such a time ; 
for many obtain honour for things that appear 
trifling, but this depends upon place and time. The 
components of honour are sacrifices, memorials in 
verse and prose, privileges, grants of land, front 
seats, public burial. State maintenance, and among 
the barbarians, prostration and giving place, and all 
gifts which are highly prized in each country. For 
a gift is at once a giving of a possession and a token 
of honour ; wherefore gifts are desired by the am- 
bitious and by those who are fond of money, since 
they are an acquisition for the latter and an honour 
for the former ; so that they furnish both with what 
they want. 

Bodily excellence is health, and of such a kind 
that when exercising the body we are free from sick- 
ness ; for many are healthy in the way Herodicus ^ 
is said to have been, 'whom no one would consider 

crates as one who killed those for whom he prescribed 
(c/. ii. 23. 29). 

53 



ARISTOTLE 

av evSai/jbovLaeie rijg vyieiag Sea to Trdvrcov aTT- 
e)^eadai rcov avOpoiTTLVcov ^ rcov TrXeioTCov . 

11 KaAAo? 8e 'irepov /ca^' eKoiarrjv rjXiKiav eariv. 
veov jjuev ovv kolXXos to Trpos rovs ttovovs ^pr^CTi/xov 
ep^ett" TO awixa rovs re rrpos Spofxov /cat Trpos" ^lav, 
TjSvv ovra ISetv Trpos aTroXavaiv, 8to ot TrivradXoi 
KaXXicrTOL, OTL TTpos ^lav /cat Trpos rd^os afxa TT€(f)v- 
Kaaiv aKfid^ovros Se Trpos fiev ttovovs rovs ttoXc- 
jMiKovs, rjSijv 8e etvat SoKeiv fjiera (fyo^eporrjros' 
yepovros Se Trpos jJiev ttovovs rovs dvayKaiovs 
LKavov, dXvTTOV 8e Sta to /xtjScv ^x^iv Sv ro yfjpas 
Xco^drai. 

12 lcr)(vs 8' eo-Tt fxev Bvvafj,is rod Kivelv erepov (Ls 
^ovXerai, dvdyKj] Se KLve.lv erepov t) eXKOvra r] 
(hdovvra T) a'Lpovra rj Tnit,ovra •^ avvdXi^ovra, oiore 
6 layypos r) Traotv r] rovroiv rialv icrriv laxvpos. 

13 ^leyeOovs 8e dperrj ro VTTepex^tv Kara fM-qKos Kal 
^ddos Kal TTXdros Ta>v ttoAAcDv roaovrco [Mell^ovL 
cocrre /Jirj ^pahvripas TTOieXv rds Kivijaeis 8td rrjv 
VTTep^oXriv . 

14 ^ AycovLcrriKr) 8e acopiaros dperrj avyKeirai ck 
fjieyedovs Kal lo'xvos Kal rd^ovs' Kal yap 6 ra^vs 
laxvpos iartv 6 yap Swdpuevos rd gkcXt] pLTrretv 
7TOJS Kal KiveXv ra^v Kal TToppco SpofiLKos, 6 Se 
OXi^eiv Kol KarexcLV TraXaLariKos, 6 Se (Laat, rfj 

" Five contests : jumping, running, discus-throwing, 
javelin-throwing, wrestling. 

* Or simply, freedom from pain " (§ 15). 
54 



RHETORIC, I. V. 10-14 

happy in the matter of health, because they are 
obliged to abstain from all or nearly all human 
enjoyments. 

Beauty varies with each age. In a young man, 
it consists in possessing a body capable of enduring 
all efforts, either of the racecourse or of bodily 
strength, while he himself is pleasant to look upon 
and a sheer delight. This is why the athletes in the 
pentathlum « are most beautiful, because they are' 
naturally adapted for bodily exertion and for swift- 
ness of foot. In a man who has reached his prime, 
beauty consists in being naturally adapted for the 
toils of war, in being pleasant to look upon and at 
the same time awe-inspiring. In an old man, beauty 
consists in being naturally adapted to contend with 
unavoidable laboiu-s and in not causing annoyance ^ 
to others, thanks to the absence of the disagreeable 
accompaniments of old age. 

Strength consists in the power of moving another 
as one wills, for which purpose it is necessary to 
pull or push, to lift, to squeeze or crush, so that the 
strong man is strong by virtue of being able to do 
all or some of these things. 

Excellence of stature consists in being superior to 
most men in height, depth, and breadth, but in such 
proportion as not to render the movements of the 
body slower as the result of excess. 

Bodily excellence in athletics consists in size, 
strength, and swiftness of foot ; for to be swift is to 
be strong. For one who is able to throw his legs 
about in a certain way, to move them rapidly and with 
long strides, makes a good runner ; one who can 
hug and grapple, a good wrestler ; one who can 
thrust away by a blow of the fist, a good boxer ; 

5n 



ARISTOTLE 

TrXriyfj TrvKrcKos, 6 8' dfJb<f)OT€pois rovrois nay- 
KpariaaTLKOs, 6 8e Trdai TrevradXos . 

15 Kvyrjpia S' iarl ^paSvrrjs y-qpcos /xer' dAuTTt'as" 
ovre yap el Ta)(v yqpdaKei, evyrjpcos, ovr^ el p,6yis 
fjLev XvTTrjpdJs 8e. eari he koI e/c rcov rod awfjiaros 
dpercbv /cat rvx^jS' fJirj dvoaos yap cx)v fjirjSe laxvpos 
ovK earai dTradrjg ovS' dXvTTOs Kal iroXvxpovios 
dvev TVX'TjS SiajjbelveLev dv. ean he tls Kal p^copt? 
laxvos Kal vyieias dXXrj Swa/xt? fJbaKpo^LorrjTos' 
TToXXol yap dvev rojv tov ad>pjaros dpercov jxaKpo- 
^Loi elaiv dXX ovSev rj dKpi^oXoyia p^pT^crtjUos" y] 
TTepl TOvra>v els rd vvv. 

16 HoXvcjuXLa Se Kal ;;^p7y(7TO0tAta ovk dSrjXa tov 
(j)lXov cLpLa/jievov , on earlv 6 rotovros (f)iXos oarts 
d o'lerai dyadd elvai eKeivco, TrpaKTiKos eariv 
avrd)v hi eKelvov. (h 8rj ttoXXoI tolovtoc, ttoXv- 
<J>lXos, CO Se Kal eVtei/cets" dvhpes, XPV^'^^4*''^^^ ' 

17 Kvrvxlo- 8' eariv, wv rj rvx^) dyadcov atria, ravra 
1362 a ylyveadac Kal vndpx^LV 7] Trdvra rj rd TrXetara rj rd 

pueytara. alria 8' earlv rj rvx^) eviojv puev cov Kal 
at rexyat, ttoXXwv 8e /cat drexvcDv, olov oacov rj 
(jivais {evhexerai Se /cat napd (f>vaLV elvaC)' vyieiag 
piev ydp rexvrj alria, KdXXovs 8e /cat pieyedovs 



<• A combination of wrestling and boxing. 

* The results of art and the results due to nature are often 
assisted (or hindered) by the interference of the irregular 
operations of fortune or chance. Health may be the result 
of fortune, as well as of art (a sick man may be cured by a 
drug taken by chance, one not prescribed by the physician) ; 
beauty and strength, of fortune as well as nature. It is 
parenthetically remarked that fortune may also produce 
unnatural monstrosities. The removal of the brackets and 
the substitution of a comma for the colon after ^tVis have 

56 



RHETORIC, I. V. 14-17 

one who excels in boxing and wrestling is fit for the 
pancratium," he who excels in all for the pentathliun. 

A happy old age is one that comes slowly with 
freedom from pain ; for neither one who rapidly 
grows old nor one who grows old insensibly but with 
pain enjoys a happy old age. This also depends 
upon bodily excellences and good fortune ; for unless 
a man is free from illness and is strong, he will never 
be free from suffering, nor will he live long and 
painlessly without good fortune. Apart from health 
and strength, however, there is a power of vitality 
in certain cases ; for many live long who are not 
endowed with bodily excellences. But a minute 
examination of such questions is needless for the 
present purpose. 

The meaning of niunerous and worthy friends is 
easy to understand from the definition of a friend. 
A friend is one who exerts himself to do for the sake 
of another what he thinks is advantageous to him. 
A man to whom many persons are so disposed, has 
many friends ; if they are virtuous, he has worthy 
friends. 

Good fortune consists in the acquisition or posses- 
sion of either all, or the most, or the most important 
of those goods of which fortune is the cause. Now 
fortune is the cause of some things with which the 
arts also are concerned, and also of many which have 
nothing to do with art, for instance, such as are due 
to nature (though it is possible that the results of 
fortune may be contrary to nature) ; for art is a 
cause of health, but nature of beauty and stature.* 

been suggested. The meaning would then be : " for instance, 
such as are due to nature, but possibly may be also contrary 
to nature." 

57 



ARISTOTLE 

<f>vat,s- oXcos Se ra rotavra rcjv ayaOoJv iarlv 
aiTO TVX'J^s, €(p ois eanv o (pUovos. ecrrt oe Kai 
rcov TTapa Xoyov dyaOcov alria rv^f], olov el ol 
dXXoi alaxpol dSeA^ot, o Se KaXos, ^ ol dXXot, firj 
elBov rov drjaavpov, 6 S' evpev, 7J el rod TrXrjaLOV 
erv)(e ro ^eXos, rovrov Se fiij, t] el ixr) rjXde pLovos 
del (f>oi,Ta>v, ol Se aTra^ eXdovres hie^ddp-qaav 
TTOvra yap rd roiavra evrv)(rip.a.ra So/cet elvai. 
18 Yiepl Se dpeTTJs, eTrelnep olKeioraros 6 Trepl roiis 
eTTaivovs TOTTOS, orav Trepl eiraivov TTOia}p,eda rov 
Xoyov, rore St,opt,crT€ov. 

6, ^Q,v fxev ovv Set aro-)(dt,eadaL TrporpeTTOvra cos 
ecropbevcov t] VTrapxovrojv , Kal ajv dTTorpeTTOvra, 
<f)avep6v rd ydp evavrca rovrojv iarlv. enei he 
rrpoKeirai rep avpu^ovXevovri. aKorros ro avp,(/)€pov, 
^ovXevovrat Se ov rrepl rov reXovs dXXd Trepl rcov 
TTpos ro reXos, ravra S' ecrrt rd crvp.(f)€povra Kara 
rds npd^eLS, ro Se avp,(f>epov dyadov, Xrjrrreov dv 
elrj aroLx^lo, Trepl dyaOov Kal avpi.(j>epovros dTrAcDs'. 
2 "^arui St] dyadov o dv avro eavrov evcKa ^ 
alperov, Kal ov eveKa dXXo alpovpbeda, koI ov 
e<f)lerai Trdvra r) rravra rd aladiqaLV exovra t) vovv, 
rj el Xd^OL vovv. Kal ocra 6 vovs dv CKdarw dTToSoiT], 
Kal oaa 6 Trepl eKaarov vovs aTToSlScoaLV eKaaro), 
rovro eariv eKaarco dyadov, Kal ov Trapovros ev 
Std/ceiTat Kal avrdpKOJs ^x^t, Kal ro avrapKes, Kal 

58 



RHETORIC, I. V. 17— VI. 2 

Speaking generally, the goods which come from 
fortune are such as excite envy. Fox'tune is 
also a cause of those goods which are beyond ^ 
calculation ; for instance, a man's brothers are all 
ugly, while he is handsome ; they did not see the '' 
treasure, while he found it ; the arrow hit one who 
stood by and not the man aimed at ; or, one who 
frequented a certain place was the only one who did 
not go there on a certain occasion, while those who 
went there then for the first tiine met their death. 
All such instances appear to be examples of good 
fortune. 

The definition of virtue, with which the topic of 
praise is most closely connected, must be left until 
we come to treat of the latter. 

6. It is evident, then, what things, Hkely to happen 
or already existing, the orator should aim at, when 
exhorting, and what when dissuading ; for they are 
opposites. But since the aim before the deliberative 
orator is that which is expedient, and men deliberate, 
not about the end, but about the means to the end, 
which are the things which are expedient in regard 
to our actions ; and since, further, the expedient is 
good, we must first grasp the elementary notions of 
good and expedient in general, ^ 

Let us assume good to be whatever is desirable 
for its own sake, or for the sake of which we choose 
something else ; that which is the aim of all things, 
or of all things that possess sensation or reason ; or 
would be, if they could acquire the latter. Whatever 
reason might assign to each and whatever reason 
does assign to each in individual cases, that is good 
for each ; and that whose presence makes a man 
fit and also independent ; and independence in 

59 



ARISTOTLE 

TO TTOLrjTLKOV 7] ^vXaKTlKOV TOJV TOLOVTCtJV, Kol <5 

aKoXovOeZ ra rotavra, /cat to, kcoXvtiko. tcov ivav- 
TLCov KOL ra (jidapriKa. 

3 AKoXovOeZ Se hL^cjs' r) yap a/x.a rj varepov, olov 
TO) [xev jxavdaveLV to eTriaTaadaL vaTepov, Tip 8€ 
vyiaweLV to t/qv a/ia. /cat to, TTOirjTLKa Tpi^^^t 
Ta p.ev (hs TO vyiaivetv vyieiag, to, 8e co? crtrta 
uyteta?, to. Se co? to yvpivdil^ecjd ai, ort <hs errl to 

4 TToXv TTOtet vyUiav. tovtcov 8e Kecfievcuv dvdyKT) 
Tas T€ Xiq^eis tojv dyaOcbv dyadds elvai /cat Tas 
TOiV KaKOiv diTo^oXds' dKoXovdet yap to) p,€v to 
firj €X€iv TO KaKov dfia, tco 8e to ex^iv to dyadov 

5 vaTepov. /cat rj dvT* iXdrrovos dyadov fj,€iC,ovos 
XrjiljLS /cat avTi fiei^ovos /ca/coy iXdrrovos' a> yap 

1362 b VTTepex^i TO fxel^ov Tov iXoTTOvos, TOVTCp yiVerat 

6 TOV jjLev Xrji/jLS tov S' dTTofioXr]. /cat ras" dperds Se 
dvdyKTj dyadov elvaf Kara yap raura? €v re 8ta- 
/ceti/rat oi e^ovTes, /cat TTotrjTLKal tcov dyaOcov elcrl 
/cat TTpaKTLKai. Trepl iKaaTrjs Be, /cat rt? /cat iroia, 

7 p^ojpt? prjTeov. /cat tt^i' ^Sovrjv dyadov elvaL' iravra 
yap enteral to, ^oia auTTJs T-fj (})voreL. axrre /cat rd 
T^Sea /cat to, /caAd dvdyKTj dyadd elvai- to. /u.et' ydp 
■j^Sov^S" TTOLTjTLKa, T(i)v he KaXoJv Ta fjbev rjSea rd 8e 
avTa Kad^ eavTa alperd eoTiv. 

8 'O.S Se Kad^ ev eiTTelv, dvdyKij dyadd elvai rdSe. 
euSai/xop'ta • /cat ydp /ca^' auro alpeTov /cat auV- 

9 apKcs, /cat eVe/ca aurou ttoAAo. alpovp.eda. Si/cato- 
crvvrj, dvBpia, aaxfipoavvrj , p,eyaXoil}vx^o-, [leyaXo- 
7Tpe7T€ta /cat at dAAat at TOtayrat e^eis' dperal ydp 
60 



RHETORIC, I. VI. 2-9 

general ; and that which produces or preserves such 
things, or on which such things follow, or all that is 
hkely to prevent or destroy their opposites. 

Now things follow in two ways — simultaneously or 
subsequently ; for instance, knowledge is subsequent 
to learning, but life is simultaneous with health. 
Things which produce act in three ways ; thus, healthi- 
ness produces health ; and so does food ; and exercise 
as a rule. This being laid down, it necessarily follows 
that the acquisition of good things and the loss of 
evil things are both good ; for it follows simultan- 
eously on the latter that we are rid of that which is 
bad, and subsequently on the former that we obtain 
possession of that which is good. The same applies 
to the acquisition of a greater in place of a less good, 
and a less in place of a greater evil ; for in proportion 
as the greater exceeds the less, there is an acquisi- 
tion of the one and a loss of the other. The virtues 
also must be a good thing ; for those who possess 
them are in a sound condition, and they are also 
productive of good things and practical. However, 
we must speak separately concerning each — what it 
is, and of what kind. Pleasure also must be a good ; 
for all living creatures naturally desire it. Hence it 
follows that both agreeable and beautiful things must 
be good ; for the former produce pleasure, while 
among beautiful things some are pleasant and others 
are desirable in themselves. 

To enumerate them one by one, the following 
things must necessarily be good. Happiness, since 
it is desirable in itself and self-sufficient, and to 
obtain it we choose a number of things. Justice, 
courage, self-control, magnanimity, magnificence, and 
all other similar states of mind, for they are virtues 

61 



ARISTOTLE 

10 ifjvx'fJ9. /cat vyUia /cat koXXos /cat ra roiavra' 
aperai yap crojixaros /cat TTOirjrLKal ttoWcov, otov r] 
vyUia /cat rjSovrjs /cat rov tjjv, Sto /cat dpcarov 
8o/cet etvai, ort Svo rcJov rot? TToAAot? TLfXLOjrdrojv 

11 atTtdv ioTLV, rjSovrjs /cat tou ^■r^v. ttAoutos"" dperrj 

12 ya/3 KTrjaeuis /cat TTOLrjrtKov iroXXajv. ^I'Aos" /cat 
^tAta* /cat ya/o /ca^' a?3TOV alperos 6 (fiiXos /cat 

13 TTOL-qriKos TroAAcov". TLfjcrj, Bo^a' /cat ya/^ T^Sea /cat 
7TOL7]rtKa TToAXcov, /Cat d/coAou^et avrot? co? evrt to 

14 TToAu TO V7Tap)^€LV €^' Ot? TtfJiCOVraL . SvvafJiLS TOV 

Aeyetv, to£» Trparrreiv TTOtrjTLKd yap Trdvra rd 

15 Toiavra dyadcbv. eVt ei)</>uta, p,vi]fj,7], evp^ddeia, 
dyx^voLa, Trdvra rd roiavra' TroLrjriKal ydp avrat 
dyaddjv at Swdfieis elaiv. oixoicos Se /cat at 67rt- 
arrjixai rrdaat /cat at re^vai /cat to ^-r^i/' et yd/o 

16 p.rjS€V dXXo erroLro dyadov, /ca^' auTO alperov 
iariv. /cat to St/catot'* avpi^ipov ydp ri kolvtj icrriv. 

17 TauTa fiev ovv ax^Bov rd ofioXoyovpieva dyadd 

18 icrnv' iv Se TOt? dp,(f>L<j^r]rrjcrLixois e/c rcovhe ol 
avXXoyLcrfioL a) to ivavrtov /ca/cov, tout dyadov. 

19 /cat o^ TO ivavnov rols ixdpolg (Tvp.(f)epef otov et 
TO SetAou? ett'at fidXiara avpLcftepei, roXs ex^polsj 
BijXov oTt dvhpia pidXiara co^eAt^ov Tot? TroAtTatj. 

20 /cat oAoj? o ot ex^pol ^ovXovrat t^ i(f) w x'^^povcri, 
rovvavriov rovrco dxpeXipiov (jyaiverai- Sto eu et- 
pi^Tat 

" The excellence of anything is proportionate to its success 
in the performance of its proper function. The function of 
acquisition is to get something valuable, such as money, and 
its " excellence " may be judged by the amount of wealth 
obtained. 

62 



RHETORIC, I. VI. 10-20 

of the soul. Health, beauty, and the like, for they 
are virtues of the body and produce many advan- 
tages ; for instance, health is productive of pleasure 
and of life, wherefore it is thought to be best of all, 
because it is the cause of two things which the 
majority of men prize most highly. Wealth, since 
it is the excellence of acquisition " and productive of 
many things. A friend and friendship, since a fi-iend 
is desirable in himself and produces many advan- 
tages. Honour and good repute, since they are 
agreeable and produce many advantages, and are 
generally accompanied by the possession of those 
things for which men are honoured. Eloquence and 
capacity for action ; for all such faculties are pro- 
ductive of many advantages. Further, natural clever- 
ness, good memory, readiness to learn, quick- witted- 
ness, and all similar qualities ; for these faculties are 
productive of advantages. The same applies to all 
the sciences, arts, and even life, for even though no 
other good should result from it, it is desirable in 
itself. Lastly, justice, since it is expedient in general 
for the common weal. 

These are nearly all the things generally recognized 
as good ; in the case of doubtful goods, the argu- 
ments in their favour are draM^n from the following. 
That is good the opposite of which is evil, or the 
opposite of which is advantageous to our enemies ; 
for instance, if it is specially advantageous to our 
enemies that we should be cowards, it is clear that 
courage is specially advantageous to the citizens. 
And, speaking generally, the opposite of what our 
enemies desire or of that in which they rejoice, 
appears to be advantageous ; wherefore it was well 
said : 

63 



ARISTOTLE 

ecTTt S ovK del tovto, aAA' cus" e77t to ttoXv' ovBev 
yap KcoXvcL iviore ravro avjx(j)epeiv rot? eVavrtoi?" 
bdev Xiyerai cos rd /ca/ca avvdyei rovg dvd pioTTOvs , 
1363 a orav fj ravro ^Xa^epov dpi^oZv. 

21 Kat o pbTj icmv vnep^oXy^, rovro dyadov, o 8' dv 

22 1] p.€ll,ov Tj Set, KaKov. /cat ov eVe/ca ttoAAo. TTeirovq- 
rai rj SeSaTrdvrjraf ^aivopbevov yap dyadov rjSr], 
Kat cos reXos ro rotovrov V7ToXap,j3dv€raL, /cat 
TcAos" TToAAoii'' ro 8e reXos dyadov. 66 ev ravr* 
etprjraL, 

/caS Se K€v evxojXrjv Ylpidp^co [/cat Tpcoal Xirroiev 
Apyetrjv 'EiXevrjv] 

/cat 

ataxpov rot Srjpov re ptevetv [^Keveov re veeadat^, 

Kat rj TTapotptta he, ro errt Ovpats rrjv vSptav. 

23 Kat oi) TToAAoi e(f>tevrat, Kat ro TreptpLayri'Tov 
(f)atv6p,evov ov yap irdvres e^tevrat, rovr" dyadov 

24 rjv, ot he rroXXot wartep irdvres <^aivovrat. /cat to 
eiratveTov ouSets" yap ro pA] dyadov erratveX. /cat 
6 ot e^dpot inatvovatv uiOTrep yap irdvres y)hrj 

" Iliad, i. 255. The words are those of Nestor to Achilles 
and Agamemnon, in which he points out how their enemies 
would rejoice if they heard all the story of their quarrel. 

* Reading 6. The ordinary reading ov is taken to mean 
" that which does not permit of excess," that which is mid- 
way between two extremes, the mean. Another suggested 
rendering is, "that of which one cannot have too much." 

" Iliad, ii. IGO. Addressed by Hera to Athene, begging 
her to prevent the Greeks departing from Troy and leaving 
Helen behind. 
64 



RHETORIC, I. VI. 20-24 

Of a truth Priam would exult." 

This is not always the case, but only as a general 
rule, for there is nothing to prevent one and the 
same thing being sometimes advantageous to two 
opposite parties ; hence it is said that misfortune 
brings men together, when a common danger 
threatens them. 

That which is not in excess * is good, whereas that 
which is greater than it should be, is bad. And that 
which has cost much labour and expense, for it at 
once is seen to be an apparent good, and such a 
thing is regarded as an end, and an end of many 
efforts ; now, an end is a good. Wherefore it was 
said : 

And they would [leave Argive Helen for Priam and the 
Trojans] to boast of," 

and, 

It is disgraceful to tarry long,"* 

and the proverb, " [to break] the pitcher at the 
door."* 

And that which many aim at and which is seen to 
be competed for by many ; for that which all aim 
at was recognized as a good, and the majority may 
almost stand for " all." And that which is the object 
of praise, for no one praises that which is not good. 
And that which is praised by enemies ; for if even 

'' Iliad, ii. 298. Spoken by Odysseus. While sym- 
pathizing with the desire of the army to leave, he points out 
that it would be " disgraceful after waiting so long " to 
return unsuccessful, and exhorts them to hold out. 

* Proverbial for " lost labour." Cf. French '^faire nau- 
frage au port" and the English " there's many a slip 'twixt 
cup and lip." 

F Q5 



ARISTOTLE 

ofxoXoyovaiv , el /cat ot KaKcos Trenovdores' 8ta yap 
TO (f>av€p6v ojxoXoyolev av, ojairep /cat (jtavXoi ovs 
ol ixOpoL enaLvovaiv. 8to XeXoiSopijadaL vveXa^ov 
l^opivdioi VTTO TiifxojvlSov TTOirjaavros 

Y^opivdioLS 8' ov fxeficfyerai to "IXlov. 

25 /cat o Tcov ^poviixcov Tt? '^ ribv ayaOoJv dvhpcov rj 
yvvaiKWV TrpocKpivev, otov ^OSvacrda Kdiqvd /cat 
'EAeVryj/ Qiqaev? koI ^AXe^avSpov at deal /cat 
'A;^;tAAea "OfJbrjpos. 

26 Kat oXois Ta Trpoatperd' TrpoaLpovvrai. 8e rrpar- 
reiv rd re elprjfieva /cat rd toi? e^dpols /ca/ca /cat 

27 TO. Tot? (jiiXoLs dyadd /cat to, Syj^ara. ravra 8e 
8i;(cos" ecrrt, ra re yev6p.eva dv /cat to. paSicos yiyvo- 
pueva. pdSta 8e Sera t] dvev Xvirr]? -^ iv oXiyco ypovw' 
TO ya/) ;^aAe7rov 6piC,erai t) Auttt^ -^ TTXrjdeL ;(/30vou. 
/cat eav cos" ^ovXovrai- ^ovXovrai he rj p,r)Sev KaKov 
7] eXarrov rod dyadov' rovro 8' eorat, edv rj Xav- 

28 ddvr] rj npicopia -J) puKpa fj. /cat Ta t8ta, /cat a 
p,rjSeL9, /cat to, TTeptrrd- TLjiri yap ovrw p.dXXov. 
/cat Ta dppLorrovra avrols' TOtavra 8e tci Te irpoa- 
■qKovra Kara yevos /cat Svvapbiv, /cat c5v eXXeirreiv 

° Meaning that they cannot have done their duty against 
their enemies, who would then have blamed them. Another 
suggested reading is ot)s ol (piXoi ^eyouai Kai oO? oi exOpoi firf 
\j/iyov<TL ("those whom their friends blame and whom their 
enemies do not blame "). 

" In the Iliad Glaucus, a Corinthian, is described as an 
ally of the Trojans. Simonides meant to praise, but the 
Corinthians were suspicious and thought his words were 
meant satirically, in accordance with the view just expressed 
by Aristotle. The Simonides referred to is Simonides of 
Ceos (Frag. 50, P.L.G. iii., where the line is differently 
given). Aristotle is evidently quoting from memory, as he 
often does, although not always accurately. 

66 



RHETORIC, I. VI. 24-28 

those who are injured by it acknowledge its goodness, 
this amounts to a universal recognition of it ; for it 
is because of its goodness being evident that they 
acknowledge it, just as those whom their enemies 
praise are worthless."^ Wherefore the Corinthians 
imagined themselves insulted by Simonides, when 
he wrote, 

Ilium does not blame the Corinthians.* 

And that which one of the practically wise or good, 
man or woman, has chosen before others, as Athene 
chose Odysseus, Theseus Helen, the goddesses 
Alexander (Paris), and Homer Achilles. 

And, generally speaking, all that is deliberately 
chosen is good. Now, men deliberately choose to do 
the things just mentioned, and those which are 
harmful to their enemies, and advantageous to their 
friends, and things which are possible. The last are 
of two kinds : things which might happen," and 
things which easily happen ; by the latter are meant 
things that happen without labour or in a short time, 
for difficulty is defined by labour or length of time. 
And anything that happens as men wish is good ; 
and what they wish is either what is not evil at all 
or is less an evil than a good, which will be the case 
for instance, whenever the penalty attached to it is 
unnoticed or light. And things that are peculiar to 
them, or which no one else possesses,** or which are 
out of the common ; for thus the honour is greater. 
And things which are appropriate to them ; such 
are all things befitting them in respect of birth and 
power. And things which they think they lack, 

" -^evbixeva. dv : Spengel omits &v : i.e. " things which have 
happened." 

"* " Or which no one else has done " (J ebb). 

67 



ARISTOTLE 

OLOvrac, kov fMtKpa fj' ovhkv yap rjrrov TrpoaipovvTai 

29 ravra Trpdrretv. /cat ra evKarepyaara' Svvara 
yap (Ls paSia' evKaripyaara 8e, a Travres t] ol 
TToAAot 7j ol ofjioioi T^ OL tJttovs KaTa)p9o)crav . /cai 
a x^pLovvrat rots ^t'Aots", ^ a OLTrex^drjaovrat rot? 
e^dpolS' Kal Sua ovs OaviMoi^ovcrL Trpoaipovvrai 
TTparreLV. Kal TTpos a evcbveXs elcrl Kai kjjirreLpot' 
paov yap Karopdayaetv o'iovrai. /cat a /xT^Setj 
<j)avXos' eTraivera yap fiaXXov. /cat cov eTTiOvfJiovV' 
res rvyxavovoLV ov yap p,6vov rjSv aAAa /cat 

30 jSeArtov (jyaiverai. /cat [xaXicrra e/cacrroi TTpos a 

1363 b TOtOUTOl, otoV OL (f)LX6vLKOL €L VLKT] cWat, OL <J}lX6- 
TLpLOL €L TLfXri, OL (f)LXoXP'TJP'0-TOL €L ;)^p7y/iaTa, /Cat Ol 

(xAAoi (haavrois. irepl p,€v ovv dyadov /cat rov 

(TVIJL(f)€pOVTOS €K TOVTCDV XrjTTTeOV TOLS TTLGTeL'S. 

7. 'Evret Se 7roAAa/ct? 6p,oXoyovvT€S dp,(f>co avp,- 
(f)€p€LV TTepl rov fiaXXov dp,(f)L(7Pr]Tovcnv, icfie^ijg dv 
eLTj XeKTcov TTepl rov jxeit^ovog dyadov Kal rod 

2 yidXXov avfi(f)€povro9. earoj Srj inrepexov jxev ro- 
aovrov Kal erL, VTTepexopLevov 8e ro ivvTTdpxov . 
Kal jxel^ov p,ev del Kal TrXeZov Trpog eXarrov, p,4ya 
Se /cat [MLKpov Kal ttoXv Kal oAtyov TTpos ro rcov 
TToXXcov fMeyeOos, Kal vnepexov p.kv ro fJLeya, ro Se 
eAAetTTOv p,LKp6v, /cat ttoXv /cat oXiyov waavrojs. 

3 eVet ovv dyadov Xdyofjbev ro re avro avrov eveKa 

68 



RHETORIC, I. VI. 28— vn. 3 

however unimportant ; for none the less they de- 
hberately choose to acquire them. And things which 
are easy of accompHsliment, for being easy they are 
possible ; such things are those in which all, or most 
men, or those who are equals or inferiors have been 
successful. And things whereby they will gratify 
friends or incur the hatred of enemies. And all 
things that those whom they admire deliberately 
choose to do. And those things in regard to which 
they are clever naturally or by experience ; for they 
hope to be more easily successful in them. And 
things which no worthless man would approve, for 
that makes them the more commendable. And 
things which they happen to desire, for such things 
seem not only agreeable, but also better. Lastly, 
and above all, each man thinks those things 
good which are the object of his special desire, as 
victory of the man who desires victory, honour of 
the ambitious man, money of the avaricious, and so 
in other instances. These then are the materials 
from which we must draw our arguments in reference 
to good and the expedient. 

7. But since men often agree that both of two 
things are useful, but dispute which is the more so, 
we must next speak of the greater good and the 
more expedient. Let one thing, then, be said to 
exceed another, when it is as great and something 
more — and to be exceeded when it is contained in 
the other. " Greater " and " more " always imply 
a relation with less ; " great " and " small," " much " 
and " little " with the general size of things ; the 
" great " is that which exceeds, and that which falls 
short of it is " small " ; and similarly " much " and 
" little." Since, besides, we call good that which is 

69 



ARISTOTLE 

Kai /XT] aXXov aiperov, /cat ov Tvavr* icfyUrai, koI o 
vovv av /cat (fipovrjcrLv Xa^ovra eXoiro, /cat ro ttolt)- 
TiKov /cat TO (f)vXaKTLK6v, rj ip CTrerat to. roiavra, 
TO o ov €V€Ka TO TeAos eoTt, TeAog o eoTLv ov 
evcKa Ta aAAa, avTco Se dyadov to rrpos avTov 
TavTa 7T€7Tov66s, dvdyKrj Ta tc 7rAeia> tov ii'6? /cat 
Tcov iXaTTovcov , avvapiOfMovfievov tov ivos t) tcuj' 
iXaTTovcov, /Ltei^ov dyaOov ^ivaf V7Tepi)(ei ydp, to 
8e ivvTTapxov VTrepex^Tai. 

4 Kat idv TO pbeyicrrov tov fxeyiaTov virepixj}, koI 
avTa avTcov /cat oaa aura avTwv, /cat to p,eyiaTov 
TOV pLeytoTov olov et o puiy lotos dvqp yvvaiKos 
TTJ? pieyLaTTjs /xei^cov, /cat oAo)? ol dvSpes rcbv 
yvvaiKcov piCL^ovs' /cat ei ol dvBpes oXoJS tojv yvvai- 
Kwv /xet^oy?, /cat dvrjp 6 pieyLOTOs ttjs pLeyLcrTrjs 
yvvaiKog pLel^cov dvdXoyov ydp exovaiv at vrrep- 
o;^at Ta)v yeucov /cat tcov pbcyloTcov iv ainoZg. /cat 

5 OTOV Tohe pLCV TOjSe eTrrjTai, eKeZvo 8e tovtw piiq' 
CTTCTaL he rj t<x> dpua rj to) icfie^rjs t) ttj bvvdpLec 
ewTTapxet ydp rj XPV^^^ V "^^^ irrop-evov iv Tjj 
OaTepov. CTrerat 8e a'^a pijkv to) vyialveLV to t,rjv, 
TOVTCp he eKelvo ov, voTepov he tw p,avddvei,v to 
eTTLOTaaOai, hvvdp,eL he to) lepoavXelv to dno- 
OTepelv 6 ydp iepoavXijaas kou dTToaTeprjaeiev . /cat 



" The one, the smaller number, and the greater number 
must be of the same species. Thus, 5 pounds is a greater 
good than 2 pounds ; but 5 farthings is not a greater good 
than 2 pounds, since the smaller number is not reckoned in 
with the greater (Buckley). 

* If B (life) follows on, is the consequent of A (health), 
but A is not the consequent of li, then A is a greater good 
than B. 

70 



RHETORIC, I. vii. 3-5 

desirable for its own sake and not for anything else, 
and that which all things aim at and which they 
would choose if they possessed reason and practical 
wisdom ; and that which is productive or protective 
of good, or on which such things follow ; and since that 
for the sake of which anything is done is the end, 
and the end is that for the sake of which everything 
else is done, and that is good for each man which 
relatively to him presents all these conditions, it 
necessarily follows that a larger number of good 
things is a greater good than one or a smaller 
number, if the one or the smaller number is reckoned 
as one of them ; ** for it exceeds them and that 
which is contained is exceeded. 

And if that which is greatest in one class surpass 
that which is greatest in another class, the first class 
will surpass the second ; and whenever one class 
surpasses another, the greatest of that class will 
surpass the greatest of the other. For instance, if 
the biggest man is greater than the biggest woman, 
men in general will be bigger than women ; and if 
men in general are bigger than women, the biggest 
man will be bigger than the biggest woman ; for the 
superiority of classes and of the greatest things con- 
tained in them are proportionate. And when this 
follows on that, but not that on this [then " that " 
is the greater good] ; ^ for the enjoyment of that 
which follows is contained in that of the other. 
Now, things follow simultaneously, or successively, 
or potentially ; thus, life follows simultaneously on 
health, but not health on life ; knowledge follows 
subsequently on learning [but not learning on 
knowledge] ; and simple theft potentially on sacri- 
lege, for one who commits sacrilege will also steal. 

71 



ARISTOTLE 

6 ra VTTepexovra rod avrov fjb€Ll,ovt fiei^oj ' dvdyKT) 

7 yap vrrepex^iv /cat tov pbeit^ovos. kol rd pbeit^ovos 
ayadov TTonqriKa pieil^co' rovro yap tjv to ixell,ovo£ 
TroLTjrLKO) eivai. /cat ov ro ttoltjtlkov fiell^ov, clbar- 
avTOJS' et yap to vyieivov alpercvrepov rod rjSeo? 
/cat /JLel^ov dyaOov, /cat rj vyieia rrjs rjSoi'rjs /xet^cov. 

8 /cat ro atpercorepov KaO avro rod fir] /ca^' avro, 
1364 a olov laxvs vyieivov- ro fjiev yap ovx avrov eveKa, 

9 TO 8e auTou, orrep rjv ro ayadov. Kciv fj ro fxev 
reXos, ro 8e pir] reXos' ro p.ev yap dXXov eVe/ca, ro 
8e avrov, olov ro yvp.vdl,eadai rod ev ex^LV ro 

10 crcofMa. /cat ro rjrrov TTpoaSeopievov darepov t] 
irepojv avrapKearepov yap- rjrrov Se TrpoaSelraL 

11 ro iXarrovcov ^ pa6va)v TrpoaSeopcevov . /cat orav 
ToSe pi€V dv€V rovSe pur] fj r) purj Svvarov fj yeveadat, 
darepov Se dvev rovrov avrapKearepov Se ro p,r] 
Seopievov, ware ^aiverai piel^ov dyaOov. 

12 Kav fj dpxr}, ro he p,7j dpxrj. Kav fj alriov, rd S' 
ovK alriov, Sta ro avro- dvev ydp alriov /cat dpx^js 
aSvvarov elvai rj yeveadai. /cat hvoZv dpxalv rd 
arro rrjs pLeil,ovog pLel^ov, /cat Svoiv alrioiv rd and 
TOV p,eit,ovog alriov p,eZt,ov. /cat dvaTraXiv Stj Bvolv 
dpxaiv rj rod p.eil,ovos dpx^) p-eit^cov /cat hvolv alrioiv 



" Eight is greater than 2 by 6, which itself is greater than 2. 
72 



RHETORIC, I. vn. 6-12 

And things which exceed the same thing by a greater 
amount [than sometliing else] are greater, for they 
must also exceed the greater.** And things which 
produce a greater good are greater ; for this we 
agreed was the meaning of productive of greater. 
And similarly, that which is produced by a greater 
cause ; for if that which produces health is more 
desirable than that which produces pleasure and a 
greater good, then health is a greater good than 
pleasure. And that which is more desirable in itself 
is superior to that which is not ; for example, strength 
is a greater good than the wholesome, which is not 
desirable for its own sake, while strength is ; and 
this we agreed was the meaning of a good. And 
the end is a greater good than the means ; for the 
latter is desirable for the sake of something else, the 
former for its own sake ; for instance, exercise is 
only a means for the acquirement of a good con- 
stitution. And that which has less need of one or 
several other things in addition is a greater good, 
for it is more independent (and " having less need " 
means needing fewer or easier additions). And when 
one thing does not exist or cannot be brought into 
existence without the aid of another, but that other 
can, then that which needs no aid is more indepen- 
dent, and accordingly is seen to be a greater good. 

And if one thing is a first principle, and another 
not ; if one thing is a cause and another not, for the 
same reason ; for without cause or first principle 
nothing can exist or come into existence. And if 
there are two first principles or two causes, that 
which results from the greater is greater ; and 
conversely, when there are two first principles or 
two causes, that which is the first cause or principle 

73 



ARISTOTLE 

13 TO TOV fM€it,OVOS (x'vTlOV jtXet^OV. hrjXoV OVV €K TtOV 

elprjixevcou on dfj,(f)OTepa>g nel^ov eanv koL yap ei 
^PXV> "^^ ^^ P'l '^PX1> So^et fjieX^ov elvai, kul et /X17 

^PXV> "^^ ^^ ^PXV> "^^ y^P '^^'^O? pLcZt^OV KOL OVK 

dpx'^, (x)(T7T€p 6 AeojSa/xa? KarrjyopoJv €(f)T] KaAAt- 
arpdrov rov ^ovXevaavra rod Trpd^avros fxdXXov 
dSiKelv ov yap dv TrpaxO^^vai p,rj ^ovXevaafjievov 
TTaXiv Se Kal Xa^pi'ou, rov rrpd^avra rov ^ovXcv- 
aavros' ov yap dv yeveadai, el p.rj rjv 6 TTpd^cov 
rovrov yap eVe/ca em^ovXeveiv , ottcos TTpd^coaiv. 

14 Kat rd GTraviwrepov rov dcjydovov, olov xpvaos 
aih-qpov dxp'Tjcrrorepos cov p,€tl,ov yap rj Krijai^ Sta 
ro x^^XcTTcorepav etvac. dXXov Se rporrov ro a- 
cf)dovov rov OTTavLOV, on rj XPI^^^ VTrepexcr ro 
yap TToXXaKL? rov oAtya/ct? VTrepex^f dOev Xeyerat 

dpiarov p^ev vSa>p. 

ig Kal oXcDg ro ;)(aAe7rcj6Tepov rov paovos' crTravtco- 
repov ydp. dXXov 8e rporrov ro paov rod p^aAcTrco- 

" A thing may be of greater importance in two ways : («) 
that which is a first principle is superior to that which is not ; 
(6) that which is not a first principle, but an end, is superior 
to that which is a first principle ; for the end is superior to 
the means. In the illustration that follows : (a) the first 
principle (suggesting the plot) is said to be of more import- 
ance (worse) than the end or result (carrying out the plot) ; 
(6) on the other hand, this end is said to be worse than the 
first principle, since the end is superior to the means. Thus 
the question of the amount of guilt can be argued both 
ways. 

"" Oropus, a frontier-town of Boeotia and Attica, had been 
occupied by the Thebans (366 b.c). Callistratus suggested 
an arrangement which was agreed to and carried out by 
C'liabrias — that the town should remain in Theban possession 
for the time being. Negotiations proved unsuccessful arid 

74 



RHETORIC, I. vn. 13-15 

of the greater is greater. It is clear then, from what 
has been said, that a thing may be greater in two 
ways ; for if it is a first principle but another is not, 
it will appear to be greater, and if it is not a 
first principle [but an end], while another is ; for 
the end is greater and not a first principle." Thus, 
Leodamas, when accusing Callistratus,^ declared that 
the man who had given the advice was more guilty 
than the one who carried it out ; for if he had not 
suggested it, it could not have been carried out. 
And conversely, when accusing Chabrias, he declared 
that the man who had carried out the advice was 
more guilty than the one who had given it ; for it 
could not have been carried out, had there not been 
some one to do so, and the reason why people devised 
plots was that others might carry them out. 

And that which is scarcer is a greater good than 
that which is abundant, as gold than iron, although 
it is less useful, but the possession of it is more 
valuable, since it is more difficult of acquisition. 
From another point of view, that which is abundant 
is to be preferred to that which is scarce, because the 
use of it is greater, for " often " exceeds " seldom "; 
whence the saying : 

Water is best." 
And, speaking generally, that which is more difiicult 
is preferable to that which is easier of attainment, 
for it is scarcer ; but from another point of view that 
which is easier is preferable to that which is more 

the Thebans refused to leave, whereupon Chabrias and 
CaUistratus were brought to trial, Leodamas was an 
Athenian orator, pupil of Isocrates, and pro-Theban in his 
political views. 

* Pindar, Olympia, i. 1. 

75 



ARISTOTLE 

16 Tcpov ex^t yap (Ls ^ovXoixeOa. Kal & ro evavriov 
fji.eZt,ov, Kal oS rj areprjais iieit,<av. Kal dperrj firj 
apeTTJs Kal KaKia [xrj Kra/cta? /xet^cov ra fiev yap 

17 reX-q, ra 8 ov reXr]. Kal cSv ra cpya /caAAto* 'q 
aicrxico, //.et'^o) avrd. Kal ajv at KaKtat Kal at 
dperal p,et^ovs, Kal rd epya [xeL^oj, eTreLTTep (hs rd 
atVta Kal at dp^ai, Kal rd dTTo^alvovra, Kal cos to, 

18 aTTO^aivovTa, Kal rd atVta Kal at dp^al. Kal <Lv 
Tj VTTepoxrj atperwrepa t) KaXXtcov, otov ro dKpi^cos 
opdv alperojrepov rov oa^paiveadar Kal ydp oi/jls 

1364b oa^prjaeojs' Kal rd <j>LXeraZpov elvai rov <j>iXoxprj- 
fiarov fiaXXov KaXXiov, ware Kal ^iXeraipia (j)iXo- 
XP'qP'O.ria^ . Kal dvrLK€ip,evct)s 8e rwv ^eXriovcov 
at VTTep^oXal ^eXriovs Kal KaXXiovoyv /caAAtous". 

19 Kal (Lv at eindvfjiiai KaXXiovs rj ^eXriovs' at ydp 
/xet^ou? ope^eis /xet^ovcov elaiv. /cat r(ji)v KaXXio- 
vcov Be ■^ /cat ^eXriovcav at eTrt^u/ztai ^eXriovs Kal 
KaXXiovs Sta ro avro. 

20 Kal cov at eTnarrjfxaL KaXXtovs r) aTTOvSaLorepai, 
Kal rd TTpdyfjiara /caAAtcu /cat aTTOvSacorepa' (l)s 
ydp €X€i rj eTTLarrjpirj, Kal ro dXrjOes- /ceAeuet Se ro 
avrrjs iKaarrj. /cat ra)v aTTOvSaiorepcov Se /cat 

21 /caAAtovojv at iTricrrrjp,ai dvdXoyov 8ta raura. /cat 

Kpiveiav dv rj KeKpiKaaw ol ^povt/xot r) Trdvres rj 

01 TToAAoi rj ol ttXcIovs ^ ol Kpanaroi dyadov fj 

" e.g. it is worse to be blind than deaf ; therefore sight is 
better than hearing (Schrader). 

76 



RHETORIC, I. VII. 16-21 

difficult ; for its nature is as we wish. And that, 
the contrary or the deprivation of which is greater, 
is the greater good."* And virtue is greater than 
non- virtue, and vice than no n- vice ; for virtues and 
vices are ends, the others not. And those things 
whose works are nobler or more disgraceful are them- 
selves greater ; and the works of those things, the 
vices and virtues of which are greater, will also be 
greater, since between causes and first principles 
compared with results there is the same relation as 
between results compared with causes and first prin- 
ciples. Things, superiority in which is more desirable 
or nobler, are to be preferred ; for instance, sharp- 
ness of sight is preferable to keenness of smell ; for 
sight is better than smell. And loving one's friends 
more than money is nobler, whence it follows that 
love of friends is nobler than love of money. And, 
on the other hand, the better and nobler things are, 
the better and nobler will be their superiority ; and 
similarly, those things, the desire for which is nobler 
and better, are themselves nobler and better, for 
greater longings are directed towards greater objects. 
For the same reason, the better and nobler the 
object, the better and nobler are the desires. 

And when the sciences are nobler and more 
dignified, the nobler and more dignified are their 
subjects ; for as is the science, so is the truth wliich 
is its object, and each science prescribes that which 
properly belongs to it ; and, by analogy, the nobler 
and more dignified the objects of a science, the nobler 
and more dignified is the science itself, for the same 
reasons. And that which raen of practical wisdom, 
either all, or more, or the best of them, would judge, 
or have judged, to be a greater good, must necessarily 

77 



ARISTOTLE 

fieZ^ov, dvayKT] ovrcos ^X^^^' V ^"^^^s t] fj Kara ttjv 
(f)p6vr)aiv CKpivav. eon he rovro kolvov Kal Kara 
Tiov dXXcov Kal yap rl Kal iroaov Kal ttolov ovtws 
ex^i' CO? av Tj i7TL(rrrjp.rj koI rj (f)p6vr]ai.s eliroi. oAA' 
eTT* ayadwv elpT^Kafxev aypiarai yap ayadov elvai, 
o Xa^ovra ra Trpdyfiara (j>p6vriaiv eXon' av e/ca- 
OTOV hriXov ovv OTL Kal [j,€Li,ov, o jjidXXov "q (fipovrjcns 

22 Xeyei. Kal to rots ^eXrioaiv VTrdp^ov, ■^ dTrAcDs" t] 
fj jSeArtous", olov dvhpia laxvo?. Kal o eXoiT* av 6 
^eXrlwVj 7) aTrXdJs t] fj ^eXritov, olov ro dhiKeZadai 
fxdXXov Tj dhiKeiv rovro yap 6 SiKaLorepos av 

23 eXoLro. Kal ro -^Slov rov rjrrov rjSeos' rrjv yap 
-^SovTjv rrdvra hiajKec, /cat avrov eVe/ca rod rjBeadai 
opeyovrat, copiaTai 8e rovrois ro dyadov Kal to 
riXos. rjSiov Se ro re aXvirorepov Kal ro ttoXv- 

24 XP^^^^'^^P^^ y]hv. /cat ro koXXiov rov rjrrov KaXov' 
ro yap KaXov eariv rjroc ro tjSv rj ro Kad* avro 

25 alperov. Kal oaojv avrol avrots t] <f>LXois ^ov- 
Xovrai aiTtot eirat jidXXov, ravra /xet'^oj dya^a, 

26 oacov Se rjKLora, jieit^co /ca/cd. /cat ra iroXvxpo- 
VLiLrepa rcov oXiyoxpovLCorepcov /cat rd ^e^atorepa 
rcov jxrj ^e^aLorepcov v7repex€L yap rj xP'fj'^i'S rdjv 
fMev rep XP^^V "^^^ ^^ ''"?? ^ovXrjaer orav yap ^ov' 
XoJvraL, vrrapx^i p-aXXov rj rov ^e^aiov. 

27 Kat d)s dv 6/c rdJv avaroixo^v Kal rwv o/jlolojv 

78 



RHETORIC, I. VII. 21-27 

be such, either absolutely or in so far as they have 
judged as men of practical wisdom. The same may 
be said in regard to everything else ; for the nature, 
quantity, and quality of things are such as would be 
defined by science and practical wisdom. But our 
statement only applies to goods ; for we defined 
that as good which everything, if possessed of prac- 
tical wisdom, would choose ; hence it is evident that 
that is a greater good to which practical wisdom 
assigns the superiority. So also are those things 
which better men possess, either absolutely, or in so 
far as they are better ; for instance courage is better 
than strength. And what the better man would 
choose, either absolutely or in so far as he is better ; 
thus, it is better to suffer wrong than to commit it, 
for that is what the juster man would choose. And 
that which is more agreeable rather than that which 
is less so ; for all things pursue pleasure and desire 
it for its own sake ; and it is by th^se conditions 
that the good and the end have been defined. And 
that is more agreeable which is less subject to pain 
and is agreeable for a longer time. And that which 
is nobler than that which is less noble ; for the noble 
is that which is either agreeable or desirable in itself. 
And all things which we have a greater desire to be 
instrumental in procuring for ourselves or for our 
friends are greater goods, and those as to which our 
desire is least are greater evils. And things that 
last longer are preferable to those that are of shorter 
duration, and those that are safer to those that are 
less so ; for time increases the use of the first and 
the wish that of the second ; for whenever we wish, 
we can make greater use of things that are safe. 
And things in all cases follow the relations between 

79 



ARISTOTLE 

TTTwaecov, Kai rdX\ OLKoXovdel' otov el to dvSpelojs 
/caAAtov Kal alpercorepov rod aux^povois , /cat avhpia 
aco(f)poavvrjs alpercorepa /cat to avhpeZov elvai tov 

28 a(x)(f)povelv . /cat o ttolvtcs alpovvTai tov /xt) o 
7TavT€9. /cat o ol TrXeiovs rj [o]^ ot eAarTous"' aya^ot* 

i3t>5a yap 7^1' ov TTavres €(f)UvTaL, wcrre /cat /xet^ov oi5 
fidXXov. /cat o ot dfJLcf)L(y^rjTovvTes rj ol ex^pol rj ol 
KptvovTes y] ovs ovtol Kpivovaiv to fiev yap cos" ai' 
et TTavTeg cftalev iarl, to Se ot Kvpioc /cat ot etSore?. 

29 /cat oT€ fxev ov TrdvTes jxeTexovai fxel^ov dTLfxia 
yap TO p,rj neTexciv ore 8e ov firjBels t) ov oAtyof 

30 OTTavLcoTepov ydp. Kal ra eTTaiveToyTepa- /caAAta> 
yap. /cat a>v at rt/iat fiel^ovs, cLcravTOJS' r) ydp 
Tifirj coanep d^ia tis icTTLV. Kal ojv at t,rjp,laL 

31 p,eit,ovs. /cat to. rcDi' ofioXoyovfievcov ^ ^aLVop,€vcov 
fxeydXcov fiel^co. Kal Statpou/xeva 8e et? to. /xepT; 
TO, avTa jMeit,oi ^atVerat* TvAeiov'aiV yap VTrepexeiv 
<f)alv€Tai. odev Kal 6 ttoltjt-^s (fyrjac Tretaat tov 
MeAeaypop* dvaoTrjvai 

oacra /ca/c' dvdpcxiTTOLai neXet tojv daTV dXcorj' 
Xaol /xev (fydivvdovai, ttoXlv hi re rrvp dp.advvei, 
T€Kva 8e t' aAAot dyovaiv. 

Kat TO avvTidevai Kal €7ToiKohofj.€tv, wairep 

^ Inserted by Spengel. 

" " Things of which the prices are greater, price being a 
sort of worth " (Jebb). 

* Or, " superiority over a greater number of things." 

* After ireicrai all the Mss. except A'= (Paris) have \iyovuav. 
If this is retained, it must refer to Meleager's wife Cleopatra, 
who " persuaded him ... by quoting." As the text stands, 
the literal rendering is : " the poet says that (the recital of 
the three verses) persuaded." The passage is from Iliad, ix. 
592-594 (slightly different). "* See Glossary. 

80 



RHETORIC, I. VII. 27-31 

co-ordinates and similar inflexions ; for instance, if 
" courageously " is nobler than and preferable to 
" temperately," then " courage " is preferable to 
" temperance," and it is better to be " courageous " 
than " temperate." And that wliich is chosen by all 
is better than that which is not ; and that which the 
majority choose than that which the minority choose ; 
for, as we have said, the good is that which all desire, 
and consequently a good is greater, the more it is 
desired. The same applies to goods which are re- 
cognized as greater by opponents or enemies, by 
judges, or by those whom they select ; for in the 
one case it would be, so to say, the verdict of all 
mankind, in the other that of those who are acknow- 
ledged authorities and experts. And sometimes a 
good is greater in which all participate, for it is a 
disgrace not to participate in it ; sometimes when 
none or only a few participate in it, for it is scarcer. 
And things which are more praiseworthy, since they 
are nobler. And in the same way things which 
are more highly honoured,'* for honour is a sort of 
measure of worth ; and conversely those things are 
greater evils, the punishment for which is greater. 
And those things which are greater than what is 
acknowledged, or appears, to be great, are greater. 
And the same whole when divided into parts appears 
greater, for there appears to be superiority in a 
greater number of things.^ Whence the poet says 
that Meleager was persuaded to rise up and fight by 
the recital of " 

All the ills that befall those whose city is taken ; the 
people perish, and fire utterly destroys the city, and strangers 
carry off the children. 

Combination and building up,** as employed by 
G 81 



ARISTOTLE 

'E'7Tt;^ap/xos', 8ta re ro avro rfj Siaipecrei {rj yap 
avvOeais VTrepox'TjV Beucvvai ttoXXtJv) Kal on o-px^ 

32 (f)aiveTai [xeydXcov /cat atriov. eTret Be ro x*^^^' 
TTCjrepov Kal anavLcorepov fietl^ov, Kai ol Kaipol 
Kal at TjXLKLai Kal ot rorroi /cat ol xpovoL Kai at 
Swa/xet? TTOiovai jxeyaXa- el yap Trapa SwayUti' /cat 
Trap' rjXiKLav Kal Trapa rovs ojxolovs, Kai et ovr<x)s 
Tj evravOa t) roB^ , e^ei fxeyedos Kal KaXaJv Kal 
dyaOaJv Kal St/catcuv /cat row evavrlcxiv. o6ev Kal 
ro €7Tlypap.[j,a ro) 6Xvp,7noviKrj- 

rrpoade piev a/x<^' djjuotcriv e^oiv rpax^lav dacXXav 
t^^us" e^ "Apyov? els Teyeav e^epov. 

Kal 6 ^l(f)iKpdrrj? avrov eveKcofila^e Xeycov e^ Sv 

33 VTTTJp^e ravra. Kal ro avro(f)ves rov e7nKrT]rov 
XCiXeTTCorepov yap. 66 ev Kal 6 TTOirjrrjs (ftrjaLV 

avrooioaKros o et/xt. 

34 /cat ro p^eyaXov pi.eyiarov pbepos' olov HepiKXrjs rov 
e7nrd(f)Lov Xeycov, rrjv veor-qra e/c rrjs TToXecos dv- 
r^prjaOai cooTrep ro eap e/c rod evtavrov el e^aLpedelrj. 

35 /cat rd ev XP^^*?- P'^^'^ovi ;^/0i7atjLia, olov rd ev yqpa 
/cat voaoLs. Kal Bvolv ro iyyvrepov rov reXovs. 
Kal ro avro) rov aTrAcSs". /cat ro ovvarov rov 

" Epicharmus (c. 550-460 B.C.), writer of comedies and 
Pythagorean philosopher, was born at Megara in Sicily 
(according to others, in the island of Cos). His comedies, 
written in the Doric dialect, and without a chorus, were 
either mythological or comedies of manners, as extant titles 
show. Plato speaks of him as " the prince of comedy " and 
Horace states definitely that he was imitated by Plautus. 

" Simonides, Frag. 163 {P.L.O. iii.). 

" Or, the yoke to which the basket, like our milk-pails 
long ago, was attached. 

82 



RHETORIC, I. VII. 31-35 

Epicharmus," produce the same effect as division, and 
for the same reason ; for combination is an exhibition 
of great superiority and appears to be the origin and 
cause of great things. And since that which is 
harder to obtain and scarcer is greater, it follows 
that special occasions, ages, places, times, and powers, 
produce great effects ; for if a man does things 
beyond his powers, beyond his age, and beyond what 
his equals could do, if they are done in such a manner, 
in such a place, and at such a time, they will possess 
importance in actions that are noble, good, or just, 
or the opposite. Hence the epigram ^ on the 
Olympian victor : 

Formerly, with a rough basket <= on my shoulders, I used 
to carry fish from Argos to Tegea. 

And Iphicrates lauded himself, saying, " Look what 
I started from ! " And that which is natural is a 
greater good than that which is acquired, because it 
is harder. Whence the poet says : 

Self-taught am I.'' 

And that which is the greatest part of that wliich is 
great is more to be desired ; as Pericles said in his 
Funeral Oration, that the removal of the youth from 
the city was like the year being robbed of its spring.^ 
And those things which are available in greater need, 
as in old age and illness, are greater goods. And 
of two things that which is nearer the end proposed 
is preferable. And that which is useful for the in- 
dividual is preferable to that which is useful ab- 

"^ Odyssey, xxii. 347. The words are those of the minstrel 
Phemius, who was forced to sing to the suitors of Penelope. 
* Not in the oration in Thucydides (ii. 35). 

83 



ARISTOTLE 

aSvudrov ro fxkv yap avro), to S' ov. koI ra iv 
reAet rov Biov reXrj yap /jidXXov ra Trpos t<S rdXei. 

36 Kai ra Trpos dXrjOeLav ra)v Trpos So^av. opos 8e 
1365 bToO Trpos- Bo^av, o XavOdveiv fjbeXXcov ovk dv eXoLTO. 

Slo /cat ro ev Trdax^i^v rod ev ttolclv So^eceu dv 
atpercorepov etvac ro [xev yap kov Xavddvr) alprj- 
aerai, TTOLeZv S' ev Xavddvcov ov hoKel dv iXeardai. 

37 Kat oaa elvai jjidXXov t] Sokciv ^ovXovraf Trpos 
aXrideLov yap fiaXXov. Sto Kal rr^v SiKaioavvqv 
(paaL [MLKpov elvai, on Sokciv t} ett'at alperwrepov 

38 ro he vyialveiv ov. /cat rd Trpos TToXXd xp7]aiixo)- 
repov, oiov ro Trpos ro ^rjv /cat ev ^rjv /cat rrjv 
TjSovTjv /cat ro TTpdrrecv rd KoXd. hid /cat o TrXovros 
Kat Tj vyieia jxeyLcnra So/cei ett-at* aTrai^ra ydp ep^et 

39 ravra. /cat rd dXvTTorepov /cat rd /xed* rjhovrjs' 
TrXeiO) ydp evos, axrre VTrdp^ei /cat r] rjhovr] dyaOdv 
Kat 7] dXvTria. /cat Suoti' o rw avrco TrpoartOe- 

40 [xevov fiel^ov rd oXov Trotet. /cat a (mtj Xavddvei 
TTapovra 7] [a] XavddveL' rrpds dX'qOeiav ydp reCvei 
ravra. hid rd rrXovreiv ^aveirj dv ixeit,ov dyaddv 

" Or, reading Kal airXCis : " that which is useful both to 
the individual and absolutely is a greater good " (than that 
which is only useful in one way), but this necessitates a 
considerable ellipse. 
84 



RHETORIC, I. VII. 35-40 

solutely ; " that which is possible to that which is 
impossible ; for it is the possible that is useful to us, 
not the impossible. And those things which are at 
the end of life ; for things near the end are more 
like ends. 

And real things are preferable to those that have 
reference to public opinion, the latter being defined 
as those which a man would not choose if they were 
likely to remain unnoticed by others. It would seem 
then that it is better to receive than to confer a 
benefit ; for one would choose the former even if it 
should pass unnoticed, whereas one would not choose 
to confer a benefit, if it were likely to remain un- 
known. Those things also are to be preferred, which 
men would rather possess in reality than in appear- 
ance, because they are nearer the truth ; wherefore 
it is commonly said that justice is a thing of little 
importance, because people prefer to appear just 
than to be just ; and this is not the case, for instance, 
in regard to health. The same may be said of things 
that serve several ends ; for instance, those that 
assist us to live, to live well, to enjoy life, and to do 
noble actions ; wherefore health and wealth seem to 
be the greatest goods, for they include all these 
advantages. And that which is more free from pain 
and accompanied by pleasure is a greater good ; for 
there is more than one good, since pleasure and free- 
dom from pain combined are both goods. And of 
two goods the greater is that which, added to one 
and the same, makes the whole greater. And those 
things, the presence of which does not escape notice, 
are preferable to those which pass unnoticed, because 
they appear more real ; whence being wealthy would 
appear to be a greater good than the appearance of 

85 



ARISTOTLE 

41 rov 8oK€LV. /cat ro dyaTTrjrov , /cat Tot? fJ-ev fjbovov 
rot? Se /xer dXXcov. 8to /cat oj)/c ictt^ ^i^/xta, av ti? 
TOP' €T€p6(f)daX[jiov rv(f)Xu)arj /cat toi^ Su' exovra' 
dyaTTTjrov yap d(f>'r]prjrat,. 

8. E/c rivojv [Mcv ovv Set rd? TTiareLS (f)ip€iv iv 
rep TTpoTpeTTCiv /cat dTTorpeTreiv, axcSov etprjTaL. 
fieytarov Se /cat Kvpiwrarov OLTravrcov Trpos to 
Svvaadai Treidetv /cat KaXcos avp.^ovXe'ueiv , ra? 
TToXireias dirdaas Xa^elv /cat to, iKacrrrjs €07) /cat 

2 v6p,Lp,a /cat avp^^epovTa SteAetv. Treidovrat yap 
aTTavres tcv avix(f)epovTL, au/x^epet Se to awl^ov rrjv 
TToXireiav. eVt Se Kvpla p.ev ianv rj rov Kvpiov 
aTTo^ai/crts"/ to. Se Kvpta SLrjprjTaL Kara rds rroAi- 
Tetas* ooat ya/a at TToXirelai, roaavra /cat to. Kvpid 
iariv. 

3 Etat Se -n-oAtTetat rerrapes, hrji^iOKparia oAty- 
ap^ia dpiaroKparia p^ovapxta- ware ro p,€V Kvpiov 
/cat ro Kptvov rovrcov ri iariv aet p.6piov, rj oXov 

4 TOUTCOP". eWt Se Sr^fioKparta p,ev iroXireia iv fj 
KX-qpcp ScavepiovraL rds dp^ds, oXiyap^ia Se iv ■^ 
ol drro npLrjpLdruiV , dpiaroKparia Se iv fj ol Kara 
TratSetW. TratSetav Se Ae'yco rr^v vrro rov vopbov 
Keipbivqv ol yap e/x/xe/xevT^/coTes' iv Tot? ro/xt/xot? 
iv rfj dpiaroKparia dp^ovaiv. dvdyKT] Se rovrovs 

^ The ordinary ms. reading is dir6(paffis, but this word 
appears most commonly to mean " negation " (from dwdcprjfii) 
in Aristotle, as opposed to "affirmation" (from KaTd(pr}fj.i). 
dTTotpavaiv is from diracpalvw. 

" It is difficult to see the connexion here. Munro's sug- 
gestion, T<f doKfiv for Tou 5oKeiv, adoptcd by Roemer, would 
mean " by the show of it," that is, by its attracting notice. 

* Or, "is not punished equally." 

" The pronouncements of the supreme authority are them- 

86 



RHETORIC, I. vii. 41— VIII. 4 

it." And that which is held most dear, sometimes 
alone, sometimes accompanied by other things, is a 
greater good. Wherefore he who puts out the eye 
of a one-eyed man and he who puts out one eye of 
another who has two, does not do equal injury ^ ; for 
in the former case, a man has been deprived of that 
which he held most dear. 

8. These are nearly all the topics from which 
arguments may be drawn in persuading and dis- 
suading ; but the most important and effective of 
all the means of persuasion and good counsel is to 
know all the forms of government and to distinguish 
the manners and customs, institutions, and interests 
of each ; for all men are guided by considerations 
of expediency, and that which preserves the State 
is expedient. Further, the declaration of the 
authority is authoritative,^ and tlie different kinds of 
authoi'ity are distinguished according to forms of 
government ; in fact, there are as many authorities 
as there are forms of government. 

Now, there are four kinds of government, de- 
mocracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, so that the 
supreme and deciding authority is always a part or 
the whole of these. Democracy is a form of govern- 
ment in which the offices are distributed by the 
people among themselves by lot ; in an oligarchy, 
by those who possess a certain property-qualifica- 
tion ; in an aristocracy, by those who possess an 
educational qualification, meaning an education that 
is laid down by the law. In fact, in an aristocracy, 
power and office are in the hands of those who have 
remained faithful to what the law prescribes, and 

selves authoritative as laying down laws and regulations for 
the citizens. 

87 



ARISTOTLE 

(/)aLV€a9ai apiarovs' odev /cat rovvofjia eiXri(}>e tovto. 
1360 & fJi'Ovapxi'O' S earl Kara rovvofxa iv fj eis anavroiv 
KvpLos iariv rovr ojv he rj fxev Kara rd^iv rtva 
^aaiXeia, rj 8 dopiaros rvpavvis. 

5 To 817 reXos eKaarrjS TToXiretas ov Set Xavdaveiv 
alpovvrai yap rd Trpos ro reXos. ean he hrjjjLO- 
Kparias p,€v reXos eXevdepla, oAtyap^^ta? 8e rrXovros, 
dpLcrroKpartas he rd Trpos rrachelav Kal rd vo/xt/xa, 
rvpavvihos he (f>vXaK7J. hrjXov ovv on rd Trpos to 
reXos eKaarrjs €07] Kal vopLipLa Kal avpL(f>epovTa 
hiaipereov, e'lTrep alpovvr ai rrpds rovro eTrava- 

6 (f)epovres. eTTel he ov fxovov at Trlareis yivovrai St 
a7ro8et/CTtKou Xoyov dXXd Kal 8t' tjOlkov (ru) yap 
TTOLOV rwa (ftaLveadac rdv Xeyovra TTiarevop,ev , rovro 
8' earlv dv dyadds <f)aLvrjraL rj evvovs rj a/x^co), 
8eot dv rd rjdrj rd)v TToXireLOJV eKaarrjs ^X^'-^ r] fids' 
rd p.ev ydp eKaarrrjs rjdos Tridavwrarov avayKTj 
Trpos eKacrrrjv elvat. ravra he XtjcjiOrjaeraL hid 
rdjv avrwv ra [xev ydp rjOrj (f)avepa Kara rrjv 
TTpoaipeatv, rj he Trpoaipeais dva(f>eperai rrpos to 
reXos. 

7 'Q,v fjiev ovv Set opeyeadaL vporpeTTOvras d)S eao- 
fjievcuv rj ovrcov, /cat e/c rivcov Set rds Trepi rov 
avp,cf)epovros Trlareis Xajx^dveiv, en he rrepl rojv 
rrepl rds TroXireias rjdcov Kal vop,Lp,ojv hid rtvcov re 
/cat Trws evTropTjaofxev , ecf) oaov rjv rco Trapovn 
Kaipd) avjipuerpov, e'iprjraf hirjKpi^ojraL ydp ev rots 
TToXiriKols rrepl rovrcov. 



" The "end " of monarchy is wanting here. 
* iii. 7-18, "iv. 

S8 



RHETORIC, I. VIII. 4-7 

who must of necessity appear best, whence tliis form 
of government has taken its name. In a monarchy, 
as its name indicates, one man alone is supreme over 
all ; if it is subject to certain regulations, it is called 
a kingdom ; if it is unlimited, a tyranny. 

Nor should the end of each form of government 
be neglected, for men choose the things which have 
reference to the end. Now, the end of democracy 
is liberty, of oligarchy wealth, of aristocracy things 
relating to education and what the law prescribes, 
. . . ," of tyranny self-protection. It is clear then 
that we must distinguish the manners and customs, 
institutions, and interests of each form of govern- 
nxent, since it is in reference to this that men make 
their choice. But as proofs are established not only 
by demonstrative, but also by ethical argument — 
since we have confidence in an orator who exhibits 
certain quaUties, such as goodness, goodwill, or both 
- — it follows that we ought to be acquainted with the 
characters of each form of government ; for, in 
reference to each, the character most likely to per- 
suade must be that which is characteristic of it. These 
characters will be understood by the same means ; for 
characters reveal themselves in accordance with moral 
purpose, and moral purpose has reference to the end. 

We have now stated what things, whether future 
or present, should be the aim of those who recom- 
mend a certain course ; from what topics they should 
derive their proofs of expediency ; further, the ways 
and means of being well equipped for dealing with 
the characters and institutions of each form of govern- 
ment, so far as was within the scope of the present 
occasion ; for the subject has been discussed in detail 
in the Politics.^ 

89 



ARISTOTLE 

9. Mera 8e ravra Xdycofiev Trepl aperijs Kal 
KaKias Kal kuXov kuI alaxpov' ovtol yap aKOTTol 
TO) eiratvovvrL /cat ipeyovTC avu^-qcreTat yap dp.a 
TTcpl Tovrcov Xeyovras KOiKelva SrjXovv ef ojv ttoioL 
rives V7ToX'iq<j>dricj6jj.eda Kara ro 7)605, rJTrep "^v 
Sevrepa TrtcrrLS' €K rcov avrow yap 'qp.ds re Kal 
dXXov d^LOTTLcrrov Svvrjaojxeda TTOielv Trpos dper'qv. 

2 eTTel 8e aufM^atvet, Kal X'^P^? crrrovBijs Kal p.erd 
aTTOvSrjs eTTaivelv rroXXaKis ov p,6vov dvOpconov rj 
deov aAAa Kal dijjvxo- xal rdv d'AAoji' l,(pcov ro 
rv)(ov, rov ainov rpoTTOv Kal Trepl rovrcov Xrjrrreov 
rds TTpordaeis, ware oaov rrapaSeiy/Jiaros X'^P''^ 
e'lTTOjpbev Kal Trepl rovnov. 

3 KaAov /xev ovv iariv, o dv 8t' avro alperov ov 
eTTaiverov rj, rj o dv dyaOov ov rjhv rj, on dyadov. 
el he rovro eari ro KaXov, avayKrj rrjv aperrjv 

4 KaXov elvac dyadov yap ov enaiverov iariv. dperrj 
8' earl ix.ev hyvapug, cos SoKeX, iTopLariKrj dyadojv 

1366 b Kai (f)vXaKrLK'q, Kal hvvajxts evepyeriKrj ttoXXujv 

5 Kal p.eydX(jL>v, /cat rrdvrcxjv Trepl Trdvra. p-eprj 8e 
dperrjs SLKaioavvr], dvSpua, acx)(f)poavvrj , p.eyaXo- 
TTpeTTeia, p,eyaXoi/jvxio., eXevdepiorrjs, Trpaorrjs, <f>p6- 

G vTjaLS, ao(f)La. dvdyKrj 8e iieyiaras elvai dperds 
rds Tot? aAAots" xpT^crt/xcoTctTas", e'lvep earlv rj dperrj 
hvvapbLs evepyeriKrj. hid rovro rovs hiKaiovg /cat 
dvhpeiovs jxdXiara rifxoiaiv rj p,ev ydp ev TToXejiw 
rj he Kal ev eiprjvrj XP'^^^P-^^ aAAot?. etra rj eXev- 
depiorrjS' Trpotevrai ydp Kal ovk dvraycovi^ovrai 
Trepl rd)V j^jOT^/xarcuv, J)V jidXiara e<j>ievrai dXXoi. 

7 eari he hiKaioavvrj jxev dperrj hi rjv ra avra>v 

" Or, "a faculty of doing many and great benefits to all 
men in all cases " (Jebb). 

90 



RHETORIC, I. IX. 1-7 

9. We will next speak of virtue and vice, of the 
noble and the disgraceful, since they constitute the 
aimjjf onejwhQ_4Kais£&_andxi£ onejffiiQ-bla ; for, 
when speaking of these, we shall incidentally bring 
to light the means of making us appear of such and 
such a character, which, as we have said, is a second 
method of proof ; for it is by the same means that 
we shall be able to inspire confidence in ourselves or 
others in regard to virtue. But since it happens 
that men, seriously or not, often praise not only a 
man or a god but even inanimate things or any 
ordinary animal, we ought in the same way to make 
ourselves familiar with the propositions relating to 
these subjects. Let us, then, discuss these matters 
also, so far as may serve for illustration. 

The noble, then, is that which, being desirable in 
itself, is at the same time worthy of praise, or which, 
being good, is pleasant because it is good. If this 
is the noble, then virtue must of necessity be noble, 
for, being good, it is worthy of praise. Virtue, it 
would seem, is a faculty of providing and preserving 
good things, a faculty productive of many and great 
benefits, in fact, of all things in all cases." The 
components of virtue are justice, courage, self-control, 
magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, 
practical and speculative wisdom. The greatest 
virtues are necessarily those which are most useful 
to others, if virtue is the faculty of conferring benefits. 
For this reason justice and courage are the most 
esteemed, the latter being useful to others in war, 
the former in peace as well. Next is liberality, for 
the liberal spend freely and do not dispute the 
possession of wealth, which is the chief object of 
other men's desire. Justice is a virtue which assigns 

91 



ARISTOTLE 

eKacrroi kxovaL, koI cos 6 vofxos, aSt/cia Se St' T]V 

8 ra aXXorpta, ovx cos o vofios. dv^pia Se St' t]v 
TTpaKTLKot eiCTt Tcov KoXcov epyoiv iv roXs kivSvvois, 
/cat COS" o vop.os KeXevei, /cat VTTiqpeTiKOL rw vofio)' 

9 SetAta Se Tovvavrlov . aaxfipoavvrj Se dperrj St' rjv 
TTpos ras rjSovds rds rov acop-aros ovrois e^pvoLv 
CDS o vop,os /ceAeuet* d/coAacria Se rovvavrlov. 

10 eXevQepLorrfs Se 77ept XPVH''^'^^ ^^ TTotr^rt/o^, ar- 
il eXevOepia Se Towavriov. peyaXoipvxLO- Se dperrj 
/xeyaAcov TTOL-qrLKrj euepyerT^/xarcDV, p^iKpoilivxio. Se 

12 TOVvavTLov. p.eyaXoTrpeireia Se dperrj iv SaTvavij- 
paai jxeyedovs TTOirjriKrj- p,iKpoiljvxio- Se /cat puKpo- 

13 TTpeneia rdvavria. (jipovrjOLs S' eVrtv dperrj Scavotas, 
KaO^ rjv ev ^ovXeveadai Svvavrai Trepi dyaOatv /cat 
KaKwv rcov etprjp^evcov els evhaipLoviav. 

14 riepi /xev ow dperrjs /cat /ca/cia? /ca^oAou /cat 
Trept TcDv fiopLOJV elprjrai Kara rov evearcora Kai- 
pov LKavcos, TTepi Se rait' aAAwv o?) ;^aAe7roi' iSett'* 
<j>avep6v ydp on dvdyKrj rd re TTOirjrLKa rijs dperrjs 
etvai KaXd {npos dperrjv ydp) /cat rd dir' dperrjs 
yLVOjxeva, roiavra Se rd re crrj/jbela rrjs dperrjs /cat 

15 ra epya. cTret Se rd arjp,ela /cat rd roiavra a 
eariv ayaOov epya rj rrddrj KaXd, dvdyKrj oaa re 
avSptas epya ^ arjp.eZa dvSplas rj dvSpeicos irerrpa- 
/crat KaXd elvai, /cat rd St/cata /cat rd St/catw? epya 
{rrdOrj Se ov' ev fiovrj ydp ravrrj rojv dpercov ovk 
del ro St/cato)? KaXov, dAA' enl rov t,rjp.LovadaL 
alaxpdv rd hiKaiws p,dXXov rj ro dSi/ccos"), /cat /caret 

" Or, taking ei's evSaifiovlau witli povXfveadai, " come to a 
wise decision conducive to their happiness." 
92 



RHETORIC, I. IX. 7-15 

to each man his due in conformity with the law ; 
injustice claims what belongs to others, in opposition 
to the law. Courage makes men perform noble acts 
in the midst of dangers according to the dictates of 
the law and in submission to it ; the contrary is 
cowardice. Self-control is a virtue which disposes 
men in regard to the pleasures of the body as the 
law prescribes ; the contrary is licentiousness. 
Liberality does good in many matters ; the contrary 
is avarice. Magnanimity is a virtue productive of 
great benefits ; the contrary is little-mindedness. 
Magnificence is a virtue which produces greatness in 
matters of expenditure ; the contraries are little- 
mindedness and meanness. Practical wisdom is a 
virtue of reason, which enables men to come to a 
wise decision in regard to good and evil things, which 
have been mentioned as connected with happiness." 
Concerning virtue and vice in general and their 
separate parts, enough has been said for the moment. 
To discern the rest ^ presents no difficulty ; for it is 
evident that whatever produces virtue, as it tends to 
it, must be noble, and so also must be what comes 
from virtue ; for such are its signs and works. But 
since the signs of virtue and such things as are the 
works and sufferings of a good man are noble, it neces- 
sarily follows that all the works and signs of courage 
and all courageous acts are also noble. The same 
may be said of just things and of just actions ; (but not 
of what one suffers justly ; for in this alone amongst 
the virtues that which is justly done is not always 
noble, and a just punishment is more disgraceful 
than an unjust punishment). The same applies 

'' i.e. the causes and results of virtue (Cope) ; or, the noble 
and the disgraceful (Jebb). 

93 



ARISTOTLE 

16 Ttt? aAAa? 8e aperas (Laavrcus. Kal e<^' oaois ra 
ddXa rLfiTj, KaXd. Kal e^' ocroLS TLfjurj [jidXXov rj 
p^pT^/zara. /cat oca jxr} avrov eveKO. TrpaTrei ri? 

17 rd)v alpcTcov. /cat to, aTrAcos' dyaOd, daa. virep 
TTJS TTarpihos ns eTTOirjoe, TrapiScbu to avrov. Kal 
TO, rfj (f)va€L dyadd- Kal d fjur) avro) dyaOd' avrov 

1367 a yap €V€Ka ra roiavra. 

18 Kat daa reOvedjru evhi-x^erai VTrdp^^tv fxdXXov rj 
l,d)vrf ro yap avrov eVe/ca fidXXov €)(^l ra t,d)vri. 

19 Kal daa epya rojv dXXcov eveKa- rjrrov yap avrov. 
Kal daat evTvpayiai irepl dXXovs, dXXd {xtj rrepl 
avrov. Kal Trepl rovs €v iroLrjaavras' SiKatov ydp. 

20 /cat rd evepyer-qp^ara' ov ydp els avrov. Kal rd 
evavrt,a ■iq icf) ols aiaxwovrai' ra yap ata^pd ai- 
a^xyvovraL Kal Xeyovres Kal ttolovvtes Kal pbeXXovres 
warrep Kal SttTr^cu TreTToiriKev , ehrovros rod 
'AA/catof 

deXoi Tt feiTTTJv, dXXd /xe KcoXvei 

aiStiJS", 

at S' €LX€S iaOXojv ipepov t) koXojv 

Kal p,ri Tt J^eiTTrjv yXwaa* e/cu/ca /ca/cov, 

atScus" Kev ovKL a* elx^v o/x/xar', 

dAA' eXeyes rrepl rco 8t/cata». 

21 Kat TTepl (Lv dycovLOJaL p,rj (fto^ovficvoL' rrepl ydp 
rd)V TTpos ho^av ^epovrcov dyadcov rovro Trda^ov- 

22 crtv. /cat at rojv (f>vaei aTTovhaiorepciiv aperaL KaX- 

23 Atous /cat rd epya, otov dvSpog t) yvvaiKos. Kal 
at aTToAauCTTi/cat aAAot? p,dXAov iq avrots' 8to ro 



« Frag. 55 {P.L.G. iii.). " Frag. 28 {P.L.O. iii.). 

94 



RHETORIC, I. IX. 16-23 

equally to the other virtues. Those things of which 
the reward is honour are noble ; also those which are 
done for honour rather than money. Also, those 
desirable things which a man does not do for his 
own sake ; things which are absolutely good, which 
a man has done for the sake of his country, while 
neglecting his own interests ; things which are 
naturally good ; and not such as are good for the 
individual, since such things are inspired by selfish 
motives. 

And those things are noble which it is possible for 
a man to possess after death rather than during his 
lifetime, for the latter involve more selfishness ; all 
acts done for the sake of others, for they are more 
disinterested ; the successes gained, not for oneself, 
but for others ; and for one's benefactors, for that 
is justice ; in a word, all acts of kindness, for they 
are disinterested. And the contrary of those things 
of which we are ashamed ; for we are ashamed of 
what is disgraceful, in words, acts, or intention ; as, 
for instance, when Alcaeus said : 

I would fain say something, but shame holds me back," 

Sappho rejoined : 

Hadst thou desired what was good or noble, and had not 
thy tongue stirred up some evil to utter it, shame would not 
have filled thine eyes, but thou would'st have spoken of what 
is right." 

Those things also are noble for which men anxiously 
strive, but without fear ; for men are thus affected 
about goods which lead to good repute. Virtues and 
actions are nobler, when they proceed from those 
who are naturally worthier, for instance, from a man 
rather than from a woman. It is the same with 
those which are the cause of enjoyment to others 

95 



ARISTOTLE 

24 oiKaiov /cat r) hiKaLoavvrj koXov. kol to tov? iy- 
Opovs TL^iopeZadaL p^aXXov koI firj KaraXXdrTeadai- 
TO re yap dvTaTToSthovai SiKaiov, to Se Slkulov 

25 KaXov, Kal dvSpeiov to fXTj -qTTaadai. /cat vlktj /cat 
TCfj,r] Twv KaXaJv alpeTO. re ydp aKapira ovTa, /cat 
VTTcpoxrjv dpeTTJs 8t]Xol. Kal to. i^vq/xovevTa, /cat 
ra fxdXXov jjbdXXov. /cat a fxr) ^ojvti eTrerat. Kat ot? 
Ttjxrj aKoXovdeZ. /cat Ta nepLTTa. Kal rd [movoj 

26 VTrapxovTa KaXXico' evpivrjfMovevTOTepa ydp. Kal 
KTrjfxara aKaprra' iXevdeptcoTepa ydp. Kal ra Trap' 
eKacFTois Se tSta /caAa. /cat ocra a7]p,€id eart rait' 
Trap e/cao-Tot? iTraivovjMevcov , olov iv Aa/ceSat/xot't 
KOfidv KaXov iXevdepov ydp arj[ji€Lov ov ydp icm 

27 KOfMWVTa pdhiov ovhkv ttolcXv epyov O'qTiKov. Kal 
TO p.-qhep.iav ipyd^ecrdai ^dvavaov Teyyqv iXevde- 
pov ydp TO p,r) TTpos dXXov ^rjv. 

28 ArjTTTeov Se Kal Ta avveyyvg Tols virdpyovaiv ws 
TavTa ovTa /cat Trpo? erraivov Kal Trpos ipoyov, olov 
Tov evXa^rj ijjvxpdv Kal eTTifiovXov Kal tov rjXidiov 

29 p^pi^crrov /cat tov avaXyrjTov Tvpaov. /cat eKaoTov 8' 
€/c Tcbv TTapaKoXovdovvTcov del /cara to ^eXTioTov, 
olov TOV opyiXov Kal tov fiaviKov dnXovv Kal tov 

1367 b avddSrj ixeyaXoTTpeTTTJ Kal aep.v6v. koX tovs ev rat? 

vnep^oXals cos ev rat? dpeTais ovTas, olov tov 
96 



RHETORIC, I. IX. 24-29 

rather than to ourselves ; tliis is why justice and 
that which is just are noble. To take vengeance on 
one's enemies is nobler than to come to terms with 
them ; for to retaliate is just, and that which is just 
is noble ; and further, a courageous man ought not 
to allow himself to be beaten. Victory and honour 
also are noble ; for both are desirable even when 
they are fruitless, and are manifestations of superior 
virtue. And things worthy of remembrance, which 
are the more honourable the longer their memory 
lasts ; those which follow us after death ; those 
which are accompanied by honour ; and those which 
are out of the common. Those which are only 
possessed by a single individual, because they are 
more worthy of remembrance. And possessions 
which bring no profit ; for they are more gentle- 
manly. Customs that are peculiar to individual 
peoples and all the tokens of what is esteemed 
among them are noble ; for instance, in Lacedaemon 
it is noble to wear one's hair long, for it is the mark 
of a gentleman, the performance of any servile task 
being difficult for one whose hair is long. And not 
carrying on any vulgar profession is noble, for a 
gentleman does not live in dependence on others. 

We must also assume, for the purpose of praise or 
blame, that qualities which closely resemble the real 
qualities are identical with them ; for instance, that 
the cautious man is cold and designing, the simple- 
ton good-natured, and the emotionless gentle. And 
in each case we must adopt a term from qualities 
closely connected, always in the more favourable 
sense ; for instance, the choleric and passionate man 
may be spoken of as frank and open, the arrogant 
as magnificent and dignified ; those in excess as 

H 97 



ARISTOTLE 

Opaavv avSpelov Kal tov dawTov eXevdepiov Sd^et 
T€ ydp rols TToWols, Kal a/xa TrapaXoyLcmKov e/c 
rrjs alrias' el yap ov jxtj dvayK-q KivSwevrcKos , 
TToXXcp fidXXov dv Sd^eiev onov KaXov, /cat el npo- 
eriKos rots rv')(ovai, Kal rots ^lAot?" VTTep^oXrj yap 

30 dperrjs to Ttavras ev TToielv. aKOTrelv he /cat Trap' 
ot? d eTraivog- axmep ydp 6 TiWKpdrrjs eXeyev, ov 
)(aXeTr6v * Adr^vaiovs ev ^Adrjvatois eTraivelv. Set Se 
TO nap eKdarois ripLiov Xeyeiv cos VTrdp^ei, otov 
ev luKvdaLs y] AdKcoaiv •^ (f)i,Xoo'6(f)ois. /cat oXojs 8e 
TO TifjiLOV dyeiv els to KaXov, eTreiTrep So/cet yeirvidv. 

31 /cat dcra /cara to TrpoarJKOV, otov el d^ia rdjv Trpo- 
y6va>v Kal tG)v ■npoviT'qpyp.evoiv evBaifiovLKov ydp 
Kal KaXov TO rrpoaeTTLKTaadai TLp.r]V. Kal el napd 
TO TTpoarJKOv 8e eVt to ^IXtiov /cat to /caAAtov, olov 
el evTv^diV p^ev p,eTpios drvx^JV 8e fJLeyaXoi/svxos , 
7] jLtet^cot" yiyvofievos ^eXricov Kal /caraAAa/crt/cai- 
repos. TOLOvTov Se to tov 'l(f>LKpdrovs, e^ otcov 
els Ota, /cat to tov 6Xvp,7TiovLKOv 

TTpoade fxev dp.tji' a>p,oLatv e)(a)v Tpaxetav, 
/cat TO TOV Tit-iMCOviSov 



" Those whose qualities are extreme may be described as 
possessing the virtues of which these are the excess. 

" Plato, Menexenus, 235 d. 

« Thus, the Scythians may be assumed to be brave and 
great hunters ; the Spartans hardy, courageous, and brief 
in speech ; the Athenians fond of literature — and they should 
be praised accordingly. 

"* That is, TO Tifxiov looks as if it were really KaXof, and 
should be spoken of as if it were so. 

' Cp. 7. 32 above. 

f Frag. Ill {P.L.G. iii.). 



98 



RHETORIC, I. IX. 29-31 

possessing the corresponding virtue,** the fool- 
hardy as courageous, the recklessly extravagant as 
liberal. For most people will think so, and at the 
same time a fallacious argument may be drawn from 
the motive ; for if a man risks his life when there is 
no necessity, much more will he be thought likely 
to do so when it is honourable ; and if he is lavish 
to all comers, the more so will he be to his friends ; 
for the height of virtue is to do good to all. We 
ought also to consider in whose presence we praise, 
for, as Socrates said, it is not difficult to praise 
Athenians among Athenians.* We ought also to 
speak of what is esteemed among the particular 
audience, Scythians, Lacedaemonians, or philoso- 
phers,'' as actually existing there. And, generally 
speaking, that which is esteemed should be classed 
as noble, since there seems to be a close resemblance 
between the two.** Again, all such actions as are in 
accord with what is fitting are noble ; if, for instance, 
they are worthy of a man's ancestors or of his own 
previous achievements ; for to obtain additional 
honour is noble and conduces to happiness. Also, 
if the tendency of what is done is better and 
nobler, and goes beyond what is to be expected ; 
for instance, if a man is moderate in good 
fortune and stout-hearted in adversity, or if, when 
he becomes greater, he is better and more for- 
giving. Such was the phrase of Iphicrates, " Look 
what I started from I" ^ and of the Olympian 
victor : 

Formerly, with a rough basket on my shoulders, I used 
to carry fish from Argos to Tegea.' 

and of Simonides : 

99 



ARISTOTLE 

7] narpos re /cat dvSpos dSeA^aJv t' ovaa rvpdvvoiv. 

32 Evret S e/c TcDt' rrpd^ecxiv 6 eiraLVos, l^iov he rov 
arrovhaiov to Kara Trpoalpeaiv, Treipareov SeiKvvvai, 
TTparrovra Kara Trpoatpeatv. p^pTyai/xoi' 8e to ttoX- 
XoLKis <f>aLV€adai TreTrpaxoTa. Sto /cat to. avp,- 
TTTcofjbaTa /cat ra utto TV)(r]S d>s eV Trpoaipecrei 
A7]7TT€ov dv yap TroAAa /cat ofjuoia 7Tpo(f)eprjTaL, crrj- 
[xetov dpeTTJs etvai So^et /cat Trpoatpiaeios . 

33 "EffTt 8' erraivos Xoyos e/x^avt^ajv [xeyeOos dpeTrjs. 
Set ow ras" rrpd^eig eTnSeiKvvvai co? to tayrat. to 
8' eyKcofiLov twv epycov ioTLV, Ta Se kvkXio els 
TTiaTiv, olov evyiveta /cat TratSeta* et/co? yap e^ 
dyadcbv dyadovs /cat tov ovto) Tpa(f)€VTa tolovtov 
elvai. 8t6 /cat iyKco/xid^oiJiev irpd^avTas. Ta 8' 
epya o-r^/xeta t-^? e^eco? ioTW, eVet iTraivol/xev dv 
/cat /xiy TTCTTpayoTa, et TnaTevoip,ev etvat tolovtov. 

34 fjiaKapiajJios 8e /cat evhaipLOViapios avTols p.kv Tavrd, 
rovTOLS 8' ou rauTCi, aAA' watrep r] evhaipiovia T-qv 
dpcT-qv, /cat o evhai/JLOvtajjios 7re/0te;^ei TavTa. 

35 "E;^et 8e kolvov ethos 6 enatvos /cat at avp.^ov\ai' 
d yap ev Toi crvfJb^ovXeveiv VTvodoio dv, TavTa 

36 fxeTaTcdevTa Tjj Xe^ei ey/cco/xia ytyv-cTat. eTret 
1368 8 ow exop,€v d Set irpdTTeiv /cat 77otoi/ Tti^a eirai. 

Set TauTa w? VTrodtJKas XeyovTas rfj Ae'^ei p.€Ta- 
TLdevai /cat OTpi^eiv, olov otl ov Set jxeya ^poveZv 
errl tols Sta tvx'tjv dXXd Tot? St auTw. ovtco fiev 

" Archedice, daughter of Hippias, tyrant of Athens, and 
wife of Aeantides, son of Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus. 

100 



RHETORIC, I. IX. 31-36 

Daughter, wife, and sister of tyrants." 
Since praise is founded on actions, and acting accord- 
ing to moral purpose is characteristic of the worthy 
man, we must endeavour to show that a man is acting 
in that manner, and it is useful that it should appear 
that he has done so on several occasions. For this 
reason also one must assume that accidents and strokes 
of good fortune are due to moral purpose ; for if a 
number of similar examples can be adduced, they will 
be thought to be signs of virtue and moral purpose. 
Now praise is language that sets forth greatness 
of virtue ; hence it is necessary to show that a man's 
actions are virtuous. But encomium deals with 
achievements— all attendant circumstances, such as 
noble birth and education, merely conduce to per- 
suasion ; for it is probable that virtuous parents will ^ 
have virtuous offspring and that a man will turn out 
as he has been brought up. Hence we pronounce 
an encomium upon those who have achieved some- 
thing. Achievements, in fact, are signs of moral 
habit ; for we should praise even a man who had not 
achieved anything, if we felt confident that he was 
likely to do so. Blessing and felicitation are identical 
with each other, but are not the same as praise and 
encomium, which, as virtue is contained in happiness, 
are contained in felicitation. 

Praise and counsels have a common aspect ; for 
what you might suggest in counselling becomes 
encomium by a change in the phrase. Accordingly, 
when we know what we ought to do and the qualities 
we ought to possess, we ought to make a change in 
the phrase and turn it, employing this knowledge 
as a suggestion. For instance, the statement that 
" one ought not to pride oneself on goods which are 

101 



ARISTOTLE 

ovv Xex^^v V7Todi]Krjv Bvvarai, coSi 8 eiraivov 
" fidya (f)povix)v ov roXs Sta TV)('f}v virapy^ovaiv aXXa. 
TotS" St' avrov." ware orav CTTaivelv ^ovXr], opa n 
av VTToOoto, /cat orav virodeadai, opa tl av eTrat- 

37 veo-eta?. 17 Be Xe^ig earai avriKeLfMevr] i$ dvay/crjs", 
orav TO fjbev kcoXvov ro Be fir] kcoXvov fieTareOij . 

38 yipTjaTeov Be /cat rcov av^r)riKa>v ttoXXols, olov ei 
fjLovog 7] TTpoJros ^ fMer^ oXtycov rj /cat [o] /JidXiara 
TTeTToirjKev . aTravra yap ravra KaXd. /cat ra e/c 
Tctjv ^(^povoiv /cat T(x)v KaipcJbv ravra Be Trapa ro 
TTpoarJKov. /cat et ttoXXolkls to avro KarcvpdojKev 
fxeya yap, /cat ovk drro rv^f)? dXXa Bt avrov av 
8o|-et€v. /cat el rd Trporpeirovra /cat rifjicovra Bid 
rovrov evprjrat /cat KareaKevaadrj . /cat et? ov 
TTpcbrov eyKiOjjbLov e7TO(,i]6rj, olov els 'IttttoXoxov, /cat 
' ApfMoBiov /cat ^ Kpiaroyeirova rd ev dyopa ara- 
drjvai. ofioLOJS Be /cat ctti rcov evavricov. Kav fir) 
Kad^ avrov evTTopfjs, irpos dXXovg avrLTrapa^aXXeiv 
oTTep ^laoKpdrrjs eTToiei Bid rrjv dawTJOeiav rov 
BiKoXoyelv. Bel Be Trpdg evBo^ovg avyKpiveiv av^rj- 

39 riKov ydp /cat KaXov, el anovBaiwv ^eXrlcov. mTrret 
8' evXoycos rj av^rjois els rovs erratvovs' ev vnep- 

" In the first sentence, the statement is imperative, there 
is a prohibition ; in the second, it is a simple affirmative, 
implying praise. In the one case there is forbidding, in the 
other not-forbidding, which are opposites. 

* Nothing more is known of him. 

* Who slew Hipparchus, tyrant of Athens. 

<* Reading daw-qdeiav. He had no legal practice, which 
would have shown the irrelevancy of comparisons in a 
law court, whereas in epideictic speeches they are useful. 
ffvvTjdeiav gives exactly the opposite sense, and must refer 
to his having written speeches for others to deliver in the 
courts. 
102 



RHETORIC, I. IX. 36-39 

due to fortune, but on those which are due to oneself 
alone," when expressed in this way, has the force of a 
suggestion ; but expressed thus, " he was proud, not 
of goods which were due to fortune, but of those 
which were due to himself alone," it becomes praise. 
Accordingly, if you desire to praise, look what you 
would suggest ; if you desire to suggest, look what 
you would praise. The form of the expression will 
necessarily be opposite, when the prohibitive has 
been changed into the non-prohibitive." 

We must also employ many of the means of 
amplification ; for instance, if a man has done any- 
thing alone, or first, or with a few, or has been chiefly 
responsible for it ; all these circumstances render an 
action noble. Similarly, topics derived from times 
and seasons, that is to say, if our expectation is 
surpassed. Also, if a man has often been successful 
in the same thing ; for this is of importance and 
would appear to be due to the man himself, and not 
to be the result of chance. And if it is for his sake 
that distinctions which are an encouragement or 
honour have been invented and established ; and if 
he was the first on whom an encomium was pro- 
nounced, as Hippolochus,* or to whom a statue was 
set up in the market-place, as to Harmodius and 
Aristogiton." And similarly in opposite cases. If 
he does not furnish you with enough material in 
himself, you must compare him with others, as 
Isocrates used to do, because of his inexperience ^ of 
forensic speaking. And you must compare him with 
illustrious personages, for it affords ground for 
amplification and is noble, if he can be proved better 
than men of worth. Amplification is with good 
reason ranked as one of the forms of praise, since it 

103 



ARISTOTLE 

oxfj ydp iariv, r) 8' inrepox'r] rcov koXcov. 8io Kav 
firj TTpos rods ivSo^ovs, dXXa Trpos roiis dXXovs Set 
TTapa^dXXeiv, eTreiirep rj VTrepox^ SoKcl fjb-qvveiv 

40 dperrjv. oXios Se rwv kolvcov elScov aTracrt rols 
XoyoLs rj jjLev av^rjat,? emrriheiordrr] rols imSeLKTi- 
Kolg' TO.? yap TTpd^ets ofxoXoyov/jLevas Xapu^dvovacv , 
ware Xoittov fxeyedos TrepidelvaL koL koXXos' rd Se 
TTapaheiypiara rols avpL^ovXevriKols' €k yap r<ov 
TTpoyeyovorwv rd fieXXovra KarafMavrevofievoi Kpi- 
vo/juev rd 8' evOvp^iqixara rots SiKavtKols ' alriav ydp 
/cat dTTohei^Lv fidXiara hey^erai ro yeyovos 8ta to 

41 daa<jiis. e/c rivcjov p.ev ovv ol 'irraivoi /cat ol ipoyot 
Xeyovrai crp^eSot' Trdvres, /cat Trpos TTola Set ^Xeirov- 
ras eTTaivelv /cat i/jeyeiv, /cat e/c rtvajv rd iyKcopua 
yiyverai /cat rd ovetSi], raur' eariv ixofJ-evcov ydp 
rovrwv ra evavria rovrois (f)av€pa' o yap ipoyos e/c 
rcov evavntov eartv. 

1368 b 10. riept Se Karrjyopias /cat diroXoytas, e/c 
TToaojv /cat ttolojv TroieZadai Set Toys' avXXoyi.ap.ovs, 

2 i^dp^evov dv e'lrj Xeyeiv. Set Srj Xa^elv rpia, ev 
fiev rlvcov /cat Tidacov eVe/ca dSiKovai, hevrepov Se 
TTco? avroL Sta/cet'/xet'oi, rpirov Se tows' Trotoys" /cat 

3 TTOJS e^ovras. Siopt,adp,€Voi ovv ro dScKelv Xeyojfiev 
€$rjs. 

"Kara) Srj ro dSiKetv ro ^XaTrrciv cKovra irapd 
rdv vopLOV. v6p.os 8' iarlv 6 p.kv tStos' o Se kolvos. 
Xeyui Se iSiov pikv /ca^' ov yeypap.pL€vov TToXtrcvovrat, 

104 



RHETORIC, I. IX. 39— X. 3 

consists in superiority, and superiority is one of the 
things that are noble. That is why, if you cannot 
compare him with illustrious personages, you must 
compare him with ordinary persons, since superiority 
is thought to indicate virtue. Speaking generally, 
of the topics common to all rhetorical arguments, 
amplification is most suitable for epideictic speakers, 
whose subject is actions which are not disputed, so 
that all that remains to be done is to attribute 
beauty and importance to them. Examples are 
most suitable for deliberative speakers, for it is by 
examination of the past that we divine and judge 
the future. Enthym ernes are most suitable for 
forensic speakers, because the past, by reason of its 
obscurity, above all lends itself to the investigation 
of causes and to demonstrative proof. Such are 
nearly all the materials of praise or blame, the things 
which those who praise or blame should keep in 
view, and the sources of encomia and invective ; for 
when these are known their contraries are obvious, 
since blame is derived from the contrary things. 

10. We have next to speak of the number and 
quality of the propositions of which those syllogisms 
are constructed which have for their object accusa-- 
tion and defence. Three things have to be con- 
sidered ; first, the nature and the number of the 
motives which lead men to act unjustly ; secondly, 
what is the state of mind of those who so act ; third- 
ly, the character and dispositions of those who are ex- 
posed to injustice. We will discuss these questions 
in order, after we have first defined acting unjustly. 

Let injustice, then, be defined as voluntarily caus- 
ing injury contrary to the law. Now, the law is 
particular or general. By particular, I mean the 

105 



ARISTOTLE 

Koivov he oaa aypa^a Trapa Trdaiv ofMoXoyeZaOat 
So/cet. CKOvres Se rroLovaiv oaa etSdre? Kai jjirj 
dvayKal.ofMevoi. oaa fxev ovv cKovres, ov Travra 
TTpoaLpovfxevoL, oaa 8e TTpoaLpo\jp,evoL, eioores 

4 aTravra' ouSet? yap o Trpoatpetrat ayvoel. St a 
8e TTpoaipovvrai ^XaTrrew /cat (f)avXa TTOietv irapa 
rov vopiov, KaKia earl Kai atcpaaia' eav yap TLves 
e^coai p,o')(driplav •^ /xtav •^ irXeiovs, Trepl he rovro 
o pioxdrjpol rvyxavovaiv ovres, /cat aSt/cot etcrtr, 
olov 6 fxev aveXevdepos Trepl p^jOi^/xara, o 8' a/coAa- 
aro? Trept ras rov awfxaros rjSovds, 6 8e fiaXaKog 
Trepl rd padvpia, 6 he heiXos Trepl rovg Kivhvvovs 
{rovs yap avyKLvhvvevovrag eyKaraXipLTravovai hia 
rov (f)6^ov), 6 he (f)LX6rip.os 8ta ripb-qv, 6 8' o^vdvfiog 
8t' opyqv, 6 he ^tAovi/cos" 8td vlkt^v, 6 he iriKpos hid 
rifjiajpiav, 6 8' d(f)pcov hid ro aTTardavai vepi ro 
hiKaiov /cat dhiKov, 6 8' dvaiaxwrog hi oXcyajpiav 
ho^rjg. OjLtota)? 8e /cat rwv dXXcov CKaaros Trept 
eKaarov rojv VTroKecfievcov. 

5 'AAAtt TTcpl p,ev rovrcov hrjXov, rd p,ev e/c roJv 
Trepl rds dperds elprjp,ev(x}v , rd 8 e/c ra)v rrepi ra 
TTadr] prjdrjao p.€vojv Xolttov 8' elrrelv rtvos eveKa 

6 /cat TT<x)s exovres a8t/coucrt, /cat rivas. TrpcJorov p,ev 
ovv hieXcopieda rivwv opeyofjievot /cat Trota (ftev- 
yovres eyxeipovaLV dhcKeXv hrjXov yap cos rat p^ev 



" irimaipecns (premeditation, deliberate or moral choice) 
is always voluntary, but all voluntary action is not pre- 
meditated ; we sometimes act on the spur of the moment. 
Choice is a voluntary act, the result of deliberate counsel, 
including the use of reason and knowledge. In the Ethics 
(iii. 3. 19) Aristotle defines TrpoaLpeais as " a deliberate appeti- 

106 



RHETORIC, I. X. 3-6 

written law in accordance with which a state is 
administered ; by general, the unwritten regulations 
which appear to be universally recognized. Men act 
voluntarily when they know what they do, and do 
not act under compulsion. What is done voluntarily 
is not always done with premeditation ; but what 
is done with premeditation is always known to the 
agent, for no one is ignorant of what he does with a 
purpose.*" The motives which lead men to do injury 
and commit wrong actions are depravity and incon- 
tinence. For if men have one or more vices, it is in 
that which makes him vicious that he shows himself 
unjust ; for example, the illiberal in regard to money, 
the licentious in regard to bodily pleasures, the 
effeminate in regard to what makes for ease,* the 
coward in regard to dangers, for fright makes him 
desert his comrades in peril ; the ambitious in his 
desire for honour, the irascible owing to anger, one 
who is eager to conquer in his desire for victory, the 
rancorous in his desire for vengeance ; the foolish 
man from having mistaken ideas of right and wrong, 
the shameless from his contenapt for the opinion of 
others. Similarly, each of the rest of mankind is 
unjust in regard to his special weakness. 

This will be perfectly clear, partly from what has 
already been said about the virtues, and partly from 
what will be said about the emotions. It remains 
to state the motives and character of those who do 
wrong and of those who suffer from it. First, then, 
let us decide what those who set about doing wrong 
long for or avoid ; for it is evident that the accuser 

tion of (longing for, ope^i-s) things in our power," as to which 
we should necessarily be well-informed. 

* Or, "in the matter of ease," taking to, pddv/xa as = 
padvfiia. 

107 



ARISTOTLE 

KarrjyopovvTi TToaa Kal TToZa rovriov vTrapx^L rep 
dvTiSt/caj aKenreov, rep S' dnoXoyovpievcp TToZa /cat 

7 iroaa rovrcov ovx vnapx^i. Travres Srj Trpdrrovcn 
TTavra rd p-ev ov St' avrovs rd 8e 8t' avrovs. rcov 
p,€v ovv p,rj St' avrovs rd p,ev Sia rvxf]v rrpdrrovai 
rd S' e^ dvayKTis, roJv S' ef dvdyKTjs rd p,kv ^ia 
rd Se (^vaei. ware Trdvra oaa p,r] St' avroiig 
TTpdrrovat, rd p,€v (xtto ri'ix'f]? rd Se <j>va€i rd Se 
/Sta. oaa Se St' auroy?, /cat (hv avrol atVtot, to. 

1369 a /iev' St' e^o? TO, Se St' ope^LV, /cat to. /Aev" Sta Aoyt- 

8 ariKTjv ope^iv rd Se St' dXoyiarov eart, 8' rj p,kv 
^ovXrjats dyadov Spelts (ouSeis" ydp ^ovXerai dAA' 
t) orav olrjdfj etvat dya^di^), dAoyot S' ope^ecg opyrj 
/cat eTndvjxia, ware iravra oaa rrpdrrovaiv dvdyKrj 
TTpdrreiv St' airta? eirrd, Std rvx^v, Sid (f)vaLV, Std 
^lav, St' eOos, Std Xoytap,6v, Std dvpov, St' eTTidvp^iav. 

9 To Se TrpoahiaLpeladaL /ca^' rjXiKLas r) e^et? -^ 
dAA' drra rd 7Tparr6p,€va Trepiepyov ei ydp avp,- 
^e^TjKe rots veois opylXois etvai t] emdvp^ririKolg , 
ov Std Ti^r ve6rr]ra Trpdrrovai rd roiavra dXXd 
St' opyrjv /cat eTndvp,iav . oi)Se Std TvXovrov /cat 
TTeviav, dXXd avp^^e^rjKe rot? /xei' Trevrjai Sta tt^i/ 
eVSetav emdvpLelv jj^prj/Adrcoi/, rot? Se irXovaioLs 
Std TT^j^ e^ovaiav eTnOvpieZv rcov p,r] dvayKaicov 
rjSovwv. dXXd irpd^ovat /cat ovroi ov Std ttAoiJtop' 
/cat TTeviav dXXd Std ti^i' eTnOvp^iav . 6p.oiu)g Se 
/cat ot St/catot /cat ot dSt/cot, /cat ot d'AAot ot Aeyd- 

" In the cases of the young, the poor, and the rich, their 
youth etc. are only "accidents," accidental not real causes. 
Aristotle defines to av/j.l3e[-iy]K6${A[ct<iphy>iica, iv. 80) as "that 
which is inherent in something, and may be predicated of it 
as true, but neither nt^cessarily, nor in most cases ; for 
instance, if a man, when digging a hole for a plant, finds a 

108 



RHETORIC, I. X. 6-9 

must examine the number and nature of the motives 
which are to be found in his opponent ; the de- 
fendant, which of them are not to be found in him. 
Now, all human actions are either the result of man's 
efforts or not. Of the latter some are due to chance, 
others to necessity. Of those due to necessity, some 
are to be attributed to compulsion, others to nature, 
so that the things which men do not do of themselves 
are all the result of chance, nature, or compulsion. 
As for those which they do of themselves and of which 
they are the cause, some are the result of habit, 
others of longing, and of the latter some are due to 
rational, others to irrational longing. Now wish is a 
[rational] longing for good, for no one wishes for any- 
thing unless he thinks it is good ; irrational longings 
are anger and desire. Thus all the actions of men 
must necessarily be referred to seven causes : chance, 
nature, compulsion, habit, reason, anger, and desire. 
But it is superfluous to establish further distinc- 
tions of men's acts based upon age, moral habits, 
or anything else. For if the young happen to be " 
irascible, or passionately desire anything, it is not 
because of their youth that they act accordingly, but 
because of anger and desire. Nor is it because of 
wealth or poverty ; but the poor happen to desire 
wealth because of their lack of it, and the rich desire 
unnecessary pleasures because they are able to procure 
them. Yet in their case too it will not be wealth or 
poverty, but desire, that will be the mainspring of 
their action. Similarly, the just and the unjust, and 
all the others who are said to act in accordance with 

treasure." The colour of a man's eyes is an " inseparable " 
accident, the fact that a man is a lawyer is a " separable " 
accident. 

109 



ARISTOTLE 

fMCVOL Kara ra^ e^ei? rrpdrreiv, Sta ravra Trpd^ovcnv 
7] yap Sid XoyiGrjjLOV 7] Sid nrddos- aXX ol fiev St' 

10 yjdr] /cat TrdOrj ■)^priard, ol 8e hid rdvavria. avfi- 
^awei fievTOL rals p-^v roiavrais e^eat rd roiavra 
aKoXovdeiv, rals 8e roiaXaSe rd rotaSe* evdvs ydp 
laws rep p,ev awtjipovi Sta rd aa>^pova etvai Sdfat 
re Kal eTTidvp^iai ^piqaral irraKoXovdovai Trepl rwv 
TjSdcov, ro) S d/coAacrro) at evavrCat, Trepl roJv 

11 avrdJv rovrojv. 8t6 rdg p,€v roiavras SiaipeVeiS" 
eariov, UKeirreov he TTola ttolols etcoOev erreadai' 
el p.€v ydp XevKog r) /xeAaj t) /xeya? t] p,LKp6s, 
ovhev reraKrai rwv roiovrojv aKoXovOeZv, el Be 
veos ri Trpea^vrrjs rj StAcato? r] dStKos, tJSt] Siacfyepec. 
Kal oXcos oaa rcbv avp^aivovrcxiv iroiel Sia(f>€peiv 
rd rjdrj ra)v dvdpa)7rcov, olov rrXovreXv So/ccov 
eavrw ^ Trevecrdai Stotaet rt, /cat evrvx^^v r] drv)(€lv. 
ravra pbev ovv varepov epovpev, vvv he Trepl ru)v 
XoiTTWV eiTToyp^ev irptorov. 

12 "EcTTt S' 0.770 rvx^jS p-ev rd roiavra yiyvopeva, 
oacxiv tJ re alrt-a aopcaros Kai p,iq eveKa rov ytyverat 
Kal pLrjre del p,r]re ws irrl ro ttoXv p,rjre reray- 
p,evws- hrjXov S' e'/c rov 6pi,ap.ov rrjs rvx^jS Trepl 

13 rovrcov. <f)vaei he, oacov rj r aina ev avroZg Kal 
1369 b reraypevrj • t) ydp del rj (hs evrt ro ttoXv coaavrojs 

aTTo^aivei. rd ydp Trapd (f>vaiv ovhev Set a/cpt^o- 
XoyeladaL, norepa Kard (f)vaLV rivd 7] dXXr]v alriav 
yiyverav ho^eie 8' dv Kal rj rv^fj air la elvai rwv 

14 roLovrwv . j3ta 8e, oaa Trap e7ndvp,t,av tj rovs Xoyt~ 

« ii. 12-18. 
110 



RHETORIC, 1. X. 9-14 

their moral habits, will act from the same causes, 
either from reason or emotion, but some from good 
characters and emotions, and others from the oppo- 
site. Not but that it does happen that such and 
such moral habits are followed by such and such 
consequences ; for it may be that from the outset 
the fact of being temperate produces in the temperate 
man good opinions and desires in the matter of 
pleasant things, in the intemperate man the contrary. 
Therefore we must leave these distinctions on one 
side, but we must examine what are the usual con- 
sequences of certain conditions. For, if a man is fair 
or dark, tall or short, there is no rule that any such^ 
consequences should follow, but if he is young or old,' 
just or unjust, it does make a difference. In a word, 
it will be necessary to take account of all the circum- 
stances that make men's characters different ; for 
instance, if a man fancies himself rich or poor, 
fortunate or unfortunate, it will make a difference. 
We will, however, discuss this later " ; let us now 
speak of what remains to be said here. 

Things which are the result of chance are all those 
of which the cause is indefinite, those which happen 
without any end in view, and that neither always, 
nor generally, nor regularly. The definition of 
chance will make this clear. Things which are the 
result of nature are all those of which the cause- is 
in themselves and regular ; for they turn out always, 
or generally, in the same way. As for those which 
happen contrary to nature there is no need to in- 
vestigate minutely whether their occurrence is due 
to a certain force of nature or some other cause (it 
would seem, however, that such cases also are due 
to chance). Those things are the result of com- 

111 



ARISTOTLE 

a/xovs yiyver at hi avrcov tcov Trparrovrcov . edei 

15 8e, oaa Sta ro ttoXXolkls 7Te7TOLrjK€vai ttolovctlv. 

16 Blol XoyLGixov 8e to. hoKovvra av^(f)epeiv eic r<x)v 
elpriixevcov dyadcov rj co? reAo? rj cos Trpos to 
TeAos", orav 8ta to crvficfjepeiv nrparriqrai' evia 
yap Kal ol aKoXaaroi avix^epovra Trpdrrovaiv , dXX 
ov Sid TO avfi(f>€p€LV dXXd 8t' rjSovrjv. 8ta dv/xov 

17 8e /cat opyrjv rd rLixajp-qriKa. 8ia^epet 8e Ti/xcopta 
/cat /cdAaCTt?" t^ ^ev yap KoXaais rod rrdaxovros 
ev€Ka eariv, 7] 8e Tt/zcopta tou vrotowTOS", tva 

18 dTTOTrXrjpcoOf] . ri fiev ovv iarlv r) dpyq, hfjXov 
ear ai ev rols Trepl rradwVy 8t' €Tndvjxiav 8e irpdr- 
rerai oaa (j^aiverai rjSea. can 8e /cat ro avvrjdes 
Kal TO idiarov ev rols 'qSeaiv rroXXd ydp /cat rcjv 
(f>va€i p,rj rjSeojv, orav idiadwaiv, rjSecos TToiovaw. 

"Q.are avXXa^ovri eLTrelv, oaa 8t' avrovs Trpdr- 
rovaiv, diravr' iarlv t] dyadd rj (f)aiv6p,€.va dyadd 
7] rjoea rj cpatvopbeva rjoea. errei o oaa ol am-ovs, 
cKovres Trpdrrovaiv, ovx CKovres 8e ocra ixtj Si' 
atJToy?, Trdvr* dv eurj, oaa eKovres Trpdrrovaiv, rj 
dyaOd t] (fyaivopieva dyadd r) T^8ea Tj (f)aiv6ixeva 
TjSea' ridrjp,i ydp Kal rr^v rcov KaKcov i^ (j>aivojxivojv 
KaKcbv T] dnaXXayrjv 7] dvrl fjiei^ovos iXdrrovos fierd' 
Xrjifjiv iv rois dyadois {aiperd ydp ttcos), Kal rrjv rcjv 
XvTTrjpcov T] <f)aivoiJt,€VCOV T] dTraXXayr)v rj fxerdXTji/jiv 
dvrl p.€i^6va)v iXarrovcov iv rois rjSiaiv ojaavrws. 

<• ii. 2. 
112 



RHETORIC, I. X. 14-18 

pulsion which are done by the agents themselves in 
opposition to their desire or calculation. Things are 
the result of habit, when they are done because they 
have often been done. Things are the result of 
calculation whicli are done because, of the goods 
already mentioned, they appear to be expedient 
either as an end or means to an end, provided they 
are done by reason of their being expedient ; for 
even the intemperate do certain things that are ex- 
pedient, for the sake, not of expediency, but of 
pleasure. Passion and anger are the causes of acts 
of revenge. But there is a difference between re- 
venge and punishment ; the latter is inflicted in the 
interest of the sufferer, the former in the interest of 
him who inflicts it, that he may obtain satisfaction. 
We will define anger when we come to speak of the 
emotions." Desire is the cause of things being done 
that are apparently pleasant. The things which are 
familiar and to which we have become accustomed 
are among pleasant things ; for men do with pleasure 
many things which are not naturally pleasant, when 
they have become accustomed to them. 

In short, all things that men do of themselves 
either are, or seem, good or pleasant ; and since 
men do voluntarily what they do of themselves, and 
involuntarily what they do not, it follows that all 
that men do voluntarily will be either that which is 
or seems good, or that which is or seems pleasant. 
For I reckon among good things the removal of that 
which is evil or seems evil, or the exchange of a 
greater evil for a less, because these two things are 
in a way desirable ; in like manner, I reckon among 
pleasant things the removal of that which is or 
appears painful, and the exchange of a greater pain 

I 113 



ARISTOTLE 

XrjTrreov dpa ra avyi<f}ipovra /cat to, rjSea, TToaa 
19 fcai TToZa. Trepi fxev ovv rod avfi(f)epovTog iv rols 
avix^ovXevTiKolg eiprfrai TTporepov, Trepi 8e rod rjhios 
eLTTCOfMev vvv. Set he vofxl^eiv cKavovs elv at roi) s opovs , 
iav (Lai rrepi eKaarov fxi^re aaa<j)eis fMTJre aKpi^ets. 
11. '^TTOKeiadcD 8' rjpXv elvai rrjv '^Sovrjv klvt^glv 
TLva Trjs 4'^'X^^ ^'^'' xardcrracrtv ddpoav /cat aladrjTrjv 
etg TTjv VTrdpxovaav (f)vaiv, XvTrrjv 8e rovvavriov. 

2 et 8' earlv rjhovr] ro roiovrov, hrjXov on /cat rjhv 
1370 a ian TO TTOirjTLKOv rrjs elprjfxevrjs Siadeaecos, ro Se 

(jidapTLKOv 7] rrjs evavrias Karaardaecos rroLrjriKov 

3 XvTrrjpov. dvdyKrj ovv rjSv elvat ro re els ro Kara 
(f)vaLv levai d)s errl ro ttoXv, /cat /xaAtora orav 
a7TeiXr](f)6ra fj rrjv eavrcov (f)vaiv rd /car' avrr]v 
yiyvofxeva, /cat ra edr)- /cat yap ro eWiafievov 
waTvep Tte^^VKOs rjS'q yiyverav ofxoLOV ydp ri ro 
edos rfj ^vaef iyyvs ydp /cat ro TToXXdKLS rat dei, 
eari 8 7y jxev <f)vaLs rod dei, ro 8e edos rov TToXXd- 

4 Kig. /cat TO /xr) ^iatov irapd ^vcriv ydp rj ^ia. 
Sto ro dvayKoiov XvTrrjpov, /cat opddJs etprjrai 

TTav yap avayKaZov rrpdyp, dvtapov €(f)v. 
rds 8' e7np,eXeias /cat rds anovhds /cat rds avv- 
rovias Xvnrjpds' dvayKaia ydp /cat ^laia ravra, 
iav jjbrj edLaddxjiv ovroj 8e ro edos Trotet tJ8u. rd 
o evavria rjSea' 8t6 at padvpuiai, /cat at dTToviai 
/cat at a/xe'Aetat /cat at 7rat8tat /cat at dvaTravaets 
/cat o V7TVOS rdjv rjheojv ovhev ydp irpos dvdyKTjv 

" Cf. i. 6 above. 

* The true nature of the " normal state " was lost during 
the period of disturbance and unsettlement. 

" From Evenus of Paros (Frag. 8, P.L.O. ii.) : see Introd. 
^ Or, ♦' rest " (bodily). 

114 



RHETORIC, I. X. 18— XI. 4 

for a less. We must therefore make om'selves 
acquainted with the number and quality of expedient 
and pleasant things. We have already spoken of the 
expedient when discussing deliberative rhetoric ; " 
let us now speak of the pleasant. And we must 
regard our definitions as sufficient in each case, 
provided they are neither obscure nor too precise. 

11. Let it be assumed by us that pleasure is a 
certain movement of the soul, a sudden and per- 
ceptible settling down into its natural state, and 
pain the opposite. If such is the nature of pleasure, 
it is evident that that which produces the disposition 
we have just mentioned is pleasant, and that that 
which destroys it or produces the contrary settling 
down is painful. Necessarily, therefore, it must be 
generally pleasant to enter into a normal state 
(especially when what is done in accordance with that 
state has come into its own again) ; ^ and the same 
with habits. For that which has become habitual be- 
comes as it were natural ; in fact, habit is something 
like nature, for the distance between " often " and 
" always " is not great, and nature belongs to the 
idea of " always," habit to that of " often." That 
which is not compulsory is also pleasant, for com- 
pulsion is contrary to nature. That is why what is 
necessary is painful, and it was rightly said, 

For every act of necessity is disagreeable.* 
Application, study, and intense effort are also painful, 
for these involve necessity and compulsion, if they 
have not become habitual ; for then habit makes them 
pleasant. Things contrary to these are pleasant ; 
wherefore states of ease, idleness, carelessness, amuse- 
ment, recreation,** and sleep are among pleasant things, 
because none of these is in any way compulsory. 

115 



ARISTOTLE 

6 Tovrojv. Kal ov dv r) iTTidvfxia evfj, airav t^Su* rj 
yap emdvpiia rod rjSeos iarlv o/oefts'. 

Toiv 8e eTTiOvfjiLcov at fiev aXoyoi elaiv at 8e 
fjierd Xoyov. Xeyco 8e dXoyovs fxev, ocra? fJirj eK 
rod VTToXaiM^dveiv rt eTnOvfxovaiv etal 8e roiavrai, 
oaai eti'ai Xeyovrai <f>va€t, axyrrep at Std rov 
acofxaros vndpxovaai, oXov r) rpo(f)rjg, hiifja Kal 
TTelva, /cat Kad eKaarov rpo(f)fjs elSos iTTidvjxia, 
/cat at rrept rd yevcrrd /cat 7T€pl rd d(f)poSlata /cat 
oXcos rd dirrd, /cat Tvepl oa/Jbrjv /cat aKorjv /cat 
oifjiv. fierd Xoyov 8e oaa e/c rov TTeiaOi^vai €7rt- 
dvpLovaiv TToXXd ydp /cat dedaaadai /cat Kr-qaaadai 
€7TLdv[Jbovaiv aKovaavres /cat Treiadevres. 

6 'E77et 8 ecTTt TO -qSeaOaL iv ra> aladdveadai rivos 
TTadovs, T} 8e (jiavracria iarlv aiadrjcrtg ris dadevT^s, 
Kav^ rw fjLefJLvrjfxevco /cat rco iXTTL^ovrt aKoXovdot 
dv (f>avraaia ris ov /xe'/xj/Tyrat •^ eAm^ei. el 8e 

^ Keeping Bekker's k&v = Kal ev. Roemer reads Kad — Kal 
del, Spengel del iv, 

" There is no consideration or "definite theory" (Jebb, 
Welldon) of the results that may follow. The desires arise 
without anything of the kind ; they simply come. 

* The passage eird 5' ea-rl . . . alcOrjcns has been punctuated 
in two ways. (1) With a full stop at iXiri^ei (Roemer, Jebb). 
The conclusion then drawn is that memory and hope are 
accompanied by imagination of what is remembered or 
hoped. To this it is objected that what Aristotle really 
wants to prove is that memory and hope are a cause of 
pleasure. (2) With a comma at fXiri^ei (Cope, Victorius). 
The steps in the argument will then be : if pleasure is the 
sensation of a certain emotion ; if imagination is a weakened 
(faded) sensation ; if one who remembers or hopes is attended 
by an imagination of what he remembers or hopes ; then, 
this being so, pleasure will attend one who remembers or 

116 



RHETORIC, I. XI. 5-6 

Everything of which we have in us the desire is 
pleasant, for desire is a longing for the pleasant. 

Now, of desires some are irrational, others rational. 
I call irrational all those that are not the result of 
any assumption." Such are all those which are called 
natural ; for instance, those which come into existence 
through the body — such as the desire of food, thirst, 
hunger, the desire of such and such food in particular ; 
the desires connected with taste, sexual pleasures, in 
a word, with touch, smell, hearing, and sight. I call 
those desires rational which are due to our being con- 
vinced ; for there are many things which we desire 
to see or acquire when we have heard them spoken 
of and are convinced that they are pleasant. 

And if pleasure consists in the sensation of a certain 
emotion, and imagination is a weakened sensation, 
then both the man who remembers and the man who 
hopes will be attended by an imagination of what he 
remembers or hopes.* This being so, it is evident 

hopes, since there is sensation, and pleasure is sensation and 
a kind of movement (§ 1). 

(pavraaia, the faculty of forming mental images (variously 
translated " imagination," " mental impression," "fantasy ") 
is defined by Aristotle {De Anima, iii. 3. 11) as a kind of 
movement, which cannot arise apart from sensation, and the 
movement produced must resemble the sensation which 
produced it. But 4>avTaaLa is more than this ; it is not 
merely a faculty of sense, but occupies a place midway 
between sense and intellect ; while imagination has need of 
the senses, the intellect has need of imagination. 

If (pavTaa-la is referred to an earlier perception of which 
the sense image is a copy, this is memory. Imagination 
carries the sense images {(pavrdafiara) to the seat of memory. 
They are then transformed into memory (of something past) 
or hope (of something future) and are handed on to the 
intellect. (See Cope here, and R. D. Hicks in his edition of 
the De Anima.) 

117 



ARISTOTLE 

TOVTO, SrjXov OTt /cat rjSoval a/xa ju.e/xvry/xei^ots' Kal 
1 eXTrit^ovaiv , CTTetWp koL aladrjOLg. oiar dvdyKr] 
Trdvra rd rjSea rj iv to) aladdveadai elvac irapovra 
Tj iv rep fMCfivrjadaL yeyevr^ixeva 7) Iv ra> iXTTil^eLV 
fxeXXovra- aladdvovr at pbkv ydp rd irapovra, /xe- 
1370 b /xvTjvrat he rd ycyevrjpieva, iXTTit,ovai Se rd pbiX- 

8 Xovra. rd pikv ovv p,vrjp,ov€vrd rjSea iariv, ov 
pLOVov oaa iv rep irapovri, ore Trapiju, rjSea rjv, 
dXK evta Kal ov^ rjSea, dv fj varepov KaXov kol 
dyaddv rd p-erd rovro- odev Kal rovr^ e'iprjraL, 

dXX rjSv roL acoOevra p,ep.vi]crdat ttovcov, 

KoX 

perd ydp re Kal dXyeai reprrerai dvrjp 
p.vqpLevos, OS rig ttoAAo, Trddr] Kal noXXd iopyjj. 

9 rovrov S' airiov on rjSv Kal rd p.rj e^etv KaKov. 
rd 8' iv iXirihi, oaa Trapovra 7) ev<f)paiV€LV rj u)(f)eXeLv 
<f>aLveraL p,eydXa, Kal dvev Xvtttjs (h^eXeZv. oXcos 
8' oaa TTapovra ev<j)paivei, Kal iXTrit^ovras Kal 
puepivrjpievovs ojs evri to ttoXv. Sid Kal rd opyi- 
^eadai r)Bv, coairep Kal "Op,r]pog eTrolrjae irepl rov 
6vp,ov 

OS re TToXv yXvKiiov p^eXiros KaraXei,^op.evoLO' 

ovdels ydp 6pyit,eraL rep dBvvdrco <f)aivop,€Vcp 
rip^oipias rv)(elv, ovSe rots' ttoXv virep avrovs rrj 
bvvdp,eL- rj ovk opyi^ovraL rj 'fjrrov. 
10 Kat iv rats rrXeiarais im9vp,iaLs aKoXovOet ris 
rjBovq' ^ ydp p,ep,vr]p,€voL to? erv^ov 7) iXTTi^ovres 

' Euripides, Andromeda (Frag. 133, T.G.F.). 
* Odyssey, xv. 400, 401, but misquoted in the second line, 
wliich runs : fis rts St; /adXa iroXXA irAOri Kal irdW iira\r)0^. 

118 



RHETORIC, I. XI. 6-10 

that there is pleasure both for those who remember 
and for those who hope, since there is sensation. 
Therefore all pleasant things must either be present 
in sensation, or past in recollection, or future in 
hope ; for one senses the present, recollects the past, 
and hopes for the future. Therefore our recollections 
are pleasant, not only when they recall things which 
when present were agreeable, but also some things 
which were not, if their consequence subsequently 
proves honourable or good ; whence the saying : 

Truly it is pleasant to remember toil after one has escaped it," 
and, 

When a man has suflfered much and accomplished much, 
he afterwards takes pleasure even in his sorrows when he 
recalls them.* 

The reason of this is that even to be free from evil 
is pleasant. Things which we hope for are pleasant, 
when their presence seems likely to afford us great 
pleasure or advantage, without the accompaniment 
of pain. In a word, all things that afford pleasure 
by their presence as a rule also afford pleasure when 
we hope for or remember them. Wherefore even 
resentment is pleasant, as Honaer said of anger that 
it is 

Far sweeter than dripping honey ; " 

for no one feels resentment against those whom 
vengeance clearly cannot overtake, or those who are 
far more powerful than he is ; against such, men feel 
either no resentment or at any rate less. 

Most of our desires are accompanied by a feeling 
of pleasure, for the recollection of a past or the hope 

« Iliad, xviii. 108. 

119 



ARISTOTLE 

ws rev^ovrai )(aipovaL TLva rjSovT^v, olov ot t' eV 
roLS TTvpeTois ixofJ-fvoL rals St^cu? Kal fj,€fxv7]fjb€voL 
COS" errtov Kai e\TTit,ovres TTLetadai )(aLpov(nv, Kal 

11 ol ipojvres Kal SiaXeyopievot Kal ypd(^ovres, Kal 
TTOLOvvres tl del nepl rod epa)p.evov X'^ipovaiv ev 
dVacrt yap rols tolovtols ixefivr^fjievoL olov aladd- 
veadai olovrai rov epoipbevov. Kal dp)(r} 8e rov 
€pa>TOS avTi] yiyver at Trdcrcv, orav pirj p,6vov irap- 
ovTos ^(aipcoaLV dAAa Kal dTTovros p,ep.vrjp,ivoL 

12 ipdJcnv. Std Kal orav XvTrrjpos yevrjrat rip pbr) Trap- 
elvai, Kal iv rols irivdeai Kal dp'qvois eyyiverai 
Tl? 'qhovri' Tj p,€V yap Xyrrrf errl ra> p,rj VTrdp^civ, 
r}Sovr) 8' iv rw p,€p,vfjadaL Kal opdv ttcos eKeZvov, 
Kal a errparre, Kal oiog rjv. Std Kal rovr^ eiKorcos 
e'iprjrat, 

ojs (f>dro, roZat 8e Trdaiv v<f)' lp,€pov wpae yooLO. 

13 Kai ro rLpboypeladat, rjSv' ov yap ro p,r] rvyxdveiv 
XvTTrjpov, ro rvyxdveiv rjSv- ol 8' opyL^onevoi 
XvTTovvrai dwrreppX-qrcos p,rj ripbcopovp^evot, cAtti- 

14 t,ovr€S 8e ;;(at/30i;CTtv. Kal ro VLKav rjBv, ov fxovov 
rols (f>t,XoviKOLS dXXd Trdaiv (f>avraaia yap vnepoxrjs 
yiyverai, ov rravres exovaiv i7Tidvp,tav rj -qpep-a r) 

15 jxdXXov. ijret, 8e to vikov rjSv, dvdyKrj Kal rds 
1371 a 7rai8td? rj8etas" elvai rds p^ax^jTiKas Kal rds ipt- 

oriKas {noXXaKLs ydp iv rarjrais yiyverai, ro viKav) 

" Or " doing something that has to do with the beloved.' 
'' Iliad, xxiii. 108, on the occasion of the mourning foi 

120 



RHETORIC, I. XI. 10-15 

of a future pleasure creates a certain pleasurable en- 
joyment ; thus, those suffering from fever and 
tormented by thirst enjoy the remembrance of 
having drunk and the hope that they will drink again. 
The lovesick always take pleasure in talking, writing, 
or composing verses '^ about the beloved ; for it seems 
to them that in all this recollection makes the object 
of their affection perceptible. Love always begins 
in this manner, when men are happy not only in the 
presence of the beloved, but also in his absence when 
they recall him to mind. This is why, even when 
his absence is painful, there is a certain amount of 
pleasure even in mourning and lamentation ; for the 
pain is due to his absence, but there is pleasure in 
remembering and, as it were, seeing him and recalling 
his actions and personality. Wherefore it was rightly 
said by the poet : 

Thus he spake, and excited in all a desire of weeping.* 

And revenge is pleasant ; for if it is painful to be 
unsuccessful, it is pleasant to succeed. Now, those 
who are resentful are pained beyond measure when 
they fail to secure revenge, while the hope of it 
delights them. Victory is pleasant, not only to those 
who love to conquer, but to all ; for there is pro- 
duced an idea of superiority, which all with more or 
less eagerness desire. And since victory is pleasant, 
competitive and disputatious " amusements must be 
so too, for victories are often gained in them ; among 

Patroclus ; Odyssey, iv. 183, referring to the mourning for 
the absence of Odysseus. 

' Controversiae or school rhetorical exercises, as well as 
arguing in the law courts ; unless epiariKdi means simply 
" in which there is rivalry." 

121 



ARISTOTLE 

Kai aarpayaXiaeis koL a^aipiaeis /cat Kv^etag /cat 
TreTreta?. /cat irepl rag ecrTrofSacr/xeVa? 8e TratStctS" 
o/xoio)?" at /xev yap T^Setat yiyvovrai, av tls iy 
avvrjdrjs, at 8' evdvs rjSelaL, olov Kvvqyla /cat 
TTaaa diqpevriKrj' ottov yap a/xiAAa, ivravOa Kai 

VlKYj icTTLV. 8tO /Cat ly SlKaVLKT) /Cat tJ epLaTLKTj 

16 T^Seta Tots" eldiap^evoLs /cat 8uva/xeVots". /cat rt/x.?^ 
/cat evSo^la rwv rjhlarcjjv 8ta to yiyveadai <j)av- 
raaiav e/cctaro) ort TotouTO? oios" o cr7roi;8atos', /cat 
[jbdXXov orav <f>6j(nv ovs oterat dXr^deveiv . tolovtol 
8' ot eyyvs /xaAAor roiv TToppco, /cat ot crvvqOeLg /cat 
oi 77oAtTat Toiv aTTCodev, /cat ot orres" tcDv /xeAAoj^rajt', 
/cat ot (fjpovLjjioi a^povcDV, Kai noXXol oXiycov 
[xaXXov yap et/co? aXr^Oeveiv rovs elprjixevovs rcjv 
ivavTicov CTTel cLv rt? ttoXv Karaj)povei, oiOTxep 
TTaiSicov r) drjpicov, ovSev fieXei, rrjs Tovra>v TLp,rjs 
t) TTJs So^-qs avrrjg ye rrjs So^rjg ^a/Dtv, dAA' emep, 
8t' d'AAo Ti. 

17 Kat o (filXog tojv rjhiatv ro re yap ^iXeZv ijSy 
(oi58ets' yap (f)LXoivos p,r) x^ipiov otVoj) /cat ro 
j)LXelad at r]hv' (fyavraala yap /cat evravda rov 
VTrapx^iv avrcp ayadov elvai, oS Travreg eTTidv- 
fiovcTLv ot aladavojxevof ro he (f>iXela9aL ayarrdadai 

18 ear IV avrov 8t' avrov. /cat ro Oavfid^eadat i^Sv 
8t auTO ro rijxdadat. /cat ro KoXaKeveadai /cat 
d KoXa^ rjSv' ^awopievos yap davfMaarrjs /cat 

19 <j>aLv6p,evog <j>iXos 6 KoXa^ eariv. /cat ro ravrd 

<» For the meaning of (piXla, <pi\€iv c/. ii. 4. 
122 



RHETORIC, I. XI. 15-19 

these we may include games with knuckle-bones, 
ball-games, dicing, and draughts. It is the same 
with serious sports ; for some become pleasant when 
one is familiar with them, while others are so from 
the outset, such as the chase and every description 
of outdoor sport ; for rivalry implies victory. It 
follows from this that practice in the law courts and 
disputation are pleasant to those who are familiar 
with them and well qualified. Honour and good 
repute are among the most pleasant things, because 
every one imagines that he possesses the qualities of 
a worthy man, and still more when those whom he 
believes to be trustworthy say that he does. Such 
are neighbours rather than those who live at a dis- 
tance ; intimate friends and fellow-citizens rather 
than those who are unknown ; contemporaries rather 
than those who come later ; the sensible rather than 
tlie senseless ; the many rather than the few ; for 
such persons are more likely to be trustworthy than 
their opposites. As for those for whom men feel / 
great contempt, such as children and animals, they 
pay no heed to their respect or esteem, or, if they 
do, it is not for the sake of their esteem, but for 
some other reason. 

A friend also is among pleasant things, for it is 
pleasant to love " — for no one loves wine unless he 
finds pleasure in it — ^just as it is pleasant to be loved ; 
for in this case also a man has an impression that he 
is really endowed with good qualities, a thing desired 
by all who perceive it ; and to be loved is to be 
cherished for one's own sake. And it is pleasant to 
be admired, because of the mere honour. Flattery 
and the flatterer are pleasant, the latter being a 
sham admirer and friend. It is pleasant to do the 

123 



ARISTOTLE 

rrpdrreiv TToWaKis rjSv' to yap avvrjdes r)Bv "^v. 

20 /cat TO iJ,eTaPd)0\.€LV 'qSv' ets" cf)vaLV yap yiyverai 
fjuera^aXXcLV to yap avTo del VTrep^oXrjv ttolcZ 
TTJs KadecTTCoarjg e^ecos' o9ev eLprjTai, 

ficTa^oXr] iravTCjov yXvKV. 
Sta TovTO Kal TO. Sia )(p6vov rjSea ecm', Kal dvdpojTTOi 
KOi TTpdypLaTa' fieTa^oXrj yap e/c tov napovTos 

21 eoTiv, a/xa 8e Kal ondvLov to hid ■)(p6vov. Kal to 
fiavOdvetv Kal to davjMdleiv rjSv cos eirt to ttoXv' 
iv fxkv yap tco 6avfidC,€iv to iTTidvfjLelv p^aOelv 
icrriv, cocrre to davfiacrrov €7n6vp,r]T6v, iv Se tco 

22 fiavOdvcLV et? to /caTo. <j)vaiv KadioTaadaL. Kal 
TO ev TTOielv Kal to ev Trdax^iv tcHv rjhicov to jxev 
yap €V irdax^i'V Tvyxdveiv ioTlv u)v eVt^u/xouo-i, 
TO he ev TTOielv ex^iv Kal VTrepex^tv , (Lv dfxcfiOTepojv 

iziih e<j>ievTat. hid 8e to rjhv elvai to evTroLrjTiKov, 
Kal TO eTTOVopdovv TjSv Tols dv9pa)7roLs eoTl tovs 

23 TrXr^atov, Kal to Ta iXXnrrj eTTLTeXelv. inel 8e to 
IJ,av9dv€LV T€ rjSi) Kal to 6avp.dl,eLV, Kal Ta ToidSe 
dvdyKT] TjSea etvai olov to t€ p.Lfj,ovp,€vov ,^ wanep 
ypa(f)LKr) Kal duSpiavTonoUa Kal TroLrjTiK-q, Kal 
TTav o dv ev fiefxipirjiJievov rj, Kav fj fir] rjSv avro 
TO iJ,€p,Lp.rjp,evov ov yap em tovtco ;!^atpet, dXXd 
avXXoyiafio? iaTiv otl tovto CKeivo, cuore p,av' 

24 ddveiv Tt avfjb^aLvet,. Kal at TreptTreVeiat Kal to 
TTapd fxiKpov ao)t,ea6ai e/c Ta>v klvSvvcov TrdvTa 

25 ydp davfiacrrd TavTa. Kal irrel to /caTo, <f>vaiv 

^ Roemer reads r6 re /.ufiriTiKov. The meaning is much 
the same, only ixi^xodfievov is passive. 

" Euripides, Orestes, 234. 

' True knowledge or philosophy, which is the result of 
learning, is the highest condition of the intellect, its normal 
124 



RHETORIC, I. XI. 19-25 

same things often ; for that which is famihar is, as 
we said, pleasant. Change also is pleasant, since 
change is in the order of nature ; for perpetual 
sameness creates an excess of the normal condition ; 
whence it was said : 

Change in all things is sweet." 

This is why what we only see at intervals, whether 
men or things, is pleasant ; for there is a change 
from the present, and at the same time it is rare. 
And learning and admiring are as a rule pleasant ; 
for admiring implies the desire to learn, so that what 
causes admiration is to be desired, and learning 
implies a return to the normal.* It is pleasant to 
bestow and to receive benefits ; the latter is the 
attainment of what we desire, the former the posses- 
sion of more than sufficient means," both of them 
things that men desire. Since it is pleasant to do 
good, it must also be pleasant for men to set their 
neighbours on their feet, and to supply their de- 
ficiencies. And since learning and admiring are 
pleasant, all things connected with them must also 
be pleasant ; for instance, a work of imitation, such 
as painting, sculpture, poetry, and all that is well 
imitated, even if the object of imitation is not 
pleasant ; for it is not this that causes pleasure or 
the reverse, but the inference that the imitation and 
the object imitated are identical, so that the result 
is that we learn something. The same may be said 
of sudden changes and narrow escapes from danger ; 
for all these things excite wonder. And since that 

or settled state. Consequently, a return to this is pleasure, 
which is defined (§ 1) as a settling down of the soul into its 
natural state after a period of disturbance. 

" Or, " larger means than the person benefited." 

125 



ARISTOTLE 

rjSv, TO. avyyevrj 8e Kara (jivaiv aAAi^Aots" icnriv, 
TTavra ra avyyevi] Kal o/xoia T^Sea (Ls irrl to ttoXv, 
olov avdpaynos dvdpwTTco Kal lttttos cttttco /cat 
veog vecp. odev Kal at Trapot/xtai eiprivrai, co? 

fjXi^ TJXiKa repirei, 
Kal 

d)9 atet rov opboXov, 
Kal 

eyvo) 8e Orjp 6fjpa, 
Kal 

del KoAotos" TTapd koXolov, 

Kal oaa d'AAa roiavra. 

26 ETret Se ro ofxotov Kal ro avyyeves rjSv eavrcp 
aTTav, pLaXtcrra 8' avros rrpos iavrov CKaaros 
rovTo TTeTTOvOev, dvdyKiq Trdvrag (jaXavrovg elvai 
ri pidXXov rj rjrTOV Trdvra yap rd roLavra VTrdp^ec 
npos avTov pbdXtara. iirel 8e <f)LXavTOL ndures, 
Kal TO. avrcov dvdyKiq rjSea etvai Trduiv, olov epya 
Kal Xoyovs. 8t6 /cat ^tAo/coAa/ce? co? evrt ro ttoXv 
Kal ^iXepaarai /cat (jiiXorLpLoi Kal ^iXoreKvoi' 
avrcov yap epya rd reKva. /cat to, cAAittt^ evrt- 

27 reAeti' rjhv' avrcov ydp epyov rjSrj yiyverai. /cat 
eTTel ro dpX€LV TJ^icrrov, Kal ro ao(f)6v SoKelv elvat 
rjSv' dpxt'Kov ydp rd (jypovelv, eort 8' rj ao<j)ia 
TToXXwv /cat davpiacrrajv e7TLariqp,r). en enel (f>LX6- 
rLjJbOL d>s enl ro ttoXv, dvdyKrj Kal rd eTTinpidv rols 

28 TTeXas rjSv elvai. Kal ro ev o) fieXriaros hoKel 
elvai avrds avrov, evravda hiarpi^etv, cooTrep /cat 
Eupt77-t87^S" fji-qal 

" Odyssey, xvii. 218 ws alel rbv bixoiov 6.yfi, debs ws t6i> 
bjjioiov. 

126 



RHETORIC, I. XI. 25-28 

which is in accordance with nature is pleasant, and 
things which are akin are akin in accordance with 
nature, all things akin and like are for the most part 
pleasant to each other, as man to man, horse to 
horse, youth to youth. This is the origin of the 
proverbs : 

The old have charms for the old, the young for the young, 

Like to like," 

Beast knows beast, 

Birds of a feather flock together,* 
and all similar sayings. 

And since things which are akin and like are 
always pleasant to one another, and every man in 
the highest degree feels this in regard to himself, it 
must needs be that all men are more or less selfish ; 
for it is in himself above all that such conditions " 
are to be found. Since, then, all men are selfish, it 
follows that all find pleasure in what is their own, 
such as their works and words. That is why men as 
a rule are fond of those who flatter and love them, ^ 
of honour, and of children ; for the last are their 
own work. It is also pleasant to supply what is 
wanting,*^ for then it beconaes our work. And since 
it is most pleasant to command, it is also pleasant to 
be regarded as wise ; * for practical wisdom is com- 
manding, and philosophy consists in the knowledge 
of many things that excite wonder. Further, since 
men are generally ambitious, it follows that it is also 
agreeable to find fault with our neighbours. And if 
a man thinks he excels in anything, he likes to devote 
his time to it ; as Euripides says : 

'' Literally, "ever jackdaw to jackdaw." 

" Of likeness and kinship. "* § 22. 

• Both practically and speculatively or philosophically. 

127 



ARISTOTLE 

KOLTTL rovr' eTTeiyeraL, 
vefxcov eKdarrjS T^/xepa? TrXelcrrov [xepos, 
tv' avros avrov rvyxavet ^eXriaTos oiv. 

29 6}ioio)s Se Kol eTrel rj TratSio. rcov rjSecov Kai Trdaa 

aveoLS, /cat d yeXoiS rojv rjSeojv, avayKt] koL to. 

1372 a yeAota i^Sea etvat, /cat dvOpconovs /cat Adyou? /cat 

epya' huxypiarai 8e Trept yeXoicov xcD/at? eV rot? 7re/3t 

TTOLrjTLKrjg. irepl fiev ovv rjBecov elpiqadcx) Tavra, 

- rd Se XvTrrjpd e/c rwv ivavricov rovrois ^avepd. 

12. ^Q.v [xev ovv eVe/ca dSt/coucrt, ravr^ eariv 

TTOJS 8' exovreg /cat Tivas, Aeyco^ev vw. auroi 

/Ltei' ow drav otcovrat Surardv etvat to 7Tpdyp,a 

7TpaxdT]vai /cat iavrois Svvarov, eiVe dv Aa^etv 

TTpd^avres, -q /xr) Xadovres /at) Sowai htKrjv, rj 

Sovvai ixkv dXX eXdrrco rrjv t,r)ixLav etvat rod 

2 Kephovs eauTot? ■^ c5v /crjSovrat. TTOta /xev ovv 
hvvard ^atVerat /cat TTOta dSwara ev rols varepov 
p-qdrjaerat (/cotvd yap ravra irdvroiv rcjv Xoycxiv), 
avTol 8' otovrat Suvarot etvat /lidAtcrra d^Ty/itot 
dSt/cetv ot etTretv Swajjuevoi, /cat ot Trpa/crt/cot /cat 
ot efiTTeipoL TToXXdJv dycovojv, Kav TroXvcpiXoi coaiv, 

3 /cdv ttXovoiol. /cat jxdXicrra jixeV, dv aurot ciatv 
ev Tot? elprjfjbevots, otovrat hvvaadai, et 8e /ti^, 
/cdv VTrdpxitiOLV aurot? roLovroi (j)iXoL rj VTrrjperaL 
r) KOLVCDVoi' 8td ydp ravra Svvavrat /cat rrparreiv 

4 /cat Xavddveiv /cat /ti) 8o wat Slktjv. /cat edv cf)iXoL 
coai rol? dSiKOVfievoLS rj roZs Kptrais' ot />tev ya/> 
(ftiXoi d(f)vXaKroL re TT/ad? to d8tKeta^at /cat irpoa- 

<» Antiope (Frag. 183, T.G.F.). 

* Only the definition appears in the existing text : 
"The ridiculous is an error, painless and non - destructive 
ugliness (5)." 
128 



RHETORIC, I. XI. 28— XII. 4 

And allotting the best part of each day to that in which 
he happens to surpass himself, he presses eagerly towards it." 

Similarly, since amusement, every kind of relaxation, 
and laughter are pleasant, ridiculous things — men, 
words, or deeds — ^must also be pleasant. The ridi- 
culous has been discussed separately in the Poetics.^ 
Let this suffice for things that are pleasant ; those 
that are painful will be obvious from the contraries 
of these. 

12. Such are the motives of injustice ; let us now 
state the frame of mind of those who commit it, and 
who are the sufferers from it. Men do wrong when 
they think that it can be done and that it can be 
done by them ; when they think that their action 
will either be undiscovered, or if discovered will 
remain unpunished ; or if it is punished, that the 
punishment will be less than the profit to themselves 
or to those for whom they care. As for the kind of 
things which seem possible or impossible, Ave will 
discuss them later,^' for these topics are common to 
all kinds of rhetoric. Now men who commit wrong 
think they are most likely to be able to do so with 
impunity, if they are eloquent, business-like, ex- 
perienced in judicial trials, if they have many friends, 
and if they are wealthy. They think there is the 
greatest chance of their being able to do so, if they 
themselves belong to the above classes ; if not, if 
they have friends, servants, or accomplices who do ; 
for thanks to these qualities they are able to commit 
wrong and to escape discovery and punishment. 
Similarly, if they are friends of those who are being 
WTonged, or of the judges ; for friends are not on 
their guard against being wronged and, besides, they 
« 11. 19. 

K 129 



ARISTOTLE 

KaTaXXdrrovraL mplv eTre^eXOetv, ol 8e Kpirai, 
XOipil,ovTat ols av ^t'Aoi coat, Kal r) oXojs a(f)(.daLV 

7] IMKpols ^rjpLLOVaLV. 

5 AadrjTiKOL 8' elarlv ol t' evavrioi rols iyKX-q- 
fxaaiv, oiov daOevrjs Trepl at/cia? /cat o Trevrjs /cat 

alaxpos irepl /xoip^etas". /cat to. AtW ev (f)av€pcp 
Kal iv o^^aA/xots'* d(j)vXaKra yap Bid to fjirjBeva 

6 dv o'ieaOai. /cat ra rrjXiKavra /cat ra rotavra ota 
jLtT^S' av ets" d<f)vXaKra yap /cat ravra' Trdvreg ydp 
rd elojdora wairep appwcrr-qixara ^vXarrovrai, Kal 
rdhiKripLara, o he (xiqBeis ttoj 'qppcoarrjKev, ovSels 

7 euAajSetrat. /cat ot? /XT^Set? ix^pos rj ttoXXol- ol 
p.kv ydp o'iovrai Xr^aeiv hid ro /xtj (l>vXdrread ai, 

01 §6 Aav^avoycrt Sta rd /xt) hoKeiv dv eTTtp^eipiyaat 
(^yAarro/xeVots", /cat Sta rd aTToXoyiav €X€LV on 

8 ovK dv ivex^iprjcrav. Kal ols VTrapx^i Kpvifjis rj 
rpoTTOs ^ r OTTOS T] hiadeais evTTOpos- Kal ocrois 
p,rj Xadovaiv earl hiuiais hiKTjs ^ dva^oXrj xpdvov 
TJ hia(f)9opal Kpircov. Kal ols, edv yevrjrai t,rj}xia, 
earl hia)aLs rfjs eKriaecxis t) dva^oXr] xpdvios, r^ 

9 8t' aTTopiav firjSev e^et o rt diToXear]. Kal ols rd 
[xev Kephf] (f)av€pd ^ /xeyctAa -^ eyyvs, at he ^Tjfjulai 

1372 b fjiLKpal r) d(j)av€LS t) TToppco. Kal (Lv n'q can rifiajpia 
10 tar] rfj (x><j)eXeia, olov So/cet r] rvpavvis. Kal daois 

" Two different persons. If the second i be omitted, the 
reference is to one. 

'' Or, a " resourceful mind." 

130 



RHETORIC, I. XII. 4-10 

prefer reconciliation to taking proceedings ; and 
judges ffivour those whom they are fond of, and 
either let them off altogether or inflict a small penalty. 
Those are likely to remain undetected whose 
qualities are out of keeping with the charges, for 
instance, if a man wanting in physical strength were 
accused of assault and battery, or a poor and an 
ugly man « of adultery. Also, if the acts are done 
quite openly and in sight of all ; for they are not 
guarded against, because no one would think them 
possible. Also, if they are so great and of such a 
nature that no one would even be likely to attempt 
them, for these also are not guarded against ; for all 
guard against ordinary ailments and wrongs, but no 
one takes precautions against those ailments from 
which no one has ever yet suffered. And those who 
have either no enemy at all or many ; the former 
hope to escape notice because they are not watched, 
the latter do escape because they would not be 
thought likely to attack those who are on their guard 
and because they can defend themselves by the plea 
that they would never have attempted it. And 
those who have ways or places of concealment for 
stolen property, or abundant opportunities of dispos- 
ing of it.** And those who, even if they do not remain 
undetected, can get the trial set aside or put off, or 
corrupt the judges. And those who, if a fine be 
imposed, can get payment in full set aside or put oflF 
for a long time, or those who, owing to poverty, have 
nothing to lose . And in cases where the profit is 
certain, large, or immediate, while the punishment 
is small, uncertain, or remote. And where there can 
be no punishment equal to the advantages, as seems 
to be the case in a tyranny. And when the unjust 

131 



ARISTOTLE 

TO. fjiev dSt/CTy/xara X'qfjifxara, at Se ^Ty^tat oi/etSi) 
fiovov. Kal OLS rovvavriov ra fxkv aSt/CT^/xara et? 
€7Taiv6v riva, olov el avve^r] d[j,a TijJicopriaaadaL 
VTTep narpos rj p,r}Tp6s, uioirep Zj-qvcovi, at Se 
t,7]iJbiai els XPVI^'^'^^ V cf)vyr)v tj tolovtov rf St' 
ajxt^orepa yap aSiKovai, /cat dfjicf)or€pcos exovres, 
ttXtjv ovx ol avTol dAA' ol evavrioi roXs rjOecnv. 

11 Kal ol TToXXoLKLS T^ XeX'qdoTCS •^ fir) il,7]p,L(x)p,€VOL. 

/cat OL TToXXaKig aTToreTVxrjKores' elal yap rtves 
/cat iv roLS tolovtols, oiOTrep Iv rois TToXep.iKois , 

12 otot dvafjidxecrOaL. /cat ois dv TjapaxprjpLa fj to 
i^Su, TO Se XvTTrjpov vaTepov, rj to KepSos, rj Se 
^i^/ita vcrrepov ol yap dKpaTels tolovtoi, ecm S' 

13 dKpaaia irepi rravTa oacov opeyovTai. /cat ot? dv 
TOVvavTLOV TO pi€V Xv7Tr)p6v rjSrj fj 'q rj ^T^^ta, to Se 
rjhv /cat (h(j)eXip.ov vcrrepa /cat ;;^povt(ijrepa" ol yap 
iyKpaTcis Kal (fipovLficuTepoi Ta rotaura Stco/couCTtv. 

14 /cat OLS dv ivSexrjTai Sid Tvxr)v So^at rrpd^ai -q St' 
dvdyKrjv rj Std <j>vaLV rj St' e^o?, /cat oAcos" dp,ap- 

15 retv dAAd ju.?) dSt/cetv. /cat ot? di^ 17 tou €ttl€lkovs 
TVX^Xv. /cat OCTOt dv erSeet? (haw. hix^JS S' etatv' 
ei'Seets" r] yap d)S avayKaiov, woTrep ol Trevr^Tes, iq 

16 d)S VTTep^oXrjs, uiOTtep ol irXovaioi. koI ol a(f)6Spa 
evhoKLfxovvTe? Kal ol a<f)6Spa dSo^ovvTcs, ol jxev 
ws ov B6^ovT€s, ol S d)S ovSev fidXXov So^ovTes. 

17 AvTol fxev ovv OVTOJS exovTes eTTLX^ipovaiv , 
dhiKovat Se tovs tolovtovs Kal Ta ToiavTa, tovs 

" Who Zeno was, and what the story, is unknown. 

* Some do wrong for the sake of gain, others for the sake 
of praise ; but the former sacrifice honour for self-interest, 
the latter self-interest for honour. 

« " More distant " (Jebb). 
132 



RHETORIC, I. XII. 10-17 

acts are real gains and the only punishment is dis- 
grace ; and when, on the contrary, the unjust acts 
tend to our credit, for instance, if one avenges father 
or mother, as was the case with Zeno,'* while the 
punishment only involves loss of money, exile, or 
something of the kind. For men do wrong from 
both these motives and in both these conditions of 
mind ; but the persons are not the same, and their 
characters are exactly opposite.* And those who 
have often been undetected or have escaped punish- 
ment ; and those who have often been unsuccessful ; 
for in such cases, as in actual warfare, there are 
always men ready to return to the fight. And all 
who hope for pleasure and profit at once, while the 
pain and the loss come later ; such are the intem- 
perate, intemperance being concerned with all things 
that men long for. And when, on the contrary, the 
pain or the loss is immediate, while the pleasure and 
the profit are later and more lasting " ; for temperate 
and wiser men pursue such aims. And those who 
may possibly be thought to have acted by chance or 
from necessity, from some natural impulse or from 
habit, in a word, to have committed an error rather 
than a crime. And those Avho hope to obtain in- 
didgence ; and all those who are in need, which is 
of two kinds ; for men either need what is necessary, 
as the poor, or what is superfluous, as the wealthy. 
And those who are highly esteemed or held in great 
contempt ; the former will not be suspected, the 
latter no more than they are already. 

In such a frame of mind men attempt to do wrong, 
and the objects of their wrongdoing are men and 
circumstances of the following kind.** Those who 

"* With a comma or colon after to, rotaOra ; without these 
render : " those who possess such things as they . . ." 

133 



ARISTOTLE 

€)(0VTa9 (hv avTol ivSeeis t] etV ravayKola 7] et? 

18 vvepo)(rjv 7] ets" aTToXavaiv , /cat tovs TToppo) /cat 
Tovg iyyvs' rcov fxev yap rj Xtji/jl? rax^Xa, TOiv S' 
r\ TLfJbcopLa fipahela, olov ol avXcovres rovs K.ap)(r]' 

19 Boviovs. Kal Tous" fjirj evXa^eXs fxrjSe (f)vXaKrLKovg 
aAAa TTiarevTLKOvs' paSiov yap iravras Xadeiv. 
/cat rovs padvfxovs' eTTi/xeAoy? yap ro eTre^eXdeXv. 
/cat rovs aiaxwrrjXovs' ov yap fjbaxrjTiKol rrepl 

20 KepSovs. /cat rovs vtto ttoXXcjv dScKrjdevras /cat 
fj,-?! iire^eXdovras (hs ovras Kara rr)v TTapoLp,iav 

21 rovrovs MuctcDv Xeiav. /cat ovs fX7]Se7Ta)7Tor€ /cat 
ovs TToXXoLKLS' dp,(f)6r€poL ydp d(f)vXaKroi, ol p,ev 

22 COS ovBcTTore, ol 8' cos ovk dv eVt. /cat rovs 8ta- 
^€^Xr]p,evovs T] evSia^oXovs' ol roiovroi ydp ovre 
rrpoaipovvrai, (j>o^ovpievoi rovs Kpirds, ovre hv- 
vavrai Treideiv (Lv ol fMiaovfMevoi Kal (ftdovovfievoi 

23 etViv. /cat Trpos ovs e;^ouat Trpo^aaiv r) Trpoyovcov 
1373 8"^ avrcov •^ (jiiXcov r^ rroLr^crdvrcov /ca/cai? rj p.eX- 

Xrjadvrcov r^ avrovs r] irpoyovovs rj cov K'qSovrai' 
coarrep yap r] TrapoipLia, 7rpo<f)d(7€cos Selrai p,6~ 

24 vov rj TTOvrjpla. Kal rovs i^Opovs Kal rovs 4>^Xovs' 
rovs jLtev ydp pahiov, rovs 8' r]hv. Kal rovs 
d(f)LXovs. Kal rovs p-r] Bclvovs eiTTelv t) rrpd^av rj 
ydp OVK iyxeipovaiv eVe^ieVat, t] /caraAAaTTOvTat, 

25 ^ ovSev TTepaivovoLV . /cat ols p^rj XvaireXei 8ta- 



" Who were too far off to retaliate. 

^ A proverb meaning " an easy prey." The Mysians 
were regarded as cowardly and unwarlike. 

134 



RHETORIC, I. XII. 17-25 

possess what they themselves lack, things either 
necessary, or superfluous, or enjoyable ; both those 
who are far off and those who are near, for in the 
one case the gain is speedy, in the other reprisals 
are slow, as if, for instance, Greeks were to plunder 
Carthaginians.'' And those who never take pre- 
cautions and are never on their guard, but are 
confiding ; for all these are easily taken unawares. 
And those who are indolent ; for it requires a man 
who takes pains to prosecute. And those who are 
baslvful ; for they are not likely to fight about 
money. And those who have often been wronged 
but have not prosecuted, being, as the proverb says, 
" Mysian booty." ^ And those who have never, or 
those who have often, suffered wrong ; for both are 
off their guard, the one because they have never yet 
been attacked, the others because they do not expect 
to be attacked again. And those who have been 
slandered, or are easy to slander ; for such men 
neither care to go to law, for fear of the judges, 
nor, if they do, can they convince them ; to this 
class belong those who are exposed to hatred or 
envy. And those against whom the wrongdoer can 
pretend that either their ancestors, or themselves, 
or their friends, have either committed, or intended 
to commit, wrong either against hiraself, or his 
ancestors, or those for whom he has great regard ; 
for, as the proverb says, " evil-doing only needs an 
excuse." And both enemies and friends ; for it is 
easy to injure the latter, and pleasant to injure the 
former. And those who are friendless. And those 
who are unskilled in speech or action ; for either 
they make no attempt to prosecute, or come to terms, 
or accomplish nothing. And those to whom it is no 

135 



ARISTOTLE 

rpL^eiv eTnrrjpovatv rj Siktjv t] eKnaiv, olov ol ^evoi 
/cat avrovpyoL- €ttI puKpo) re yap hiaXvovrai koi 

26 paSicos Kararravovrat. koL tovs ttoXXol tjSlktjko- 
ras, 7j roiavra ota dScKovvraL- eyyvs yap n Sok€l 
Tov fjiTj dSiKeXv elvaL, orav ri roiovrov dSiK7]9fj 
rts otov elcoOcL /cat avros dSiKeXv Xeyco 8' olov 

27 €L ns rov eliodora v^pit,eiv atKLcraiTO . /cat rovs 
■^ TTeTTOirjKoras /ca/ca>s" rj ^ovXrjdevras "^ ^ovXo- 
jxivovs r] TTOLiqaovras- e^eL yap /cat to rjSv /cat to 

28 KaXov, /cat iyyvg rov {jLtj dSt/ceiP' (f)aiV€rai. /cat 
ols ^([aptowTat •^ (f)iXois rj davpiat,opLivois rj ipco- 
p,€VOLS rj Kvpiois rj oAcos" rrpos ovs t,6jaiv avroi' 

29 /cat irpos ovs eariv eTrtet/ceta? rv)(€lv. /cat ols o.v 
iyKeKXrjKores wai /cat rrpoSLaKexioprjKores , otov 
KaAAtTTTTOS- iiToUt rd rrepl Aicova' /cat yap rd 

3Q roiavra iyyv? rov jMrj aSt/cetv (f>aiverai. /cat rovs 
VTT* dXXcov fxeXXovras, dv firj avroi, d>s ovKeri 
ivhexofxevov ^ovXevaaaOai, ioarrep Xeyerai Alvea'i- 
hyjjxos VeXoyvL TrefxipaL Korrd^ia dvSpaTToSiaap^evcp , 

31 OTt €<f>9acr€v, d)s /cat avros jJi,eXXa>v. /cat ovs aSt- 
Krjaavres hvvrjcrovrai ttoAAo, St/cata rrpdrrciv, cos 

" alKia (assault) was a less serious oifence than v^pis 
(wanton outrage). 

* ofs, i.e. supplying dSiKovfiivoi^, " by whose being 
wronged." oPs has been suggested, i.e. supplying ddiKovvres, 
" wronging whom." 

* In our relations with whom, almost = from whom. 
Another interpretation is : " In reference to whom there is a 
chance . . . consideration/rom o</(«r«, meaning thejudges " 
(Welldon). 

"* Callippus was a friend of Dion, who freed Syracuse 
from Dionysius the Younger. He afterwards accused Dion 
and contrived his murder. His excuse was that Dion knew 
what he intended to do, and would be likely to strike first, 
if he did not anticipate him. 

136 



RHETORIC, I. XII. 25-31 

advantage to waste time waiting for the verdict or 
damages, such as strangers or husbandmen ; for they 
are ready to compromise on easy terms and to drop 
proceedings. And those who have committed 
numerous wrongs, or such as those from which they 
themselves are suffering ; for it seems almost an act 
of justice that a man should suffer a wrong such as 
he had been accustomed to make others suffer ; if, 
for instance, one were to assault a man who was in 
the habit of outraging others." And those who have- 
already injured us, or intended, or intend, or are 
about to do so ; for in such a case vengeance is both 
pleasant and honourable, and seems to be almost an 
act of justice. And those whom we wrong ^ in order 
to ingratiate ourselves with our friends, or persons 
whom we admire or love, or our masters, in a word, 
those by whom our life is ruled. And those in 
reference to whom there is a chance of obtaining 
merciful consideration.'' And those against whom 
we have a complaint, or with whom we have had a 
previous difference, as Callippus acted in the matter 
of Dion ; ** for in such cases it seems almost an act of 
justice. And those who are going to be attacked by 
others, if we do not attack first, since it is no longer 
possible to deliberate ; thus, Aenesidemus is said to 
have sent the prize in the game of cottabus to Gelon,* 
who, having reduced a town to slavery, had antici- 
pated him by doing what he had intended to do him- 
self. And those to whom, after having injured them, 
we shall be enabled to do many acts of justice, in the 

' Aenesidemus, tyrant of Leontini, being anticipated by 
Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, in the enslavement of a neigh- 
bouring state, sent him the cottabus prize, as a compliment 
for having " played the game " so skilfully. The cottabus 
was originally a Sicilian game. 

137 



ARISTOTLE 

paStoj? laaojxevoi, oooTT^p e<^y] ^\a.atov 6 ©eTraAo? 
heiv dSt/ceiv eVia, otto)? Svvr^rai /cat St/cata ttoAAo, 

TTOtett'. 

32 Kat a iravres rj ttoXXoI ahiKelv elcodaaiv avy- 

33 yvojfjbrjg yap oiovrai rev^eadai. /cat ra paSia 
Kpviftai' roiavra 8' ocra Ta;^y avaAicr/cerat, olov 
ra eocooLfia, rj to. evpLera^XriTa ax'^f^oLaiv rj XP^' 

34 fJiaaiv ^ KpdaeoLV. rj a iroXXaxov a^aviaai eviropov 
roiavra he ra ev^aaraKra /cat ev /At/cpot? roTTOig 

35 a(f)avLt,6fX€va. /cat ot? d8id(f)opa /cat oixoia TToXKd 
TTpovvrjpxe ro) aSi/cowrt. /cat oaa alaxvvovrai ol 
dSiKrjOevres Aeyetv, otov yuvat/ccov olKeiiov v^pet? 
t) etV avrovs t] els vtels. /cat ocra (fnXoSiKetv 
Bo^eiev dv 6 eTre^Lwv roiavra Se rd re puKpd Kol 
i(f> ois avyyva>p,rj. d)s fiev ovv e^ovres dSt/coucrt, 
Kat TTOta /cat TTOiovg /cat Std ri, axeSov ravr^ eariv. 

1373 b 13. To. 8 dhiKrip,ara rtdvra /cat rd SiKaicojxara 
SieXcofiev, dp^djjievoi rrpchrov evrevdev. (Lpiarai 
Brj rd 8t/cata /cat rd aSt/ca vr/aos' re vojxovg [8vo],^ 
2 /cat TTpos ovs ear I, Sixd>S. Xeyu) 8e vo/xov rov p,ev 
iSiov rov 8e koivov, iBiov fxev rov eKdaroig (hpi- 
ofjievov TTpos avrovs, xai rovrov rov p,ev dypa<f)ov 
rov 8e yeypa/jifievov, koivov 8e rov Kara <f)vaiv. 
can yap, o piavrevovrai ri irdvres, cf)vaei koivov 
hiKaiov Kal dSiKov, Kav firjSefJ.ia Koivcovia irpos 
* Bracketed by Spengel, but retained by Roemer. 

" Tyrant of Pherae. 
188 



RHETORIC, I. xn. 31— xiii. 2 

idea that it will be easy to repair the wrong ; as Jason 
the Thessalian " said one should sometimes commit 
injustice, in order to be able also to do justice often. 

Men are ready to commit wrongs which all or 
many are in the habit of committing, for they hope 
to be pardoned for their offences. They steal objects 
that are easy to conceal ; such are things that are 
quickly consimied, as eatables ; things which can 
easily be changed in form or colour or composition ; 
things for which there are many convenient hiding- 
places, such as those that are easy to carry or stow 
away in a corner ; those of which a thief already 
possesses a considerable number exactly similar or 
hard to distinguish. Or they commit wrongs which 
the victims are ashamed to disclose, such as outrages •' 
upon the women of their family, upon themselves, 
or upon their children. And all those wrongs in 
regard to which appeal to the law would create the 
appearance of litigiousness ; such are wrongs which 
are unimportant or venial. These are nearly all the 
dispositions which induce men to commit wrong, the 
nature and motive of the wrongs, and the kind of 
persons who are the victims of wrong. 

13. Let us now classify just and unjust actions 
generally, starting from what follows. Justice and 
injustice have been defined in reference to laws and 
persons in two ways. Now there are two kinds of 
laws, particular and general. By particular laws I 
mean those established by each people in reference 
to themselves, which again are divided into written 
and unwritten ; by general laws I mean those based 
upon nature. In fact, there is a general idea of just 
and unjust in accordance with nature, as all men in 
a manner divine, even if there is neither communica- 

B 139 



ARISTOTLE 

aXXijAovs fj fJbrjSe avvdrjKrj, oXov koX rj So^o/cAeouj 
AvTiyovTj (fiaiverai Xeyovaa, on SiKaiov aircipr]- 

Hevov ^ttj/rat top YloXweiKT], ais" (jtvaei ov tovto 

StKaiov 

ov yap TL vvv ye KaxOeg, dXX' del. ttotc 
C,fj rovro, KovSels otSev e^ orov cf)dvr]. 

Kat cos KfMTTeSoKXrjg Xeyet, Trepl rov [mt] Kreiveiv 
TO e/jLiJjvxov rovro yap ov rial fiev StVaiov real S' 

ov SlKaLOV, 

dXXd ro p.kv Trdvrcov vopup^ov Std t' evpvfieSovros 
atdepos -qvcKecos rerarai Sid r dnXerov av yrjs. 

Kai d)s iv ro) MeoroTyvia/coi Xeyei. 'AA/ciSa/ias". 

3 TTpos ovs Se SiwpicrraL, 8i;\;aj? Stcopccrrai' ■^ yap 
TTpos ro KOLVov Tj TTpos kva rcov Koivoivovvrcov , a 
Set TTpdrrcLV kol p,r) irpdrreLV. 

Ato /cat TaSt/o^/iara /cat rd hiKaLwpLara hix^iiS 
ear IV dhiKelv Kal SiKaioTrpayelv t] yap rrpos eva 
/cat (LpLG/xevov 7) Trpos ro kolvov 6 yap /xot;(;eua)i' 
/cat rvirroiv dSt/cet Ttvct ra)v d>piap.evo)v, 6 he fxrj 

4 crrparevofievos ro kolvov. aTrdvrcov Brj rcov dSt/CT^- 
jjidrcov BijiprjiJievaiv, /cat rcov p,ev ovrcov Trpos ro 
Koivov rcov 8e npos dXXov Kal Trpos dXXovs, dva- 
Xa^ovres Tt ecm ro dSt/cetcr^ai, Xeycop,ev rd Xomd. 

5 eCTTi St^ ro dSiKeladai ro vtto eKovros rd dSt/ca 
rrdax^^v' rd ydp dhiKeZv uipKjrai Trporepov eKovaiov 

" Antigone, 456. 

* Of Elis, pupil of Gorgias. The oration is not extant, but 

140 



RHETORIC, I. xiii. 2-5 

tion nor agreement between them. This is what 
Antigone in Sophocles " evidently means, when she 
declares that it is just, though forbidden, to bury 
Polynices, as being naturally just : 

For neither to-day nor j^esterday, but from all eternity, 
these statutes live and no man knoweth whence they came. 

And as Empedocles says in regard to not killing that 
which has life, for this is not right for some and 
wrong for others. 

But a universal precept, which extends without a break 
throughout the wide-ruling sky and the boundless earth. 

Alcidamas ^ also speaks of this precept in his Messe- 
niacus. . . . And in relation to persons, there is a 
twofold division of law ; for what one ought to do or 
ought not to do is concerned with the community 
generally, or one of its members. 

Therefore there are two kinds of just and unjust 
acts, since they can be committed against a definite 
individual or against the community ; he who com- 
mits adultery or an assault is guilty of wrong against 
a definite individual, he who refuses to serve in the 
army of wrong against the State. All kinds of 
wrong acts having been thus distinguished, some of 
which affect the State, others one or several in- 
dividuals, let us repeat the definition of being 
wronged," and then go on to the rest. Being 
wronged is to suffer injustice at the hands of one 
who voluntarily inflicts it, for it has been established 

the scholiast supplies his words : eXevOepovs a<f>rjKe iravras 
6f6s ■ ovdeva 8ov\ou r; <f>v(ris ireiroiriKev (" God has left all 
men free ; Nature has made none a slave "). The Messen- 
ians had revolted from Sparta. 
« i. 10. 3. 

14.1 



ARISTOTLE 

6 eivai. eVet 8 dvdyKT] tov a.8t,KOV[X€vov ^XaTrr^adai 
/cat a/couCTtco? ^XanTeaOai, at ^ev ^Xd^ai e/c rciv 
TTporepov ^avepai elaiv rd yap dyadd /cat rd 
KaKd Si-^prjrat /ca^' ayra Trporepov, /cat to, e/coucrta, 

7 oTt ecTTiv ocra etSore?. cocrr' dvdyKT] Trdvra rd 
ey/cAT^/xara i^ Trpos" to koivov r^ Trpds rd tStov eti^at, 
/cat 7} ayvoowro? ^ a/cot'ros", ^ ckovtos /cat etSoro?, 
/cat TOfTo^v TO, jLtet' 7Tpo€XofJt,€vov rd 8e 8ta irddos. 

8 7re/)t /xev ow 9vp,ov prjd'^aeTat, iv rots rrepl rd 
TTadrjy TTola Se Trpoaipovvrai /cat ttcos" e-)(ovT€S, 
eiprir at Trporepov. 

9 Ettci 8' oyuoAoyowres" TroAAa/ctS' TrcTTpax^vat, tj 
1374a TO imypafifia ov^ op^oXoyovatv ri irepl o to irrt- 

ypafjifxa, olov Xa^elv /xer dAA' ov /cAe</rat, /cat 7ra- 

rd^ai Trporepov dAA o?);\; v^piaai, /cat avyyeveadat 

aAA' oi5 fioLxevaai, 7] KXeipai dAA' o?);^ lepoavXrjcrai 

{ov ydp Oeov rt), t] eTrepydaaadai jxev dAA' o?) 

hrjpLoaiav , 7} BieiXexdo-i [xev rot? TToXefxioLs dAA' 01) 

TTpohovvai, 8td ravTa 8eot di^ /cat Trept toutcov' 

hicjopiadai, ri kXottt^, tL v^pis, Ti /juoix^ia, orrcos 

idv Te vnap^^eiv edv re p,rj VTrapxeiv PovXcopueOa 

10 SeiKvvvai, e^oip-ev ep,(f)avit,eLV rd ScKatov. ecm 8e 

TTavra ra rotavra Trepi tov dSiKov etvat /cat <j>avXov 

rj p,rj ctSt/cov rj dp^^ia^rjrrjaLS' iv ydp rfj TrpoaipeaeL 

» i. 6. " i. 10.3. " ii. 2. " i. 11, 12. 

142 



RHETORIC, I. XIII. G-IO 

that injustice is a voluntary act. And since the man 
who suffers injustice necessarily sustains injury and 
that against his will, it is evident from what has been 
said in what the injuries consist ; for things good 
and bad have already been distinguished in them- 
selves,'' and it has been said that voluntary acts are 
all such as are committed with knowledge of the 
case.* Hence it necessarily follows that all accusa- 
tions concern the State or the individual, the accused 
having acted either ignorantly and against his will, 
or voluntarily and with knowledge, and in the latter 
case with malice aforethought or from passion. We 
will speak of anger when we come to treat of the 
passions,'' and we have already stated ^ in what 
circumstances and with what dispositions men act 
with deliberate purpose. 

But since a man, while admitting the fact, often 
denies the description of the charge or the point on 
which it turns — for instance, admits that he took 
something, but did not steal it ; that he was the 
first to strike, but committed no outrage ; that he 
had relations, but did not commit adultery, with a 
woman ; or that he stole something but was not 
guilty of sacrilege, since the object in question was 
not consecrated ; or that he trespassed, but not on 
public land ; or that he held converse with the 
enemy, but was not guilty of treason — for this reason 
it will be necessary that a definition should be given 
of theft, outrage, or adultery, in order that, if we 
desire to prove that an offence has or has not been 
committed, we may be able to put the case in a true 
light. In all such instances the question at issue is 
to know whether the supposed offender is a wrong- 
doer and a worthless person, or not ; for vice and 

143 



ARISTOTLE 

Tj iioxOrjpia Kal to dStKclv, to. 8e roiavra rcov 
ovofjidrojv TTpoaarjixaivei rrjv Trpoaipeaiv, olov v^pLS 
Kal kXottt]' ov yap el iTrdra^e, Trdvrcos v^piaev, 
dAA' el eveKd rov, olov rod art/xao-at eKelvov r] 
auTo? rjcrdrjvav. ouSe TrdvTCO^, el Xddpa eXa^ev, 
eKXeipev, dAA' el errl ^Xd^r] /cat a<j)erepiap.cx> eavrov. 
ofMOLOJS 8e Kal 7T€pl rojv dXXcov e^et, oiairep koX 
Trepl TOVTCov. 

11 'Ettci 8e rcov SiKaiwv Kal rcov dhiKcov fjv hvo 
eihrj {rd fxev yap yeypajxpieva rd S' dypa(f)a), Trepl 
cSv p,ev ol vofxoi dyopevovaiv e'ipr]Tai, tcov 8' dypd- 

12 (fiojv hvo earlv e'ihrf ravra 8' earl rd p.ev Ka9 
VTrepPoXrjv dperijs Kal KaKtas, i<f>' oTs ovetSr] Kal 
eTTaivoi Kal drLpbiai Kal rip,al Kal Scopeai, olov 
TO X^P*-^ ^X^''^ "^V "^oirjaavri ev Kal dvrevTToielv 
rov ev TTOLTjaavra Kal ^oridr^riKov elvai tols 0iAois" 
Kal daa dXXa Toiavra, rd Be rov iStov vouov Kai 

13 yeypafifievov e'AAet/x/xa. ro ydp eTrieiKes SokcX 
St/catov elvai, ean he emeiKeg ro Trapd rov ye- 
ypafjifMevov vofxov hiKaiov. avjx^aivet, he rovro rd 
fjbev dKovTOJV rd he eKovrcov rcov vo/Jiodercbv , 
aKovTOiv p.ev orav Xddrj, ckovtcov 8' orav fir) 
hvva>VTaL hiopiaai, dAA' dvayKalov p,ev rj KadoXov 
elrreLV, fjir) fi he, dAA' (hs eirl ro ttoXv. Kal oaa 



" Roemer reads, after Dittmeyer, et ivi ^\d^ri [toijtov d<f>' 
o5 ^Xa^e] Kai . . . from the old Latin translation. 

* I^aws are special and general, the former being written 
or unwritten. The unwritten law, again, is of two kinds : 
(1) general; (2) supplementary to the special written law. 
This general law (not the same as the general law " based 
upon nature " § 2) refers to acts which go beyond the legal 
standard of virtuous or vicious acts and are characterized by 

144> 



RHETORIC, I. XIII. 10-13 

wrongdoing consist in the moral purpose, and such 
terms as outrage and theft further indicate purpose ; 
for if a man has struck, it does not in all cases follow 
that he has committed an outrage, but only if he 
has struck with a certain object, for instance, to 
bring disrepute upon the other or to please himself. 
Again, if a man has taken something by stealth, it 
is by no means certain that he has committed theft, 
but only if he has t^ken it to injure another "• or to 
get something for himself. It is the same in all 
other cases as in these. 

We have said that there are two kinds of just and 
unjust actions (for some are written, but others are 
unwritten), and have spoken of those concerning 
which the laws are explicit ; of those that are un- 
written there are two kinds. One kind arises from 
an excess of virtue or vice, which is followed by 
praise or blame, honour or dishonour, and rewards ; 
for instance, to be grateful to a benefactor, to render 
good for good, to help one's friends, and the like ; ^ 
the other kind contains what is omitted in the special 
written law. For that which is equitable seems to 
be just, and equity is justice that goes beyond the 
written law. These omissions are sometimes in- 
voluntary, sometimes voluntary, on the part of the 
legislators ; involuntary when it niay have escaped 
their notice, voluntary when, being unable to define 
for all cases, they are obliged to make a universal 
statement, Avhich is not applicable to all, but only 
to most, cases ; and whenever it is difficult to give 

a remarkable degree (/ca^' vwep^o^-qv) of virtue or the opposite. 
For these laws do not prescribe any special reward or punish- 
ment, but acts are praised or Ijlamed, honoured or dis- 
honoured, rewarded or punished, in accordance with the 
general feeling of mankind. 

L 145 



ARISTOTLE 

firj paBiov hiopiaai hi aTreipiav, olov to rpwaai 
(JLSrjpcp TT-qXiKU) /cat ttolu) rivi' VTroXelrroL yap du 

14 o alojv SiapidfjiovvTa. dv ovv fj dSiopLaTov, Serf 
8e vofioder'qaai, dvayKt] dirXcbs etTrelv, ware Kdv 
SaKTvXiov exojv iTrdprjrai ttjv xetpa ^ Trard^rj, 
Kara fiev tov yeypafifxevov vofjiov evoxds icrri /cat 
aot/cei, Kara Se ro dXrjdes ovk aSt/cet, /cat to 

1374 b eTTtei/ces rovro ioTLV. 

15 Et o ecTTt TO elpripjivov to imeLKes, ^avepov 
TTOta eart ra eTTieiKij Kau ovk eTneLKrj, /cat ttolol 

16 oj5/c iiTLeLKels dvOpojTTOi' e^' ots- re yap Set cruy- 
yvcofJbrjv ^x^tv, iTTietKrj ravTa, /cat to to, afMaprij- 
fjbaTa /cat ra aSt/CT^/xara /xi^ tou I'crou d^iovv, fiTjSe 
ra aTyxTjixoTa' ecrrt S' drux'i^P'O.Ta p,€v daa Trapd- 
Xoya Kal jxr] (Xtto fjboxdrjpLas, dfxapT-qfjLaTa 8e daa 
fXT) napaXoya Kal fxrj dno TTovrfpiaSy dhiKrjjxara 
oe oaa p.rjTe rrapaXoya diro Trovrjplas r' eaTiv 

17 ra yap St' eTndvp.iav dird novrjpias. Kal to tols 
avdpojTTivoLS avyyivcoaKeiv eTrtet/ce?. /cat to p,r) 

TTpOS TOV VOjJiOV aAAo. TTpOS TOV VOfModeTTjV aKOTTelv, 

/cat fiT] rrpo'S tov Xoyov dXXd Trpos ttjv SidvoLav 
TOV vofxoderov, Kal p,rj irpds ttjv irpd^iv dXXd Trpds 

18 Trfv TTpoaipeaiv, Kal fxrj npos to fJL€pos dXAd irpos 
TO bXov, fxrjSe ttolos tls vvv, dXXd ttolos tls ■^v 
aet 7] 6US" €7rt to ttoXv. Kal to fivrjixoveveLV /xdXXov 
cov knadev dyaddJv ^ KaKOJV, Kal dyaddJv wv 
etrade jxaXXov ^ iTTOirjaev. Kal to dvex^adai 
ahtKovjxevov . Kal to p,d?^ov Xoycv ideXeiv Kpi- 

19 veadai r^ ^py(i>- Kal to els hiaiTav fxdXXov rj els 
81k7)v ^ovXeadai levar 6 yap StatTrjTrjs ro enieiKes 

" " Inexperience " (Jebb). 
146 



RHETORIC, I. XIII. 13-19 

a definition owing to the infinite number of cases,* 
as, for instance, the size and kind of an iron instru- 
ment used in wounding ; for life would not be long 
enough to reckon all the possibilities. If then no 
exact definition is possible, but legislation is neces- 
sary, one must have recourse to general terms ; so 
that, if a man wearing a ring lifts up his hand to 
strike or actually strikes, according to the written 
law he is guilty of wrongdoing, but in reality he is 
not ; and this is a case for equity. 

If then our definition of equity is correct, it is 
easy to see what things and persons are equitable 
or not. Actions which should be leniently treated 
are cases for equity ; errors, wrong acts, and mis- 
fortunes, must not be thought deserving of the same 
penalty. Misfortunes are all such things as are 
unexpected and not vicious ; errors are not unex- 
pected, but are not vicious ; WTong acts are such as 
might be expected and vicious, for acts committed 
through desire arise from vice. And it is equitable 
to pardon human weaknesses, and to look, not to 
the law but to the legislator ; not to the letter of 
the law but to the intention of the legislator ; not 
to the action itself, but to the moral purpose ; not to 
the part, but to the whole ; not to what a man is 
now, but to what he has been, always or generally ; 
to remember good rather than ill treatment, and 
benefits received rather than those conferred ; to 
bear injury with patience ; to be willing to appeal 
to the judgement of reason rather than to violence ;* 
to prefer arbitration to the law court, for the arbi- 
trator keeps equity in view, whereas the dicast looks 

^ " To be willing that a judicial sentence should be 
nominal rather than real " (Jebb). 

147 



ARISTOTLE 

opa, o o€ 8iKacrTr]s rov vofxov Kal rovrov eVe/ca 
BiaiTTqrrjs evpedrj, ottcos to eTTiei/ce? laxvrj. nepl 

fJbeV OVV TOJV €7TL€.LKCx)V SlCOplaOoj TOV TpOTTOV TOVTOV . 

14. ASLKrjfia 8e yLiet^ov, ocra> av dvo ix,eit,ovos 
Tj aSt/ctas" Sto Koi rd eAa^^icrra fieyicrra, otov o 
MeAavcoTTou KaAAtCTrpaTo? Karrj-yopet,, on rrap- 
eXoycaaTO rpia rjixioj^eXia lepd rovs vaoTroiovs' 
eTTL oiKatoavvr^s Se rovvavriov . eari he ravra e'/c 
rov ivvirapxeiv rfj hvvdjxef 6 yap rpia T^/xtco^e'Ata 
lepa /cAej/ra? Kav oriovv dhiK-qaeiev . ore fiev drj 
ovTCo TO iJt,ell,ov, ore 8' e/c rov ^Xd^ovs Kpiverat. 

2 /cat oi) ixt] eariv tar] rifxcopla, dXXd rrdaa eXdrrwv. 
Kai, ov fjb-q eariv tacris" ;(aAe7ror yap Kal dSvvarou. 
Kai ov p,rj ear I SiKrjv Xa^elv rov rradovra' dviarov 

3 yap- 7) yap Slktj Kal KoXaai? laais. Kal el 6 
rradcbv Kal dStKrjOels avros avrov jxeydXois eKo- 
Xaaev en ydp fjbel^ovi 6 TTOirjaas StKaios KoXa- 
adrjvai, otov So^o/cAt^s" vnep Ey/CTTy/xovo? avv- 
iiyopcov, e7T€L diTea(j)a^ev eavrdv v^piaOeis, ov 

1375 a nfJirjaeLV e(j)rj eXdrrovog rj ov 6 Tra^ojv eavrco 

4 crtfiTjaev. Kal o {xovos r] Trpdiros 'q fier^ oXiywv 
TTeTTOiTjKev. Kal rd TroAAa/cts" ro avrd dfiaprdveiv 
fj-eya. Kai St 6 av Ipqrrjdfj Kal evpeOij rd KwXvovra 
Kal ^TjfiLovvra, otov ev "Apyei ^r][j,Lovrai, 8t' ov dv 



» i. 7. 13. Callistratus and Melanopus were rival orators. 
Nothing is known of this particular charge. 

* The magistrates who superintended the building and 
repairing operations. 

" Understanding IdcrOai. Or " to punish adequately," 
supplying ov /xrj lct) rifiwpia. ' 

''An orator, not the tragic poet. 

* " Or has been seldom paralleled " (Cope, butcp. i. 9. 38). 
148 



RHETORIC, I. xin. 19— xiv. 4 

only to the law, and the reason why arbitrators were 
appointed was that equity might prevail. Let this 
manner of defining equity suffice. 

14, Wrong acts are greater in proportion to the , 
injustice from which they spring. For this reason ' 
the most trifling are sometimes the greatest, as in the \ 
charge brought by Callistratus ** against Melanopus ( ' 
that he had fraudulently kept back three consecrated \ 
half-obols from the temple-builders * ; whereas, in J 
tlie case of just actions, it is quite the contrary. The 
reason is that the greater potentially inheres in the 
less ; for he who has stolen three consecrated half- 
obols will commit any wrong whatever. Wrong acts 
are judged greater sometimes in this way, sometimes 
by the extent of the injury done. A wrong act is 
greater when there is no adequate punishment for { 
it, but all are insufficient ; when there is no remedy, 
because it is difficult if not impossible to repair it ; '^ 
and when the person injured cannot obtain legal ) 
satisfaction, since it is irremediable ; for justice and ^ 
punishment are kinds of remedies. And if the 
sufferer, having been wronged, has inflicted some 
terrible injury upon himself, the guilty person de- 
serves greater punishment ; wherefore Sophocles,** 
when pleading on behalf of Euctemon, who had 
committed suicide after the outrage he had suffered, 
declared that he would not assess the punishment at 
less than the victim had assessed it for himself. A i 
wrong act is also greater when it is unprecedented, i 
or the first of its kind, or when committed with the \ 
aid of few accomplices ^ ; and when it has been fre- _j 
quently committed ; or when because of it new pro- 
hibitions and penalties have been sought and found : 
thus, at Argos the citizen owing to whom a new 

149 



ARISTOTLE 

vofjios redfj /cat 8i ovs ro SeafJbcoTtjpiov (okoSo- 

5 fJi'qOrj. /cat to OrjpLOjSearepov d8i,Kr)fxa fX€lt,ov. 
/cat o e/c TTpovolas /xaAAor. /cat o ot a/couot'Tes" 
(f)o^ovvTaL [xdXXov ^ iXeovaiv. /cat ra p,kv prjTopLKo, 
ioTL roiavra, ort ttoAAo. dvrjprjKe 8t/cata •»} inrep- 
Pd^TjKcv, olov opKovg Se^ids Tricrreis eTnyafMias' 

6 TToAAoiv yap dSiKrjfiaTOJV VTrepoxTj. /cat to evrau^a 
o5 /coAa^ovrat ot aSt/cowre?, OTrep TTOiovaiv ol 
i/j€vSopiapTVpovvT€S' TTov ydp ovK dv dSiKijaeiev, 
et ye /cat iv rw SiKaaTrjpicp ; /cat e^' ot? alaxvvrj 
[xaXiara. /cat et tovtov v(f)^ ov ev TTeirovdev 
ttXclu) ydp aSt/cet, ort re /ca/cai? Trotet /cat ort ovk 

7 ey. /cat o irapa rd dypa(j)a St/cata* dpieivovos ydp 
fxr] 8i' dvdyKr)v ScKaiov etvat. ra /u-ef ow yeypap.- 
p,€va ef ap'tty/cT^?, ra 8' dypa<f)a ov. dXXov 8e 
TpoTTOv, el TTapd rd yeypapLfMeva' 6 ydp rd <f}0^epd 
aSt/ccuv /cat rd €7TLt,t]p,ia /cat to. /xt) e7Ti^r^/xta 
dSi/cr^CTetev at'. Trept /xep' ovv d8t/ci^/Ltaro? pLeLt,ovo9 
/cat eActTTOvos' eiprjrai. 

15. riepi 8e TCtJi/ dre-)(yu)v KaXovp.€VOJV marecov 

exdp,ev6v eari ru)V elprjp,evixiv einhpapbelv tSiat ydp 

2 adrai, rajv SiKaviKtov. elal Se nevre rov dpidiMov, 

" And therefore the violation of them is more discreditable. 
* When he thinks of the punishment they may entail. 

150 



RHETORIC, I. XIV. 4— xv. 2 

law has been passed, is punished, as well as those on 
whose account a new prison had to be built. The 
crime is greater, the more brutal it is ; or when it has 
been for a long time premeditated ; when the recital 
of it inspires terror rather than pity. Rhetorical tricks 
of the following kind may be used : — the statement 
that the accused person has swept away or violated 
several principles of justice, for example, oaths, 
pledges of friendship, plighted word, the sanctity of 
marriage ; for this amounts to heaping crime upon 
crime. Wrong acts are greater when committed 
in the very place where wrongdoers themselves are 
sentenced, as is done by false witnesses ; for where 
would a man not commit wrong, if he does so in a 
court of justice ? They are also greater when accom- 
panied by the greatest disgrace ; when committed 
against one who has been the guilty person's bene- 
factor, for in that case, the wrongdoer is guilty of 
wrong twice over, in that he not only does wrong, but; 
does not return good for good. So too, again, when 
a man offends against the unwritten laws of right, 
for there is greater merit in doing right without being 
compelled" ; now the written laws involve compulsion, 
the unwritten do not. Looked at in another way, 
wrongdoing is greater, if it violates the written laws ; 
for a man who commits wrongs that alarm him ^ and 
involve punishment, will be ready to commit wrong 
for which he will not be punished. Let this suffice 
for the treatment of the greater or less degree of 
wrongdoing. 

15. Following on what we have just spoken of, we 
have now briefly to run over what are called the 
inartificial proofs, for these properly belong to forensic 
oratory. These proofs are five in number : laws, 

151 



ARISTOTLE 

3 vojxoi fidprvpes avvdrJKau fidaavoi opKOs. irpwrov 

pL€V OVV TTepl VO/MCOV eLTTajfJieV , 7TWS XPV^^^^^ '^'^^ 

TTporpenovra /cat aTTorpeTTOvra /cat Karr^yopovvra 

4 /cat OLTToXoyovixcvov . (jyavepov yap on, edv fxev 
ivavTLOs 17 o yeypafjUfievos rco TTpdyixart, tco kolvco 
vo/xci) XPV^'^^^^ '^^'' Totj eTTLCLKeaLV (hs St/cato- 

6 ripoLS. /cat oVt ro yvchpur] rfj dpiarrj rovr' ecrri, 

6 ro fxr} TravreXcJos -x^pfjaOaL rot? yeypafifievoLs . /cat 
OTL TO jxev eTTtet/ce? aet fxevcL /cat oySeTrore jxera- 
jSaAAet, ou8' o /cotP'o? (/cara (f)vaLv ydp iariv), ol 
he yeypanixevoL TToXXdKLS' odev elprjTai rd iv rfj 
YiO<j)OKXeovs ^AvTLyovrj' aTroAoyetrat ydp on edaipe 
TTapd rov rov KpeovTOS" vofiov, aAA' ov trapd rdv 
dypa^ov 

1375 b OX) yap n vvv ye Kd^Oes, aAA aet irore . . , 

ravT" OVV eyoj ovk e/xeXXov dvBpos oiiSevos. 

7 /cat OTL TO SiKaLov iamv dXrjdes n /cat avpL(f>epov, 
aAA' ov TO So/cow* coot' ov vofios 6 yeypa/Mfievos' 
ov ydp TTOtet to epyov to tov v6p,ov /cat otl 
cooTTep dpyvpoyvcofiiov 6 KpiT^js ecrnv, ottojs 

8 SiaKpiVYj TO KL^SrjXov St/catov /cat to dXrjdes. /cat 
oTt ^eXTLOVos dvSpos to tols dypd(f)OLS ^ rot? 

9 yeypa/xfievoLS p^/a^cr^at /cat ip^/jLeveiv. /cat et ttou 

ivaVTLOS VOfJLU) evSoKLpiOVVTL 7] Kttt ttUTOS" aVT(^' 

otov ivLOTc 6 fjiev /ceAeuet Kvpia elvaL drr* dv 

" Although the use of inartificial proofs is almost entirely 
confined to forensic oratory, they may be used in deliberative 
oratory. 

' The first line is quoted i. 13. 2. The second differs 
somewhat from Sophocles (Antigone, 458), where the passage 
runs, TovTui' iyu ovk f/jLeWof, dvdpds ovdevbs \ <pp6vy)iJ.a Selaaa', iv 
6eo7<n rrjv dlKrjv \ Siaaeiy (" I was not likely, through fear of the 

i52 



RHETORIC, I. XV. 3-9 

witnesses, contracts, torture, oaths. Let us first then 
speak of the laws, and state what use should be made 
of them when exhorting or dissuading," accusing or 
defending. For it is evident that, if the written law 
is counter to our case, we must have recourse to 
the general law and equity, as more in accordance 
with justice ; and we must argue that, Avhen the dicast 
takes an oath to decide to the best of his judgement, 
he means that he will not abide rigorously by the 
Avritten laws ; that equity is ever constant and never 
changes, even as the general law, which is based on 
nature, whereas the written laws often vary (this 
is why Antigone in Sophocles justifies herself for 
having buried Polynices contrary to the law of 
Creon, but not contrary to the unwritten law : 

For this law is not of now or yesterday, but is eternal . . . 
this I was not likely [to infringe through fear of the pride] 
of any man) ; * 

and further, that justice is real and expedient, but 
not that which only appears just ; nor tlie written 
law either, because it does not do the work of the 
law^; that the judge is like an assay er of silver, 
whose duty is to distinguish spurious from genuine 
justice ; that it is the part of a better man to make 
use of and abide by the unwritten rather than the 
written law,** Again, it is necessary to see whether 
the law is contradictory to another approved law or 
to itself; for instance, one law enacts that all con- 
pride of any man, to incur the penalty for violating these 
statutes at the bar of heaven "). 

' Which is the administration of real justice, not that 
which appears to the legislator to be such and is embodied 
in legal enactments. 

'' Cp. 14. 7 above. 

153 



ARISTOTLE 

avvOojVTai, 6 S dnayopevec fxr] avvrideadai Trapa 

10 Tov vopLOV. /cat el a/x^t^oAos', a>are arpi<j)eLv /cat 
opdv €(f)' OTTorepav rrjv dycoyrjv -^ ro hiKatov i(f)- 

11 apfioaei t] to avpL(j}€pov , elra rovrio ;)^/3?^cr^at. Arat 
et rd fiev Trpdyfiara e0' ols iredr] 6 v6p,os /JirjKeTL 
fievcL, 6 8e vojxos, Treipareov tovto StjXovv /cat 

12 jjidxeaOaL ravrj] Trpos rov vopLOV. edv he 6 ye- 
ypafjbfMevos fj Trpos rd 7Tpdyp,a, ro re yvco/Jirj rfj 
dpLcrrrj XeKreov ore ov rov Trapa rdv vofiov eVe/ca 
Si/cct^etv eariv, dAA' tW, edv dyvoijarj rl Aeyet o 
vopLog, fjLT) cTTiopK'^. /Cat oTt ov ro (XTrAais" dyadov 
alpeZrai ovSeis, dXXd ro avrco. /cat ort ovSev 
Sia^epet r) yLti^ Ketudai r) /xi^ )(^p7Jadai. /cat ort ei/ 
rat? aAAats" re^vaLS ov XvcnreXel irapaao^lt^eadai. 
Tov larpov ov ydp roaovro ^Xdnrei rj dpiapria 
rov larpov oaov rd edit^eadai dTreidelv rep dp^ovri. 
/cat OTt rd rojv vopicov aocficorepov ^rjrelv elvai, 
rovr iariv o ev rdls eTraivovpievoLS vopiOLs array o- 
peverai. /cat Trept piev rdJv vopuxiv ovtco Stcoptadw. 

13 Ile/jt Se pLaprvpojv, p,dprvpes elat hirroi, ol 
piev TTaXaiol ol Se Trpdac^aroi, /cat rovrojv ol pLcv 
pt,ere-)(ovres rov Kivhvvov ol 8' cKrds. Xeyto Be 
TTaXatovg pev rovg re TTOLTjrds /cat oawv dXXcov 
yvcopLpiOjv elal Kpiaets <f>avepaL, olov ^ AOrjvaloi 
'OpiT^pcp pidprvpi expyjcravTO irepl HaXapblvos /cat 
TeveStoi evayxos YleptavSpo) rto K^opivdlcp irpos 



' Alai 5' iK 'ZaKafjuvos Ayev SvoKalSeKa vrjas, | arTJae S' dyup tv' 
'AO-qvaluv 'iaravTo (pdXayyes, Iliad, ii. 557-8. The Lacedae- 
monians, acting as arbitrators between Athens and Megara, 
who were fighting for the possession of Salainis, decided in 
favour of Athens on the strength of the two Hnes in the Iliads 
which were taken to show that Salamis belonged to Athens. 
154 



RHETORIC, I. XV. 9-13 

tracts should be binding, while another forbids 
making contracts contrary to the law. If the mean- 
ing of the law is equivocal, we must turn it about, 
and see in which way it is to be interpreted so as to 
suit the application of justice or expediency, and 
have recourse to that. If the conditions which led 
to the enactment of the law are now obsolete, while 
the law itself remains, one must endeavour to make 
tills clear and to combat the law by this argument. 
But if the written law favours our case, we must say 
that the oath of the dicast " to decide to the best of 
his judgement " does not justify him in deciding 
contrary to the law, but is only intended to relieve 
him from the charge of perjury, if he is ignorant of 
the meaning of the law ; that no one chooses that 
which is good absolutely, but that which is good for 
himself ; that there is no difference between not 
using the laws and their not being enacted ; that in 
the other arts there is no advantage in trying to be 
wiser than the physician, for an error on his part 
does not do so much harm as the habit of disobeying 
the authority ; that to seek to be wiser than the 
laws is just what is forbidden in the most approved 
laws. Thus much for the laws. 

Witnesses are of two kinds, ancient and recent ; of 
the latter some share the risk of the trial, others are 
outside it. By ancient I mean the poets and men 
of repute whose judgements are known to all ; for 
instance, the Athenians, in the matter of Salamis, 
appealed to Homer ** as a witness, and recently the 
inhabitants of Tenedos to Periander of Corinth ^ 

It was reported that the second line was the invention of 
Solon. 

'' It is not known to what this refers. 

155 



ARISTOTLE 

Jjtyeiels. /cat KAeo^oip' Kara Kptrtou rots' SoAco- 
vos iXeyeiois e;^p'>JcraTo, Xeycov on irdXai aaeXyrjg 
7] oiKia' ov yap dv ttotc eTrotrjcre SoAoiv 

CLTTeXv fJiOL KpiTt'a 7rVpp6TpL)(l, TTarpOS OLKOVeLV. 

14 776/31 jLtet* oyp' Tcuv y€Vop,ivaiv ol tolovtoi fxdprvpes, 
1376 a TTepl Se TcDi' eaofxevoiv /cat oi ■^(pr^ap.oXoyoi, olov 

QejJiiaroKXrjs, on vavfj,a)(rjreov, to ^vXlvov retxos 
Xeycov. en Kal at ■napoipt,iai, wairep etp'qraL, 
p.aprvpia iariv olov et rts" avfi^ovXevei p,r] TTOiei- 
adai <f>LXov yipovra, tovtco p,aprvpei rj Trapoifita, 

fxrjTTor €V epScLV yepovra. 

xrat TO rovs vlovs dvaipelv (Lv /cat tov? Trarepas, 

vrjinos OS TTOTepa KTeivas rralhas /caraAetTret. 

15 UpoacpaTOL 8 oaot yvwpijjiOL tl KeKpiKaaLV 
XprjcnfjiOL yap at toijtcov Kpiaeis rols Trepl rcov 
avrcov dfjL(f)La^r]Tovacv olov Ey)8oyAos" eV rot? 
SiKaaTr^pLois exprjoaTO Kara \dpr]Tos o YlXaTwv 
etTre TTpos ^ Apxi^tov , on eTnhehwKev iv rfj vroAet 

16 TO 6p.oXoy€iv TTOVTjpovs etvat. /cat ol fieTexovTcs 
Tov KtvSvvov, dv Sd^coCTt iJjevSeadat. ol fiev ovv 
TOiovroi Twv TOiovTOJv fjLovov fjidprvp€s elatv, et 

" (Frag. 22, P.L.G. ii., where the line runs, etV^Mej/at 
Kpirlq. ^avOorpixL warphs aKotJeiv). The Critias attacked by 
Cleophon is the well-known oligarch and grandson of the 
first. Cleophon argued from the phrase " bid him listen to 
liis father " that his ancestor was a disobedient son and a 
degenerate. In reality, Solon had a high opinion of the 
family, and probably meant to praise the father. 

* Herodotus, vii. 141. 

« They have not been mentioned before. Spengel would 
therefore omit dpijrat, and remove the commas : " proverbs 
are, as it were, evidence." 

156 



RHETORIC, I. XV. 13-16 

against the Sigeans, Cleophon also made use of the 
elegiacs of Solon against Critias, to prove that his 
family had long been notorious for licentiousness, / 
otherwise Solon would never have written : 

Bid me the fair-haired Critias listen to his father." 

One should appeal to such witnesses for the past, 
but also to interpreters of oracles for the future ; 
thus, for instance, Themistocles interpreted the 
wooden wall to mean that they must fight at sea.^ 
Further, proverbs, as stated," are evidence ; for 
instance, if one man advises another not to make a 
friend of an old man, he can appeal to the proverb. 

Never do good to an old man. 

And if he advises another to kill the children, after 
having killed the fathers, he can say, 

Foolish is he who, having killed the father, suffers the '' 
children to live.'* 

By recent witnesses I mean all well-known persons 
who have given a decision on any point, for their 
decisions are useful to those who are arguing about 
similar cases. Thus, for instance, Eubulus,^ when 
attacking Chares in the law courts, made use of what 
Plato said against Archibius, namely, " that the open 
confession of wickedness had increased in the city." 
And those who share the risk of the trial, if they 
are thought to be perjurers. Such witnesses only 
serve to establish whether an act has taken place or 

^ From the Cypria of Stasinus, of the " epic cycle." 
* Opponent of Demosthenes. Chares was an Athenian 
commander, both naval and military. Nothing is known 
of Archibius. Plato is probably the comic poet. 

157 



ARISTOTLE 

yeyovev r^ firj, et eariv r^ ^iq, irepl he tov ttolov ov 
fjbdprvpes, otov el SiKaLov 7) dSiKov, el av[Ji(f)€pov 

17 rj d<7viJi(f)opov ol S' aTTCodev /cat rrepl rovrcov 
TTiaroraroL. Tnaroraroi 8' ol TraAatot* dhidi^dopoL 
ydp. TncxTcvpLara Se irepl fxaprvpicov jxaprvpas 
p,ev fXT] exovTi, on eK rcbv euKorcov Set Kpiveiv /cat 
Tovr^ earl to yvd>iLr^ rfj apiarrj, /cat ort ovk eariu 
i^aTrarrjoai rd elKora eirl dpyvplo), Kal otl ov^ 
dAtcr/ceTat rd et/cora ifjevSofjiaprvptdJv. exovri 8e 
TTpos fJLT] exovra, on ovx vrrohiKa rd eiKora, /cat 
on ovhev dv eSet puaprvpidyv, el e/c rcbv Xoyojv 

18 LKOVOV rfV Oeoiprjaai. eicrt Se at puaprvpLai at 
p,ev nepl avrov at Se Trept rod djX(f)ia^'r)rovvros , 
Kal at fiev Trepl rod rrpdypbaros at Se rrepi rod 
rjdovs, ware (f)avep6v on ovherror e9nv airoprjaai 
fiaprvplas XPV^^H'V^' ^^ H'V 7^9 '^^ctrd rod TTpdy- 
fiaros rj avru> op^oXoyovpLevrj? r] ro) aficfyLa^r)- 
rodvn evavrias, dAAct Tiept rod r^dovg rj avrod els 
eTTieiKeiav rj rod dji^Lajirjrodvros els (j>avX6r7jra. 

19 rd S' aAAa irepl pudprvpos tj (J>lXov rj e^dpod t) 
pLera^v, -q evhoKLp,odvros rj dho^odvros rj piera^v, 
/cat OCTat aAAat rotadrat, Sta^opat, e/c rdJv avrojv 
roTTCOV XeKreov e^ otcovnep /cat rd evdvp,rjp.ara 
Xeyop,ev. 

20 Ylepl Se rd)v avvdrjKwv roaavrrj rod Xoyov XPV' 
1376 b crt's" ianv oaov av^eiv rj Kadaipelv rj irtards TTOielv 



' Or, "witnesses wholly unconnected with the case." 
158 



I 



RHETORIC, I. XV. 16-20 

not, whether it is or is not the case ; but if it is a 
question of the quahty of the act, for instance, 
whether it is just or unjust, expedient or inexpedient, 
they are not competent witnesses ; but witnesses 
from a distance " are very trustworthy even in regard 
to this. But ancient witnesses are the most trust- 
worthy of all, for they cannot be corrupted. In 
regard to the confirmation of evidence, when a man 
has no witnesses, he can say that the decision should 
be given in accordance with probabilities, and that 
this is the meaning of the oath " according to the 
best of one's judgement " ; that probabilities cannot 
be bribed to deceive, and that they cannot be con- 
victed of bearing false witness. But if a man has 
witnesses and his adversary has none, he can say that 
probabilities incur no responsibility, and that there 
would have been no need of evidence, if an investiga- 
tion according^ to the arguments were sufficient. 
Evidence partly concerns ourselves, partly our ad- 
versary, as to the fact itself or moral character ; so 
that it is evident that one never need lack useful 
evidence. For, if we have no evidence as to the fact 
itself, neither in confirmation of our own case nor 
against our opponent, it will always be possible to 
obtain some evidence as to character that will 
establish either our own respectability or the worth- 
lessness of our opponent. As for all the other 
questions relative to a witness, whether he is a friend, 
an enemy, or neutral, of good or bad or middling 
reputation, and for all other differences of this kind, 
we must have recourse to the same topics as those 
from which we derive our enthymemes. 

As for contracts, argument may be used to the 
extent of magnifying or minimizing their importance, 

159 



ARISTOTLE 

rj aTriarovs, iav ^xev avrco VTTap-)(coaL, Tnaras Kai 
Kvplag, irrl 8e rov aix<j)La^'r]rovvTog rovvavriov. 

21 TTpos fiev ovv TO TTiaras "^ aTTioTovs KaraaKevaL^etv 
ovSev hia^epei rrjs Trepl rovs jj-dprvpas rrpay- 
ixareias' ottoZol yap av nves (Law ol linyeypapL- 
fievoL ^ (f>vXdrrovres , tovtols at avvdrJKaL Tnarat, 
elaiv. ofioXoyoviMevqs S' etvat rrjs avvd'qKrjs, 
OLKelas jxev ovarjs av^rjreov rj yap avvdr]K7] vofios 
iarlv iStos" /cat Kara pbepos, Kal at [xev avvdrJKai 
ov TTOLovat, Tov vofjiov KVpiov, ol Sc vopLOi Tas Kara 
rov vofMov avvdriKas. Kal oXco? avros o vofxos 
avvd-qKT] Tts" iariv, ware oaris aTTiareX rj avaipeX 

22 avv9'qK7]v, rovg v6p.ovs dvacpel. krt, 8e Trparre- 
rat rd ttoAAo. rcov avvaXXayfjidrcov Kal rd iKovat,a 
Kara avvdrJKas, ware aKvpwv yiy^opievcov av'at- 
peirai rj rrpos ciAAt^Aous" XP^^^ '^^'^ dvOpcoTTCov. 
Kal rdXXa 8e oaa dpp,6rreL, iTTCTToXrjs IBelv eariv. 

23 dv 8' ivavrca fj Kal fj,erd rdjv dfi(f)ia^r]rovvrojv, 
TTpdJrov fiev, dnep dv rt? Trpos vofMov evavrcov p,a- 
X^aairo, ravd^ dpixorrev droirov yap ei rots p-ev 
v6p.oLS, dv jxrj opdws Keip^evoi waiv dXX e^ap.ap- 
roiaiv ol ridep^evoL, ovk ol6p,eda Secv rreideauai, 

24 rat? 8e avvOiJKais dvayKaiov . eW on rov 8i/catou 
earl ^paPevrrjs 6 SiKaar-^?' ovkovv rovro aKerrreov, 

25 aAA' COS" SiKaLorepov. Kal rd p,ev hiKaiov ovk eari 
Heraarpeifjat ovr dTrdrr) ovr^ dvdyKj] {TTe<f>VK6s 
ydp eariv), avvdrJKat. Be yiyvovrai Kal e^aTrarrj- 
devrwv Kal dvayKaadevrojv . Trpos oe rovrois 
160 



RHETORIC, I. XV. 20-25 

of proving that they do or do not deserve credit. 
If we have them on our side, we must try to prove 
them worthy of credit and authoritative ; but if they 
are on the side of our opponent, we must do the 
opposite. In view of rendering them worthy or 
unworthy of credit, the method of procedure is 
exactly the same as in the case of witnesses ; for 
contracts are trustworthy according to the character 
of their signatories or depositaries. When the exist- 
ence of the contract is admitted, if it is in our favour, 
we must strengthen it by asserting that the contract 
is a law, special and partial ; and it is not the con- 
tracts that make the law authoritative, but it is the 
laws that give force to legal contracts. And in a 
general sense the law itself is a kind of contract, so 
that whoever disobeys or subverts a contract, sub- 
verts the laws. Further, most ordinary and all 
voluntary transactions are carried out according to 
contract ; so that if you destroy the authority of 
contracts, the mutual intercourse of men is destroyed. 
All other arguments suitable to the occasion are easy 
to see. But if the contract is against us and in 
favour of our opponents, in the first place those 
arguments are suitable which we should oppose to 
the law if it were against us ; that it would be strange 
if, while we consider ourselves entitled to refuse to 
obey ill-made laws, whose authors have erred, we 
should be obliged to consider ourselves always bound 
by contracts. Or, that the judge is the dispenser of 
justice ; so that it is not the contents of the contract 
that he has to consider, but what is juster. Further, 
that one cannot alter justice either by fraud or 
compulsion, for it is based upon nature, whereas 
contracts may be entered into under both conditions. 

M l6l 



ARISTOTLE 

fjKOTTelv el evavria iari rivi rj raJv yeypafMndvcov 
v6[xoiv r] rwv kolvcjv, /cat ra)v yeypafifxevcov t) 
rots' oLK€iOis T] TOLS dXXorplois, eWtra et aAAat? 
ovvQrjKaLs varepais t] Trporepais' rj yap at varepat 
Kvpiai, aKvpoL 8' at Trporepai, rj at -nporepai opdai, 
at 8 varepat rjirarriKauiv , OTrorepcos av rj XPV' 
aLjJbov. en 8e ro avpi<j)epov opdv, et Trrj evavriovrat 
rot? Kpirals, Kal oaa dXXa roiavra- /cat yap ravra 
ev6ea>pr]ra ofioicos. 
26 At 8e ^dcravot ixaprvpiai nves elaiv, ex^iv 8e 
80/couCTt ro TTiarov, on dvdyKrj rt? irpoaeanv. 
ovKOW xP-XeTTov ovhe rrepl rovrcov eiTTelv rd evSe- 
xdfJ-eva, e^ a)v edv re VTtdpxcoaw oLKelai, av^etv 
eunv, on dXr^BeZs puovai rwv fxaprvpLcov elaiv 
1377 a avraf edv re VTrevavriai cLai /cat p,erd rov dp,<f)t- 
a^rjrovvrog, SiaXvoL dv ns rdXrjdrj Xeycov /ca^' 
oXov rov yevovs rcov ^aadvcuv ovSev ydp ■^rrov 
dvayKa^ofxevoL rd ipevbij Xeyovaiv t] rdXr]9rj, Kal 
SiaKaprepovvres p^rj Xeyeiv rdXr]6rj, Kal paSicog 
KaraifsevhopbevoL co? 7Tava6p,evoi ddrrov. Set 8 
ex^iv eTTava^epeiv eirl roiavra y€yevrjp,eva rrapa- 
Selyfjiara d laaaiv ol Kpivovres. 8et 8e Xeyeiv (vs 
ovK elaiv dXrjdels at ^daavof ttoXXol p,ev yap 
rraxv^poves , Kal XtdoSepfioi, Kal rat? ijjvxo-is ovres 
Svvarol yevvaiojs eyKaprepovat rais dvdyKais, 01 
he SetAot /cat evXa^els irpo rod rds dvdyKas IheZv 
avroiv Karadappovatv, ware ovSev ion TTiarov ev 
^aadvoLS.^ 

' This passage [Set 5' ^x^i-" • • • iSao-di'ots], which is found 
in the best (Paris. A*^) ms., is now generally rejected, mainly 
as being linguistically un-Aristotelian. 

162 



I 



RHETORIC, I. XV. 25-26 

In addition to this, we must examine whether the 
contract is contrary to any written law of our own 
or foreign countries, or to any general law, or to 
other previous or subsequent contracts. For either 
the latter are valid and the former not, or the former 
are right and the latter fraudulent ; we may put it 
in whichever way it seems fit. We must also con- 
sider the question of expediency — whether the con- 
tract is in any way opposed to the interest of the 
judges. There are a number of other arguments of 
the same kind, which are equally easy to discern. 

Torture is a kind of evidence, which appears 
trustworthy, because a sort of compulsion is attached 
to it. Nor is it difficult to see what may be said 
concerning it, and by what arguments, if it is in our 
favour, we can exaggerate its importance by assert- 
ing that it is the only true kind of evidence ; but if 
it is against us and in favour of our opponent, we 
can destroy its value by telling the truth about all 
kinds of torture generally ; for those under com- 
pulsion are as likely to give false evidence as true, 
some being ready to endure everything rather than 
tell the truth, while others are equally ready to make 
false charges against others, in the hope of being 
sooner released from torture. It is also necessary 
to be able to quote actual examples of the kind with 
which the judges are acquainted. It may also be 
said that evidence given under torture is not true ; 
for many thick-witted and thick-skinned persons, and 
those who are stout-hearted heroically hold out under 
sufferings, while the cowardly and cautious, before 
they see the sufferings before them, are bold enough ; 
wherefore evidence from torture may be considered 
utterly untrustworthy. 

163 



ARISTOTLE 

27 Ilept 8' opKOiv rerpaxcos can SicXelv 7] yap 
SiScocTL Kal Aa/x/8avei, 7] ovSerepov, ^ to p,kv ro 
S ou, /cat rovrcov r} StScucrt fiev ov Xafi^dvei Se, 
■)5 Xafx^dvei, fiev StScoat 8' ou. ert aAAcos" irapd 
ravra, ei ojjLWjxoaraL ovros rj vtt avrov t] vtt 

28 eKeivov. ov SiSwat, fiev ovv, otl paSiios emop- 
KOVCTLV, Kal StOTt O fJ,€V O/XOCTas' OVK aTToStSaxTt, 

Tous" 8e /xi^ o/xdcravro? oterat /caraStKacretv. /cat 
COS" ouTos" o /ciVSut'o? KpeLTTWv o ev Tols StKaaraXs' 

29 Tot? /xev yap Tnarevei rep S oy. ou Xap^^dvei 8 , 
OTt dvrt ;)^/37y/>taT6ov opKos- /cat ort et t^v <f)avXos, 
KOTWfioaaro dv KpeZrrov yap eVe/ca toi> ^avXov 
elvai rj p-qSevos' opoaag p.kv ovv e^et, prj 6p.6aa? 
8' ou. ovrcx) 8e 8t' dperrjv dv eirj, aAA' oy 8t' 
iiTiopKLav TO p.'q. Kal to tov 'B,€VO(f)dvovs app^oT- 
ret, OTt ov/c tcny TrpoKXrjcns avT7] dae^el Trpos 
evcre^rj, aAA' opoia Kal el laxvpos dadevrj Trard^at 

30 ri TrXrjyrjvai rrpoKaXeaaiTo . et Se Xap.^dvei, otl 
TTLOTevet avTO), eKeivcp 8 ov. /cat to tov Set'o- 
<f)dvovs peTauTpeifjavTa ^areov ovtws lgov elvai 
av o p,ev aaep-qs otocp, o o evaeprjs opvvrj- betvov 

" In Attic legal procedure, the challenge (TrpoKXTtcns) to take 
an oath on the question at issue was one method of deciding it. 
One party offered the other something to swear by {didoicri 
6pKou), this being the real meaning of SpKos, and the other 
party either accepted {Xafx^dvei, Six^rai) it or refused it. 
Both parties, of their own accord, might propose to take i 
the oath. ' 

* There are three reasons for not tendering the oath : ( 1 ) 
men are always ready to perjure themselves, if they are 
likely to benefit by doing so ; {'2) if your adversary takes the 
oath, he will decline to pay, trusting that he will be acquitted, 
whereas, if he is not on his oath, he will probably be con- 
demned ; (3) there is less risk in leaving the decision to the 
dicasts, who can be trusted. 

164 I 



RHETORIC, I. XV. 27-30 

As to oaths " four divisions may be made ; for either 
we tender an oath and accept it, or we do neither, 
or one without the other, and in the last case we 
either tender but do not accept, or accept but do 
not tender. Besides this, one may consider whether 
the oath has already been taken by us or by the 
other party. If you do not tender the oath to the 
adversary, it is because men readily perjure them- 
selves, and because, after he has taken the oath, he 
will refuse to repay the money, while, if he does 
not take the oath, you think that the dicasts will 
condemn him ; and also because the risk incurred 
in leaving the decision to the dicasts is preferable, 
for you have confidence in them, but not in your 
adversary.* If you refuse to take the oath yourself, 
you may argue that the oath is only taken with a 
view to money ; that, if you had been a scoundrel, you 
would have taken it at once, for it is better to be a 
scoundrel for something than for nothing ; that, if 
you take it, you will win your case, if not, you will 
probably lose it ; consequently, your refusal to take 
it is due to moral excellence, not to fear of committing 
perjury. And the apophthegm of Xenophanes '^ is 
apposite — that "it is unfair for an impious man to 
challenge a pious one," for it is the same as a strong 
man challenging a weak one to hit or be hit. If you 
accept the oath, you may say that you have con- 
fidence in yourself, but not in your opponent, and, 
reversing the apophthegm of Xenophanes, that the 
only fair way is that the impious man should tender 
the oath and the pious man take it ; and that it 

" Born at Colophon in Asia Minor, he migrated to Elea 
in Italy, where he founded the Eleatic school of philosophy. 

165 



ARISTOTLE 

re TO [j.r] diXetv avrov, virkp (Lv CKeivovs d^tot 

31 ofioaavras SiKa^eiv. el Se SiScomv, on euaejSe? 
TO diXeiv rols deols eTTirpeTreiv, /cat on ovSev Set 
avTov aXkcov Kpirwv Setcrdaf avrco yap BtScoat 

32 Kpivetv. /cat on arorrov to fxr] deXeuv ofivvvai 
TTept (hv aXXovs a^ioi ofivvvaL. 

ETret oe /ca^' eKaoTOv hrjXov ttcos XeKTeov, /cat 
avvSva^ofzevov ttcos Xcktcov SijXov olov el avTog 
Hev deXei Xafx^dveLV SiSovat 8e pufj, /cat et hihoiai 
[xev Xajx^dveiv he fi-q deXei, Kal el XafM^dveiv koL 
1377 b StSoj^at ^e'Aet elVe p,rjheTepov e/c yap twv elpripievoiv 
avayKT] avyKelaOai, oiOTe Kal tovs Xoyovs dvdyKrj 
avyKelcrdai e/c twv elprj/jbevojv. edv Se fj yeyevq- 
fievos V7T avTov /cat evavTios, otl ovk CTrtop/cta' 
eKovoLov yap to aSt/ceiv, to S' eTTiopKeZv dhiKelv 

33 ecTTt, Ta oe ^ta /cat aTrdTrj aKovaia. e^Tau^a ovv 
avvaKTeov /cat to errLopKelv, oti eoTi to ttj hiavola, 
aXX ov TO) aTOjxaTL. edv Se T(h avTiSiKO) fj opua)- 
p,o(jp,evos, OTL TrdvTa dvaipeZ 6 pur] epu,evoiv ois 
cup-oaev Sta yap tovto /cat Tot? vopbois ;!^/3cu»'Tat 
opioaoJVTes . Kal " vpds pev d^Lovaiv ep,p.€V€LV 
ols opoaavTes St/ca^eTe, auTot S' ovk ep,p,evovaLV ." 
/cat ocra av dXXa av^cov tis" etWter. irepl p,ev ovv 
r&v dT€)(ya)V iriaTeoiv elprjodco roaavTa. 

■1 
" The defence in such cases is: (1) that the previous oath 
was taken as the result of fraud or compulsion ; (2) that you 
did not mean what you said. 



166 



i 



RHETORIC, I. XV. 30-33 

would be monstrous to refuse to take the oath 
yourself, while demanding that the judges should 
take it before giving their verdict. But if you tender 
the oath, you may say that it is an act of piety to 
be willing to leave the matter to the gods ; that 
your opponent has no need to look for other judges, 
for you allow him to make the decision himself ; and 
that it would be ridiculous that he should be un- 
willing to take an oath in cases where he demands 
that the dicasts should take one. 

Now, since we have shown how we must deal with 
each case individually, it is clear how we must deal 
with them when taken two and two ; for instance, 
if we wish to take the oath but not to tender it, to 
tender it but not to take it, to accept and tender it, 
or to do neither the one nor the other. For such 
cases, and similarly the arguments, must be a com- 
bination of those already mentioned. And if we 
have already taken an oath which contradicts the 
present one, we may argue that it is not perjury ; 
for whereas wrongdoing is voluntary, and perjury is 
wrongdoing, what is done in error or under com- 
pulsion is involuntary. Here we must draw the 
conclusion that perjury consists in the intention, not 
in what is said.*' But if the opponent has taken such 
an oath, we may say that one who does not abide 
by what he has sworn subverts everything, for this 
is the reason why the dicasts take an oath before 
applying the laws ; and [we may make this appeal] : 
" They demand that you abide by your oath as judges, 
while they themselves do not abide by theirs." 
Further, we should employ all means of amplification. 
Let this suffice for the inartificial proofs. 

167 



B 

1. E/c TLVCov jxkv ovv Set /cat TTporpeTreiv /cat 
d7TOTp€7T€LV /cttt eTTaivelv /cat iffiyeiv /cat KarrjyopeZv 
/cat d77oAoyeta^at, /cat Trotat So^at /cat Trpordcreis 
XP'iJCTLfxot rrpos rds tovtcov TTLarets, ravr' icrriv 
Trepl yap tovtcov /cat e/c toutojv to, ivdvp.'qfxaTa, 
(vs Ttepi CKaaTov etTretv tSta to yevos tmv Xoycxjv. 

2 CTret S' eVe/ca Kpiaecog eoTiv r) p-qToptK-q (/cat yap 
TO.? crvpi^ovXds Kplvovai /cat t^ St/C7^ Kpiais iaTLv), 
dvdyKT) fiT) pbovov irpos top Xoyov opdv, ottojs 
dTToSeiKTLKOs ecTTat /cat ttlgtos, dXXd /cat avTov 

3 TTOtoi^ Ttva /cat tov KpiTrjv /caraa/ceua^etv 77oAu 
yap Sta0cpet Trpo? TrlaTtv, /xaAtcrra /.tev" ei^ rat? 
avfx^ovXals, etra /cat ev" rat? Si/cat?, to ttolov Tiva 
^aiveadai tov XeyovTa /cat to Trpos" auTou? inroXap,- 
^dveiv €)(€iv TTCxJS avTov, irpos 8e roirrots" cdv /cat 

4 auTot SLaK€Lp,€voi. 7TCOS TuyxdvcoGLV . TO fiev ovv 
TTOLOV Ttwa (^aiveadai tov XeyovTa p^^pT^CTt/xcoTepov 

" This is Cope's interpretation. Jebb renders : " If we 
take each branch of Rhetoric by itself." The classes are of 
course the deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. 

* The instructions given for enthymematic or logical proof 
should suffice ; but since the function of Rhetoric is to find 
the available means of persuasion and its end is a judgement ; 
and since an appeal to the speaker's own character and to 
the passions of those who are to give the judgement is bound 
to carry great weight, the speaker must be provided with 
rules for ethical and "pathetic " (emotional) proofs. In i. 5 

168 



BOOK II 

1. Such then are the materials which we must 
employ in exhorting and dissuading, praising and 
blaming, accusing and defending, and such are the 
opinions and propositions that are useful to produce 
conviction in these circumstances ; for they are the 
subject and source of enthymemes, which are speci- 
ally suitable to each class (so to say) of speeches.** 
But since the object of Rhetoric is judgement — for 
judgements are pronounced in dehberative rhetoric 
and judicial proceedings are a judgement — it is not 
only necessary to consider how to make the speech 
itself demonstrative and convincing, but also that 
the speaker should show himself to be of a certain 
character and should know how to put the judge 
into a certain frame of mind. For it makes a great 
difference with regard to producing conviction — 
especially in demonstrative, and, next to this, in 
forensic oratory — that the speaker should show him- 
self to be possessed of certain qualities and that his 
hearers should think that he is disposed in a certain 
way towards them ; and further, that they themselves 
should be disposed in a certain way towards him.^ 
In deliberative oratory, it is more useful thatthe orator 

Aristotle mentions appeals to the emotions with disapproval, 
but this does not apply to all such appeals, but only to those 
which are likely to bias the judges unfairly {e.g. stirring up 
envy, hatred, a desire for revenge). 

169 



ARISTOTLE 

els Tas avfJi^ovXcis iariv, to Se hiaKeZadai ttcos 
Tov aKpoarriv els ras hiKas' ov yap ravra ^aiverai 
(f)tXovai Kal fxiaovaLV, ouS' o/oyii^o/ieVoi? /cat Trpdcos 
exovaiv, aAA' 7) ro Trapdnav erepa -^ Kara to 
msn P'eyeOos erepa- rco ixev yap (f)LXovvrL, Trepl ov 
TToieZrai rrjv Kpiuiv, ^ ovk dSiKelv 7) pn,Kpd hoKeZ 
dhiKelv, rep Se ficaovvrt rovvavriov /cat ro) fiev 
€7TL6vfMovvri, Kal eveXTTiSi ovrt, edv fj ro eaofievov 
r)8v, Kal eaeadai Kal dyadov eaeadai (f>alverat., 
rep 8' aTTadel Kal Svaxepalvovrt rovvavriov. 

5 "Tov fiev ovv avrovs elvat TTiarovs rovs Xeyovras 
rpla earl rd atVia' roaavra ydp eari St' a m- 
arevofMev e^o) roJv dTToSel^ecov. eari Se ravra 
(f)p6v7]cris Kal dperr] Kal evvoia' StaipevSovrai ydp 
TTepl o5;^ Xeyovaiv rj avp,^ovXevovaLV r) Sto. rrdvra 

6 ravra 7) Sia rovrcov rt* t) ydp 8t' d<l)poavvrjv ovk 
op9a>s So^d^ovoLV, Tj 8o^dl,ovr€S opddJs Sta /Lto;\;- 
drjpiav ov rd SoKovvra Xeyovaiv, r) (f)p6vLp,0i p,ev 
Kal emeLKels elalv dAA' ovk evvor BioTrep evhe- 
p^erai /xi) rd ^eXriara avpL^ovXeveiv yiyvcoaKovras . 
Kal TTapd ravra ovSev. dvdyKrj dpa rov aTravra 
BoKOVvra raur' e)(eLV elvat rols aKpocofxevoLS 

7 TTiarov. 66 ev p,ev roivvv ^p6vLp,oi Kal aTTovSaXoi 
<f)aveLev dv, e/c ru)v Trepl rds dperds htr^pT^p.evoiv 
XrjTTreov Ik rcov avrcbv ydp Kav erepov ris kov 
iavrov KaraaKevdaeie roiovrov rtepl 8' evvoias 
Kal <f)LXtas ev rots Trepl rd Trddrj XcKreov. 



" Opposed to eW\7rt5i. Others render " in a bad humour." 

'' eTneiKj'js and (TTToi'Salos both = dyados. In a restricted 
sense ^Trtei/c^s is " respectable," <nrov8aios " serious." 

« i. 9. 
170 



RHETORIC, II. I. 4-7 

should appear to be of a certain character, in forensic, 
that the hearer should be disposed in a certain way ; 
for opinions vary, according as men love or hate, are 
wrathful or mild, and things appear either altogether 
different, or different in degree ; for when a man is 
favourably disposed towards one on whom he is passing 
judgement, he either thinks that the accused has com- 
mitted no wrong at all or that his offence is trifling ; 
but if he hates him, the reverse is the case. And if a 
man desires anything and has good hopes of getting 
it, if what is to come is pleasant, he thinks that it is 
sure to come to pass and will be good ; but if a man 
is unemotional or not hopeful" it is quite the reverse. 
For the orator to produce conviction three qualities 
are necessary ; for, independently of demonstrations, 
the things which induce belief are three in number. 
These qualities are good sense, virtue, and goodwill ; 
for speakers are wrong both in what they say and 
in the advice they give, because they lack either all 
three or one of them. For either through want of 
sense they form incorrect opinions, or, if their 
opinions are correct, through viciousness they do not 
say what they think, or, if they are sensible and 
good,^ they lack goodwill ; wherefore it may happen 
that they do not give the best advice, although they 
know what it is. These qualities are all that are 
necessary, so that the speaker who appears to possess 
all three will necessarily convince his hearers. The 
means whereby he may appear sensible and good ^ 
must be inferred from the classification of the 
virtues ; *= for to make himself appear such he 
would employ the same means as he would in the 
case of others. We must now speak of goodwill 
and friendship in our discussion of the emotions. 

171 



ARISTOTLE 

8 "EcTTt Se ra Trddr), 8t' oaa /xerajSaAAovre? 8ta- 
(fiepovGL TTpos TO,? KpLoei? , ols €TTerai Avttt] Kat 
rjSovq, olov opyrj eXeos (f)6^os /cat oaa d'AAa roiavra, 

9 /cat TO. rovrois ivavria. Set Se BiaLpelv ra Trepi 
eKaarov els rpia- Xeyo) 8' olov irepi opyrjs, TTcog 
re SiaKeLfjievoL opylXot elai, Kal riatv eLcouaacv 
opyit^eadai, Kal enl ttoCols' el yap ro [juev ev rj ra 
Svo exoijJiev rovrojv, anavra 8e p.r], aSvvarov av 
elf] rrjv opyrjv epbTTOLetv opioicos 8e xai evL rwv 
a'AAojv. coartep ovv Kal eml rcov 7TpoeLpT]p.evcov 
hieypdtjjap.ev rds TrpordaeLs, ovrco Kai em rovrcuv 
7TOL'^acop,ev Kal hLeXiopbev rov elprjp,evov rpoirov. 

2. "Ecttoj 8-17 opyT) ope^LS p,erd Xvttt]? rip^coplas 
cf)aLvop,evrjs 8ta <j)aiv opLevrjv oXiycopiav rcov ei? 
avrov rj rG)v avrov, rod oXiycopelv p,iij rrpoarjKovrog. 
2 el hrj rovr^ earlv rj opyq, dvdyKrj rov 6pyLt,6[xevov 
opyl^eadai del rcov Kad^ eKaarov rtvt, olov KAect>ft 
137S b aAA' ovK dvOpcoTTO), Kal on avrov r) rojv avrov 
rt TTeTToirjKev rj rjfxeXXev, Kal Trdarj opyfj eTreauat 
riva rjSovrjv rrjv drro rrjs eXTriSos rov rLfxcoprjaaadaL' 
rj8v p,ev yap ro oXeadai rev^eadai wv e(j>ierai, 
ovSet? 8e TcDv (f)acvop,eva)v dSvvdrcov enteral 
avru), 6 8' opyiljOpLevos e^ierat hvvarcjjv avro). 
8t6 KaXoJS e'lprjrai rrepl 6vp.ov 

OS re TToXv yXvKLOiV p,eXiros KaraXei^op^evoto 
dvSpojv iv arrjdeaaiv de^erat' 

" In i. generally (cp. i. 2. 22). 

'' Gomperz translates (paivofiivijs " real or apparent " ; Jebb 
omits (paiuoiJ.^vT]i and translates (paLvo/xiv-qi' " apparent " ; 
Cope confines both to the meaning " manifest." 

Iliad, xviii. 109 (cp. i. 11. 9). 

172 



RHETORIC, II. I. 8— 11. 2 

The emotions are all those affections which cause 
men to change their opinion in regard to their 
judgements, and are accompanied by pleasure and 
pain ; such are aiigej, ..pitju fgar^ and all similar 
emotions and their contraries. And each of them 
musFbe dividedrunder three heads ; for instance, in 
regard to anger, the disposition of mind which makes 
men angry, the persons with whom they are usually 
angry, and the occasions which give rise to anger. 
For if we knew one or even two of these heads, but 
not all three, it would be impossible to arouse that 
emotion. The same applies to the rest. Just as, then, 
we have given a list of propositions * in what we have 
previously said, we will do the same here and divide 
the emotions in the same manner. 

2. Let us then define anger as a longing, accom- 
panied by pain, for a real or apparent revenge for a 
real or apparent slight,^ affecting a man himself or 
one of his friends, when such a slight is undeserved. 
If this definition is correct, the angry man must 
always be angry with a particular individual (for 
instance, with Cleon, but not with men generally), 
and because this individual has done, or was on the 
point of doing, something against him or one of his 
friends ; and lastly, anger is always accompanied by 
a certain pleasure, due to the hope of revenge to 
come. For it is pleasant to think that one will 
obtain what one aims at ; now, no one aims at what 
is obviously impossible of attainment by him, and 
the angry man aims at what is possible for himself. 
Wherefore it has been well said of anger, that 

Far sweeter than dripping honey down the throat it spreads 
in men's hearts." 

173 



ARISTOTLE 

OLKoXovOel yap /cat i^SovTy rt? 8ia re rovro /cat 
StoTt Starpl^ovaLV iv rco rt/xwpetcr^at rij Siavoia' 
7] ovv t6t€ ytvopbivrj (j>avraaia rjSovrjv e/ATTOtet, 

OJGTTep 7] TCOV eVVTTVlWV . 

3 'Ettgi S' -j^ oAtycopta ecrriv ivepyeta S6$r]s irepl 
TO fMTjSevos d^iov (^atvo/xevoj^" /cat yap ra /ca/ca 
Kat raya^a a^-ta olojxeOa aTrovSrjg clvai, /cat ra 
avvreivovra Trpos avrd- oaa 8e /xi^Sev rt -^ p,LKpov, 
ovhevos a^ia UTroAa/.tjSavop.ev'. rpta 8' ecrnv etSry 
oAtycopias", KaTa(f>p6vr]aLS re /cat iTrrjpeacrjJbos Kat 

4 v^pis' o re yap Kara(f)pova)v oXiycopel' oaa yap 
olovrai [MTjBevos d^ca, rovrcov Kara(f}povovaLV , rcx)V 
he fjbTjSevos a^icov oXiycopovatv /cat o eTTrjped^cov 
<f}aiverai Kara^poveZv . eari yap 6 eTrrfpeaapLog 
ip,7To8tap,6s raXs §ovXrjaeai.v ovx tva ri avr& aAA* 
tva p.r] eKeivcp. enel ovv ov^ i-va avrco rt,, oAi- 
ywpeX' SijXov yap ort ovre ^Xdifteiv viroXajx^dvei' 
i(f)o^eXro yap dv /cat ovk (hXtycopet' ovr^ (h(j)eXriaai 
dv ovhev d^LOV Xoyov i(f)p6vrL^€ yap dv axrre 
(f>i,Xos elvai. 

5 Kat o v^pit,ojv 8' oAtycopet" eari yap v^pis ro 
jSAaTrretv /cat AuTreti'^ e^' ols alaxdvi) earl rip 

^ A' reads wpdrTeiv Kal X^yeiv, adopted by Roemer. 

<• The thought of revenge in the future, as distinguished 
from dwelling upon it in the present. 

* Or, "those in which this tendency does not exist, or is 
trifling." 

* Or, " how to make liim his friend," 0(Xos being for 
(piXov by attraction. 

* In Attic law iJ^pis (insulting, degrading treatment) was 

174 



RHETORIC, II. II. 2-5 

for it is accompanied by a certain pleasure, for this 
reason first,** and also because men dwell upon the 
thought of revenge, and the vision that rises before 
us produces the same pleasure as one seen in dreams. 

Sl ighting is an actualization of opinion in regard 
to something which appears valueless ; for things 
which are really bad or good, or tend to become so, 
we consider worthy of attention, but those which are 
of no importance or trifling ^ we ignore. Now there 
are three kinds of slight : disdain, spitefulness, and 
insult. For he who disdains, slights, since men dis- 
dain those things which they consider valueless and 
slight what is of no account. And the spiteful man 
appears to show disdain ; for spitefulness consists in 
placing obstacles in the way of another's wishes, not 
in order that any advantage may accrue to him who 
spites, but to prevent any accruing to the other. 
Since then he does not act in this manner from self- 
interest, it is a slight ; for it is evident that he has 
no idea that the other is likely to hurt him, for in 
that case he would be afraid of him instead of slight- 
ing him ; nor that he will be of any use to him 
worth speaking of, for in that case his thought would 
be how to become his friend.'' 

Similarly, he who insults another also slights him ; 
for insult ^ consists in causing injury or annoyance 
a more serious offence than aUla (bodily ill-treatment). It 
was the subject of a State criminal prosecution {ypa<p'q), a'tKia 
of a private action {oiKri) for damages. The penalty was 
assessed in court, and might even be death. It had to be 
proved that the defendant struck the first blow (ii. 24. 9). 
One of the best known instances is the action brought by 
Demosthenes against Midias for a personal outrage on 
himself, when choregus of his tribe and responsible for the 
equipment of a chorus for musical competitions at public 
festivals. 

175 



ARISTOTLE 

Traaxovn, /xr] Iva ti yevrjrai avTcp ctAAo 7} on 
iyevero, aAA oVcos" 'qcrdfj- ol yap dvriTTOtovvTeg 
6 ovx v^pii,ovaiv dXXa TLficopovvrai. atnov 8e t'^? 
r)8ovrjg rols v^plt,ovcTiv , on olovrat, /ca/ccu? Spcoi/re? 
awTOfS" V7Tepex€iv /xaAAov. 8to ot Wot /cat ot 
TrAowatot v^picrrai- U7repe;\;etv yap oiop'Tat v^pi- 
^ovre?. u^pecos" 8e drt/xta, o 8' dnpidt^aiv oXiycopel' 
TO yap pirjSevo^ d^Lov ovSe/xtav e;\;et nix-qv, ovr* 
dyadov ovre KaKov. Sto Aeyet opyi/^ofieuos 6 
'A;^tAAet'S' 

'qrlfi'qarcv eAcov yap e;^et yepas avros 



J > 



cucet Ttv anixrjrov iJberava(TTr]v , 

7 ct)? 8ta ravra 6pyi^6[ji€Vos. TTpoarjKeiv 8' otoi^rat 
TToXvctipeladat, vtto tcjv rjrrovwv Kara yevos, Kara 
1379 a 8wajLtt;', /car' dpeTTyj/, /cat oAco? ei^ c5 dv ravrcp 
V7T€pexj] TToXv, oiov €V p^pT^/xaatv d TrAoJcrios' rrivqros 
/cat €v TO) Aeyetiv prjroptKos dhvvdrov etTretv /cat 
dpxojv dp^op-evov /cat dpx^iv d^tos olopuevos rov 
dpx^odai d^lov. 8td eiprjraL 

dvpbos he fieyas ion Siorpe^ecoi' ^aaiXirjOiv 



/cat 

dAAd 



re /cat fxsTOTTcauev ex^i kotov 



" Iliad, i. 356. 

^ Iliad, ix. 648. ixiravAarris, lit. " one who changes his 
home," used as a term of reproach (see also Glossary). 

'^ ravT(^. Other readings are raOra, or rtj. 

^ Iliad, ii. 196. 

• Iliad, i. 82. The words are those of the soothsayer 
Calchas to Achilles, and the reference is to Agamemnon. 

176 



RHETORIC, II. 11. 5-7 

whereby the sufferer is disgraced, not to obtain any 
other advantage for oneself besides the performance 
of the act, but for one's own pleasure ; for retalia- 
tion is not insult, but punishment. The cause of 
the pleasure felt by those who insult is the idea that, 
in ill-treating others, they are more fully showing 
superiority. That is why the young and the wealthy • 
are given to insults ; for they think that, in com- 
mitting them, they are showing their superiority. 
Dishonour is characteristic of insult ; and one who 
dishonours another slights him ; for that which is 
worthless has no value, either as good or evil. Hence 
Achilles in his wrath exclaims : 

He has dishonoured me, since he keeps the prize he has 
taken for himself," 

and 

[has treated me] like a dishonoured vagrant,* 

as if being wTath for these reasons. Now men think 
that they have a right to be highly esteemed by 
those who are inferior to them in birth, power, and 
virtue, and generally, in whatever similar respect " 
a man is far superior to another ; for example, the 
rich man to the poor man in the matter of money, 
the eloquent to the incompetent speaker in the 
matter of oratory, the governor to the governed, 
and the man who thinks himself worthy to rule to 
one who is only fit to be ruled. Wherefore it has 
been said : 

Great is the wrath of kings cherished by Zeus,"* 

and 

Yet it may be that even afterwards he cherishes his 
resentment,* 

N 177 



ARISTOTLE 

8 ayavaKTOvaL yap Sia ttjv VTTepo)(r}v . en ixfi' dtv 
Tis oterai ev Trdaxecv Setv ovtol 8' elatv ovs €v 

TTeTTOLTJKeV 7] TTOlCt, T] aVTOS rj St' aVTOV Tl? t] TCOV 

avTOV Tis, 7] ^ovXeraL ^ i^ovX-qdr]. 

9 Oavepov ovv eK rorjrcov rjSr] ttojs t' e)(ovT€S 
opyLL,ovTai avrol koL riai /cat Sta irola. avrol 
fiev yap, orav XuTTowrav ec^terai yap tlvos 6 
AVTrovficvos' idv re ovv /car' evOvcopiav otlovv 
avTiKpovarj rt?, otov T(p Sufjojvri irpos ro inelv, 
eav re p,rj, opbOLOJS ravro (f>aiverai TTOLeiv /cat 
eav re avrnTparrr] rt? edv re fxr] avfiTrpdrrr] 
eav re dXXo ri evoyXfj ovrcos exovra, rols Trdcnv 

10 6pyit,eraL. Sto Kdp,vovres, TrevofMevoi, [ttoAc/xow- 
res], epdJvres, Sufjcovres, oXoJS eTnOvfiovvres /cat 
fxr] KaropOovvres opyiXot elal /cat evTrapopfnqroi, 
fidXtara p,ev Trpos rovs rod rrapovros oXiyaipovvras , 
OLOV KafMvcov fiev rots Trpos rrjv voaov, TTevojxevos 
Se roZs TTpos rr]v Treviav, TToXefxatv Se rot? Trpos rov 
TToXefMov, epdjv Se rot? TTpos rov epcora' ofiotcos 
Se /cat roZs aXXois' TTpoojSoTTOLrjraL yap eKaaros 
TTpos rrjv eKaarov opyrjv vtto rov VTrap^ovros 

U TTadovs. en S' eav rdvavrla rvxi] TrpocrBexofxevos' 
Xvrrel yap fidXXov ro ttoXv Trapd Sof av, wavep /cat 
repTTet ro ttoXv Trapd 86$av, idv yevrjrai o ^ovXerai. 

"» rots 7rp6s Tr)v vdaov : lit. *' the sick man [is angry with 
those who slight him] in regard to his illness," that is, by 
making light of it. 

* Or, " his suffering at the moment." 
178 



RHETORIC, II. II. 8-11 

for kings are resentful in consideration of their 
superior rank. Further, men are angry at slights 
from those by whom they think they have a right 
to expect to be well treated ; such are those on 
whom they have conferred or are conferring benefits, 
either themselves, or some one else for them, or one 
of their friends ; and all those whom they desire, or 
did desire, to benefit. 

It is now evident from these considerations what 
is the disposition of those who are angry, with whom 
they are angry, and for what reasons. Men are 
angry when they are pained, because one who is 
pained aims at something ; if then anyone directly 
opposes him in anything, as, for instance, prevents 
him from drinking when thirsty, or not directly, but 
seems to be doing just the same : and if anyone 
goes against him or refuses to assist him, or troubles 
him in any other way when he is in this frame of 
mind, he is angry with all such persons. Wherefore 
the sick, the necessitous, [those at war], the love- 
sick, the thirsty, in a word, all who desire something 
and cannot obtain it, are prone to anger and easily 
excited, especially against those who make light of 
their present condition ; for instance, the sick man 
is easily provoked in regard to his illness," the 
necessitous in regard to his poverty, the warrior in 
regard to warhke aifairs, the lover in regard to love- 
affairs, and so with all the rest ; for the passion ^ 
present in his mind in each case paves the way for 
his anger. Again, men are angry when the event 
is contrary to their expectation, for the more un- 
expected a thing is, the more it pains ; just as they 
are overjoyed if, contrary to expectation, what they 
desire comes to pass. From this it is obvious what 

179 



ARISTOTLE 

8to /cat wpai /cat xpovoL /cat Siadeaeis /cat vXiKLai, 
€K rovTCov (jyavepai, TTolai cvklvtjtol irpos opyrjv 
/cat 7TOV /cat ttotg, /cat ort ore fMaXXov iv tovtols 
etat, //.aAAov Kat evKLvqroL. 

12 AuTOt jLtei/ ow ovrojs e^ovres evKivrjrot irpo's 
opyrfu, opyL^ovraL Se rols re KarayeXaxn /cat 
xX€vdt,ovaL /cat aKcoTrrovcnv v^pll,ovaL yap. /cat 
Tot? Ta roiavra ^XaTTTovaiv oaa v^pecos arj/JLCLa. 
avayKT] Se roiavra elvai a fx-^re avri rivos p-'qr* 
(h(f)eXi,p.a roZs rroiovaiv tJSt) yap So/cet 8t' v^piv. 

13 /cat Tot? /ca/ccDs" Xeyovcn /cat Kara^povovai Trepl 
a avrol ixdXiara aTTovhdt,ovaiv , otov ol irrl <f)LXo- 
aocf)La ^iXoripLOvp^evoi idv rts et? rrjv <j)iXoao^iav , 
ot o evrt T7^ toea eav ns et? rrjv loeav, ofMOLws oe 

14 /cat eTTt Tcut' dXXcov. ravra 8e TroAAoi jjidXXov, idv 
VTTOTTrevarwaL fjbT] virdpx^iv avrols, rj oXcog t] firj 

1379 b laxvpcos, rj firj So/cetv CTretSav yap a<j>6hpa otcovrai 
VTrdpxetv iv rovroig^ iv ots aKwrrrovrai, ov (fypovrl- 

15 l^ovaiv. /cat rot? <^tAots" fxaXXov t] rocs fir] ^t'Aots" 
otovrat yap 7Tpoai]K€iv [jbdXXov Trdorx^iv ev vtt* 

16 avrd)v r] fir], /cat rols eldiap.ivoLs rtfMav t] (fipovrc- 
^eiv, idv TTaXiv firj ovrcos ofMtXcbcrLV /cat ydp vtto 
rovroiv otovrai Kara^poveladai' ravrd ydp dv 

^ iv Toihois is bracketed by Spengel : Cope explains it as 
" in those particular things " (philosophy, personal beauty, 
and the like). 

» evKlvr/Toi refers grammatically to diadicrets and iiXiKlai. 
180 



RHETORIC, II. II. 11-16 

are the seasons, times, states of mind, and conditions 
of age in which we are easily moved " to anger ; and 
what are the various times, places, and reasons, 
which make us more prone to anger in proportion 
as we are subject to their influence. 

Such then are the dispositions of those who are 
easily roused to anger. As to the objects of their 
anger, men are angry with those who ridicule, mock, 
and scoff at them, for this is an insult. And with 
those who injure them in ways that are indications 
of insult. But these acts must be of such a kind 
that they are neither retaliatory nor advantageous 
to those who commit them ; for if they are, they 
then appear due to gratuitous insult. And men 
are angry with those who speak ill of or despise 
things which they themselves consider of the greatest 
importance ; for instance, if a man speaks con- 
temptuously of philosophy or of personal beauty in 
the presence of those who pride themselves upon 
them ; and so in all other cases. But they are far 
more angry if they suspect that they do not possess 
these qualities, either not at all, or not to any great 
extent, or when others do not think they possess 
them. For when they feel strongly that they do 
possess those qualities which are the subject of 
mockery, they pay no heed to it. And they are 
more angry with those who are their friends than 
with those who are not, for they think that they 
have a right to be treated well by them rather than 
ill. And they are angry with those who have been 
in the habit of honouring and treating them with 
respect, if they no longer behave so towards them ; 
for they think that they are being treated with con- 
tempt by them, otherwise they would treat them as 

181 



ARISTOTLE 

17 TToieXv. Kal toIs fJirj avmroLOVGLV ev, fxrjSe t7)v 
tarjv di^aTToStSouatv. Kal rots ravavria ttolovolv 
avrolg, eav tJttovs (Law Karacppovelv yap Travres 
ol roLOVTOi (f)aivovraL, Kal ot [xev cos rjTrovcov ol 
8' COS" Trap' riTTovctiv. 

18 Kat rots' ev iJirjSevl Xoycp ovaiv, av ri oXiycopcoaL, 
/iaAAov VTTo K€Lr at yap 'q opyrj ri^s oXiyoipias rrpos 
Tovs p,r] TTpoaiqKovras, TrpoarjKei, he rols rJTToai 

19 fJir) 6Xt,ya)p€LV. rots Se ^t'Aots", idv re fxr) eS Xeyojaiv 
^ TTOLcoaiv, Kal ert, puaXXov iav ravavria, Kal eav 
firj aiadavcovrat Seofievcov, axjTrep 6 ^AvrL(f>a)vros 
YIXii^^iTnrog rep MeXedypcp' oXiycoplag yap ro fxr) 
aiaOaveaOai arjfietov Sv yap <l>povrit,oixev, ov 

20 Xavddvei. Kal rots eTTixo-ipovaL rats aTu;^tatS" Kal 
oXcos evdvfiovfievoLS ev rats avrwv dri';^tats" rj 
yap exOpov rj oXtyiDpovvros ar)p,elov. Kal rols 
fxrj ^povril^ovaiVy eav XvirrjaioaLV Sio /cat rots' 

21 KaKO. dyyeXXovGLV 6pyil,ovr at. koX rols 'fj aKovovai 
TTepl avrwv t) deoj fxevoLs rd avrdJv ^auAa* 6p,oLOL 
ydp elcFLV 7] oXiycopovaiv r^ exdpols' ol yap <j)iXoL 

22 avvaXyovaiv , ded>p.evoi he rd ot/ceta (f)avXa Trdvres 
dXyovcrcv. en rots' oXiycopovoi Trpds irevre, irpos 
ovs ^LXortpLovvrai, -npos ovs ^avjud^ouatv, i5^' c5v 
^ovXovrai 6avfj,dl,€adai, tj ovs alaxvvovrai, t] ev 
rols alaxwop.evois avrovs' ev rovrots edv res 

" Plexippus was the uncle of Meleager. The allusion is 
obscure. It may refer to Meleager giving the skin of the 
Calydonian boar to Atalanta, which his uncle wanted. One 
of Antiphon's tragedies was named Meleager {T.G.F. p. 792). 

■* Literally, " for the things which ( = the persons whom) 
one respects, do not escape notice." 

182 



RHETORIC, II. II. 17-22 

before. And with those who do not return their 
kindnesses nor requite them in full ; and with those 
who oppose them, if they are inferiors ; for all such 
appear to treat them with contempt, the latter as if 
they regarded them as inferiors, the former as if 
they had received kindnesses from inferiors. 

And they are more angry with those who are of 
no account, if they sHght them ; for anger at a slight 
was assumed to be felt at those who ought not to 
behave in such a manner ; for inferiors ought not 
to shght their superiors. And they are angry with 
friends, if they neither speak well of nor treat them 
well, and in an even greater degree, if they do the 
opposite. And if they fail to perceive that they 
want something from them, as Plexippus <» in Anti- 
phon's tragedy reproached Meleager ; for failure to 
perceive this is a sign of slight ; since, when we care 
for people, these things are noticed.'' And they are 
angry with those who rejoice, or in a general way 
are cheerful when they are unfortunate ; for this is 
an indication of enmity or slight. And with those 
who do not care if they pain them ; whence they are 
angry with those who bring bad news. And with 
those who listen to the tale of their faults, or look 
on them with indiiference, for they resemble slighters 
or enemies ; for friends sympathize and all men are 
pained to see their own faults exposed." And further, 
with those who slight them before five classes of 
persons : namely , their rivals, those whom they admire, 
those by whom they would like to be admired, those 
whom they respect, or those who respect them ; 
when anyone slights them before these, their anger is 

« The real friend, therefore, would feel as much pain as 
the other whose faults are exposed. 

18a 



ARISTOTLE 

23 oXtycopfj , opyit^ovrai fjbdXXov. /cat rols els ra 
Totavra oXiycopovaiv vvep cov avroXs alaxpov fxrj 
porjOelv, olov yovels, rcKva, yvvaiKas, dp)(op,evovs . 
Kai Tols x^P^^ P''^ dTToStSoucrtv rrapa to TrpoaiJKov 

24 yap 7] oXiycopia. /cat roXs elpcuvevofJievoLS' irpos 
26 aTTOvhdt,ovras' Kara^povr^riKov yap rj elpcoveia. 

/cat rot? T(x>v dXXcov evTTOirjrLKots, idv /xr] /cat 
avTwv Kat yap rovro Kara^^povqrLKov , ro p.r] 

26 d^iovv ojv TTOLvrag /cat avTov. TTOiiqTiKov S' opyrjg 
/cat rj Xrjdri, olov /cat -q rojv 6vofxdTa>v ovrcos ovaa 
nepl fjLLKpov oXiycopias yap So/cet Kat 7] Xridrj 
a'qp.elov elvar St d/xeXeiav p,ev yap rj Xi^dr] yiy- 

27 verat, rj 8' d/xe'Aeta oAtycopta iariv. olg jxev ovv 
6pyit,ovTai /cat ojs exovreg /cat Sid Trota, d/xa 

1380a etprjTaL' SrjXov S' on Seot dv avrov KaraGKCvdt^eiv 
TO) Xoycp TOLOVTOvs otot ovres opytXojg exovaiv, 
/cat rovs ivavrtovg tovtols evoxov? ovras i(f)^ otj 
6pyit,ovraL, /cat roiovrovs oIols 6pyiiC,ovTaL. 

3. 'Ettci Se TO opyil^eadaL ivavriov rco rrpav- 
veadai /cat opyrj TTpaorrjri, XrjTrreov ttuis exovres 
rrpdoL etcrt /cat TTpos rivas Trpdcjs exovcn /cat Std 

2 TLvcov TTpavvovrat. earco 817 Trpdiivais Kardaraais 

3 Kai rjpifxrjaLS opyrjg. el ovv 6pyit,ovrai rots 
oXtycopovatv, oXiycxjpia S' icrrlv eKovaiov, <f)avep6v 
on /cat Tot? jjbrjSev rovrcov TTOLovatv 7) dKovaicos 

4 TTOLovaiv rj ^aivojxevois tolovtols Trpdoi elaiv. /cat 
TOLS Tovavria cov eTToirjaav ^ovXop,evoLS. /cat oaoi 

» Cope translates " rulers and governors " ; but can 
dpXfffOaL be used in a middle sense ? 

'' To avoid the apparent tautology (§ 17), Roemer {Rhein. 
Mus. xxxix. p. 503) boldly conjectures x'"V'"'' • " 'lot to 
return another's greeting." 

184 



RHETORIC, II. II. 23— III. 4 

greater. They are also angry with those who slight 
such persons as it would be disgraceful for them not 
to defend, for instance, parents, children, wives, and • 
dependents.* And with those who are ungrateful,* 
for the slight is contrary to all sense of obligation. 
And with those who employ irony, when they them- 
selves are in earnest ; for irony shows contempt. 
And with those who do good to others, but not to 
them ; for nob to think them worthy of what they 
bestow upon all others also shows contempt. Forget- 
fulness also is a cause of anger, such as forgetting 
names, although it is a mere trifle, since even for- 
getfulness seems a sign of slight ; for it is caused by 
indifference, and indifference is a slight. We have 
thus stated at one and the same time the frame of 
mind and the reasons which make "men angry, and 
the objects of their anger. It is evident then that 
it will be necessary for the speaker, by his eloquence, 
to put the hearers into the frame of mind of those 
who are inclined to anger, and to show that his 
opponents are responsible for things which rouse 
men to anger and are people of the kind with whom 
men are angry. 

3. And since becoming angry is the opposite of 
becoming mild, and anger of mildness, we naust 
determine the state of mind which makes men mild, 
towards whom they become mild, and the reasons 
which make them so. Let us then define making 
mild as the quieting and appeasing of anger. If 
then men are angry with those who slight them, and 
slight is voluntary, it is evident that they are mild 
towards those who do none of these things, or do 
them involuntarily, or at least appear to be such ; and 
towards those who intended the opposite of what 

185 



ARISTOTLE 

Kal avrol els avrovs tolovtol' ouSei? yap avros 

5 avTov SoK€L oXtycopelv . /cat Tors' ofjuoXoyovac Kal 
fieTafMeXofjievoLs' co? yap exovres Slktjv to AuTret- 
a9aL CTTL Tolg TTCTTOLrjiJidvoLS vavovrai, rrjs opyfjs. 
aiqp.elov Se enrl rijs rcov olKercov KoXdcreoJS' rovs 
[xev yap avriXdyovras Kal dpvovjj,4vovs p,dXXov 
KoAa^o/xev, TTpos 8e tovs 6p,oXoyovvras St/catcos" 
KoXd^€crda(, Travofieda OviMovfxevoL. atrtov S' oTt 
dvaLGXVVTia to rd (f)avepd dpveladat, rj 8' dv- 
aLcrxwrla dXiyoipia Kal Kara<j)p6vr]ai,s' c5v yovv 

6 TToAu Kara(f)povovfM€V, ovk alcr)(vv6p,eda. Kal rots 
raTTewovpiivoLS npos avrovs Kal p,rj dvriXiyovaiv 
^aivovrai yap 6p,oXoyeiv rjrrovs etvat, ol S' rjrrovs 
^OjSowTat, (f)o^oviJ,€vos 8e ouSeis" oAtycupet. OTt 
8e irpos Tovs ra7T€Lvovp,€vovs iraveraL rj dpyx], koX 
ol Kvves SrjXovcriv ov BdKvovres rovs Kadl^ovras. 

7 Kal roLS GTTOvSd^ovaL Trpos rovs aTTovSd^ovras' 
So/cei yap OTTOvhdt^ead ai dXX ov Karacfypovelcrdai. 

8 Kal roLs p.€L^a> KexapLapbdvois . Kal rots Seo/AeVot? 

9 Kal TTapavrovp.ivois' raTreivorepoi, ydp. Kal rois 
jxTj v^pLorals /xrjSe ;)(AeuaCTTars' p.rjh* oXiycopois, t] 
els prfheva rj jxrj els XPV^'^^^^ H'V^ ^^S" rotovrovs 

10 oiot rrep avroi. oXois S' eK rcov evavriu>v Set 
OKOTTelv rd irpavvriKd. Kal ovs 0oj8owTat tj al- 
ax^vovrai' ews ydp dv ovrcos exoicrt-v, ovk 6p- 
yit^ovrai' dSvvarov ydp a/xa ^ojSeta^ai /cat 6p- 



" i^airivjjs 5' 'Odvaija Idov K^vei vXaKd/xupof \ ol fiiv kckX^- 
yovrei iwibpafjiov avrkp '08v<r(Xe{is \ l^ero Kepdocrvvjj (^Odyssey, 
xiv. 29-31). 

* That is, greater than their present disservices. 

186 



RHETORIC, II. in. 4-10 

they have done, and all who behave in the same way 
to themselves, for no one is likely to slight himself. 
And towards those who admit and are sorry for a 
slight ; for finding as it were satisfaction in the pain 
the offenders feel at what they have done, men 
cease to be angry. Evidence of this may be seen in 
the punishment of slaves ; for we punish more 
severely those who contradict us and deny their 
offence, but cease to be angry with those who admit 
that they are justly punished. The reason is that 
to deny what is evident is disrespect, and disrespect 
is slight and contempt ; anyhow, we show no 
respect for those for whom we entertain a profound 
contempt. Men also are mild towards those who 
humble themselves before them and do not contradict 
them, for they seem to recognize that they are 
inferior ; now, those who are inferior are afraid, and 
no one who is afraid slights another. Even the be- 
haviomr of dogs proves that anger ceases towards 
those who humble themselves, for they do not bite 
those who sit down.* And men are mild towards 
those who are serious with them when they are 
serious, for they think they are being treated 
seriously, not with contempt. And towards those 
who have rendered them greater services.* And 
towards those who want something and deprecate 
their anger, for they are humbler. And towards 
those who refrain from insulting, mocking, or slight- 
ing anyone, or any virtuous man, or those who 
resemble themselves. And generally speaking, one 
can determine the reasons that make for mildness 
by their opposites. Thus, men are mild towards 
those whom they fear or respect, as long as they feel 
so towards them, for it is impossible to be afraid and 

187 



ARISTOTLE 

11 yit^eadai. /cat Tot? hC opyrjv rrocijaaacv rj ovk 
6p'yit,ovTaL 7) rjrrov opyit^ovraL' ov yap St' oXiycupiav 
^aivovrai Trpa^ai.' ovSels yap 6pyil,6p.evos oXiyoipeZ' 

1380 b "H H-^^ y^P oXiyoipia aXvirov, rj 8' opyrj }iera XvTrrjs. 

12 /cat ToXg alaxvvofMevois avrovs. 

Kat k)(ovr€£ 8e ivavricos raJ opylt^eadat hrjXov 
OTL TTpdoL etCTtV, otov iv 77at8ta, iv yeXatrt, iv 
ioprfj, iv evr]p.epia, iv KaropOoiaet, iv TrXrjpcoaet., 
oXcos ev aXvTTLa /cat rjSovfj firj v^pcaTLKfj /cat iv 
iXTTiSi eTTtet/cet. eVt KexpoviKores /cat //,?) VTroyvLoi 

13 T-fi opyfj ovres' Trawet yap opyrjv 6 "x^povos. Travec 
8e /cat irepov opyrjv fxet^co rj rrap" aXXov Xrj^delaa 
Tijioypia rrporepov 8to ev ^iXoKpdrrjs, elirovrog 
rivog opyt^ofievov tov Srjfxov " Tt o{)k airoXoyei; " 

ovTTO) ye ^<pi^' aAAa rrore; orav aA- 

Xov tSco Bia^e^Xrjfxevov'" TTpdot, yap yiyvovrai, 
orav elg dXXov rrjv opyrjv avaXajacoaiv , otov avve^rj 
irrl 'Epyog&t'Aou' fjidXXov yap x^XeTraivovres rj 
KaAAta^evet aj)elaav 8ta to KaAAtcr^eVous" rfj 

14 TTporepaia Karayvwvai ddvarov. /cat idv iXecocnv' 
/cat idv fMel^ov KaKov TreTTOvdores (haiv rj ol opyi- 

" They regard the disrespectful treatment as merely a 
temporary lapse. 

" vXripojaLs : lit. " filling up." The reference may be to the 
" fulfilment " of one's desires, or to " repletion " in the 
matter of food (L. and S.), which seems less likely ; " in 
fulness of content " (Jebb). 

" Opponent of Demosthenes, and one of the pro-Mace- 
donian party. Impeached for his share in the disastrous 
" Peace of Philocrates," he went into exile and was con- 
demned to death during his absence. 

'' Rrgophilus failed in an attack on Cotys, king of Thrace, 
while Callisthenes concluded a premature peace with 
Perdiccas, king of Macedonia. 

188 



RHETORIC, II. III. 11-14 

angry at the same time. And against those who 
have acted in anger they either feel no anger or in 
a less degree, for they do not seem to have acted 
from a desire to slight. For no one slights another 
when angry, since slight is free from pain, but anger 
is accompanied by it. And men are not angry with 
those who usually show respect for them." 

It is also evident that those are mild whose con- 
dition is contrary to that which excites anger, as 
when laughing, in sport, at a feast, in prosperity, in 
success, in abundance,^ and, in general, in freedom 
from pain, in pleasure which does not imply insult, 
or in virtuous hope. Further, those whose anger is 
of long standing and not in its full flush, for time 
appeases anger. Again, vengeance previously taken 
upon one person appeases anger against another, 
even though it be greater. Wherefore Philocrates," 
when someone asked him why he did not justify 
himself when the people were angry with him, made 
the judicious reply, " Not yet." " When then ? " 
" When I see someone accused of the same offence " ; 
for men grow mild when they have exhausted their 
anger upon another, as happened in the case of 
Ergophilus.** For although the Athenians were more 
indignant with him than with Callisthenes, they 
acquitted him, because they had condemned Calli- 
crates to death on the previous day. Men also 
grow mild towards those whom they pity * ; and if 
an offender has suffered greater evil than those 

* Another reading is iav eXwai, " if they have convicted 
him." This is adopted by Roemer, who refers to Plato, 
Republic, 558 a, where, in speaking of the freedom allowed 
to all who live under a democracy, it is remarked that, even 
if a man is convicted by a court of justice, he takes no heed 
of the sentence, which is very often not enforced. 

189 



ARISTOTLE 

^6fji.€VOL av eSpacrav (Larrep elX7](f)evai yap otovrai 

15 rifXiopLav. /cat eav a^iKelv o'icovrat avrol /cat 
Si/cato)? TTaax^iv ov yiyverai yap rj opyf] tt/jos" 
TO SiKaLov ov yap en Trapa ro TTpoarJKOv oiovrai 
Traax^iVy rj S opyrj rovro rjv. Sio Set rco Xoyo) 
irpoKoXat^eLV ayavaKrovai yap rjrrov KoXa^ofxevoi 

16 /cat OL SouAot. /cat iav fxrj aladrjaeaOai otcovrat 
OTi St avrovs /cat at-^' cSv enadov rj yap opyrj 
rcbv Kad^ CKacrrov icmv SijXov 8' e/c tou opiafjiov. 
Sto opOais TTeTTOirjTat 

cfiaadai OBvaarja irroXnTopdiov, 

ws ov Terijjicoprjjievos , et jxrj rjcrOero /cat ^^' od 
/cat dt'^' oTou. cScrre ovre rot? aAAot? OCTOt jmt^ 
aiadavovrai opyit,ovTaL, ovt€ rot? redvecxxjiv eVt, 
ois" TTeTTOvOoat re ro e(y)(arov /cat ou/c aAyj^croucriv 
ouS' aladrjCTOfxevois, ov ol 6pyit,6fi€VOL c^tevrai. 
Sto ev TTepl rod "^Kropog 6 Troirjrrj^, Travaai ^ovXo- 
jievos rov ^K-^iXXea rrjs opyrjs redvewros , 

Kaj(f)rjv yap 8rj yalav aeiKi^ei fxeveaivajv. 

17 hijXov ovv on roXs KaraTTpavveiv ^ovXofievois €K 
rovrcov rcbv rorrcov XeKreov, avrovs P'^v Trapa - 

° Therefore, if you think that a man will never learn who 
took vengeance on him, you will be less cruel ; for anger is 
personal, and so Odysseus, because he was angry, inflicted 
a savage punishment, and wished Polyphemus to know it. 

* Odyssey, ix. 504. 

" Or, " as if Odysseus would not have considered himself 
avenged, had P. remained ignorant ..." 

^ Or, "with any who can no longer feel their anger." 
Cope translates : " with all the rest (besides those actually 
within reach) who are out of sight." 

190 



RHETORIC, II. III. 14-17 

who are angry would have inflicted, for they have an 
idea that they have as it were obtained reparation. 
And if they think that they themselves are wrong 
and deserve what they suffer, for anger is not aroused 
against what is just ; they no longer think that they 
are being treated otherwise than they should be, 
which, as we have said, is the essence of anger. 
Wherefore we should inflict a preliminary verbal 
chastisement, for even slaves are less indignant at 
punishment of this kind. And men are milder if 
they think that those punished will never know 
that the punishment comes from them in requital for 
their own wrongs ; for anger has to do with the 
individual, as is clear from our definition.* Wherefore 
it is justly said by the poet : 

Tell him that it is Odysseus, sacker of cities,* 

as if Polyphemus would not have been punished," 
had he remained ignorant who had blinded him and 
for what. So that men are not angry either with 
any others who cannot know who punishes them,** or 
with the dead, since they have paid the last penalty 
and can feel neither pain nor anything else, wliich 
is the aim of those who are angry.* So then, in 
regard to Hector, Homer, when desirous of restrain- 
ing the anger of Achilles against a dead man, well 
says : 

For it is senseless clay that he outrages in his wrath,' 
It is evident, then, that men must have recourse to 
these topics when they desire to appease their 
audience, putting them into the frame of mind 

* To make the offender feel pain as part of the punish- 
ment. 
' Iliad, xxiv. 54. 

191 



ARISTOTLE 

aK€vdt,ovaL roLovrovs, ots S' 6pyit,ovrai, rj (f)o- 
^epovs 7] alaxvvrjs d^lovs rj /ce;;^aptcr/xeVou? -^ 
aKovras rj VTrepaXyovvras rot? 7re7TOir]p.evoig. 

4. TiVas" 8e ^iXovai /cat fXLcrovcTL, /cat 8ta rt, 
TT^v 0tAtW Kat TO (f>LXeLV opLadfievoL Xeycofiev. 

2 earcxi St] to (j>iXeLV to ^ovXecrdai tivl a oteTat 
dyadd, eKeivov eve/ca aAAa /xi^ auTou, /cat ro fcara 

1381aSwa/XtV TTpaKTtKOV €LVaL TOVTCOV . <f)l,XoS S icTTLV 

6 (JjlXcov /cat dvri^iXovixevos. olovrai 8e (fyiXoi 
elvat ol ovrcos e^^iv olo/xevoL rrpos dAAr^Aouj. 

3 TOUTCOV Se v7roK€Lfjb€V(x)v dvdyKT] (f)i,Xov elvai top 
avv7]S6fj,evov roXs dyadols /cat aut'aAyowTa roXs 
XvTrrjpoLS pbTj Sid ri erepov dXXd 8t eKelvov. ytyvo- 
jjiivcov yap a>v ^ovXovrai ;^atpouCTt irdvres, rcov 
ivavTtojv Se AuTTOWTai, coore tt^s ^ovXiqaetos 

4 arjfielov at XvTrai /cat at rjSovaL /cat ot? Stj TawTa 
aya^a /cat /ca/ca, /cat ot Tot? aurot? 0tAot, /cat ot 
Tot? auTOt? ix^poC' ravrd yap tovtols ^ovXeadai 
dvdyKT], cSore a Trep avrco /cat aAAo) ^ovXofxevos, 
rovrcp ^aiverai (j>lXos etvat. 

6 Kat Tou? TreTrotrj/coTa? eu (jyiXovaiv, •^ auTouj 17 
c5v /cr^SovTai- i^ et fxeydXa, rj et TTpodvpbws, rj €t 
ev TOiovTois KatpoLS, /cat auTcop' ev-e/ca* -^ 01)9 ai' 

6 otcovTat ^ovXeaOai iroieiv €v. /cat toj)? tcoi' (f>iX(x}v 
(f)iXov9 /cat <j)iXovvTas ovs avrol ^lXovglv. Kat 

7 Toi)? (f)i,XovfJi€vovs VTTo rwv (jyiXovfJievcjjv avrois. Kat 
Tovs TOLS avroLS i^dpovs Kat pnaovvras ovs avTOC 

" (I>i\f7i' may be translated " to love " or "to like"; <f>i\ia 
by " love," " liking," or " friendship " ; for (piXoi "friend " 
alone is suitable. For the two meanings cp. the use of airner 
in French, and lieben in German. 

192 



RHETORIC, II. III. I7~iv. 7 

required and representing those with whom they are 
angry as either formidable or deserving of respect, 
or as having rendered them great services, or acted 
involuntarily, or as exceedingly grieved at what they 
have done. 

4. Let us now state who are the persons that men 
love " or hate, and why, after we have defined love 
and loving. Let loving, then, be defined as wishing 
for anyone the things which we believe to be good, 
for his sake but not for our own, and procuring them 
for him as far as lies in our power. A friend is one 
who loves and is loved in return, and those who think 
their relationship is of this character consider them- 
selves friends. This being granted, it necessarily 
follows that he is a friend who shares our joy in 
good fortune and our sorrow in affliction, for our own 
sake and not for any other reason. For all men 
rejoice when what they desire comes to pass and 
are pained when the contrary happens, so that pain 
and pleasure are indications of their wish. And 
those are friends who have the same ideas of good 
and bad, and love and hate the same persons, since 
they necessarily wish the same things ; wherefore 
one who wishes for another what he wishes for 
himself seems to be the other's friend. 

We also like those who have done good either to 
us or to those whom we hold dear, if the services 
are important, or are cordially rendered, or under 
certain circumstances, and for our sake only ; and 
all those whom we think desirous of doing us good. 
And those who are friends of our friends and who 
like those whom we like, and those who are liked by 
those who are liked by us ; and those whose enemies 
are ours, those who hate those whom we ourselves 

o 193 



ARISTOTLE 

fjbLaovacv, kol rovs fxicrovfievovs vtto rcov avrots 
fjbLcrovfjievcov Trdai yap rovrots ravra dyada (f)aL- 
verai etvai /cat avrots, axrre ^ovXeadai ra avroZs 

8 dyada, 6 rrep rjv rov (j>iXov. en rovs evTroLrjriKOVS 
els XPIP'^'^^ '^^^ ^^'s" ooirrjpiav ^lo rovs eAeu- 
depiovs Kal rovs dvSpeiovs rtfxcoGi /cat rovs St/catou?. 

9 roLovrovs 8' VTroXaji^dvovai rovs /X17 d^ erepcuv 
t,a)vras' roiovroi 8' ol diro rov epydl,eaOai, /cat 
rovrcov ol dvro yeojpyias /cat rwv dXXcov ol avr- 

10 ovpyol fxaXiara. /cat rovs uw(f)povas, on ovk 

1 1 a8i/cot. /cat rovs aTrpdypbovas 8ta ro avro. /cat 
ols ^ovXopeda (f)iXoi elvai, idv (^aivoivrai ^ov- 
X6p,evof elal 8e roLovroL ol t' aya^oi /car aperrjv 
/cat ot eu8o/ct/xoi 7) ev aTracrtv •^ ei' rot? ^eXricrrois 
T] iv rots davp,al^op,€VOLS vcf)^ avrwv ^ iv rots dav- 

12 pi,dt,ovatv avTovs. ert rovs r}8et? cryp'Siayayeti/ /cat 
avvhtrjpepevaaf rotovrot 8' ot evKoXot /cat ju.7^ 
eAey/CTt/cot roiv dp,apravop.evcx)v /cat /xi^ <j}tX6vetKoi 
fjtrjSe SvaepiSes' rravres yap ot rotovrot ptaxrjrtKot, 
at 8e /Jtaxdp-evot rdvavria <f>atvovraA, ^ovXeadat. 



" Aristotle's opinion of husbandry, in which tillat^e and 
planting, keeping of bees, fish, and fowl were included, was 
not nearly so favourable as that of Xenophon in his 
Oeconomicus. In two lists of the elements of a State given 
in the Politics, it comes first at the head of the lower 
occupations. In its favour it is said that it forms the best 
material of a rural democracy, furnishes good sailors, a 
healthy body of men, not money-grabbers like merchants 
and tradesmen, and does not make men unfit to bear arms. 
On the other hand, it claims so much of a man's time that 

194 



RHETORIC, II. IV. 7-12 

hate, and those who are hated by those who are 
hated by us ; for all such persons have the same idea 
as ourselves of what is good, so that they wish what 
is good for us, which, as we said, is the characteristic 
of a friend. P'urther, we like those who are ready 
to help others in the naatter of money or personal 
safety ; wherefore men honour those who are liberal 
and courageous and just. And such we consider 
those who do not live upon others ; the sort of men 
who live by their exertions, and among them 
agriculturists, and, beyond all others, those who 
work with their own hands.** And the self-controlled, 
because they are not likely to commit injustice ; 
and those who are not busybodies, for the same 
reason. And those with whom we wish to be 
friends, if they also seem to wish it ; such are those 
who excel in virtue and enjoy a good reputation, 
either generally, or amongst the best, or amongst 
those who are admired by us or by whom we are 
admired.^ Further, those who are agreeable to 
live or spend the time with ; such are those who 
are good-tempered and not given to carping at our 
errors, neither quarrelsome nor contentious, for all 
such persons are pugnacious, and the wishes of 
the pugnacious appear to be opposed to ours. 

he is unable to devote proper attention to political duties, 
and should be excluded from holding office. He further 
says that husbandmen, if possible, should be slaves (neither 
of the same race nor hot-tempered, for they will work better 
and are less likely to revolt) ; or, as the next best alternative, 
barbarians or serfs. The favourable view taken by Aristotle 
here and in the Of.conomics (probably not his) does not 
agree with that put forward in the Politics. 

* Spengel reads i) iv oh 6av/j.d.^ov<np avroL and brackets [^ 
(V Tois Oav/jLai'ou^voii v(f>' avTiov]. Hwaaiv, ^eKTLcjTOLS, and ols 
will then all be neuter. 



ARISTOTLE 

13 Kat ol e77tSe^iot /cat rcoOdaai^ Kal VTro/juelvai,' 
em ravro yap ap,(j)6repoL aTrevSovai rep TrXrjaLov, 
hvvdjxevoi re aKcxJTrreadai, Kol e/x/xeAoi? (tkcott- 

14 rovres- Kal rovg inaLvovvrag ra vndpxovTa dyadd, 
Kat rovrojv /xaAtcrra a (f)0^ovvTaL p,'q vndpxetv 

15 avrols- /cat rovg Kadapiovs Tvepl oijjiv, Trepl dp^ir- 

16 €x6vr]v, vepl oXov rov ^iov. /cat rovg p,rj oveiSc- 
1381 b ard? /xT^re rcbv dpLaprr^pbdroiv ixrjTe tcov evepye- 

17 rrfp^aroiv' a/x^ore/jot yap eXeyKriKoi. /cat rovs firj 
fivrjCTLKaKOvg, jJirjSe <j)vXaKrLKOVs ra)V iyKXruxdrayv, 
dXX evKaraXXdKTovs' o'lovs ydp dv inroXapi^dvojaLV 
elvai TTpos Tovs dXXovs, /cat Trpos avrovs oiovrac. 

18 Kal Tovs P'T] KaKoXoyovg /xi^Se etSoras" p^iqre rd 
TOW ttXtjulov /ca/ca fiT^re rd avrcjv, dXXd rdyaOd' 

19 d ydp dyadd? rovro Spa. Kal tovs fJ-r) dvTiTeivov- 
ras roXs opyL^ofxevois rj aTTOvSd^ovaiv pia-)(rjTiKol 
ydp ol TOLOVTOL. Kal TOVS TTpos avTovs aTTovhaiws 
TTCOS exovTas, otov davp,d/^ovTas avrovs Kal arrov- 

20 haiovs VTToXapL^avovras Kat x^^povras avroZs, Kat 
ravra jLtaAtora Trenovdoras Trepl d p,dXiara ^ov- 
Xovrai avrol rj 9avfxdt,€adaL -^ crTrouSatot SokcIv 

21 etvat t) rjScXs. /cat rovs ofMOLovs /cat rawra cttl- 
rrjSevovras , edv p,y] TrapevoxXcoai, /xrjS ciTrd ravrou 
f) 6 ^ios' yiyverai ydp ovrco rd 

K€pap,€VS K€pap.€L. 

22 Kal rovs rdjv avr<x>v eTndvp.ovvr as, cLv ivSex^rai 
o'/xa p^erex^iv avrovs ' et 8e /X7y, ravro Kal ovroi 

^ Spengt'l reads r(j3 waicrai Kai t<^ virofie'ivai (from A*'), 
lioemer (Ithein. Mus. xxxix. p. 504) supports this, on the 
ground that rwdd^fiv implies gross abuse, and would hardly 
be spoken of as e/jLfieXQs (TKibtrrfiv. 

196 



RHETORIC, II. IV. 13-22 

And those are liked who are clever at making or 
taking a joke, for each has the same end in view as 
his neighbour, being able to take a joke and return 
it in good taste. And those who praise our good 
qualities, especially those which we ourselves are 
afraid we do not possess ; those who are neat in 
their personal appearance and dress, and clean-living ; 
those who do not make our errors or the benefits 
they have conferred a matter of reproach, for both 
these are inclined to be censorious ; those who bear 
no malice and do not cherish the memory of their 
wrongs, but are easily appeased ; for we think that 
they will be to ourselves such as we suppose them 
to be to others ; and those who are neither given 
to slander, or eager to know the faults of their neigh- 
bours nor our own, but only the good qualities ; for 
this is the way in which the good man acts. And 
those who do not oppose us when we are angry or 
occupied, for such persons are pugnacious ; and 
those who show any good feeling towards us ; for 
instance, if they admire us, think us good men, and 
take pleasure in our company, especially those who 
are so disposed towards us in regard to things for 
which we particularly desire to be either admired or 
to be thought worthy or agreeable. And we like 
those who resemble us and have the same tastes, 
provided their interests do not clash with ours and 
that they do not gain their living in the same way ; 
for then it becomes a case of 

Potter [being jealous] of potter." 

And those who desire the same things, provided it is 
possible for us to share them ; otherwise the same 

" Two of a trade never agree (Hesiod, Works and Days, 25). 

197 



ARISTOTLE 

23 cru/xj8atVet. Kol rrpog ovs ovrcos e^ovaLV <ji)are yt,rj 
aiaxweaOai to. TTpos So^av, /u-t) Kara^povovvr^g. 

24 Kttt irpos ovs alaxvpovrai ra npos dX-njOeLav. /cat 
TTpog ovs </>tAort/xowrai, t] v(f)* aJv ^rjXovaOai, ^ov- 
Xovrai Kal [j,rj (ffOoveXadat, rovrovg. rj ^lXovolv •^ 

25 ^ovXovrai ^iXoi elvai. kol ols av rdyada avfi- 
TTpdrrcocTLV, idv p,r) pbeXXrj avrols eaeadat /xet^co 

26 /ca/ca. /cat rols 6[xoioig /cat rovs dirovras /cat rovs 
rrapovrag ^tAoucrtv Sto /cat rovs irepX rovs redveoj- 
ras roLOVTovs Trdvres (juXovaiv. 

Kat oXojs Tovs a(f)6Spa ^iXo^iXovs Kal firj 
iyKaraXeiiTOvras' fidXiara yap ^iXovai tcov dyadwv 

27 rovs ^iXelv dyadovs. /cat rovs p^rj rrXarropbevovs 
TTpos avrovs' rotovroi Be /cat ol rd cjjavXa rd 
iavrcov Xeyovrcs. eip'qr at ydp on rrpos rovs 
(fiiXovs rd TTpos So^av ovk alaxvv6p,eda' el ovv 6 
alaxwoi^ievos p^rj <f)tXel, 6 p,r] alaxwop^evos (j>iXovvrt. 
eoLKev. Kal rovs p^r] ^o^epovs , /cat ovs dappovp,ev' 

28 ovSels ydp ov (f)o^eLraL (f)LXeL. e'lSr] 8e ^lAtaj 
iraipeia olKet,6rr)s avyy eveia Kal oaa roiavra. 

29 TTOtT^Tt/ca 8e (fyiXias x^P^^> '^'^^ '^^ H-V SerjOevros 
TTOLTJaaL, Kal ro TTotrjaavra pL-rj SrjXcocraf avrov 

„ ydp ovrcos eveKa (jyaiverai Kal ov 8ta tl erepov. 
1382a nept 8' exOpas Kal rod puLoelv <j>avep6v (hs €K 
rdJv evavrioiv 8et OecopeXv. TTOcrjriKd 8' exdpcis 
31 opyi^, eTTrfpeaa/xos, Sia^oX'^. opyrj p,ev ovv iarlv 



" Those with whom we are ambitious of entering into 
competition " in the race for distinction " (Cope). There is 
no unfriendHness, whereas envy produces it. 

* A parenthetical remark. Aristotle explains that he is 
not thinking of merely conventional faults ; if, then, one 
who is ashamed of these is no friend, then one who is not . . . 

198 



RHETORIC, II. IV. 23-31 

thing would happen again. And those with whom 
we are on such terms that we do not blush before 
them for faults merely condemned by public opinion, 
provided that this is not due to contempt ; and 
those before whom we do blush for faults that are 
really bad. And those whose rivals we are,** or by 
whom we wish to be emulated, but not envied, — these 
we either like or wish to be friends with them. And 
those whom we are ready to assist in obtaining what 
is good, provided greater evil does not result for 
ourselves. And those who show equal fondness for 
friends, whether absent or present ; wherefore all 
men like those who show such feeling for the dead. 

In a word, men like those who are strongly attached 
to their friends and do not leave them in the lurch ; 
for among good men they chiefly like those who are 
good friends. And those who do not dissemble with 
them ; such are those who do not fear to mention 
even their faults. (For, as we have said, before friends 
we do not blush for faults merely condemned by public 
opinion ; if then he who blushes for such faults is 
not a friend, he who does not is likely to be one).** 
And men like those who are not formidable, and in 
whom they have confidence ; for no one likes one 
whom he fears. Companionship, intimacy, kinship,, 
and similar relations are species ~bf friendship. 
Things that create friendship are doing a favour, 
and doing it unasked, and not making it public after 
doing it ; for then it seems to have been rendered for 
the sake of the friend, and not for any other reason. 

As for enmity and hatred, it is evident that they 
must be examined in the light of their contraries. 
The causes which produce enmity are anger, spite- 
fulness, slander. Anger arises from acts committed 

199 



ARISTOTLE 

e/c rcov rrpos iavrov, e^dpa 8e /cat dvev rcov irpog 
eavrov eav yap VTroXafji^dvcop^ev elvai roiovhe, p.L- 
aovfMev. /cat rj piev opyrj del Trept to. Kad^ e/cacrra, 
oiov KaAAta t] HcvKparei, to 8e puaos /cat Trpos 
ra yevT]' rov yap KXeirrrjv /xtcret /cat toj' avKocfidvrrjv 
arras, /cat to /xep" larov )(p6va), to S dviarov. 
/cat TO /xet" XvTrrjs e<j)eais, ro 8e KaKov' a'ladeaOai 
yap ^ovXeraL 6 opyil,6pbevos, ro) 8' ovBev Sta^e'/aet. 
eCTTt Se TO. pi€v XvTTTjpd aladrjrd Trdvra, rd Se 
pbaXiara /caKo. rJKLGra aladrjrd, aSi/cta /cat d- 
(f)poavvrj- ovhev yap XvTrel rj Trapovaia rrjs Ka/cia?. 
/cat TO /xei^ /xeTO. XvTrrjg, to S' ou /xeTCt XvTrrjs' 6 piev 
yap opyil^opLevog XvTreLraL, 6 8e pLiacov ov. /cat 
o /iev TToAAoiv av yevopuevojv eXerjaetev , 6 8' ou8eros"* 
o /xev yap avrnradeLv ^ovXerai w opyl^erai, 6 
32 8e i^irj etvat. (j)avep6v ovv Ik rovrcov otl ivSex^raL 
€)(dpov'5 /cat cf)tXovg /cat dvras dTToSeiKvvvai /cat 
p,rj ovrag iroLeZv /cat (f)daKovras SiaXvcLv, /cat 8t' 
opyrjv rj 8t e)(dpav dpL<jiLa^rjrovvras e</>' oiroTcp 
dv TTpoaiprjrai rt? ayetv. Trota 8e <j)o^ovvrai /cat 
TtVa? /cat TTcDs" exovres, c58' ear at (jiavepov. 

5. 'EoT-co 8?) (f)6^og XvTrrj rig ^ rapa^rj e/c 
(jiouraaias pbeXXovros /ca/coy <f)daprLKOv rj Xvrrrjpov' 
ov yap rravra ra /ca/ca (f)o^ovvrat,, olov et earai 
dhiKos rj ^paSvs, dXX oaa XvTrag pt,€ydXas rj 
<f)6opdg Svvarai, /cat ravr idv pi.rj rroppa) aXXd 
avveyyvs (j)aivrjr ai coare pLeXXeiv. rd ydp iroppa) 
a(f)6Spa ov (fio^ovuraf 'iaaat ydp Travreg on diro- 

" He wishes to see and know tlie result of the measures 
taken against those with whom he is angry. Or, it may 
mean that he wishes the object of his anger to feel his wrath, 
and to know l)y whom, and for what, he is punished. 

200 



RHETORIC, II. IV. 31— V. 1 

against us, enmity even from those that are not ; for 
if we imagine a man to be of such and such a char- 
acter, we hate him. Anger has always an individual 
as its object, for instance Callias or Socrates, whereas 
hatred applies to classes ; for instance, every one 
hates a thief or informer. Anger is curable by time, 
hatred not ; the aim of anger is pain, of hatred evil ; 
for the angry man wishes to see what happens ; " 
to one who hates it does not matter. Now, the 
things which cause pain are all perceptible, while 
things which are especially bad, such as injustice or 
folly, are least perceptible ; for the presence of vice 
causes no pain. Anger is accompanied by pain, but 
hatred not ; for he who is angry suffers pain, but he 
who hates does not. One who is angry might feel 
compassion in many cases, but one who hates, never ; 
for the former wishes that the object of his anger 
should suffer in his turn, the latter, that he should 
perish. It is evident, then, from what we have just 
said, that it is possible to prove that men are enemies 
or friends, or to make them such if they are not ; to 
refute those who pretend that they are, and when they 
oppose us through anger or enmity, to bring them 
over to whichever side may be preferred. The things 
and persons that men fear and in what frame of mind, 
will be evident from the following considerations. 

5. Let fear be defined as a painful or troubled 
feeling caused by the impression of an imminent 
evil that causes destruction or pain ; for men do not 
fear all evils, for instance, becoming unjust or slow- 
witted, but only such as involve great pain or de- 
struction, and only if they appear to be not far off 
but near at hand and threatening, for men do not 
fear things that are very remote ; all know that they 

201 



ARISTOTLE 

davovvrai, aAA' ort ovk iyyvs, ovSev (f>povTLt,ovai,v . 

2 ei Srj 6 <j)6^os rovT* eariv, avayKrj ra roiavra 
(po^epa etvai oaa ^aiverai Swa/xtv e'xetv [MeydXi^v 
rod (fyOelpeiv t] ^XaTrreLV ^ActjSas" els Xv-n-qv fieydX-qv 
avvreivovaas. Sto /cat rd arjixeta rojv roiovroiv 
^o^epa- iyyvs yap (^aiverai ro (f)o^ep6v' tovto 

3 yap eari KivSvvog, (f)0^€pov TrXriataaixos . rocavra 8e 
^X^P^ '^^ '^^^ opyr) hvvap,iv(x)v noLeiv Tf 8i]Xov 
yap OT(, ^ovXovraL, ware iyyvs elai rod ttolscv. 

i /cat aSt/cta Swa/xtv e^ovaa' raJ TTpoaipeladai yap 

5 o aSt/cos" aSi/cos". /cat dperrj vPpil,ofjbev7] BvvafjiLV 
us2h exovaa- SrjXov yap on, Trpoo^LpetraL pt,ev, orav 

6 v^pi^rjrai, aet, Swarat 8e vvv. /cat (f>6Pos rcbv 
Suva/xevojt' Tt TTOLTJaai' iv TrapacrKevfj yap dvdyKrj 

7 eti^at /cat tw rotovrov. eTret 8' ot TroAAot x.'^ipovs 
/cat yjrrovs rov /cep8atVetv /cat SetAot ef rots' 

/Clv8wOtS", (f)0^€p6v CO? 6771 TO TToAu TO CTt' ttAAo) 

auTov etvat, ware ol avvethores TreiroirjKori, ri 

8 Seivov (jio^epol rj KarenreZv rj eyKaraXiireZv . /cat 
ot SvvdfxevoL d8t/cetv Tot? SvvafievoLS aSi/cetCT^af 
COS" yap eTTt to ttoAu dSiKovaiv ol dvOpwrroi, orav 
Svvwvrai. /cat ot rj8i,K7]p,evoL t) vofMi^ovres dSt/cei- 
aOai' del yap nqpovai Kaipov. /cat ot rjBiK'qKores, eav 
Swa/Ltti' exwai, (^o^epoi, SeStore? ro avrnradelv. 

9 VTTeKeiro yap ro roLovro (^o^epov. Kal ol rwv 
avrwv dvraywvtarai, oaa pbrj ivSex^rau a/xa 
VTrdpx^tv dp,^olv del yap TToXefiovac rrpos rovs 

" By the definitions of anger and hatred. 
* And therefore, having the inclination to be unjust, if he 
has the power, he will be so. 

W2 



RHETORIC, II. V. 1-9 

have to die, but as death is not near at hand, they 
are indifferent. If then this is fear, all things must 
be fearful that appear to have great power of de- 
stroying or inflicting injuries that tend to produce 
great pain. That is why even the signs of such 
misfortunes are fearful, for the fearful thing itself 
appears to be near at hand, and danger is the 
approach of anything fearful. Such signs are the 
enmity and anger of those able to injure us in any 
way ; for it is evident that they have the wish," so 
that they are not far from doing so. And injustice 
possessed of power is fearful, for the unjust man is 
unjust through deliberate inclination.^ And out- 
raged virtue when it has power, for it is evident 
that it always desires satisfaction, whenever it is 
outraged, and now it has the power. And fear felt by 
those able to injure us in any way, for such as these 
also must be ready to act. And since most men are 
rather bad than good and the slaves of gain and 
cowardly in time of danger, being at the mercy of 
another is generally fearful, so that one who has 
committed a crime has reason to fear his accomplices 
as likely to denounce or leave him in the lurch. 
And those who are able to ill-treat others are to be 
feared by those who can be so treated ; for as a 
rule men do wrong whenever they can. Those who 
have been, or think they are being, wronged, are also 
to be feared, for they are ever on the look out for 
an opportunity. And those who have committed 
some wTong, when they have the power, since they 
are afraid of retaliation, which was assumed to be 
something to be feared. And those who are our 
rivals for the same things, whenever it is impossible 
to share them, for men are always contending with 

203 



ARISTOTLE 

10 roLovrovs. kol ol rots Kpeirroaiv avrcbv <j)o^epoi' 
fMaXXov yap ixv SvvaivTo ^XaTrreiv avrovs, el /cat 
Tovs Kpeirrovs. /cat ovs ^o^ovvrai ol Kpeirrovs 

[I avTwv, Ota ravro. /cat ol rovs Kpelrrovg avrcbv 
avrjp7]Kores. /cat ol rots TJrroaiv avrcbv CTTt- 
rideixevof rj yap rjSr] (f)o^epOL rj av^rjdevres. 

Kat rcbv r^hiKiqixevciiv /cat e^dpcbv rj dvri,7T(xXcov 
ovx oL o^vdvfioL /cat TrapprjcnaariKol, aAA' ol Trpaoi 
/cat ctpcoves Kai Travovpyor dSrjXoi yap el eyyvs, 

12 cocTT ovSeTTore cf)avepoi on TTOppco. rravra he ra 
(popepa <f)o^€pcbrepa, oaa, av ajxdprcocnv, eiravop- 
OcLaaadai firj evhe^erai, aAA' rj oXcos dSvvara, rj 
jxr] ecf)' iavroZs aAA' errl roZs ivavrlots. /cat ciSv 
poTjoeLaL jjbrj eiaiv rj /jlttj paotat. cos o aTTAcog 
enrelv, (j)0^epd iariv oaa icf)* erepcov ytyvofxeva rj 
jxeXXovra eXeeivd eariv. rd p,ev ovv (f)0^epd, /cat 
a (j>o^ovvrac, u^eSov cLs elrreZv rd jieyiara raur' 
eariv cos Se SiaKeLfjievoL avrol cfto^ovvrat, vvv 
Xeycop,ev . 

13 Et S-q eariv 6 <^6^os fxerd rrpoahoKtas rov 
ireiaeadai ri cjiQapriKov irdOos, cf)avep6v ore ovSels 
<j)0^eiraL rcbv olojievcov jirjhev dv TraOelv, ovSe 
ravra a [x-rj o'lovrai Tradetv, ovSe rovrovs v<f> cLv 
jirj o'iovrai, ovhe rore ore firj otovr ai. avayKrj 



" Or simply, " near ... far from us." 
204 



RHETORIC, 11. V. 10-13 

such persons. And those who are feared by those 
who are stronger than we are, for they would be 
better able to injure us, if they could injure those 
stronger than ourselves ; and those whom those who 
are stronger than ourselves are afraid of, for the 
same reason. And those who have overthrown those 
who are stronger than us and those who attack those 
who are weaker, for they are either already to be 
feared, or will be, when they have grown stronger. 

And among those whom we have wronged, or are 
our enemies or rivals, we should fear not the hot- 
tempered or outspoken, but those who are mild, 
dissemblers, and thorough rascals ; for it is uncertain 
whether they are on the point of acting, so that one 
never knows whether they are far from it.** All 
things that are to be feared are more so when, after 
an error has once been committed, it is inipossible 
to repair it, either because it is absolutely impossible, 
or no longer in our power, but in that of our op- 
ponents ; also when there is no possibility of help or 
it is not easy to obtain. In a word, all things are to be 
feared which, when they happen, or are on the point 
of happening, to others, excite compassion. These 
are, so to say, nearly all the most imporTant things 
which are to be feared and which men fear. Let us 
now state the frame of mind which Teads men to fear. 

If then fear is accompanied by the expectation 
that we are going to suffer some fatal misfortune, it 
is evident that none of those who think that they 
will suffer nothing at all is afraid either of those 
things which he does not think will happen to him, 
or of those from whom he does not expect them, or 
at a time when he does not think them likely to 
happen. It therefore needs be that those who think 

205 



ARISTOTLE 

roivvv ^o^eladai rovs olo[j,€vovg tl Tradelv av, /cat 

14 Tovs VTTo rovrojv Kal ravra /cat rore. ovk ocovrat 

1388 a ov /)«i\ V »> > / /\ » 

0€ TTaveiv av ovre oi ev evrv)(Lais {JbeyaAais ovres 
Kal SoKovvTcs, 816 v^pcaral Kal oXiycopoi Kal 
dpacrelg [iroiei 8e roiovrovs ttXovtos l(y)(vs ttoXv- 
(j>iXla SvvafiLs), ovre ol tJStj TreTTOvdevai Trdvra 
vojxil,ovres ra heiva Kal aTrei/jvyfjuevoi -npos to 
fieXAov, ojCTTep ol a7TorvixTTavi,t,6p,evoi -r^hrj' aXXa 
Set Ttt'a eXiriha VTrelvai acjorripias , Trepl ov ayo)- 
VLCoaiv. arip,elov he- 6 yap (f)6Pos ^ovXcvtlkovs 
TTOtet, /catTot ouSeis" ^ovXeverai irepi rcov dv- 

15 eXTTLaTwv. ware Set roiovrovs 7TapaaKevdl,eiv , orav 
27 ^eXnov ro (jio^elaOai avrovs, on roiovrot elaiv 
oioL Tradelv Kal yap ctAAot fxei^ovs erraOov Kal 
rovs ofiOLOVs heiKvvpai 7Tdcr)(ovras t] ireTTOvdoras , 
Kac VTTO TOLovrcDV v(f) Sv OVK wovTO, Kal ravra 
/cat rore ore ovk a>ovro. 

16 'ETrei Se Trept <f)6^ov <j)avep6v ri eari, Kal rayv 
(jyo^epuiv, /cat cu? e/caoTot exovreg SeStaat, (f)avep6v 
€/c rovrcov Kal ro dappelv ri ean, Kal rrepl rrola 
OappaXeoi Kal ttcos Sia/cei/xei^ot OappaXeoL elaiv 
ro re yap dapaos evavriov rco ^o^cx) Kal ro dap- 
paXeov rw (j)o^epix)' ware jxerd (ftavraaias rj eXnls 
rcbv aoyrrjpioyv a>? eyyvg ovrcDV, row Se <f>o^ep6jv 

17 rj fiT) ovroiv -q TToppo) ovrcov. earn Se OappaXea 

206 



RHETORIC, II. V. 13-17 

they are likely to suffer anything should be afraid, 
either of the persons at whose hands they expect it, 
or of certain things, and at certain times. Those 
who either are, or seem to be, highly prosperous do 
not think they are likely to suffer anything ; where- 
fore they are insolent, contemptuous, and rash, and 
what makes them such is wealth, strength, a number 
of friends, power. It is the same with those who 
think that they have already suffered all possible ills 
and are coldly indifferent to the future, like those 
who are being beaten to death ; for it is a necessary 
incentive to fear that there should remain some hope 
of being saved from the cause of their distress. A 
sign of this is that fear makes men deliberate, 
whereas no one deliberates about things that are 
hopeless. So that whenever it is preferable that the 
audience should feel afraid, it is necessary to make 
them think they are likely to suffer, by reminding 
them that others greater than they have suffered, 
and showing that their equals are suffering or have 
suffered, and that at the hands of those from whom 
they did not expect it, in such a manner and at 
times when they did not think it likely. 

Now, since we have made clear what fear and 
fearful things are, and the frame of mind in each 
case which makes men fear, one can see from this 
what confidence is, what are the things that give it, 
and the frame of mind of those who possess it ; for 
confidence is the contrary of fear and that which 
gives confidence of that which causes fear, so that 
the hope of what is salutary is accompanied by an 
impression that it is quite near at hand, while the 
things to be feared are either non-existent or far off. 
Confidence is inspired by the remoteness of fearful 

207 



ARISTOTLE 

ra re Beiva iroppoj ovra /cat ra dappaXea iyyvs. 
/cat €TTavopda)aets eav dxn /cat ^orjdeiai, rj ttoXXoI 
Tj jLteyaAat 7) a/x^co, /cat /XT^re rjhiK-qfJievoi pb-qre 
rjSiKTjKores chaw, avrayajviarai re r^ fj,r) (Law 
oXoJs, 7] jJirj exioai SvvapbLV, rj Svvajjiiv exovres (Lai 
<f)tXoi i} TTerroLrjKores €V t] Treirovdore's . rj iav 
TrXeiovs (Law oils ravra avpLcfiepei, t] KpetrrovSy t] 

18 dfiffico. avTol 8e ovrcos exovres dappaXeoi elaw, 
iav TToXXa KarcopdcoKevat o'lcovrai /cat p.rj Trerrov- 
devai, T^ iav TroAAa/cts" iXrjXvdores els ra Sewa 
/cat hiaiTe^evyores (Law St;)^^!)? yap dTradeis 
ytyvovrai ol dvOpcoTTOi, 'q rco pur] TreTreipdadaL r) 
T(p ^orjdeias ^X^^^> <^cr7re|0 iv rols Kara QdXarrav 
KwhvvoLS ol re aTreipoL p^et/xtui/o? dappovai ra /xeA- 
Aoi^ra /cat ol ^orjdelas exovres Sta rrjv ipbTretplav . 

19 /cat orav rots o/xotot? '§ p,rj (fyo^epov, pu-qSe rots 
7]rroat /cat cbv Kpetrrovs otovr at elvaf olovr at he, 
(Lv KeKparrjKaatv 7) avrcjv rj ra>v Kpetrrovcov 17 

20 r(x)v opiot(x)v. /cat eav vrrapx^tv avrots otcovrat 
TrXetoi /cat /xet^co, ols vnepexovres <^o^epot eiatv 

\Zii b ravra 8' iarl rrXijOos XPVH'^'''^^ '^'^^ taxvs acoptdrcuv 
/cat (f)tX(x)v /cat x^p(^S /cat rdjv irpos rroXeptov napa- 
aKevojv, -q iraawv -^ rcov pteylarcov. /cat idv ptri 
rjhiKrjKores (Law -^ pt-qSeva r) ptrj ttoXXovs t) ptr) 

21 roiovrovs rrept cov (f)o^ovvrat. /cat oAo;? dv rd 
TTpos deovs avrots KaXdJs ^XTI> '^^ "^^ aAAa /cat rd 
(XTTo arjptetojv /cat Aoyto^v dappaXeov ydp rj opyrj, 
rd 8e jiTj dhtKeZv dXX dhtKetadat opyrjs rrotrjriKov , 

<• ra (T03T7)pia or some other word instead of rd OappaXia 
would be expected, to avoid tlie tautology. The fact of 
remoteness inspires confidence, because we do not expect 
fearful things to happen ; while salutary things inspire it if 
near at hand, because we expect them to happen. 

208 



RHETORIC, II. V. 17-21 

things, or by the nearness of things that justify it." 
If remedies are possible, if there are means of help, 
either great or numerous, or both ; if we have neither 
committed nor suffered wrong ; if we have no rivals 
at all, or only such as are powerless, or, if they have 
power, are our friends, or have either done us good 
or have received it from us ; if those whose interests 
are the same as ours are more numerous, or stronger, 
or both. We feel confidence in the following states 
of mind : if we believe that we have often succeeded 
and have not suffered, or if we have often been in 
danger and escaped it ; for men are unaffected by 
fear in two ways, either because they have never 
been tested or have means of help ; thus, in dangers 
at sea, those who have never experienced a storm 
and those who have means of help as the result of 
experience have confidence as to the future. We are 
also reassured, when a thing does not inspire fear 
in our equals, our inferiors, or those to whom we 
think ourselves superior ; and we think ourselves 
superior to those whom we have conquered, either 
themselves or their superiors or equals. And if we 
think we possess more or more considerable advan- 
tages, such as make their possessors formidable ; such 
are abundance of money, strength of body, friends, 
territory, military equipments, either all or the most 
important. And if we have never done wrong to 
anyone, or only to a few, or not to such as are to be 
feared ; and, generally, if it is well with us in regard 
to the gods, especially as to intimations from signs 
and oracles, and everything else of the kind ; for 
anger inspires confidence, and it is the wrong that we 
suffer and not that which we inflict upon others that 

p 209 



ARISTOTLE 

TO 8e Oelov VTToXajx^dverai ^orjOeXv rot? dhiKov- 
22 jxevoLs. Kal orav imx^Lpovvres rj fir^bev av Tradetv 
/XT^Se TTeiaeadat rj Karopdioaeiv o'icovTai. Kal irepl 
fj,ev rwv (f)o^€pcov Kal OappaXecov e'lpr^TaL. 

6. TloXa S alaxvvovrat Kal dvaia-)(vvTOvaLv , Kal 
irpos rivas Kal tto)? exovres, Ik rcxivhe hrjXov. 

2 karoi Srj alax^vq Xvtttj tls r) rapax^) irepl rd els 
aSo^Lav (f)aiv6p,eva (f)€p€Lv rcov KaKcov, -^ Trapovrcov 
7] yeyovorcDv rj jxeXXovrcDV, r^ 8' dvaLcrxvvria oAi- 

3 ycopia TLS Kal aTrdOeta Trepl rd avrd ravra. el 
S-q iariv alaxvvr] rj opiadelaa, dvdyKrj alaxvvecrdai 
em TOLS TOLOvrois rd>v /ca/ccov oaa alaxpd So/cet 
ett'at r] avTcp rj (Lv ^povrit^er roiavra 8' earlv 
oaa ttTTo KaKtas epya eoTLv, olov rd aTTo^aXeiv 
aoTTLoa ■^ f^vyelv dird heiXias ydp. koI to dvro- 

4 aTeprjaaL TTapaKaradrjKrjV drr' dStKias ydp. Kal to 
avyyeveadai of? ov 8et rj ottov ov 8et r) otc firj 

5 Set" an a/coAaotas" ydp. Kal ro Kephaiveiv aTTo 
jxiKpcov rj arr alaxpd)v rj o-tt' dhvvdTOiv , olov Trevrj- 
TOiv rj TedvewTcov oOev Kal rj rrapoLjiia, to kov 
arro veKpov ^epeiv drrd alaxpoKepheias ydp Kal 

6 aveXevOepias. Kal to /xt) ^orjdelv Swdfievov els 
XprjjJ'.aTa, rj rjTTOv ^orjOeTv. Kal to ^orjdeZadat 

7 Trapa tcov ■^ttov evrropcov. Kal Savei^eaOai 6t€ 
ooget avreiv, Kal aiTelv ot€ aTratTeXv, Kal drTaLTclv 
ore airetv, Kal irraivelv Iva ho^rj alreiv, Kal ro 



" It is assumed that the gods will be on our side if we have 
suifered wrong ; suffering wrong rouses anger and at the same 
time inspires confidence, if our relations with the gods are 
such that we feel we can rely upon them for assistance. 
210 



RHETORIC, II. V. 21— VI. 7 

causes anger, and the gods are supposed to assist 
those who are wronged.'* Lastly, we feel confidence 
when, at the beginning of any undertaking, we do 
not expect disaster either in the present or future, 
or hope for success. Such are the things that inspire 
fear or confidence. 

6. What are the things of which men are ashamed 
or the contrary, and before whom, and in what frame 
of mind, will be clear from the following considera- 
tions. Let shame then be defined as a kind of pain 
or uneasiness in respect of misdeeds, past, present, 
or future, which seem to tend to bring dishonour ; 
and shamelessness as contempt and indifference in 
regard to these same things. If this definition of 
shame is correct, it follows that we are ashamed of 
all such misdeeds as seem to be disgraceful, either 
for ourselves or for those whom we care for. Such 
are all those that are due to vice, such as throwing 
away one's shield or taking to flight, for this is due 
to cowardice ; or withholding a deposit, for this is 
due to injustice. And illicit relations with any per- 
sons, at forbidden places or times, for this is due to 
licentiousness. And making profit out of what is 
petty or disgraceful, or out of the weak, such as the 
indigent or dead ; whence the proverb, " to rob even 
a corpse," for this is due to base love of gain and 
stinginess. And to refuse assistance in money 
matters when we are able to render it, or to give 
less than we can ; to accept assistance from those 
less able to afford it than ourselves ; to borrow when 
anyone seems likely to ask for a loan, to ask for a 
loan from one who wants his money back, and asking 
for repayment from one who wants to borrow ; to 
praise in order to seem to be asking for a loan, and 

211 



ARISTOTLE 

aTTorervxrjKOTa fit^Sev rJTTov Trdvra yap dveXev- 

8 depias ravra arj/jiela. to 8' iTraivelv irapovras, 
/cat TO rayadd puev VTrepeTTaivelv rd 8e (f)avXa 
avvaAeKpeiv, /cat to VTrepaXyeiv dXyovvTi irapovTa, 
/cat raAAa TravTa oaa TotavTa' /coAa/cetas' yap 
arjjxeia. 

9 Kat TO p.rj VTTOfieveiv ttovovs ovs ol Trpea^vTepoi 
1384 a y^ ol Tpv(j)(jL)VTes ^ OL iv e^ovoia fjbdXXov ovTes "q 

bXws ol d8vvaTa)T€pof rrdvTa ydp /xaAa/cta? aiqix^la. 

iO /cat TO V(f>' €T€pov ev ndax^LV, /cat to TroAAa/ct?, /cat 

a €V eTTOLTjaev ovetSt^etf p,iKpo^vxlo.S ydp iravTa 

11 /cat TarreivoTrjTog arjp,€La. /cat to Trepl avTov 
TTOvTa XeyeLv /cat iirayyeXXeadai, /cat to TaAAoTpta 
avTov (f)daK€iv dAa^ovetas" yct/3. opioicxis 8e /cat 
aTTO TCtii' aAAojv eKaaTTj^ tcov tov tJBovs KaKitjjv 
Ta €pya Kat. Ta ar^/xeta /cat Td o/xota* alaxpd ydp 

12 /cat acaxvPTLKa. Kat em tovtols to tcov /caAcDv 
COP' Traj/Te? pbeTexovaiv t] ol op,oi,OL iravTes tj ol 
TrAetCTTOt, piTj pi€T€xeLV. ofxolovs Se Xeyco opLoedvels , 
TToXiTas, rjXiKag, avyyevels, oXcos tovs e^ taov 
ataxpov yap rjdr] to p,rj pi,€T€X€(,v, otov TratSeuo-eo;? 
eTTt ToaovTov /cat tcov dXXcov o/ioica?. rravTa Se 
TavTa pidXXov, dv St' cavTOV (jiaivrjTaf ovtco ydp 
7]Brj aTTO /ca/ctas" pudXXov, du avTos fj atTto? twv 

13 VTTap^dvTOiv Tj VTTapxdvTcov "^ /xeAAop'Tait' . Trdaxov- 
Tes" Se t) TTerrovdoTes rj TreKJOfievoi Td TOLavra 

212 



RHETORIC, II. VI. 7-13 

when you have failed to obtain it to keep on asking ; 
for all these are signs of stinginess. And to praise 
people when they are present, to overpraise their 
good qualities and to palliate the bad, to show ex- 
cessive grief at another's grief when present, and all 
similar actions ; for they are signs of flattery. 

And not to submit to toils, which those put up 
with who are older or live luxuriously or hold higher 
positions, or, generally speaking, are less fitted to 
do so ; for all these are signs of effeminacy. To 
accept favours from another and often, and then to 
throw them in his teeth ; for all these things are 
signs of littleness and abasement of soul. And to 
speak at great length about oneself and to make all 
kinds of professions, and to take the credit for what 
another has done ; for this is a sign of boastfulness. 
Similarly, in regard to each of all the otherTices of 
character, the acts resulting from them, their signs, 
and the things which resemble them, all these are 
disgraceful, and should make us ashamed. It is also 
shameful not to have a share in the honourable 
things which all men, or all who resemble us, or the 
majority of them, have a share in. By those who 
resemble us I mean those of the same race, of the 
same city, of the same age, of the same family, and, 
generally speaking, those who are on an equality ; 
for then it is disgraceful not to have a share, for 
instance, in education and other things, to the same 
extent. All these things are the more disgraceful, 
if the fault appears to be our own ; for they are at 
once seen to be due rather to natural depravity if 
we ourselves are the cause of past, present, or future 
defects. And we are ashamed when we suffer or 
have suffered or are likely to suffer things which tend 

213 



ARISTOTLE 

aicrxvvovrai baa els arL^iav ^epei kol oveihi)' 
ravra S iarl ra et? VTrrjperT^creis rj acofxaros "^ 
epyojv alaxpcov, ajv iarl ro v^pit,eadai. koX to. 
fiev €LS OLKoXaatav Kal eKovra Koi aKovra {ra 8' 
eis" jSiav aKovra)' oltto avavhpias yap ■^ SeiAia? rj 
VTTOfxovT] /cat ro fxrj ap,vvea9ai. 
"A p,ev ovv alaxvvovrat, raur' earl Kal ra 

14 roiavra' eTrel 8e Trepl dSo^ias (jyavraaia earlv rj 
alaxvvT], Kal ravrrjs avrijs x^P^^ aAAo, /xi) rwv 
aTTo^aiv6vrcx)v y ovhelg he rrjs So^rjs (f)povrL^eL dAA' 
rj Sea rovg So^dt,ovras, avdyKT] rovrovs alaxv- 

15 veaOai a)V Xoyov e;^et. Xoyov 8' e^et rwv 6avp,a- 
^ovrcov, Kal ovs Oavpid^ei, Kal ixf)" d)v ^ovXerai 
6avp.at^eadai, Kal Tipos ovs ^tAoTt/xetrai, /cat cUv 

16 fMT] Kara^poveZ rrjs So^'^rjs. Oavfxd^eadat puev ovv 
^ovXovrai viro rovrcov Kal 9avp,dt,ovai rovrovs 
oaoi Ti exovaiv dyadov rcov rip.iu)V, t) Trap' wv 
rvyxdvovac BeopbevoL acf)6Spa rivos lov eKeZvoi Kvpioi, 

17 olov ol epchvres' (fnXortpLOvvraL 8e Trpos rovs 6p.oiovs, 
(f)povrit,ovat 8' d)s dXrjdevovroiv rcov (fypovificov' 
roLovroL 8' ol re TTpea^vrepoi Kal ol Tre'naihevp.evoL. 

18 Kal ra ev 6<j)6aXp.ois Kal rd ev <jiavepa> puaXXov 
odev Kal rj Trapot/xta, ro ev 6(j)6aXp.ols elvai alSo). 
Sid rovro rovs del TTapeaop,evovs p,dXXov alaxv- 
vovrai Kal rovs Tvpoaexovras avrots, 8ia to iv 

1384b o(f)9aXp,OLS dp,(j)6repa. 

19 Kat rovs pirj Trepl ravrd evoxovs' SrjXov yap on, 



" Euripides, Cresphontes : alStbs iv 6(p6a\fx.o7ffL ylyverai, 
TkKvov {T.G.F. frag. 457). 

S14 



RHETORIC, II. VI. 13-19 

to ignominy and reproach ; such are prostituting 
one's person or performing disgraceful actions, in- 
cluding unnatural lust. And of these actions those 
that promote licentiousness are disgraceful, whether 
voluntary or involuntary (the latter being those that 
are done under compulsion), since meek endurance 
and the absence of resistance are the result of 
unmanliness or cowardice. 

These and similar things are those of which men 
are ashamed. And since shame is an impression 
about dishonour, and that for its own sake and not 
for its results ; and since no one heeds the opinion 
of others except on account of those who hold it, it 
follows that men feel shame before those whom they 
esteem. Now men esteem those who admire them 
and those whom they admire, those by whom they 
wish to be admired, those whose rivals they are, and 
whose opinion they do not despise. They desire to 
be admired by those, and admire those who possess 
anything good that is greatly esteemed, or from 
whom they urgently require something which it is 
in their power to give, as is the case with lovers. 
And they are rivals of those who are like them ; and 
they give heed to the men of practical wisdom as 
likely to be truthful ; such are the older and well 
educated. They are also more ashamed of things 
that are done before their eyes and in broad day- 
light ; whence the proverb. The eyes are the abode 
of shame." That is why they feel more ashamed 
before those who are likely to be always with them 
or who keep watch upon them, because in both cases 
they are under the eyes of others. 

Men are also ashamed before those who are not 
open to the same accusations, for it is evident that 

215 



ARISTOTLE 

rdvavrla 8o/cet Tovrocg. /cat rovg fir) avyyvco- 
fMovLKoijs rots cfjaivofJievoLS afiaprdveLV d yap Ti? 
avTos TTOiel, ravra Xeyerai roZs TreAa? ov vefieadv, 

20 ware d firj rroLet, SrjXov ore vcfiead. /cat rovg 
i^ayyeXriKovs ttoXXoZs' ovhkv yap Sta(^epei p,7] 
hoKelv rj fXT) e^ayyeXXcLv. i^ayyeXriKol 8e ot re 
T^8t/c7j/xeVot 8ta ro Traparrjpelv /cat ot /ca/coAoyof 
eiTTcp yap /cat rovs p^r) dpaprdvovrag , eVt p,dXXov 
rovs dp.aprdvovras . /cat ols 'q SLarpi^rj eTrt rat? 
r<jL)v TriXas dp,apr taig, olov ;(Aei'ao'Tat9 /cat K(x)p,a)So- 
7TOLOCS' KaKoXoyoL yap ttoj? ovrot Kal e^ayyeXri- 
Koi. /cat ev oig prjSev dnorervxijKaaLV (Larrep 
yap 6avp,al,6p,€voi SiaKeivraL- 8to /cat rovs npcorov 
herjdevras ri alaxvvovrai cbs ovSev ttoj rjSo^-qKores 
ev avrols. roLOvroi 8' ot re dpri ^ovXopevoL <j)iXoi, 
elvat (to. yap ^eXricrra reOeavrai, 8io ev e)(€t, rj 
rov EuptTTtSou aTTO/cptcrts" npog rovg Y^vpaKoaiovs) 
/cat roiv TrdXai yvcopLp,a>v ol pirfSev (rvveiSores. 

21 alcrxvpovrai 8' ov povov aura rd prjOevra alcrxvv- 
rrjXd dXXd /cat rd ar]p,eta, olov ov p.6vov d(j)pohi- 
aid^ovres dXXd /cat rd arjp^ela avrov. /cat ov 

22 p,6vov TTOiovvres rd ala^pd, dXXd /cat Xeyovres. 
opoicos 8e ov rovg elpr^pevovs p,6vov alaxvvovrai, 
aXXd /cat rovs SrjXcooovras avrols, olov depdrrovras 

23 /cat <f)iXovs rovrcov. oXa>s 8' ovk ala^vvovraL ovd^ 

" Jebb translates, " who have never seen us break down." 
* The (jreek scholiast says : " Euripides, having been sent 
as amlmssador to the Syracusans, to ask for peace and 
friendship, when they refused said : O Syracusans, if for no 
other reason than that we are just feeling the need of your 
friendship, you ought to respect our admiration." Nothing 
is known of this embassy. Hyperides has been suggested 
instead of Euripides. 

216 



RHETORIC, II. VI. 19-23 

their feelings are contrary. And before those who 
are not indulgent towards those who appear to err ; 
for a man is supposed not to reproach others with 
what he does himself, so it is clear that what he 
reproaches them with is what he does not do himself. 
And before those who are fond of gossiping generally ; 
for not to gossip about the fault of another amounts 
to not regarding it as a fault at all. Now those who 
are inclined to gossip are those who have suffered 
wrong, because they always have their eyes upon 
us ; and slanderers, because, if they traduce the 
innocent, still more will they traduce the guilty. 
And before those who spend their time in looking 
for their neighbours' faults, for instance, mockers 
and comic poets ; for they are also in a manner 
slanderers and gossips. And before those from whom 
they have never asked anything in vain," for they feel 
as if they were greatly esteemed. For this reason 
they feel ashamed before those who ask them for 
something for the first time, as never yet having lost 
their good opinion. Such are those who have re- 
cently sought their friendship (for they have only 
seen what is best in them, which is the point of the 
answer of Euripides to the Syracusans),* or old 
acquaintances who know nothing against us. And 
men are ashamed not only of the disgraceful things 
we have spoken of, but also of indications of them, 
for instance, not only of sensual pleasures, but also 
of the indications of them ; and not only of doing, 
but also of saying disgraceful things. Similarly, men 
are ashamed not only before those who have been 
mentioned, but also before those who will reveal 
their faults to them, such as their servants or friends. 
In a word, they are not ashamed either before those 

217 



ARISTOTLE 

cov TToXv Kara<^povovai ttjs So^tjs rod dXrjOevcLV 
[ovSels yap TratSta /cat drjpia atcr^^werat) ovre 
ravra tovs yvcopipiovs koI tovs dyvairas, oAAa 
Tovs fJi>ev yvcopip,ovs rd irpog dXijOeLav SoKovvra 
rovs Se aTTCxidev rd irpog rov vojjlov. 

24 Kvrol Se coSe Sta/ceijtxevot alorxwdetev dv, Trpwrov 
fiev el VTrdpxotev Trpos avrovs exovres ovrco nves 
otovs €(f>a{j.€v etvai ovs ala^vvovrai. "^aav S' ovroi 
7] davpLaiC^6p,evoi r^ Oavfia^ovres t) v(f>^ (hv ^ovXovrai 
davp,dl,eadai, rj (hv Seovrai riva xpeiav a)v firj 
rev^ovrai dBo^ot, ovres, koi odroi rj opcovres 
{atairep KuStas" Trepl rrjs Tid/Jiov KXrjpovxtcis iSr^- 
p.7]y6pr]a€v rj^iov ydp VTToXa^elv rovs ^Adrjvaiovg 
TTepieardvaL kvkXo) rovs 'EXXrjvas, ws opojvras 
Kal [XT] p.6vov aKovaopbevovs a dv i/jrj(f)i(TOJvraL) , ^ 
dv rrX-^aiov ojaiv ol roiovroi, rf fieXXcocriv aladrj- 
aeadai. 8to /cat opdadai arv^ovvres vtto rwv 
1885a ^rjXovvrojv TTore ov ^ovXovrai' Oavfjbaaral ydp ol 

26 lr]Xa)raL /cat orav l^cuCTtv a Karaiaxvvovaw epya 
Kal 7Tpdyp.ara rj avrdJv rj Tvpoyovoiv rj dXXcov rLvwv 
TTpos ovs VTTapxei avrois dyxccrreia ris. /cat oXojs 
VTTep (Lv alaxvvovrat avroi' etori 8 ovroi ol elprj- 
p.ivoL /cat ol els avrovs avai^epofievoi, wv 8i8d- 
a/caAot 7j avfx^ovXoL yeyovaac, 7] edv aJatv erepoi 

" This rendering involves a plural neuter with a plural 
verb. Others take the actions or things in a good sense, 
" deeds and fortunes, their own or their ancestors, which 
they are likely to disgrace." 

218 



RHETORIC, II. VI. 23-25 

whose opinion in regard to the truth they greatly - 
despise — for instance, no one feels shame before 
children or animals — or of the same things before 
those who are known to them and those who are 
not ; before the former, they are ashamed of things 
that appear really disgraceful, before strangers, of 
those which are only condemned by convention. 

Men are likely to feel shame in the following 
situations ; first, if there are any who are so related 
to them as those before whom we said that they feel 
shame. These, as we pointed out, are those who are 
admired by them or who admire them, or by whom 
they wish to be admired, or from whom they need 
some service, which they will not obtain if they lose 
their reputation. These, again, are either persons 
who directly see what is going on (just as Cydias, 
when haranguing the people about the allotment of 
the territory of Samos, begged the Athenians to 
picture to themselves that the Greeks were standing 
round them and would not only hear, but also see 
what they were going to decree) ; or neighbours ; 
or those likely to be aware of what they say or do. 
That is why men do not like, when unfortunate, to 
be seen by those who were once their rivals, for 
rivalry presumes admiration. Men also feel shame 
when they are connected with actions or things which 
entail disgrace," for which either they themselves, or 
their ancestors, or any others with whom they are 
closely connected are responsible. In a word, men 
feel shame for those whom they themselves respect ;^ 
such are those mentioned and those who have any 
relation to them, for instance, whose teachers or 
advisers they have been ; similarly, when they are 

'> i.e. when they have done anything disgraceful. 

219 



ARISTOTLE 

26 o/xoioi, irpos ovs ^tAort/xowraf ttoAAo. yap at- 
axvvo/JievoL 8ta rovg tolovtovs /cat TTOiovai Kal ov 

27 TTOLOvaiv. /cat jjieXXovres opdadac /cat iv (f>av€pcp 
a.vacrTp€(f)€adai rots avvethoaiv alaxvvr-qXoL /xaA- 
Xov elaiv. odev Kal AvTi(f)6jv 6 TTOirjTrjg fieXXoiv 

a7TOTVfJi7TaVLl,€Cr9aL VTTO AlOVVOLOV €L7T€V, ISwV TOVS 

avvaTToOvqcTKeLV /xeAAovras" iyKaXvTrrop.evovs ws 
rjeaav Sio. tcov ttvXcov, " rt lyKaXvTrreade " c^rj' 
" -^ firj avptov Tis" vpids l^t] tovtwv ; " Trepl p.kv 
odv alaxvvrjs ravra- irepl he avaiaxwrcas SrjXov 
(OS e/c TCOV evavricov evTToprjaopiev . 

7. TtcTt 8e X'^P''^ exovai /cat ein riaiv rj ttcDs" 
awToi €xovr€S, opiaafievoLg rrjv X^P*-^ BrjXov eoTai. 

2 ecrno Sr] x^P^^> '<^ct^' '^^ o excov Xeyerai x^P''^ 
VTTOvpyelu^ Seofxevcp firj dvrl tlvos, fjirjS ii^a rt 
avru) ro) VTTovpyovvri, dXX Iva e/cetvoj Tf fieydXr) 
8' dv '^ cr(f)6Spa SeofMevcp, ^ fieydXcov /cat ;;^aAe7ra)i/, 
rj iv KaipoLS roiovrois, r] p,ovos, r) irpwros, r] 

3 fidXiara. SeijaeLs 8' etcrtv at ope^eig, Kal rovrcov 
pidXiara at /xera XvTrrjg rod p,rj yiyvojjievov roiavrai 
8e at eTndvp,iaL, otov 6 epcos. Kal at eV rat? rov 

^ Spengel reads Ka9' ^v 6 (X'^'' ^^yerai X"/"" ^Xf"*? virovpyia 
" favour, in accordance with which he who has it is said to 
feel benevolence, is rendering a service to one who needs 
it." 



" When on an embassy to Syracuse, he was asked by 
Dionysius which was the best kind of brass. On his replying, 

220 



RHETORIC, II. VI. 26— VII. 3 

in rivalry with others who are hke them ; for there 
are many things which they either do or do not do 
owing to the feehng of shame which these men 
inspire. And they are more Ukely to be ashamed 
when they have to be seen and to associate openly 
with those who are aware of their disgrace. Where- 
fore the tragic poet Antiphon," when he was about 
to be flogged to death by order of Dionysius, seeing 
that those who were to die with him covered their 
faces as they passed through the gates, said, " Why 
cover your faces ? Is it because you are afraid that 
one of the crowd should see you to-morrow ? " Let 
this account of shame suffice ; as for shamelessness, 
it is evident that we shall be able to obtain ample 
knowledge of it from the contrary arguments. 

7. The persons towards whom men feel benevolent,** 
and for what reasons, and in what frame of mind, 
will be clear when we have defined what favour is. 
Let it then be taken to be the feeling in accordance 
with which one who has it is said to render a service 
to one who needs it, not in return for something nor 
in the interest of him who renders it, but in that of 
the recipient. And the favour will be great if the 
recipient is in pressing need, or if the service or the 
times and circumstances are important or difficult, or 
if the benefactor is the only one, or the first who has 
rendered it, or has done so in the highest degree. 
By needs I mean longings, especially for things 
the failure to obtain which is accompanied by pain ; 
such are the desires, for instance, love ; also those 

" that from which the Athenians made their statues of 
Harmodius and Aristogiton," Dionysius ordered him to be 
put to death. 

" x^pt5 may mean (1) benevolence, the feeling which prompts 
a favour ; (2) an actual favour conferred ; (3) gratitude. 

221 



ARISTOTLE 

acofMaros KaKcuaeat /cat iv /ctvSwots" /cat yap 6 
KivSvvevwv eTndvjxeZ /cat o Xv-TTOV/xevos . Sio ot ei/ 
Trevto. TTapiaraixevoL /cat ^vyaZs, Kav [MiKpa VTrrj- 
perrjcrcoaiv , 8ta to jjueyedos rrjg ScTjaecos" /cat roi' 
Kaipov Kexo-pi'Crp.evoi, olov 6 ev AvKeio) rov (f)oppi,6v 

4 Sous". dvdyKT] ovv fxaXiara fiev els ravrd €)(€iv 
rr]v VTTOvpyiav, el he p,rj, els tcra t] jxeit,co. 

CloT^ eirel ^avepov /cat ore /cat e^^' ot? yiyverat 
;\;apts' /cat ttcoj exovai, hrjXov on Ik rovrcov irapa- 
CKevaareov, tovs p-ev SeiKvvvras rj ovras •^ ye- 
yevrjp,evovs iv roLavrr] Seryo-et /cat Xvttt], rovs Se 
VTTTjperrjKOTas ev Toiavrr] XP^^^- tolovtov re ^ 

5 VTTrjperovvras . (jtavepov he /cat odev d(/)aipeta6aL 
evhex^rat. rrjv X'^P^^ '^^^ Trotetr dxaplarrovs' t] yap 

1385 b oTi avrcjv eVe/ca VTrrjperovatv rj VTrrjperrjaav {rovro 
h ovK -^v x^^P^^)) V OTt aTTO rvxrjS avveTrecrev rj 
avvrivayKaad-qaav, rj on a-TreSoj/cav aAA' ovk 
ehcoKav, etV elhores etVe a-n- ducborepcos yap rl 
D ai'Tt nvos, o)ar ovo ovrws av eirj x^P^^' x^f- 
irepi aTTaaas ras Karrjyopias aKeirreov rj yap 
X^P''^ eoTTtv Tj on rohl rj roaovhl r) roiovhl t) irore 
T] 7T0V. arqpLeLov he, el eXarrov p,rj VTrr^perrjaav , 
/cat et rots' exQpols rj ravrd rj taa rj fj.eit,(x)' hrjXov 

" Probably given to a beggar or vagrant Avho had nothing 
to sleep on. 

* That is, should have in view the satisfaction of urgent 
wants and desires (Cope). 

" Reading 3t€ ; others read oh, " by whom." 

"* 'dxapiffTovs : the word generally means " ungrateful," 
and so Jebb takes it here : "and to make men ungrateful." 

' The other five categories in Aristotle's list are : relation, 
position, possession, activity, passivity. 

•^ Because in that case their motives in rendering the 
greater service cannot be disinterested. 
222 



RHETORIC, II. VII. 3-6 

whicli arise in bodily sufferings and dangers, for 
when a man is in pain or danger he desires 
something. That is why those who help a man 
who is poor or an exile, even if the service be 
ever so small, are regarded with favour owing to 
the urgency and occasion of the need ; for in- 
stance, the man who gave the mat " to another 
in the Lyceum. It is necessary then, if possible, 
that the service should be in the same direction * ; 
if not, that it should apply to cases of similar or 
greater need. 

Since then it is evident on what occasions," for 
what reasons, and in what frame of mind a feeling 
of benevolence arises, it is clear that we must derive 
our arguments from this — to show that the one side 
either has been, or still is, in such pain or need, and 
that the other has rendered, or is rendering, such a 
service in such a time of need. It is evident also by 
what means it is possible to make out that there is 
no favour at all, or that those who render it are not 
actuated by benevolence ^ ; for it can either be said 
that they do, or have done so, for their own sake, 
in which case there is no favour ; or that it was mere 
chance ; or that they acted under compulsion ; or that 
they were making a return, not a gift, whether they 
knew it or not ; for in both cases it is an equivalent 
return, so that in this case also there is no favour. 
And the action must be considered in reference to 
all the categories ; for if there is a favour it is 
so because of substance, quantity, quality, time, or 
place.* And it denotes lack of goodwill, if persons 
have not rendered a smaller service,^ or if they have 
rendered similar, equal, or greater services to our 
enemies ; for it is evident that they do not act for 

223 



ARISTOTLE 

yap OTt ouSe ravra rjfMoJv eVe/ca. rj el cf>avXa 
etSoJS" ovSels yap o/xoAoyet SeladaL (f>avXcov. 

8. Kat nepl p.kv rod ;(apt^ecr^at /cat axo.piarelv 
eLpr^rai' irola S eAeetva /cat rivas eXeovcn, /cat 

2 TTois" avTOL k)(ovres, XeycDp^ev. ecrroj Srj e'Aeo? Xvttt] 
Tts" eTTt (f)aivop,€vcp KaKO) (f)dapTLKaj rj Xvmjpa) 
rod dva^tov rvyxo-veiv, o kov avros TrpocrSo/crj- 
aetev av iradeZv r] ra)v avrov riva, /cat rovro, orav 
TrXrjaLOV (f>ai.vrjraL' SrjXov yap on dvdyKT] rov /xeA- 
Aovra iXeTJaeiv vrrapx^LV roiovrov olov oteadai 
TTaOelv dv tl /ca/cov -^ avrov rj rdJv avrov riva, /cat 
roLovro /ca/cov olov etp-qrai, iv rw opcp ^ opuoiov ^ 

3 TTapairXiqaLov . Sto oiire ol TravreXcos aTToXcoXores 
eXeovaiv {ovSev yap dv ert Tradelv otovraL' Treirov- 
daai yap) ovre ol VTrepevhaip^oveiv olofxevou, dAA' 
v^pl^ovaiv el yap dnavra otovrat vTrdpx^iv rd- 
yadd, hrjXov ori, /cat to prj evhex^adai iradeiv 

4 p,r]Sev KaKov /cat yap rovro rwv dyaddjv. elal 
8e roLovroL olol vop^it^eiv Tradelv dv ot re ttcttov- 
66re? Tjhrj /cat StaTret^evyores , /cat ot Trpea^vrepot, 
/cat Sia ro <^poveiv /cat 8t' epLTretpiav , /cat ot dadevels, 
/cat ot SetAorepot p,dXXov, /cat ot TreTratSey/xeVof 

6 eyAoytCTTot ydp. Kat ot? VTrdp^ovai yovels ^ rcKva 
r) yvvdiKes' avrov re ydp ravra, /cat ofa Tradelv 

6 TO, elprjp.eva. /cat ot fx-qre ev dvSplas ndOet, ovres, 
olov ev dpyfi rj Odppei (aAoytcTa ydp rov eaop,€vov 
ravra) p^rjr^ ev v^pLoriKfj Siadeaei (/cat yap oSroi 
224 



RHETORIC, II. VII. 6— VIII. 6 

our sake in this case either. Or if the service was in- 
significant, and rendered by one who knew it ; for no 
one admits that he has need of what is insignificant. 
8. Let this suffice for benevolence and the opposite. 
We will now state what things and persons excite 
pi ty , and the state of mind of those who feel it. Let 
pity then be a kind of pain excited by the sight of 
evil, deadly or painful, which befalls one who doe s 
not deserve it ; an evil which one might expect to 
come upon liimself or one of his friends, and when 
it seems near. For it is evident that one who is 
likely to feel pity must be such as to think that he, 
or one of his friends, is liable to suffer some evil, and 
such an evil as has been stated in the definition, or 
one similar, or nearly similar. Wherefore neither 
those who are utterly ruined, are capable of pity, 
for they think they have nothing more to suffer, 
since they have exhausted suffering ; nor those who 
think themselves supremely fortunate, who rather 
are insolent. For if they think that all good tilings 
are theirs, it is clear that they think that they cannot 
possibly suffer evil, and this is one of the good things. 
Now those persons who think they are likely to 
suffer are those who have already suffered and 
escaped ; the advanced in age, by reason of their 
wisdom and experience ; and the weak, and those 
who are rather more timid ; and the educated, for 
they reckon rightly ; and those who have parents, / 
children, or wives, for these are part of them and 
likely to suffer the evils of which we have spoken ; 
and thos^who are not influenced by any courageous 
emotion, such as anger or confidence, for these 
emotions do' not take thought of the future ; and 
those who are not in a wantonly insolent frame of 

« 225 



ARISTOTLE 

aAoyiCTTOi Tov Treiaeadai ti), dAA' ol fieTa^v 
rovrcov. fxrjr av <f)0^oviJi€vot a(f)6Spa' ov yap 
iXeovoLV ol e/CTTeTrAi^y/zeVot Sto. ro etvai irpos to) 

7 olKetip TTadei. kou oiojvrai rivas elvai eTTiei/cets" 
o yap pnqhiva olofxcvos Trdvras otT^creTat d^iov9 

1386 a etvat KaKov. Kal oXcos Srj orav exj] ovrcos axrr* 
dvap.vrjadrjvav roiavra au/x^e^T^/cdra tj avrcp 7] rcov 
avrov, r^ eAmcrat ycvecrdai t] avrip ■^ ra)V avrov. 

8 '^s P'€v ovv exovres iXeovaiv, etprjTac, d 8* 
iXeovaiv, e/c tov opicr/jiov SrjXov oaa re yap rcov 
XvTTTjpwv /cat oSvvTjpcbv ^dapTLKa, Trdvra eXeeivd, 
Kal oaa dvaiperiKd, /cat oacov rj rvxf] alria KaKutv 

9 fJieyeOos exovrcov. eari 8' oBvvrjpd p,kv /cat ^6ap- 
Tt/ca davaroL /cat at/ctat acoixaraiv /cat /ca/ccocret? 

10 /cat yrjpas /cat I'do'ot /cat rpo^rjs eVSeta, cSi' 8' ij 
TTJXi] alria KaKOJV, d^tAta, oXiyocfuXia (8to /cat to 
hieoTtdadai aTTo tcov (f)iXcov /cat avvijdcDv iXeeivov), 
alaxos, daOiveia, dvaTrrjpla. /cat to o^et' TrpoarJKev 

11 dyai^dt' ti irpd^ai, KaKov tl crvfi^rjvai. /cat to 
TToAAd/ct? TotoyTO^'. /cat to TTCTrovdoros yeveaOat 
TL dyadov, olov AiOTTCiOeL rd Trapd /SaatAeoj? 
reOvedrrL Kare7Tep,^dri . /cat to •^ /xiySev ytyevi^- 
CT^at dya^op', •^ yevofJievcov firj etvac aTToXavaiv. 

'E^' of? /xei' ow iXeovcTi, ravra /cat to. roLavrd 

12 iaTLV iXeovoL 8e tous" re yvcopifMovs, idv fxr] a<f)6- 

226 



RHETORIC, II. VIII. 6-12 

mind, for they also take no thought of future suffer- 
ing ; but it is those who are between the two ex- 
tremes that feel pity. Those who are not in great 
fear ; for those who are panic-stricken are incapable 
of pity, because they are preoccupied with their 
own emotion. And men feel pity if they think that 
some persons are virtuous ; for he who thinks that 
no one is will think that all deserve misfortune. 
And, generally speaking, a man is moved to pity 
when he is so affected that he remembers that such 
evils have happened, or expects that they may 
happen, either to himself or to one of his friends. 

We have stated the frame of mind which leads men 
to pity ; and the things which arouse this feeling 
are clearly shown by the definition. They are all 
painful and distressing things that are also destruc- 
tive, and all that are ruinous ; and all evils of which 
fortune is the cause, if they are great. Things dis- 
tressing and destructive are various kinds of death, 
personal ill-treatment and injuries, old age, disease, 
and lack of food. The evils for which fortune is 
responsible are lack of friends, or few friends (where- 
fore it is pitiable to be torn away from friends and 
intimates), ugliness, weakness, mutilation ; if some 
misfortune comes to pass from a quarter whence one 
might have reasonably expected something good ; 
and if this happens often ; and if good fortune does 
not come until a man has already suffered, as when 
the presents from the Great King were not dispatched 
to Diopithes until he was dead. Those also are to 
be pitied to whom no good has ever accrued, or who 
are unable to enjoy it when it has. 

These and the like things, then, excite pity. The 
persons men pity are those whom they know, pro- 

227 



ARISTOTLE 

Spa iyyvg (Law olKeiorrjTL- Trepl he rovrovs oioirep 
TTcpl avrovs f^eXXovras exovuiv. 8l6 /cat "Afiacns 
CTTL fjbev rep viel ayop,evcp cttl to aiTodaveZv ovk 
iSaKpvaev, u)9 (f)aaiv, inl Se rco ^iXcp TrpoaaiTovvTi' 
rovTO jxkv yap eXeeivov, eKelvo Be Set,v6v to yap 
Setvov eTepov tov eXeeivov Kal eKKpovoTLKov tov 

13 eXeov Kal TroXXaKig tw euavTico ;;^pr^crt/xoi/. eVt 
eXeovoLV eyyvs avToZs tov Setvov ovtos. /cat tovs 
ofJbOLovs eXeovat Kara -qXiKtas, Kara rjdr], Kara 
e^eis, /cara d^tco/xara, /cara yevrj- iv Tracrt yap 
TOVTOLS fidXXov (fyaiveTai Kal avTw av VTrdp^af 
oXcos yap Kal evravda Set Xa^elv otl, ocra e<j> 
avTOiv (f)o^ovvTaL, TavTa ctt' aAAoji^ yiyv6p.eva 

14 eXeovcTiv. errel 8' iyyvg (f)aLv6p,eva to. vadrj 
eXeeivd ecrrt, to, he [xvpioaTov €tos yevofieva i^ 
ecrd/xeva ovt^ eXvit^ovTeg oirre pLepLvrjixevoi rj oXws 
OVK eXeovaiv rj ovx ofMotcos, dvayKT] tovs crvv- 
aTTepya^ofjuevovs cr;^7y/xaCTt /cat (^covals Kal eadiJTi 
Kal oXws rfj VTTOKpiaeL iXeeivoTcpovs etvai' iyyvs 
yap TTOLovai ^aivea6ai to KaKov npo 6p.p.dT(x}V 

15 TTOLovvTeg , rj ojs p,eXXov rj (Ls yeyovos. Kal rd 
nsQh yeyovoTa a/art rj fxeXXovra Sto. rax^cov iXeeivoTepa 

16 Sto, TO avTo. Kal Ta arjp,ela Kal Tas rrpd^eis, 
olov iaOrJTdg re Tcijv rreTTOvdoTcov Kal ocra rotavra, 
Kal Xoyovs kq,1 oaa dXXa rcbv iv tco nddei ovroiv, 
olov TJhr] TeXevTwvTcov . Kal /xaAtora to ctttov- 

<• Herodotus, iii. 14, where the story is told, not of Amasis, 
but of his son Psarnmenitus. 

* Jebb renders: "Again men pity when the danger is 

near themselves," which may mean when they see something 

, terrible happening to others and likely soon to befall them- 

2S28 



RHETORIC, II. VIII. 12-16 

vided they are not too closely connected with them ; 
for if they are, they feel the same as if they them- 
selves were likely to suffer. This is why Amasis " is 
said not to have wept when his son was led to execu- 
tion, but did weep at the sight of a friend reduced 
to beggary, for the latter excited pity, the former 
terror. The terrible is different from the pitiable, 
for it drives out pity, and often serves to produce 
the opposite feeling. Further, the nearness of the 
terrible makes men pity.** Men also pity those who 
resemble them in age, character, habits, position, or 
family ; for all such relations make a man more likely 
to think that their misfortune may befall him as 
well. For, in general, here also we rnay co nclude 
th at all that men fear in regard to themselves exci t^s_ 
their pity when ot hers are the victims . And since 
sufferings are pitiable when they appear close at 
hand, while those that are past or future, ten thou- 
sand years backwards or forwards, either do not 
excite pity at all or only in a less degree, because 
men neither expect the one nor remember the other, 
it follows that those who contribute to the effect by 
gestures, voice, dress, and dramatic action generally, 
are more pitiable ; for they make the evil appear 
close at hand, setting it before our eyes as either 
future or past. And disasters that have just hap- 
pened or are soon about to happen excite more pity 
for the same reason. Pity is also aroused by signs 
and actions, such as the dress of those who have 
suffered, and all such objects, and the words and 
everything else that concerns those who are actually 
suffering, for instance, at the point of death. And 

selves. Vahlen inserts ov yap before Irt : " For men cease 
to pity when the terrible comes close to themselves." 

229 



ARISTOTLE 

oaiovs" eti^at iv rols roiovrots Kaipols ovras eAeet- 
vov airavTa yap ravra 8ta ro iyyvs <f)aCveadaL 
juaAAov TTOtet Tov eXeov, /cat cos dva^lov ovros, Kal 
iv 6(f>daXiJiols <f>aLvop.evov rov Tradovs. 

9. 'AvrtVetTat 8e rw iXeelv ixdXtcrra jxev o 
KaXovai vefxeadv ro) yap XvirelaOai eVi rats dv- 
a^iaLs KaKOTTpayiais dvriK€ip,ev6v eari rpoirov Tivd 
Kal (XTTO rov avrov rjdovs ro XvTreXardai eVt rats 
dva^lais evirpaylaLs. Kal djX(f)Oi rd Trddrj rjdovs 

2 ;/p7jcrTou* Set yap eVt /Jt-ev rots dva^tcos Trpdrrovat, 
KaKOJS avvd-)(deadai Kal iXeeXv, rols Be €v ve/jueadv 
dSiKov yap ro napd rrjv d^iav yiyv6p.evov, Sto 

3 Kai rols deoZs dTToSiSopbev ro vepieadv. So^ete 8' 
dv /cat o (f)d6vos rep eXeelv rov avrov dvriKeXaOaL 
rpoTTOv chs avveyyvs cov Kal ravrov rep vep,eadv, 
ear I h erepov Xvtttj p,ev yap rapaxcoSrjs Kal 6 
<j)d6vos earl Kal els evTTpayiav, dXX ov rov dva^iov 
dAAa rov taov Kal 6p,oiov. ro Se /xt^ on avru) ri 
avjx^TJaerai erepov, dXXd 8t' avrov rov TrXyjaiov, 
aTraaiv ofiOLOJS Set v7Tdp)(ei,v. ov yap eVt earai, ro 
fiev vefieat-s ro Se <f)d6vos, dXXd <j)6fios, edv Sto. 
rovro 7] XvTTr) V7rdp-)(rj Kal rj rapa^'^, on avrco n 

4 earai <f)avXov aTTO rijs eKeivov evTrpa^ias. (f)ave- 
pov 8 ort aKoXovd'qaeL Kal rd evavria Trddrj rov- 
roLS' o p,ev yap XvTTOvp-evos eirl rols dva^icxis /ca/co- 
TTpayovatv 'qad-qaerac ^ dXvnos earai eTrt rols 

" " When the men, who are in such crises, are good men " 
(Jebb). If they were not, their misfortune would appear 
deserved. 

* The signs and actions, and the demeanour of the 
sufferer. 
230 



RHETORIC, II. viir. 16— ix. 4 

when men. show themselves undaunted " at such 
critical times it is specially pitiable ; for all these 
things, ** because they come immediately under our 
observation, increase the feeling of pity, both because 
the sufferer does not seem to deserve his fate, and 
because the suffering is before our eyes. 

9. Now what is called indignation" is the antithesis 
to pity ; for the being pained at undeserved good 
fortune is in a manner contrary to being pained at 
undeserved bad fortune and arises from the same 
character. And both emotions show good char- 
acter, for if we sympathize with and pity those who 
suffer undeservedly, we ought to be indignant with 
those who prosper undeservedly ; for that which 
happens beyond a man's deserts is unjust, wherefore 
we attribute this feeling even to gods. It would 
seem that envy also is similarly opposed to pity, as 
being akin to or identical with indignation, although 
it is really different ; envy also is indeed a disturb- 
ing pain and directed against good fortune, but not 
that of one who does not deserve it, but of one who 
is our equal and like. Now, all who feel envy and 
indignation must have this in common, that they are 
disturbed, not because they think that any harm will 
happen to themselves, but on account of their neigh- 
bour ; for it will cease to be indignation and envy, 
but will be fear, if the pain and disturbance arise 
from the idea that harm naay come to themselves 
from another's good fortune. And it is evident that 
these feelings will be accompanied by opposite feel- 
ings ; for he who is pained at the sight of those who 
are undeservedly unfortunate will rejoice or will at 
least not be pained at the sight of those who are 

" veiieaav : " the nobler brother of envy " (Nietzsche). 

231 



ARISTOTLE 

evavTLcog KaKOTrpayovcnv olov tovs TrarpaAota? 
Kal jxiaL(f)6vovs , orav rvxoiai rifMcoptag, ovBels av 
Xv7T7]6€L7] xP'^^'^os' Set yap -xj^ipctv irrl toi? roiov- 
roL9, (l)s S' avTcos /cat errl toZs ev TrpdrrovaL /car' 
a^tat'* dfKJxjo yap St/cata, Kal iroieZ ■x.^ipetv rov 
eTTtet/c-Jj* dvdyKT] yap e\Trit,eLV VTrdp^ai av, dnep 

5 Toi ofjiOLO), /cat avTw. /cat ecrrt tou aurov tJOovs 
oLTTavra ravra, to. S' ivavrla rov ivavriov 6 yap 
avros eoTLV e7rt;^atpe/ca/cos" /cat <f)dovep6?' i<j)' u> 

1387 a. yap Tts" AuTTCtTat yLyvopbivo) /cat VTrdpxovri, dvay- 
Kalov rovrov iirl rfj areprjaei /cat rfj (f)dopa rfj 
rovrov ;\;atpetv. Sto /ccoAyrt/ca //.et' iXeov irdma 
ravra iari, Sta^epet 8e Std rag elpr^fjuevag air Lag' 
oiore TTpos ro p/rj iXeetvd TTOielv drravra 6p,oicos 
Xprjcnp'a. 

6 Yipcorov p,kv ovv Trepl rod v€p,eadv Xiy(x}p.€V, 
rial, re vefieacoac /cat inl riai koX rrcos exovres 

7 avroL, elra p,€rd ravra irepl rcov dXXcov. <f>avep6v 
8' e/c r&v elpr]p,4vcx}v et yap iart ro vep,eadv 
XvTTeZaOai IttI rep ^aivofievco dva^iios evrrpayelv, 
TTpcorov p,€V SrjXov on ovx otov r* cttI Trdac rols 

8 dyadoLS vep,eadv ov yap et St/caio? 17 dvhpelos, 'q 
el dperrjv X-^iperai, vefieo'^creL rovrco {ovhe yap 
eXeoi CTTL Tot? ivavrioLS rovrwv elaiv), oAA' eVi 
trXovrcp Kal hvvdp,ei /cat rot? TotouToi?, oacov (hs 
ctTrAcDs" ehreiv d^ioi elcriv ol dyadol [/cat ot rd (jtvaei 
exovres dyadd, olov evyeveiav Kal KdXXos Kal oaa 

" There is justice both in the punishment of the parricide 
and in the deserved good fortune of others. The conclusion 

232 



RHETORIC, II. IX. 4-8 

deservedly so ; for instance, no good man would be 
pained at seeing parricides or assassins punished ; 
we should rather rejoice at their lot, and at that of 
men who are deservedly fortunate ; for both these " 
are just and cause the worthy man to rejoice, because 
he cannot help hoping that what has happened to his 
like may also happen to himself. And all these 
feelings arise from the same character and their 
contraries from the contrary ; for he who is malicious 
is also envious, since, if the envious man is pained 
at another's possession or acquisition of good fortune, 
he is bound to rejoice at the destruction or non- 
acquisition of the same. Wherefore all these 
emotions are a hindrance to pity, although they 
differ for the reasons stated ; so that they are all 
equally useful for preventing any feehng of pity. 

Let us then first speak of indignation, the persons 
with whom men feel indignant, for what reasons, 
and in what frame of mind ; and then proceed to 
the rest of the emotions. What we have just said 
will make matters clear. For if indignation is being 
pained at the sight of good fortune that is apparently 
undeserved, in the first place it is clear that it is 
not possible to feel indignation at all good things ; 
for no one will be indignant with a man who is just 
or courageous, or may acquire any virtue (for one 
does not feel pity in the case of opposites of 
those qualities),* but men are indignant at wealth, 
power, in a word, at all the advantages of which 
good men are worthy. [And those who possess natural 
advantages, such as noble birth, beauty, and all such 

must refer to the latter ; if his like is fortunate, he hopes he 
may be. 

* Because it is a man's own fault, and pity is only felt for 
what is undeserved. 

233 



ARISTOTLE 

9 Toiavra]. eTreihrj 8e ro ap^oZov iyyvg tl (fiaiverai 
rov (fivcrei, avdyicrj rots ravro exovav ayadov, 
eav vecoarL k)(ovres rvyxo-vojaL /cat 8ia rovro 
evTrpayaJai, fjidXKov vefjueadv f-taXXov yap Xvirovatv 
OL veojari TrXovrovvres rwv TraAat /cat Sto. yevos' 
ofxoicxjs Se /cat dp)(ovr€S /cat Bvvdfjbevot /cat rroXv- 
^lXol /cat evrcKvoi /cat otlovv rwv roiovrcov. kolv 
Std ravr^ d'AAo n dyaOov yiyvrjrai, avroZs, (Laavrojs' 
/cat yap evravOa p,dXXov XvTrovcrtv ol veoirXovroi 
dpxovres Std rov TrXovrov rj ol apxaiOTrXovroi. 

10 opLOLOis 8e /cat crrl rcbv dXXcov. alnov S' on ol 
fjuev hoKovai rd avrojv ex^tv ol 8' ov- ro yap del 
ovrco (f)aiv6p,€Vov exeiv dXrjdes So/cet, ware ol 

11 erepoL ov rd avrcov €)(€iv. /cat evret CKaarov rcov 
dyaddjv ov rov rvxovros d^tov, dXXd rtg ecrrlv 
dvaXoyia /cat ro dpp^orrov, olov ottXcov /cdAAo? 
ov ra> SiKalcp dppiorreL dXXd ra> dvhpeico, /cat 
ydp,OL Sia(f)€povres ov rots veaxirl rrXovrovcrtv 
dXXd rols €vy€veartv , — edv ovv dyados iov p.rj rod 
apfMorrovros rvy )(av7], vepiearjrov. /cat rov rjrrco 
rep KpelrrovL dp,(/)ia^rjr€lv , fidXicrra p,€V ovv rovs 
ev rep avrcp' odev /cat rovr^ eiprjrai,, 

" The first part of the sentence is clear : men are indignant 
when what good men deserve is possessed by those who are 
not good. The literal translation of the text as it stands is : 
" Men are indignant ... at all the advantages of which 
good men and those who possess natural advantages are 
worthy " ; but this cannot be right, since there is nothing in 
natural advantages to arouse moral indignation, there is no 
question of their being deserved or undeserved. Something 
may have fallen out like "but they will not be indignant 
with those who possess natural advantages." Roemer {Rhein. 
Mus. xxxix. p. 504) suggests : ov5' ei to, (pvaet, ^xoi'O'"' CLyadd 
(understanding ve/xeaT^crei toutois). 
234> 



RHETORIC, II. IX. 9-11 

things. ]** And since that which is old seems closely 
to resemble that which is natural, it follows that, if 
two parties have the same good, men are more 
indignant with the one who has recently acquired it 
and owes his prosperity to it ; for the newly rich 
cause more annoyance than those who have long 
possessed or inherited wealth. The same applies to 
offices of state, power, numerous friends, virtuous , 
children, and any other advantages of the kind. And 
if these advantages bring them some other advan- 
tage, men are equally indignant ; for in this case 
also the newly rich who attain to office owing to 
their wealth cause raore annoyance than those who 
have long been wealthy ; and similarly in all other 
cases of the same kind. The reason is that the 
latter seena to possess what belongs to them, the 
former not ; for that which all along shows itself 
in the same light suggests a reality, so that the 
former seem to possess what is not theirs.* And since 
every kind of good is not suitable to the first comer, 
but a certain proportion and suitability are necessary 
(as for instance beautiful weapons are not suitable 
to the just but to the courageous man, and dis- 
tinguished marriages not to the newly rich but to 
the nobly born), if a virtuous man does not obtain 
what is suitable to him, we feel indignant. Similarly, 
if the inferior contends with the superior, especially 
among those engaged in the same pursuit, — whence 
the saying of the poet, 

* SoKe2v is a stronger word than cpaiveaOai, indicating an 
intellectual operation as opposed to an impression received 
through the senses. The idea is that where anything has 
been so long in a person's possession, it has come to be 
regarded as his by right. 

235 



ARISTOTLE 

A'lavros S' dAeeti/e fJbdxrjv TeXa/jLiovtaSao- 

TLevs yap ol vefxeaacrx , or a/zetVovt <f)CDrL fxdxotTO. 

1387 b €t be fiT), Kav oTTCoaovv 6 rJTTCov ro) Kpelrrovc, otov 
€i o jxovGLKos ro) St/cato)* ^eXrLov yap rj biKaioavvi) 
TTJg fiovcnKTJs. 

or? fiev ovv vefxeaaxTL Kal 8i' a, e'/c tovtcov SijXov 

12 ravra yap /cat rd roiavrd iariv. avrol Se V€- 
fMecrrjTLKOL eicriv, idv d^toi rvyxdvojaLV ovres tcov 
jxeyicrrcov dyadcov /cat ravra KeKrrjpiivoi- ro yap 
roJv ofMOLCov rj^Lojddat rovs fir) o/xotous' ov St/catov. 

13 Sevrcpov S', dv ovres dyadol /cat OTTOvSaXoi rvy- 
Xdvcoaiv Kplvovai re yap ev, /cat rd aSt/ca pacrovaLv. 

14 /cat edv (j>LX6ript,oi /cat opeyofxevoi rivcbv rrpd^ewv, 
/cat p,aXiara Trepl ravra ^tAort/xot coaiv wv erepoi 

15 ava^LOL ovres rvyxdvovcriv. /cat oAcos" ot d^iovvres 
avrol avrovs, (Lv erepovs pir) d^iovai,, vepiea-qriKol 
rovroLS /cat rovrojv. 8to /cat oi avS/aaTroSaiSets" 
/cat cf)avXoL /cat d^LX6rLp,oi ov vepbearjrLKoi' ovhev 

16 ya/3 eoTtv o5 eavrovs olovr ai d^iovs elvai. (bavepdv 

e/c TowToiv eTTt TTOLOLs arvxovGL Kai /ca/co- 
irpayovatv ^ p,r) rvyxdvovcn ;;^atpetv •^ dXvTTW^ 
exeiv Set* e/c yap rwv elpTjpbevcov rd avrLKeip-evd 
eari hrjXa, oior edv rovs re Kpirds roiovrov^ 
irapacTKevdcrr] 6 Xoyos, Kal rovs d^iovvras eXeel- 
adat, Kal e<f> ots eXeeXadai, bel^r] dva^iovg p,ev 

" Iliad, xi. 542. Only the first verse is given in the 
received text of Homer ; the second is not found in any of 
the Mss. The reference is to Cebriones, a son of Priam slain 
by Patroclus. 

^ It has been suggested to insert ni) before rxryx^ivuffi : " if, 
although virtuous and worthy, they do not happen to possess 
such advantages." 

236 



RHETORIC, II. IX. 11-16 

He avoided battle with Ajax, son of Telamon," for Zeus 
was indignant with him, when he would fight with a better 
man ; 

or, if the pursuit is not the same, wherever the inferior 
contends with the superior in anything whatever, as 
for instance, the musician with the just man ; for 
justice is better than music. 

From this it is clear, then, with whom men are 
indignant and for what reasons ; they are these or 
of such a kind. Men are prone to indignation, first, 
if they happen to deserve or possess the greatest 
advantages, for it is not just that those who do not 
resemble them should be deemed worthy of the same 
advantages ; secondly, if they happen to be virtuous 
and worthy,^ for they both judge correctly and hate 
what is unjust. And those who are ambitious and 
long for certain positions, especially if they are those 
which others, although unworthy, have obtained." 
And, in general, those who think themselves worthy 
of advantages of which they consider others un- 
worthy, are inclined to be indignant with the latter 
and because of these advantages. This is why the 
servile and worthless and unambitious are not in- 
clined to indignation ; for there is nothing of which 
they think themselves worthy. It is evident from 
this what kind of men they are whose ill fortunes, 
calamities, and lack of success must make us rejoice 
or at least feel no pain ; for the opposites are clear 
from what has been said. If then the speaker puts 
the judges into such a frame of mind and proves 
that those who claim our pity (and the reasons why 
they do so) are unworthy to obtain it and deserve 

* Or, " of which others happen to be unworthy.'' 

237 



ARISTOTLE 

ovTos TvyxdveLv a^iovs 8e fir] rvyxo-veLV, dSvvaTov 

10. ArjXov 8e /cat ■ eTrt ricn i^Oovovari /cat rtcrt 
/cat TTios exovres, eiirep icrrlv 6 ^dovos Xvttt] rt? 
irrl evTTpayia (J)aLVOfxevr) twv elprjfxevojv dyada)v 
Trepl rovs ofjboiovs, fJ-rj tva rt avrw, dXXd 8t' 
CKeivovs' ^dovrjaovcjL fxev yap ol rotovroL ols elal 

2 rives ofMoioL rj (jiaivovr ai. ofMotovs 8e Xeyco Kara 
yevos, Kara avyyevetav , KaO' i^At/ctav, /ca^' ^it-v, 
Kara So^av, Kara ra vrrapxovra. /cat ols p,iKpov 
eAAetVet ro purj rrdvra inrapxeiv. 8t6 ol fieydXa 
TTpdrrovres /cat ol evrvxovvres (jidovepoi claiv 

3 Trdvras ydp olovrai ra avrwv <f>€p€LV. /cat at 
rt/xcij/xerot eVt rtVL hiai^epovrois , /cat fidXiara irri 
ao<j)ia Tj evSatfiovLa. /cat ol <f)LX6rLfjLOL (f)dov€pc6- 
repoL rcov d(f>LXoripiO}v . /cat ol ho^6ao<f)OL' (J)lX6- 
rifjLOL ydp em ao</)La. /cat oAoJS" ol ^tAoSofoi vepl 
rL ^dovepoL TTepL rovro. /cat ol fjLLKpoiftvxoL' 
irdvra ydp fieydXa 8o/cet avrois elvai. 

4 'E^ OLS 8e (jidovovaiv, ra fxev dyadd eLprjraf i(f)^ 
1388 a oaoLS ydp (juXoho^ovai /cat ^tAort/xowrat epyois rj 

KrrjfjbacTL /cat opeyovraL 86^r)s, /cat oaa evrvx^jfJiard 
icTTL, ax^^dv Trepl Trdvra </)66vos eari, /cat fxaXLora 
ojv avroL rj dpiyovrai ?} otot^rat heZv avrovs ^X^^^> 
ri CUV rfj KriqaeL pLLKpo) VTrepixovaiv rj fJUKpoj eX- 
XeirrovaLV . 

5 ^avepov 8e /cat oi? ^dovovcriv' dfjba ydp eiprjrai' 

" If some one else possesses the one thing which they think 
necessary to complete their happiness, they are envious of 
him, because they consider it ought to be theirs. 

238 



RHETORIC, 11. IX. 16— X. 5 

that it should be refused them, then pity will be 
impossible. 

10. It is equally clear for what reason, and of 
whom, and in what frame of mind, men are envious, 
if envy is a kind of pain at the sight of good fortune 
in regard to the goods mentioned ; in the case of 
those like themselves ; and not for the sake of a 
man getting anything, but because of others possess- 
ing it. For those men will be envious who have, or 
seem to have, others " like " them. I mean like in 
birth, relationship, age, moral habit, reputation, and 
possessions. And those will be envious who possess all 
but one of these advantages '^ ; that is why those who 
attempt great things and succeed are envious, because 
they think that every one is trying to deprive them 
of their own. And those who are honoured for some 
special reason, especially for wisdom or happiness. 
And the ambitious are more envious than the un- 
ambitious. And those who are wise in their own 
conceit, for they are ambitious of a reputation for 
wisdom ; and, in general, those who wish to be 
distinguished in anything are envious in regard to it. 
And the little-minded, because everything appears 
to them to be great. 

The advantages which excite envy have already 
been stated. Nearly all the actions or possessions 
which make men desire glory or honour and long for 
fame, and the favours of fortune, create envy, 
especially when men long for them themselves, or 
think that they have a right to them, or the possession 
of which makes them slightly superior or slightly 
inferior. 

And it is evident whom men envy, for it has just 
been stated by implication. They envy those who 

239 



ARISTOTLE 

TOL? yap iyyvs /cat )(p6va) /cat rorrco Kal rjXiKia 
/cat 80^77 <f>dovovaLV . 66 ev eLprjr at 

TO atryyeves yap kol ^doveZv eTriararai. 

/cat Trpos ovs ^iXorip.ovvTai' ^L\orLp.ovvTai jxev yap 
Trpos Tovs eip7]p,evovs , rrpos Se rovs p,vpLO(jT6v eros 
ovras ri Trpos tovs iaofjbevovs rj r^dvewras ovheis, 
ovhe TTpos rovs €<f>* ' Hpa/cAetats' cm^Aats'. ovS^ ajv 
TToXv otovrai Trap' avrots 7) napa rocs aAAot? Aet- 
Treadai, ovS' wv ttoXv VTrepexecv, (Laavrcos /cat npos 

6 rovrovg /cat irepl ra roiavra. cTrei 8e Trpos rovs 
dvrayojvLcrras /cat avrepaaras /cat oXcos tovs tojv 
avTOjv i^iep^evovs (jyiXoTi/JiovvTaL, avdyKrj jxaXiara 
TOVTOis (/idovetv odev eLprjTat, 

Kal K€pafjb€vs Kepafiel. 

7 /cat ToXs Ta)(v ol rj /xoXls tv)(ovt€s ^ p-rj tvx6vt€s 
g (f)dovovaLv . Kal aJv r) K€KTr)p,€vcov rj KaTopdovvTwv 

oveiBos avTOLS' etcxt §e Kat ovtol iyyvs Kal ofxoLOi' 

BrjXov yap on Trap avTovs ov Tvyxd-vovai tov 

dyadov, coare tovto Xvttovv Trotet tov <l)d6vov. 

9 /cat Tols rj €-)(ovcn rawra rj K€KTrjp,€VOLS oaa avrols 

TTpOCrfjKeV 7j KeKTTjVTO TTOTC StO Trp€a^VT€pOL V€iO- 

10 Tepois. Kal ol TToXXd haTravqaavTes els Tavro rots 

11 oAtya <f)9ouovaLv. SrjXov Se /cat e<^' ots ;)(;atpouo'tM 
ol roiovTOL Kal eVt riVt /cat 7T(x>s ej^oj/res" (os yap 

" According? to the scholiast, from Aeschylus. 

* Two rocks at the east end of the Straits of Gibraltar, 
supposed to be the limit westwards of the ancient world. 

* That is, no one w ill attempt to compete with them in 
their special branch of study. Roemer reads Kal wpdi roi>s 
wepi ra roLavra, translated by Jebb as if there were a full 

240 



RHETORIC, II. X. 5-11 

are near them in time, place, age, and reputation, 
whence it was said, 

Kinship knows how to envy also ; " 

and those with whom they are in rivahy, who are 
those just spoken of ; for no man tries to rival those 
who lived ten thousand years ago, or are about to 
be born, or are already dead ; nor those who live 
near the Pillars of Hercules ; * nor those who, in 
his own opinion or in that of others, are either far 
inferior or superior to him ; and the people and things 
which one envies are on the same footing." And 
since men strive for honour with those who are 
competitors, or rivals in love, in short, with those 
who aim at the same things, they are bound to feel 
most envious of these ; whence the saying, 

Potter [being jealous] of potter. ■* 

And those who have succeeded with difficulty or have 
failed envy those whose success has been rapid. 
And those whose possessions or successes are a re- 
proach to themselves, and these, too, are those near 
or like them ; for it is clear that it is their own 
fault that they do not obtain the same advantage, 
so that this pains and causes envy. And those who 
either have or have acquired what was naturally 
theirs or what they had once acquired ; this is why 
an older man is envious of a younger one. Those 
who have spent much envy those who have only 
spent little to obtain the same thing. And it is 
clear at what things and persons the envious rejoice, 
and in what frame of mind ; for, as when they do 

stop at uTrep^X""' " In like manner we vie with those 
engaged in such or such pursuits." 
" ii. 4. 21. 

R 241 



ARISTOTLE 

ovK €)(ovr€s XvTTOVvraL, ovrcos e^ovres cttl rols €V- 
avTLOLS rjcrdrjaovTaL. ware av avrol fiev TrapaaKeva- 
adcoaiv ovrcos ep^etv, ol S' eXeeladai r) rvyyaveiv 
rivos dyadov a^LO'up.evoL (haiv oioi ol eLprjfxevoi, 
SrjXov (x)s oil rev^ovr at eXeov Trapa rcav Kvpicov. 

11. ricDs" S' exovres l,rjXovaL kol ra TTola /cat 
6771 riaiv, evUevo eari orjAov. et yap ecm C^r^Aos 
XvTTr] ris 6771 <f)aivoiJi€V7j TTapovaia dyadojv ivn/jLcov 
/cat ivSexopievcov avraj Xa^elv rrepl rovs ofioiovs rfj 
(/)va'€L, ovx ore dXXo) dAA' on ovxl Kal avrcp iariv 
8to /cat 677t6i/ces" iariv 6 t,fjXos /cat imeiKcbv, ro 
Se <j)9ov€iv cf)avXov /cat (f)avXcov 6 fiev yap avrov 
TTapa(JKevdt,eL 8ta rov t^rjXov rvyxdveuv rcov dyadcbv, 
6 8e rov ttXtjoLov fxrj ex^tv Sid rov (f)66vov dvdyKrj 
Srj ^r}Xa)rtKOV9 fxev elvai rovs d^iovvras avrovs 
1388 b dyaddjv (Lv /jltj exovatv ovhels yap d^iol ra <f)aw6- 

2 p,€va dSvvara. 8to ol veoi /cat ol' fieyaXoiJjvxoL 
roiovroL. /cat ols vnapx^t roiavra ay add a rdJv 
ivripLOiV d^id iariv dvhpdJv earn, yap ravra TrXovros 
/cat 77oAu</)tAta /cat dpxal Kai baa roiavra- d>s yap 
TrpoaiJKov airrois dyadols elvai, on TrpoarJKe rois 
dyadcbs exovai, ^rjXovai ra roiavra rcbv dyadcov. 

3 /cat oils' ol aAAot d^iovaiv. /cat (Lv Trpoyovoi rj 
avyyeveis t] ot/cetot rj ro edvos rj rj ttoXis evrifxoi, 

" " The same state of mind which is absent in the painful 
feeling will be present in the joy excited by the opposite 
occasions," meaning that, if one set of circumstances pro- 
duces pain, the opposite will produce pleasure (Cope). Or, 
omitting ovk before ^xofret, " For in the same frame of 
mind as they are pained (at another's good fortime) they 
will rejoice in the contrary state of things " (at another's bad 
fortune). 

" Something like " although they are within their grasp " 
is needed to complete the sense. 
242 



RHETORIC, II. X. 11— XI. 3 

not possess certain things, they are pained, so when 
they do possess them, they will rejoice in the opposite 
circumstances.'^ So that if the judges are brought 
into that frame of mind, and those who claim their 
pity or any other boon are such as we have stated, 
it is plain that they will not obtain pity from those 
with whom the decision rests. 

1 1 . The frame of mind in which men feel emula- 
tion, what things and persons give rise to it, will be 
clear from the following considerations. Let us 
assume that emulation is a feeling of pain at the 
evident presence of highly valued goods, which are 
possible for us to obtain, in the possession of those 
who naturally resemble us — pain not due to the fact 
that another possesses them, but to the fact that we 
ourselves do not. Emulation therefore is virtuous 
and characteristic of virtuous men, whereas envy is 
base and characteristic of base men ; for the one, 
owing to emulation, fits himself to obtain such goods, 
while the object of the other, owing to envy, is to 
prevent his neighbour possessing them. Necessarily, 
then, those are emulous who hold that they have a 
claim to goods that they do not possess ; ^ for no 
one claims what seems impossible. Hence the 
young and high-minded are emulous. And so are 
those who possess such advantages as are worthy of 
honourable men, which include wealth, a number of 
friends, positions of office, and all similar things. 
For, believing it their duty to be good, because such 
goods naturally belong to those who are good, they 
strive to preserve them. And those are emulous, 
whom others think worthy of them. Honours ob- 
tained by ancestors, kinsfolk, intimates, nation, or 



243 



ARISTOTLE 

t,r]Xo)riKol irepl raxha' oi/ceia yap otovrat avrois 

4 etvai, /cat d^Loi tovtcov. el 8' earl ^TyAcara ra 
evTifJua ayadd, dvdyKrj rds re dperds etvai roiavras, 
/cat oaa rots dXXoLs ci^eAtyua /cat evepyeriKd' 
TLpLwai yap rovs evepyerovvras /cat rovs dyaOovs. 
/cat oauiv ayadcov dTToXavcris rots nXrjatov eariv, 
otov ttXovtos /cat /caAAoy fidXXov vyieias. 

5 ^avepov he /cat ol t,r]\a)rol rives' ol yap ravra 
/cat ra roiavra KeKrrjfxevot tpqXojroi. ecm Se 
ravra ra et,pr]fjt,eva, otov dvSpia ao<j>La dpx^j' ol yap 
dpxovres rroXXovs SvvavraL ev Trotelv, arparrjyol,, 

6 prjTopes, TTOvres ol ra roiavra 8vvdp,evot,. /cat 
ols TToAAoi o/j,oLOL ^ovXovrai etvai, •^ ttoXXoI yvd>- 
pLfxoL, ^ <j>iXoL TToXXol. Tj ovs TToXXol 6avp,dt,ovaLV , 

7 r) ovs avrol Oavfidl^ovaLV . /cat cov eVatvot /cat 
eyKcofita Xeyovrat rj vtto ttoltjtwv rj Xoyoypd(f)Oiv . 
Kara(f)povovai 8e rdJv evavriojv evavriov yap 
^i^Ao) Kara<f)p6v'r]aLS iari, /cat ro lr]Xovv rep /cara- 
<f)poveiv. dvdyKT) Be rovs ovrojs exovras a>are ^rj- 
Xcbaal rivas rj ^rjXovaOai, Kara(f)povrjTLKovs etvai 
rovrcov re /cat errt rovrois oaot ra evavria KaKa 
exovai rdjv dyaOojv rcov ^'qXcorcov. Sio 77oAAa/cts" 
KaTa^povovai rcov evrvxovvroiv , drav dvev rcov ev- 
rlpLcov dyaddtv vnapxi) avrols rj rvx^]. 8t' wv jxev 

" Spending one's money benefits one's neighbour to a 
certain extent, and beauty is always pleasant to look upon. 
One does not admire anj'^one because he is in good health, 
so much as because he is handsome. 

'' '* Who have many acquaintances or friends " (Jebb). 

* 'KoyoypdcpoL means either the oldest Greek historians 
(or rather "chroniclers"), or the writers of speeches for use 
in the law courts, or of panegyrics. 

<* Kai ivi TovTois. According to Cope, an unnecessary 
S44 



RHETORIC, II. XI. 3-7 

city make men emulous in regard to such honours ; for 
they tliink that these honours really belong to thenx 
and that they are worthy of them. And if highly 
valued goods are the object of emulation, it neces- 
sarily follows that the virtues must be such and all 
things tliat are useful and beneficial to the rest of 
mankind, for benefactors and virtuous men are 
honoured ; to these we may add all the goods which 
our neighbours can enjoy with us, such as wealth 
and beauty, rather than health.** 

It is also evident who are the obj ects of emulation ; 
for they are those who possess these or similar 
goods, such as have already been spoken of, for 
instance, courage, wisdom, authority ; for those in 
authority, such as generals, orators, and all who have 
similar powers, can do good to many. And those 
whom many desire to be like, or to be their acquaint- 
ances or friends ; ^ those whom many or ourselves 
admire ; those who are praised or eulogized either 
by poets or by prose writers." The opposite char- 
acters we despise ; for contempt is the opposite of 
emulation, and the idea of emulation of the idea_of 
contempt. And those who are in a condition which 
makes them emulate, or be emulated by, others, must 
be inclined to despise those persons'^ (and for that 
reason) who suffer from defects contrary to the 
good things which excite emulation. That is why 
we often despise those who are fortunate, whenever 
their good fortune is not accompanied by highly 
valued goods. The means of producing and destroy- 

parenthetical note (" and on such occasions "). Jebb refers 
both rovTwv and rovrois to persons : " tend to show contempt 
to or about those who." The "reason" in the translation 
above is that they suiFer from the want of "the highly 
valued goods." 

245 



ARISTOTLE 

ovu T<x Trddrj eyyiyveraL /cat SiaAuerat, i^ cov at 
TTtorets" ycyvovrai Trepi avraJv, eiprjrai. 

12. To, Se -^'^7^ TToZoi TLves Kara ra Trddrj /cat 
rds €^€Ls /cat ra? T^At/cta? /cat ra? Ti;;^as", BicXdcofiev 

2 fxerd ravra. Xeyco Se Trddrj fiev opyrjv eTTtdv/JLLav 
/cat TO, TOLavra, irepl dJv elprjKapiev Trporepov, 
e^ets" 8e apera? /cat /ca/ctas" eXpiqrai. he Trepi rovrwv 
TTporepov, /cat Trota Trpoaipovvrai e/cacrrot, /cat ttoiwv 

1389 a 7rpa/CTt/cot. T^XiKiai 8' €tat veoTTjs /cat aKp^rj /cat 
yrjpas. rvx'fjv Se Xeycj evyiveiav /cat ttAoutov /cat 
hwafxeis /cat rdvavria tovtols /cat oAo*? evrvxiav /cat 
SuCTryp^tW. 

3 Ot jLtev otJv veot to, t^'^t^ etatj/ eTndvp.'qrLKOi, /cat 
otot TTOielv (Lv dv e7rt,6vp,'qcr(joaLV . /cat roiv Trept 
TO aco/xa eTndvjJbtojv p^dXiara ^aKoXovdrjTLKoi eiat, 
rals Trepi ra d(/)po8l(na, /cat d/cparets" ravrrjs. 

4 evfJuerd^oXoL Se /cat dipLKopot TTpos rag eTTidvpuias, 
/cat a(f)6Spa piev eTndvpLovai, Ta^ecos^ Se Travovrat' 
o^eXai yap at ^ovX'qcreLs /cat oi5 pbeydXai, cooTrep 

5 at TcDv Kapivovrcov St^at /cat TrelvaL. /cat dvpuKot 
/cat o^vdvpuoL /cat otot d/coAou^ett' r^ ^PH'fj> '^^^ 
rjrrovs elat rov dvpov' 8td yd/a ^iXonpiiav ovk 
dvexovrai oXiycopovpuevoL, dXX' dyavaicrovaiv , dv 

6 ot'ojvTat dSt/ceta^at. /cat <f)iX6rLp,0L p,ev elcrL, pi.dX- 
Xou Se (J)lX6vlkol' VTTepox^S yap eTndvpLel rj veorrjs, 
rj Se VLKT] VTTepoxrj rts". /cat dp,(j)U) ravra pudAXov 
rJ ^iXoxp'Tip-arof ^tAo^^/ai^/xarot Se rjKiara Sid ro 
pirjTroi evSeias TreTreipdadai, uycmep ro HirraKov 

7 e;:^et dTT6(f>deypi,a els ^ Ap,(f)idpaov . /cat ou KaKO-qOeis 

» The TTto-rts i7<?t/c77 is resumed from ii. 1.8. As the irddri 
* and ?^eis have been discussed already, only the ages and 

their character remain. 

246 



RHETORIC, 11. XI. 7— XII. 7 

ing the various emotions in men, from which the 
methods of persuasion that concern them are derived, 
have now been stated. 

12. Let us now describe the nature of the char- 
acters of men according to their emotions, habits, 
ages, and fortunes. By the emotions I mean anger, 
desire, and the hke, of which we have ah*eady spoken ; 
by habits virtues and vices, of which also we have 
previously spoken, as well as the kind of things men 
individually and deliberately choose and practise.^ 
The ages are youth, the prime ofjife, and old age. ,-^-» 
By fortune I meari noble birth, wealth, power, and 
their contraries, and, in general, good or bad fortune.** 
The young, as to character, are ready to desire 
and to carry out what they desire. Of the bodily 
desires they chiefly obey those of sensual pleasure 
and these they are unable to control. Changeable 
in their desires and soon tiring of them, they desire 
with extreme ardour, but soon cool ; for their will, 
like the hunger and thirst of the sick, is keen rather 
than strong. They are passionate, hot-tempered, 
and carried away by impulse, and unable to control 
their passion ; for owing to their ambition they 
cannot endure to be slighted, and become indignant 
when they think they are being wronged. They are 
ambitious of honour, but more so of victory ; for 
youth desires superiority, and victory is a kind of 
superiority. And their desire for both these is 
greater than their desire for money, to which they 
attach only the slightest value, because they have 
never yet experienced want, as Pittacus ^ said in 
his pithy remark on Amphiaraus. They are not ill- 

* One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece. 

247 



ARISTOTLE 

(xAA evrjdeis Sia to firJTTOj redeojpr^Kevai ttoXXols 
7Tov7]ptas. /cat evTTLoroi 8ta to /xt^ttco ttoAAo, 

8 i^rjTTarrjadai. Kal eveXmSes' oiatrep yap ol olvoi- 
fievoL, ovTio hiddepp^oi elcrtv ol vIol vtto rijs ^vaeojs' 
ajxa 8e /cai Sia to pLt^TTio TroAAa amorervxriKivaL. 
/cat 1,0)01 ra TrXelarra eXirihr rj fxev yap eXirls rod 
fieXXovTos ioTLV rj he fiv-^/jbrj rod 7ra/30t;\;oyLteVoi>, 
Tot? Se veoLS to jxev fieXXov ttoXv to he Trap- 
eXrjXvdos ^paxv' rfj yap Trpojrrj 7]ixepa fjbepivijadaL 
jxev ovoev olov re, eATTLi^eLV oe Trai^a. /cat ev- 
€^a7TaT7]roL elat, 8ta ro elprj/jievov eXTrit,ovai yap 

Q pahiios. /cat avSpetoTe/jof dvfMcoSeis yap /cat eveX- 
TTtSe?, cov ro jxev firj (fto^eladai ro 8e dappeZv Trotet* 
ovre yap opyilopbevos ovSels ^o^eZrai, ro re 

10 eXm^eLv dyadov rt dappaXeov eariv. /cat al<r)(yv- 
rrjXoL- ov yap tto) KaXd erepa V7roXap,^dvovaLV , dXXa 

11 TTeTTaiSevvrac vtto rod v6p.ov p,6vov. /cat fxeyaXo- 
ijjvxof ovre yap vtto rod ^lov iroi reraTreivcovrai, 
aAAa rcbv dvayKaiatv direLpoi elaiv, /cat ro d^tovv 
avrov fjbeydXatv ixeyaXoipv)(io.' rovro S' eveXinBos . 

12 Kat p,dXXov alpovvrai Trpdrreiv ra KaXd ru)V 
avp,(f)ep6vrwv' rw yap rjdei ^cuai fxdXXov if) ru> 
XoyLapLO), eart S' o jxev X.oyLa/xos rov crvpL(f>epovros 

13 rj he dperrj rov KaXov. Kal (^tAo^tAot /cat ^tA- 
1389 b eraipoL jxdXXov rcov dXXa)v rjXLKLcov 8ta to x^^P^^^ 

rep av^ijv Kal ixtjttco TTpos ro avjJL(f>epov Kpiveiv 



" Or, " they do not look at things in a bad light, but in a 
good," i.e. they are not always ready to suspect. 

* Social convention is the only law that they know, and 
they are ashamed if they violate it, because as yet they have 
no idea of higher laws which may command them to do so. 

* ^6oi "in the widest sense, includes all that is habitual 

248 



RHETORIC, II. XII. 7-13 

natured but simple-natured,'* because they have never 
yet witnessed much depravity ; confiding, because 
they have as yet not been often deceived ; full of 
hope, for they are naturally as hot-blooded as those 
who are drunken with wine, and besides they have 
not yet experienced many failures. For the most 
part they live in hope, for hope is concerned with 
the future as memory is with the past. For the 
young the future is long, the past short ; for in the 
morning of life it is not possible for them to re- 
member anything, but they have everything to hope ; 
which makes them easy to deceive, for they readily 
hope. And they are more courageous, for they are 
full of passion and hope, and the former of these 
prevents them fearing, while the latter inspires them 
with confidence, for no one fears when angry, and 
hope of some advantage inspires confidence. And 
they are bashful, for as yet they fail to conceive of 
other things that are noble, but have been educated 
solely by convention.'' They are high-minded, for 
they have not yet been humbled by life nor have 
they experienced the force of necessity j further, 
there is high-mindedness in thinking oneself worthy 
of great things, a feeling which belongs to one who^ 
is full of hope. 

In their actions, they prefer the noble to the 
useful ; their life is guided by their character " rather 
than by calculation, for the latter aims at the useful, 
virtue at the noble. At this age more than any 
other they are fond of their friends and companions, '' 
because they take pleasure in living in company and 
as yet judge nothing by expediency, not even their 

and characteristic ; in a limited sense, it expresses the habitual 
temper or disposition " (Twining). 

249 



ARISTOTLE 

14 ixTjSev, coare /XTySe rovs <J)lXovs. kul arravra inl 
ro /jidXXov /cat a(f)o8p6r€pov dfiaprdvovaL Trapd 
TO ^iX(i)V€Lov Trdvra yap dyav rrpdrrovaLV ^iXovai 
T€ yap dyav Kat pnaovaLV dyav /cat rdXXa ndvra 
o/JiOicos. /cat eiSeVat Trdvra otovrat, /cat Suaxvpi- 
^ovTai' Tovro yap airiov ecrr» /cat rov iravra dyav. 

15 /cat rd dSiKTJfxara dScKovcnv et's" v^piv /cat ov 
KaKovpyiav. /cat iXerjTLKol Sid ro Trdvra^ XPV' 
arovs /cat ^eXriovs VTToXan^dveiv rfj ydp avrcov 
d/ca/cta rovs TriXas [Merpovaiv, oior dvd^ia Trdayeiv 

16 VTToXafjL^dvovaiv avrovs. /cat <f>iXoyeX(jires , ^^o /cat 
evrpdrreXoL' rj ydp evrpaTreXia TreTraLhevp^evrj v^pis 
iariv. rd p,kv ovv rcbv vecov roLovrov iarw rjOos. 

13. Ot 8e TTpea^vrepoL /cat TraprjKp.aKores ax^Sov 
e/c rd)V ivavrtcov TouTot? rd TrXelara exovaiv rjOy]' 
8ia ydp ro ttoAAo, err} ^c^tcoKcvat, /cat rrXeico i^- 
rjTTarrjadat /cat rjfiaprrjKevai, Kal rd ttXcloj (fiavXa 
elvai rd)V TTpaypidrcov , ovre Sta/Se^atowrat ovSev, 

2 '^rrov re dyav diravra r} Set, /cat otop'Tat, taacrt 
8' ovhev. /cat dp,(j>ia^r}rovvres TTpocmdeaaiv aet 
ro lao)? /cat rdxa, /cat Trdvra Xeyovaiv ovroi, 

3 TTayicos 8' ou8eV. /cat KaKorjOeis elaiv eon ydp 
KaKorideia rd eTTi ro ;^etpor VTroXafi^dveiv Travra. 
en 8e Ka^vTroTTroL etat 8ta TT^t' aTnanav, aTncrrot 

4 8e St' ipLTTeLpiav . /cat oure ^lXovol cr^dSpa oure 
pnaovai 8ta ravra, dXXd /caret ri^v BtWro? VTTodnjKtjv 
/cat <j>LXovaLV cos p,Larjaovres /cat pnaovcTiv d>s 

5 (fycXijaovres . /cat fxiKpoi/jvxoc Sto. ro reraTTeivdjadai 

" One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece. The maxim was 
MTyS^c d7ai', i\re </Mid nimis. Never go to extremes. 

* Or, " better than they really are." 

* One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece. 

250 



RHETORIC, 11. xii. 14— XIII. 5 

friends. All their errors are due to excess and 
vehemence and their neglect of the maxinx of Chilon," 
for they do everything to excess, love, hate, and 
everything else. And they think they know every- 
thing, and confidently affirm it, and this is the cause 
of their excess in every tiling. If they do wrong, it,, 
is due to insolence, not to wickedness. And they are^'fY'^ 
inclined to ~pity, because they think all men are 
virtuous and better than themselves ^ ; for they 
measure their neighbours by their own inoffensive- 
ness, so that they think that they suffer undeservedly. 
And they are fond of laughter, and therefore witty ; 
for wit is cultured insolence. Such then is the *-' 
character of the young. 

13. Older men and those who have passed their 
prime have in most cases characters opposite to those 
of the young. For, owing to their having lived many 
years and having been more often deceived by 
others or made more mistakes themselves, and since 
most human things turn out badly, they are positive 
about nothing, and in everything they show an 
excessive lack of energy. They always " think," 
but " know " nothing ; and in their hesitation they 
always add " perhaps," or " maybe " ; all their 
statements are of this kind, never unqualified. They 
are mahcious ; for malice consists in looking upon 
the worse side of everything. Further, they are 
always suspicious owing to mistrust, and mistrustful 
owing to experience. And neither their love nor 
their hatred is strong for the same reasons ; but, 
according to the precept of Bias," they love as if they 
would one day hate, and hate as if they would one 
day love. And they are little-minded, because they 



251 



ARISTOTLE 

VTTO rov ^iov ovhevos yap fj,eydXov ovBe TrepiTrov, 

6 dXXa rcJov npos rou ^iov i7ndvfj,ovatv. kol dv- 
eXevdepof eV yap tl rajv dvayKaioiv rj ovaia, a/xa 
Se /cat hid rrjv i/jbTfeiplav laaatv cvs ;^aAe7rot' to 

7 KTrjaaadaL /cat pdhiov ro dTTO^aXelv . /cat SetAot 
/cat TTOvra 7Tpo(f)o^7]TiKoi' ivavriois yap Sta/cetvrat 
rot? veois' Karei/jvyfievoL yap elatv, ol 8e depfioL 
axrre TTpocoBoTToirjKe ro yrjpas rfj SetAta* /cat yap 

8 o (jio^os Kard^v^is tls lariv. /cat ^tAd^coot, /cat 
/xaAtCTTa €7ri tt^ reXevrala 7]ixepa hid rd rod dirovros 
elvai rrjv iTnOvfiiav, /cat ov he evheeXs, rovrov 

9 fidXiara iTridvficlv . /cat (f)iXavroL jxaXXov tj Set* 
[JLiKpoifivxt'Oi' ydp Tts" /cat avTTj. /cat tt/jos" to cruju.- 
(f)€pov t^djcriv, aAA' ou 7r/96s' to KaXov, /xaAAov •^ 
Set, Sta ro ^iXavroL etvat* to yttev ydp avfj,(f)epou 

1390 a auToi dyadov iari, ro he KaXov aTrXcbs. 

10 Kat dvaiaxwroL jxaXXov rj aLcr)(vvr7jXoi,' hcd ydp 
ro p,rj <f)povrit,eLV o/jlolws rov koXov /cat rov ovp,- 

11 (j)epovros oXiyoipovai rov hoKelv. /cat hvaeXTTLhes 
hid rrjv €jji7T€ipiav' rd ydp TrXeico rcov yiyvofx,eva>v 
<j>avXd ear IV aTTO^aivei yovv rd TroAAa eTrt ro 

12 x^^P^^' '^^^^ ^"^^ ^^^ "^W heiXiav. /cat ^coctl rfj pivrj/jir) 
fxaXXov ^ rfj iXTTihi' rov ydp ^iov ro jxev Xoittov 
oXiyov rd he TrapeXrjXvdos ttoXv, eari he tj fxev 
cXttIs rov fjieXXovros r] he fJivtjp.rj rojv Trapoixop-evoiv . 
oirep atriov /cat rrjs dhoXecrxiciS avrois' hiareXovai 
ydp rd yevofieva Xeyovres' dvafJLifxvqcrKOfievoL ydp 

13 i^SovTat. /cat oi dvfxol d^et? fjiev dadeveZg he 
elaiv, KoX at emdvpiiai at fieu eKXeXoiTraaiv at 
he dadevets elacv, ware ovr' eiridvp.'qriKol ovre 
TTpaKTiKol Kard rd? evidv/Jiias, dXXd Kard ro 

252 



RHETORIC, II. XIII. 5-13 

have been humbled by hfe ; for they desire nothhig 
great or uncommon, but only the necessaries of hfe. 
They are not generous, for property is one of these 
necessaries, and at the same time, they know from 
experience how hard it is to get and how easy to 
lose. And they are cowardly and inclined to antici- 
pate evil, for their state of mind is the opposite of 
that of the young ; they are chilled, whereas the 
young are hot, so that old age paves the way for 
cowardice, for fear is a kind of chill. And they are 
fond of life, especially in their last days, because 
desire is directed towards that which is absent and 
men especially desire what they lack. And they 
are unduly selfish, for this also is littleness of mind. 
And they live not for the noble, but for the useful, 
more than they ought, because they are selfish ; for 
the useful is a good for the individual, whereas the 
noble is good absolutely. 

And they are rather shameless than modest ; for 
since they do not care for the noble so much as for 
the useful, they pay little attention to what people 
think. And they are little given to hope owing to 
their experience, for things that happen are mostly 
bad and at all events generally turn out for the 
worse, and also owing to their cowardice. They live 
in memory rather than in hope ; for the life that 
remains to them is short, but that which is past is 
long, and hope belongs to the future, memory to the 
past. This is the reason of their loquacity ; for they 
are incessantly talking of the past, because they take 
pleasure in recollection. Their outbursts of anger 
are violent, but feeble ; of their desires some have 
ceased, while others are weak, so that they neither 
feel them nor act in accordance with them, but only 

253 



ARISTOTLE 

KepSos. Slo Kal aa>(/>povLKol ^aivovrai olrrjXiKovroL' 
at re yap eTnOvfilaL aveiKaaL, Kal SovXevovcrt Ta> 

14 KcpSei. Kal jxaXXou ^cocn Kara Xoyiaixov r) Kara 
TO Tjdos' 6 fiev yap Xoyiapios rov avp,<f)epovTos to 
S' rjdos rijs dperrjs icmv. /cat rahiK-qjxara aSi- 

15 KovcFLV els KaKovpyiav, ovk els v^piv. eXerjTiKol he 
Kttt OL yepovres elatv, aXX ov 8ta ravro rots veois' 
OL fjbev yap Sea </)t,Xavdpa)TTLav, ol 8e St' dcrdeveiav 
rrdvTa yap o'lovrai eyyvs elvai avrols Trade lv, 
rovTO 8' "^v eXerjTLKOv. 66 ev oSvprcKOL elai, Kal 
OVK evrpdireXoL ovhe (jjiXoyeXoiof evavriov yap ro 

16 oovpTLKOv Tcp (fnXoyeXoiTL. TUiv p,ev ovv vecov Kal 
rdjv TTpea^vreptov rd rjOr] roiavra- coot' errel 
aTToSexovTat irdures rovs rep a^erepcp TJdei Xeyo- 
jxevovs Xoyovs Kal rovs o/jLolovs, ovk d8r]Xov ttcos 
Xpa)p-€vo(, TOLS Xoyots roiovroL <^avovvraL Kal avrol 
Kai OL Xoyoi. 

14. Ot 8e dKfjbd^ovres (f)avep6v on p,era^v 
rovrcov ro rjOos eaovrai, eKarepwv d<j>aipovvres 
ry^v vrrep^oXrjv, Kal ovre a(f)68pa dappovvres 
(dpaavTTjs yap ro roiovrov) ovre Xiav (f)o^ovfJLevoi, 

2 KaXcos Se irpos dp,<j)co e^ovres, ovre Trdai inarevovres 
ovre TTaaiv dmarovvres, dXXd Kara ro dXrjdes 

1390 b Kpivovres [xdXXov. Kal ovre npos to KaXov ^wvres 
fjiovov ovre irpos to cFvp,<f>epov, dXXd Trpos dix(f)a). 
Kal ovre Trpos ^etSco ovre Trpos damriav, dXXd Trpos 

3 TO dp/Jborrov . o/JbOLOJS Se Kal Trpos dvpiov Kal 
Trpos eTndvfMLav. Kal a(v(J>poves fi^r^ avSpias Kal 

" Or, " speeches which resemble (or reflect) it " (their 
character). 

254 



RHETORIC, II. XIII. 13- XIV. 3 

from motives of gain. Hence men of this age are 
regarded as self-controlled, for their desires have slack- 
ened, and they are slaves to gain. In their manner 
of life there is more calculation than moral character, 
for calculation is concerned with that which is useful, 
moral character with virtue. If they commit acts of 
injustice it is due to vice rather than to insolence. 
The old, like the young, are inclined to pity, but 
not for the same reason ; the latter show pity from 
humanity, the former from weakness, because they 
think that they are on the point of suffering all kinds 
of misfortunes, and this is one of the reasons that 
inchne men to pity. That is why the old are 
querulous, and neither witty nor fond of laughter ; 
for a querulous disposition is the opposite of a love 
of laughter. Such are the characters of the young 
and older men. Wherefore, since all men are willing 
to listen to speeches which harmonize with their 
own character and to speakers who resemble them,** 
it is easy to see what language we must employ so 
that both ourselves and our speeches may appear to 
be of such and such a character. 

14. It is evident that the character of those in the 
prime of life will be the mean between that of the 
other two, if the excess in each case be removed. 
At this age, men are neither over-confident, which 
would show rashness, nor too fearful, but preserving 
a right attitude in regard to both, neither trusting 
nor distrusting all, but judging rather in accordance 
with actual facts. Their rule of conduct is neither 
the noble nor the useful alone, but both at once. 
They are neither parsimonious nor prodigal, but 
preserve the due mean. It is the same in regard to 
passion and desire. Their self-control is combined 

255 



ARISTOTLE 

avSpeXoL fiera croj(f>pouvv'r]s . iv yap rot? veots fat 
Tots" yepovai Si-^p-qTat ravra- elcrl yap ol [xev veot 
avSpeXoi Kal a/coAacrrot, ot 8e Trpear^vrepot aa>(f)pov€? 
Kau 0€lAol. cos Se KadoXov elTrelv, ocra fxev hirjpr^rai 
rj veoTTjs Kal ro yrjpas rwv oj(f)eXiixo)v , ravra dp,^oi 
exovacv, oaa S' vvep^dXXovaLV 7} iXXeiTrovcn, 
4 roirrwv ro fierpiov Kal ro dpp,6rrov . oLKfjud^et 8e 
ro fjiev awfxa airo rdv rpiaKovra irwv P'€)(pt rcov 
Trevre Kal rpidKovra, rj Se i/jv^r] rrepl rd ivos Setv 
TTevrrjKovra. Trept fiev ovv veorrjros /cat yqpojs 
/cat aKfxrjg, ttoicov rjOojv eKaarov icmv, elpiqaOo) 
roaavra. 

15. Ilept 8e r&v dird rvxrjs ycyvofxevojv dyadojv, 
8t oaa avrdjv Kal rd rjOr] ttokx arra avfi^aLvet 

2 roXs dvdpdiTTOLs, Xeyojjxev i^e^rjS' evyeveiag fxev 
ovv rjdos iari ro <^iXorip,6r€pov elvai rov K€Krr)- 
fievov avrrjv diravres ydp, drav vrrdpxj} Tt, irpos 
rovro acopeveiv elcoOaatv, rj 8' evyeveia em/xoTTys" 
Tt? TTpoyovcov iarlv. Kal Karacj^povrjrLKOv /cat 
rd)V ofiotcov earl rots irpoyovois rols avrcov, Siori 
TToppco ravrd fidXXov rj iyyvs ytyvofxeva ivrcpiorepa 

3 /cat €vaXat,6v€vra. eari 8e evyeves fJ-ev /caret rrjv 
rov yevovs dperrjv, yevvaZov 8e /card ro fir] i^- 
iaraadai rrjs <f>va€a)S' orrep d)S errl ro ttoXv ov 
avfJ,^aLV€L rols evyeviaiv , aAA' elalv ol rroXXol 
evreXels' <f>opd ydp ris iariv iv rols yeveaiv dv8pd)v 
coairep iv rols /card rds x^P^^ y tyvofxivo is , Kal 
iviore dv fj dyadov ro yivos, iyyivovrat 8td rivos 
Xpovov dvBpes TTepirroi, Karreira rrdXtv dvaSiScoatv . 
i^iararai 8e rd jxev ev(f>vd yivrj els p>avLK(x>repa 

" i.e. the advantages and distinctions the family possessed 
256 



RHETORIC, II. XIV. 3— xv. 3 

with courage and their courage with self-control, 
whereas in the young and old these qualities are 
found separately ; for the young are courageous but 
without self-control, the old are self-controlled but 
cowardly. Speaking generally, all the advantages 
that youth and old age possess separately, those in 
the prime of life possess combined ; and all cases of 
excess or defect in the other two are replaced by 
due moderation and fitness. The body is most fully 
developed from thirty to thirty-five years of age, the 
mind at about forty-nine. Let this suffice for youth, 
old age, and the prime of life, and the characters 
which belong to each. 

15. Let us next speak of the goods that are due 
to fortune, all those, at least, which produce certain 
characters in men. A characteristic of noble birth 
is that he who possesses it is more ambitious ; for all 
men, when they start with any good, are accustomed 
to heap it up, and noble birth is a heritage of 
honour from one's ancestors. Such men are prone to 
look down even upon those who are as important as 
their ancestors, because the same things " are more 
honourable and inspire greater vanity when remote 
than when they are recent. The idea of noble birth ^^ 
refers to excellence of race, that of noble character 
to not degenerating from the family type, a quality 
not as a rule found in those of noble birth, most of 
whom are good for nothing. For in the generations 
of men there is a kind of crop as in the fruits of the 
field ; sometimes, if the race is good, for a certain 
period men out of the common are born in it, and 
then it deteriorates. Highly gifted families often 

of old ; such distinctions, when possessed by those of later 
date, are less thought of. 

s 257 



ARISTOTLE 

rjdrj, olov ol a??' 'AA/ct^taSou /cat ol oltto AiovvaLOV 
rod vporepov, ra he crrao-t/xa els a^eXrepiav Koi 
vco6p6r7]ra, olov ol airo l^tfxcx)vos /cat nept/cAeous" 
/cat TiOJKpdrovs. 

16. Ta> Se ttXovto) d eVerat "^'^t^, eTnTToXrjs 

ecrriv tSeiv aTraffiv v^pLcrral yap /cat VTTeprj<f)avoi, 

Traa^^ovres rt utto t^s" KTrjaecos rod TrXovrov cocr- 

I39ia77ep yap e^j^ovxes" anavra rdyada ovroj Sta/ceti/Tat* 

o yap ttAoutos' otor rtp-iy rt? t?^? d^ias rcjv dXXcov, 

2 8to (f)a(,verai covia diravra etvai avrov. /cat rpv- 
(f)€poi /cat craAa/ccoves", rpv<j)epol [xev Sta ri^v rpv(f)rjV 
/cat TT^P' evSei^LV rrjs evSaifxovLas, aaXaKOJves Se 
/cat croAot/cot 8ta to rravras elojdevat hiarpi^eLV 
Trepl ro epd>ixevov /cat 6avfxat,6p,€vov vtt' avrdv, 
Kal ro) oieudai ^rjXovv rovs dXXovs d /cat avroL 
dfia 8e /cat et/coTa>? rovro irdaxovaiv ttoXXoI yap 
elaiv ol Seo/xevoL rcov i)(6vrcov. oOev /cat ro 
HipbOiVihov etprjrai, Trepl rcov ao<j)cbv /cat TrXovaicov 
rrpog rrjv yvvalKa rrjv 'lepcovog epopLevrjv Trorepov 
yeveadat Kpelrrov irXovaiov t] aocjjov rrXovacov 
eLTTelv rovs ao(f)ovs yap e<f)rj opdv IttI rats ra>v 

3 TrXovaicov dvpais hiarpi^ovras. Kal rd o'ieadai 
d^iovs etvai dpxeiv exeiv yap olovr at cLv eveKev 
dpx^iv d^LOV. Kal d)s ev Ke(f)aXaicp, dvorjrov ev- 

4 Salfxovos rjdos TrXovrov eariv. Sta^e'pei he roXs 
vecoari KeKrrjpievoLs Kal rots TrdXai rd rjdr] rep 
aTTOvra pbdXXov Kal </)avX6repa rd /ca/ca e^etv rovs 
veoTrXovrovs' (ZaTrep ydp dTrathevata TrXovrov earl 
ro veoTrXovrov elvai. Kal dhiKt^fxara dhiKovaiv 



258 



RHETORIC, II. XV. 3 xvi. 4 

degenerate into maniacs, as, for example, the de- 
scendants of Alcibiades and the elder Dionysius ; 
those that are stable into fools and dullards, like the ^ 
descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates. 

16. The characters which accompany wealth are 
plain for all to see. The wealthy are insolent and 
arrogant, being mentally affected by the acquisition 
of wealth, for they seem to think that they possess 
all good things ; for wealth is a kind of standard of 
value of everything else, so that everything seems 
purchasable by it. They are luxm-ious and swaggerers, 
luxurious because of their luxury and the display of 
their prosperity, swaggerers and ill-mannered because 
all men are accustomed to devote their attention to 
what they like and admire, and the rich suppose that 
what they themselves are emulous of is the object 
of all other men's emulation. At the same time this 
feeling is not unreasonable ; for those who have need 
of the wealthy are many in number. Hence the 
answer of Simonides to the wife of Hiero concerning 
the wise and the rich, when she asked which was 
preferable, to be wise or to be rich. " Rich," he 
answered, " for we see the wise spending their time 
at the doors of the rich." And the rich think they 
are worthy to rule, because they believe they possess 
that which makes them so.** In a word, the character 
of the rich man is that of a fool favoured by fortune. 
At the same time there is a difference between the 
character of the newly rich and of those whose wealth 
is of long standing, because the former have the vices 
of wealth in a greater degree and more ; for, so 
to say, they have not been educated to the use of 
wealth. Their unjust acts are not due to malice, 

<» " What makes power worth having " (Cope). 

259 



ARISTOTLE 

ov KaKovpyiKOL, aAAa ra fjiev v^pianriKa to. 8e 
OLKpaTevrLKOL, olov et? aiKLav /cat jU.oi;^etW. 

17. Ofioiios Se /cat 77epi Svvdfxeojs a^^Sov ra 
TrAetara (f>avepd iariv rjOr]' rd jxev yap rd avrd ep^et 

2 17 hvvaiXLS ra> ttXovto) rd Se ^eXriw (f)LXorcfi6T€pOL 
ydp /cat dvhpojhearepoi elai rd rjdrj ol BwdpuevoL 
Tcov irXovaiojv Sta rd IcjiUaOai epyojv oaa i^ovaca 

3 avToXs TTparretv Sid ttjv hvvap.Lv. /cat arrovha- 
ariKOJTepoi Sta rd ev eTri/AeAeia etvai, dray/ca^o- 

4 p,evoi GKOTTelv rd Trepl rrjv Svvap,Lv. /cat aep^vorepoL 
rj ^apvrepoL- TTOtel ydp ep.(jiaveoripovs rd d^icxjp.a, 
8to pLerpidtjOVOLV kari 8e rj a€p,v6rr]g fiaXaKrj /cat 
€VCF)(iqp,o)v ^apvrrjs. kolv dhiKchoLV, ov pLiKpahiK7]rai 
eloLV dXXd /xeyaAa8t/cot. 

5 * H 8 evrvx^o- /caret, to, p,6pt,a rwv €lpr)p,€vojv ej^^et 
rd ijdrf els ydp ravra avvreivovaiv at /xeytcrrat 
hoKovaai etvai ezJryp^tat, /cat eVt ei? evreKvlav /cat 

1391 b TO. /cara rd acbpua dyadd Trapacr/ceua^et ?^ evrvx^a 

6 TrAeove/crett'. V7T€prj<^avcor€poL p,ev ovv /cat d- 
XoyicrrorepoL 8td tt^i^ evrvx^^oiv claiv, iv 8' d/coAou- 
^et ^eXriarov rjdos rfj evrv^ia, on <j)LX6deoi elai, 
/cat kxovai irpos rd delov rrcos, Tncrrevovres 8td 
ra yiyvopbeva dyaOd drrd rrjs rv^f]?. Trepl fxev 
ovv rcov /ca^' rfXiKiav /cat rv^rjv rjdcov etp-qraf 
rd ydp evavria rcov elprjpievcov e'/c rcov ivavrlcov 



" ev exifieXelqi : " because they are administrators " (Jebb). 

* The three divisions are noble birth, wealth, and power. 
The meaning is that the highest kinds of good fortune tend 
or converge to tliese {i.e. to noble birth, wealth, and power), 
Kara to, fiopta might also mean "in part." Hobbes, in his 
Brief of the Art of Rhetorick, paraphrases: "the manners 
260 



RHETORIC, II. XVI. 4— xvii. 6 

but partly to insolence, partly to incontinence, which 
tends to make them commit assault and battery and 
adultery. 

17. In regard to power, nearly all the characters 
to which it gives rise are equally clear ; for power, 
compared with wealth, exhibits partly identical, and 
partly superior characteristics. Thus, the powerful 
are more ambitious and more manly in character 
than the rich, since they aim at the performance of 
deeds which their power gives them the opportunity 
of carrying out. And they are more energetic ; for 
being obliged to look after their power, they are 
always on the watch." And they are dignified rather 
than heavily pompous ; for their rank renders them 
more conspicuous, so that they avoid excess ; and 
this dignity is a mild and decent pomposity. And 
their wrongdoings are never petty, but great. 

Good fortune in its divisions ^ exhibits characters 
corresponding to those which have just been men- 
tioned ; for those which appear to be the most 
important kinds of good fortune tend in their direc- 
tion ; further, good fortune furnishes advantages 
over others in the blessing of children and bodily " 
goods. Now, although meii are more arrogant and 
thoughtless owing to good fortune, it is accompanied 
by a most precious quality. Fortunate men stand 
in a certain relation to the divinity and love the 
gods, having confidence in them owing to the benefits 
they have received from fortune. We have spoken " 
of the characters associated with different ages and 
fortunes ; the opposite characters to those described, 
of men that prosper, are compounded of the manners of the 
nobiUty, the rich, and those that are in power, for to some of 
these all prosperity appertains." 

« ii. 12-14 ; ii. 15-17. 

261 



ARISTOTLE 

<f>av€pa iariv, olov Trivqros /cat arvxovs rjdos Kal 
dSvvdrov. 

18. Ettci 8 Tj Tcov TTiOavcbv Xoycov xprjcris Trpos 
Kpiaiv iarc (Trepl a>v yap ta/xev /cat KCKpiKafiev, 
ovSev kn Set Xoyov), ecrrt 8e, dv re Trpos eVa ris 
ra> Xoycp ;)^/3aS/xei^o? TrporpeTrrj rj dirorpeTTr], olov 
at vovderovvres ttolovctlv t) 7T€l6ovt€s (ovSev yap 
rJTTOv KpirrfS 6 etf ov yap Set Tretaai, ovros iartv 
(1)S dnXaJg elnelv Kpir-^s), edv re Trpos dfM(f)La^7]rovvra 
edv re Trpos VTrodeaiv Xeyrj ris, o/xot'ojs" to) yap 
Xoycp dvdyKT] )(prjada{, /cat dvaLpelv rdvavria, 
TTpos a waTTcp dfi(/)La^r]rovvra rov Xoyov TToielrai. 
waavrcos Se /cat ev rots eTrtSet/crt/cot?* warrep yap 
TTpos Kptrrjv rov 6ea>p6v 6 Xoyos avvearrjKev. 
oXcos Se fiovos iarlv dirXats Kpcrrjs ev rots ttoXl- 
rLKOLS aycbaiv 6 rd t,rirovp,eva KpivoiV rd re yap 
dp.(j)ia^'r)rovpieva li-jrelrai, ttcos ^X^^> '^^^ Trepl wv 
^ovXevovrat. Trepl Se rwv Kara rds TToXireias 
rjOchv ev rols avjx^ovXevrLKOLS e'ipr]rai Trporepov. 
ware Bcwptapievov dv etrj ttojs T€ /cat Sta riviov 
rovs Xoyovs rjdiKovs TTOirjreov . 

" Having dealt with ethical and pathetic proofs, Aristotle 
proceeds to the discussion of topics of enthymemes common 
to all three kinds of Rhetoric. The diflficulty in the Oreek 
lies in the absence of a suitable apodosis to the long sentence 
beginning iyrei de i] tCiv -mdavCcv. Grammatically, it might be 
(iirre oimiuanivov hv ei'ij, but it by no means follows that " since 
the employment of persuasive speeches is directed towards a 
judgement . . . therefore it has been determined how . • . 
we must make our speeches ethical." Spengel, regarding 
eirel 5k . . . fiovXevovrai merely as an enlargement of ii. 1, i^, 
brackets the passage. Cope suggests that something has 
fallen out after fiovXevovTai : "Since in all the three kinds of 
Rhetoric the object is to secure a judgement, [I have shown 
how to put the judges into a certain frame of mind in the 

262 



RHETORIC, 11. xvii. 6— xvin. 1 

for instance, of the poor, of the unfortunate, and of 
the weak, arc obvious from their opposites. 

18.« Now the employment of persuasive speeches 
is directed towards a judgement ; for when a thing 
is known and judged, there is no longer any need of 
argument. And there is judgement, whether a 
speaker addresses himself to a single individual and 
makes use of his speech to exhort or dissuade, as 
those do who give advice or try to persuade, for this 
single individual is equally a judge, since, speaking 
generally, he who has to be persuaded is a judge ; 
if the speaker is arguing against an opponent or 
against some theory, it is just the same, for it is 
necessary to make use of speech to destroy the 
opposing arguments, against which he speaks as if 
they were the actual opponent ; and similarly in 
epideictic speeches, for the speech is put together 
with reference to the spectator as if he were a judge. 
Generally speaking, however, only he who decides 
questions at issue in civil controversies * is a judge 
in the proper sense of the word, for in judicial cases 
the point at issue is the state of the case, in de- 
liberative the subjects of deliberation." We have 
already spoken of the characters of forms of govern- 
ment in treating of deliberative rhetoric,** so that it 
has been determined how and by what means we 
must make our speeches conform to those characters, 
discussion of the characters and emotions]. I have also 
spoken of the cliaracters of the forms of government ; so 
that this part of the subject need no longer detain us." It 
is generally agreed that we have not the chapter as originally 
arranged, although it is not supposed that any part of it is 
non-Aristotelian (see Cope and note in Jebb's translation). 
'' Both forensic and deliberative. 

« Or, " for in both forensic and deliberative arguments the 
issue is the state of the case." "^ i. 8. 

263 



ARISTOTLE 

2 Ettci 8e TTepl eKaarov fxev yevos rwv Xoycov 
erepov rjv to reXos, Trepl aTrdvTcov S' avrcx)v elXrjpLp^i- 
vai So^at Koi Trpordaeis elaiv, i^ c5v Tas TrlaTeiS 
(f)epovaL Kol avpL^ovXevovres koI imSeLKvufxevoL 
KUt afxt^ia^rjTovvres, eVt 8' e^ cov tjOlkovs rovs 
Xoyovs ivhej^^erai TTOLelv, koL Trepl rovTiov Sico/aicrTat, 

3 XoiTTOv rjixlv hieXdelv Trepl rwv koivcov Trdai yap 
avayKoiov rd Trepl rod Svvarov /cat dSvvdrov 
TTpoaxprjcrdaL iv roZs Xoyois, Koi rovs p-^v cos 
ear at rovs Se cos yeyove Treipdcrdai SeiKvvvai. 

4 ere Se rrepl pieyedovs kolvov dTrdvrojv earl rwv 
XoyoiV xpdov^oLt yap Trdvres rep pLeiovv Kal av^eiv 
Kal avpi^ovXevovres Kal erraLVOvvres rj ipeyovres 

5 Kal Karrjyopovvres '^ dTToXoyovp,evoi . rovratv he 
1392 a Sioptadevrcov Trepl re evdvpirjpidrwv Koivfj TTeLpaOct)p,ev 

eLTTeZv, el ri e^op-ev, koX Trepl TrapaSetypudrwv , oTrco? 
rd XoLTrd Trpoadevres aTTohcopiev rrjv e^ ^PXV^ Trpo- 
OeoLv. ecTTL he rdjv kolvcov ro p,ev av^etv oiKeiorarov 
roLs eTnheiKrLKOLS, ojarrep etprjrai, ro he yeyovos 
rols hiKaviKOLS (Trepl rovrcov yap rj Kpiais), rd he 
hvvardv Kal icropbevov rols crvpL^ovXevriKOLS . 

19. Yipdjrov p,ev ovv Trepl hvvarov Kal dhvvdrov 
Xeyojpiev. dv hrj rovvavriov fj hvvardv rj elvat •^ 
yeveadai, Kal rd evavriov ho^eiev dv etvai hvvardv 
OLOV el hvvardv dvdpiOTTOV vyLaaOijvat, Kal voarjcrar 
Tj yap avrrj hvvap,is rGiV evavrloiv, 7^ evavrla. /cat 

» i. 3. '' i. 4-8. " i. 9 ; 10-15. 

'' i. 9. 40. Amplication is to be understood of the 
exaggeration of both great and small things. It is most 
264 



RHETORIC, II. XVIII. 2— xix. 1 

Now, since each kind of Rhetoric, as was said," has 
its own special end, and in regard to all of them we 
have gathered popular opinions and premises whence 
men derive their proofs in deliberative, epideictic, 
and judicial speeches,^ and, further, we have deter- 
mined '^ the special rules according to which it is 
possible to make our speeches ethical, it only remains 
to discuss the topics common to the three kinds of 
rhetoric. For all orators are obliged, in their 
speeches, also to make use of the topic of the possible 
and impossible, and to endeavour to show, some of 
them that a thing will happen, others that it has 
happened. Further, the topic of magnitude is 
common to all kinds of Rhetoric, for all men employ 
extenuation or amplification whether deliberating, 
praising or blaming, accusing or defending. When 
these topics have been determined, we will endeavour 
to say what we can in general about enthyraemes 
and examples, in order that, when we have added 
what remains, we may carry out what we proposed 
at the outset. Now, of the commonplaces amplifica- 
tion is most appropriate to epideictic rhetoric, as has 
been stated ; ^ the past to forensic, since things past 
are the subject of judgement ; and the possible and 
future to deliberative. 

19. Let us first speak of the possible and the im- 
possible. If of two contrary things it is possible 
that one should exist or come into existence, then 
it would seem that the other is equally possible ; for 
instance, if a man can be cured, he can also be ill ; 
for the potentiality of contraries, qua contraries, is 

suited to epideictic oratory, in which there is no doubt as 
to the facts ; so that it is only necessary to accentuate their 
importance or non-importance. 

265 



ARISTOTLE 

2 et TO ofioLOV Swarou, /cat ro ojxolov. koI el ro 

3 ;\;aAe7ra)Tepov Suj^arop', /cat ro pdov. /cat et ro 

4 aTTOuSatot' /cat /caAov yeveadat Svvarov, /cat oAws" 
Sut'aTot' yeviadar ;^aAe7rajTepoy yap KaXrjv oiKLav 

5 7/ otKiav elvai. /cat ou t^ apX''7 Swarat yeveadai, 
Kai, ro reXos' ovSev yap yiyverat ovh^ apx^rai 
yiyveadai rcJov ahvvdrcov , olov to crvp-jxerpov rrjv 
SiafieTpov elvat, ovr^ dv ap^atro yiyveadai ovre 
yLyverai. /cat ov ro reAos", /cat r^ ^PXl ^vvarij' 

6 drravra yap e^ o.px'fjs ylyverai, /cat et ro vcrrepov 
rij ovGLa rj rfj yeveaei Svvarov yeveadat, /cat ro 
Trporepov, olov et avhpa yeveodai Svvarov, /cat TratSa- 
TTporepov yap eKelvo yiyveraf /cat et 77at8a, /cat 

7 dvSpa- dpx'Tj yap eKeivrj. Kol o)v epcos t] eTndvfMLa 
(f)vaeL iarlv ouSei? yap rcov dSvvdrcov epa ovS* 

8 eTndvjxeZ d)S errl ro ttoXv. Kai (Lv emarrjp^ai elai 
/cat rexyat, hvvard ravra /cat eti^at /cat yeveadat. 

9 /cat oacov rj dpxr) rrjs yeveaeojs ev rovrotg earlv a 
T^/xet? dvayKaaatpbev dv r} TTeiaatptev ravra 8' 

10 earlv Sv Kpetrrovg t) Kvptot rj (f)iXot. /cat Sv rd 
p-epr) Sward, /cat ro oXov. /cat djv ro dXov Svvarov, 
Kai rd pteprj tos" ctti to ttoAu* et yap rrpoaxi-a/jta 
Kai /ce^aAi? /cat ;\;tTa>i' Swarat yeveadat, Kai 
VTToBr'jfiara Svvarov yeveadat, Kai et VTToSr]nara, 

11 /cat TTpoaxi'apta Kai /ce^aAt? /cat ;)^iTc6t'. /cat et to 



" As a general rule, from their nature as contraries, 
although it may not be true in particular cases. If a man 
is ill, he may also be well, although in particular cases 
certain qualities may make him more liable to one or the 
other, e.g. he may suffer from an incurable disease 
(Schrader). 
266 



RHETORIC, II. XIX. 2-1 1 

the same." Similarly, if of two like things the one 
is possible, so also is the other. And if the harder 
of two things is possible, so also is the easier. And 
if it is possible for a thing to be made excellent or 
beautiful, it is possible for it to be made in general ; 
for it is harder for a beautiful house to be made than 
a mere house.* Again, if the beginning is possible, so 
also is the end ; for no impossible thing comes, or 
begins to come, into existence ; for instance, that the 
diameter of a square should be commensurable with 
the side of a square is neither possible nor could be 
possible. And when the end is possible, so also is the 
beginning ; for all things arise from a beginning. And 
if that which is subsequent in being or generation can 
come into being, so then can that which is antecedent ; 
for instance, if a man can come into being, so can 
a child, for the child is antecedent ; and similarly, 
if a child can come into being, so can a man, for the 
child is a beginning. And things wliich we love or 
desire naturally are possible ; for as a rule no one 
loves the impossible or desires it. And those things 
which form the subject of sciences or arts can also 
exist and come into existence. And so with all 
those things, the productive principles of which re- 
side in those things which we can control by force 
or persuasion, when they depend upon those whose 
superiors, masters, or friends we are. And if the 
parts are possible, so also is the whole ; and if the 
whole is possible, so also are the parts, speaking 
generally ; for instance, if the front, toe-cap, and 
upper leather," can be made, then shoes can be 
made, and if shoes, then the above parts. And if 
''An argument a fortiori. If a beautiful house can be 
built, so can a house of any kind ; for this is easier. 

The meaning of the Greek words is quite uncertain. 

267 



ARISTOTLE 

1392 b yevo? oXov rcbv SvvaraJv yeveadai, /cat ro ethos, 
/cat et TO ethos, Kal to yevos, olov el ttXoiov yeveadai 
hvvaTov, /cat TpLrjpr], /cat el Tpnfjpr], /cat ttXoIov. 

12 /cat el OaTepov t(x>v irpos dXXrjXa 7Te(f>VK6T(vv , /cat 
daTepov, OLOV el StTrXdaLov, Kal rjfiiav, /cat et 'qfXLorv, 

13 /cat StTrActcrtov. /cat et aVeu Te-xyqs Kal TrapaaKevrjs 
hvvarov yeveadai, pLoXXov Sta TexvrjS Kal eVt/iteAeta? 
Syvarov odev Kal ^ AydOojvi eLp7]Tai 

Kal /jbrjv TO. fxev ye XPV '^^X^V Trpdaaeiv, tol he 
rjpuv avayKji Kal tvxJ) TrpoayiyveTai. 

14 /cat et Tols ;(;etpocrt /cat rJTTOcri, Kal d(f)poveaTepois 
hvvaTov, Kal toIs evavTLois p,dXXov, ojoTtep Kal 
^laoKpoTTjs e<f)rj hecvov elvat el 6 jxev Y^vdvvos 

15 efiadev, avTos he /jbrj hvvrjaeTat evpelv. irepl he 
ahvvaTov hrjXov otl e'/c tcov evavTia>v Tols elprj/juevoLs 
vnapx^i. 

16 Et Se yeyovev tj p.'q yeyovev, e/c Tuivhe aKeTrreov. 
TrpdJTOV pLev yap, el to tjttov yiyveadai Tre^vKos 

17 yeyovev, yeyovos dv eirj Kal to jjloXXov. Kal el to 
vcrrepov eLCoOos yiyveaOai yeyovev, Kal to TrpoTepov 
yeyovev, olov el eTTLXiXrjcrTaL, Kal ep,ade ttotc 

18 TOVTO. Kal el ehvvaTo Kal e^ovXeTo, venpaxev 
TTOVTes ydp, oTav hvvdfievoL ^ovXrjdwaL, npdT- 

19 Tovaiv ipLTTohdfv ydp ovhev. €ti, el e^ovXeTO Kal 

" T.G.F. p. 765. 
268 



RHETORIC, 11. XIX. 11-19 

the whole genus is among things possible to be made, 
so is the species, and if the species, so the genus ; 
for example, if a vessel can be built, so can a trireme, 
if a trireme can, so can a vessel. If of two naturally 
corresponding things one is possible, so also is the 
other ; for instance, if the double is possible, so is 
the half, if the half, so the double. If a thing can 
be made without art or preparation, much the more 
can it be made with the help of art and carefulness. 
Whence it was said by Agathon " : 

And moreover we have to do some things by art, while 
others fall to our lot by compulsion or chance. 

And if a thing is possible for those who are inferior, 
or weaker, or less intelligent, it will be still more so 
for those whose qualities are the opposite ; as 
Isocrates said, it would be very strange if he were 
unable by himself to find out what Euthynus had 
learnt [with the help of others]. As for the im- 
possible, it is clear that there is a supply of arguments 
to be derived from the opposite of what has been said 
about the possible. 

The question whether a thing has or has not 
happened must be considered from the following 
points of view. In the first place, if that which is 
naturally less likely has happened, then that which 
is more likely will most probably have happened. If 
that which usually happens afterwards has happened, 
then that which precedes must also have happened ; 
for instance, if a man has forgotten a thing, he must 
once have learnt it. If a man was able and wished 
to do a thing, he has done it ; for all men do a thing, 
when they are able and resolve to do it, for nothing 
hinders them. Further, if a man wished to do it 

269 



ARISTOTLE 

fjLr]Sev rcov e^co eKioXvev, koI el iSvvaro /cat (hpyi- 
^ero, /cat et eSvvaro /cat eTre^y/xet* wg yap em to 
TToXv, iov opeyovrai, dv SvvajvTai, /cat TTOiovaiv, 
ol ixev (^avXoL St aKpaaiav , ol 8' eTTtet/cei? OTt rcDt' 

20 eTneiKiov eTnOvixovaiv. /cat et e/xeAAe yiyveadai, 
/cat TTOtetv ei/cos" yap Tot* j-iiXXovra /cat TTOirjaai. 

21 /cat et ye'yop'ep' oaa 7re<^u/cet Trpo eKeivov t) eVe/ca 
eKeLvov, oiov et rjcrrpai/je, /cat i^povrrjaev, /cat et 
iTTCtpaae, /cat eirpa^ev. /cat et oaa varepov ire- 
(j)VKei yiyvecrdai ^ ov eVe/ca ytyverat ye'yovev, /cat 
TO rrporepov /cat to rovrov eVe/ca ye'yot'er, otov et 
i^povrrjaey /cat rjurpaijjev, /cat et eTTpa^e, /cat 

22 eTTeipaaev . eari 8e touto)!' ctTrat^wt' to, /xev e^ 
dmy/dy? TO. S' COS" em to ttoAj) ovtojs exovra. Trepl 
Se Toj} /xt) yeyot'et'at (fiovepov on e/c tcDi' ivavTicuv 
TOLS elpripiivots . 

1303 a Kat Trept tou eaofievov e/c TcSi' auTcDi/ Si^Aov to 
Te yap ef Sym/xet /cat ^ovXijcrec ov earai, /cat to, 
ev eTndvp.la /cat opyi^ /cat XoyLapLO) fiera Swdfiecus 
ovra. Sia ravra /cat et ei^ opfj,fj rov TTOielv tj 
pi,eXXrjaeL, ear at,' (hs ynp eVi to ttoAu ytyveTat 

24 p,dXXov rd p,eXXovra rj to. /Lti^ }LeXXovra. /cat et 
irpoyeyovev oaa rrporepov 7Te<f)VKei yiyveadai, otov 

25 ct avvve(f>eL, ei/cos" ucrat. /cat et to eve/ca rovrov 
270 



RHETORIC, II. XIX. 19-25 

and there was no external obstacle ; if he was able 
to do it and was in a state of anger ; if he was able 
and desired to do it ; for men as a rule, whenever 
they can, do those things which they long for, the 
vicious owing to want of self-control, the virtuous 
because they desire what is good. And if anything 
was on the point of being done, it most probably 
was done ; for it is likely that one who was on the 
point of doing something has carried it out. And if 
all the natural antecedents or causes of a thing have 
happened ; for instance, if it has lightened, it has 
also thundered ; and if a man has already attempted 
a crime, he has also committed it. And if all the 
natural consequences or motives of actions have 
happened, then the antecedent or the cause has 
happened ; for instance, if it has thundered, it has 
also lightened, and if a m.an has committed a crime, 
he has also attempted it. Of all these things some 
are so related necessarily, others only as a general 
rule. To establish that a thing has not happened, 
it is evident that our argument must be derived from 
the opposite of what has been said. 

In regard to the future, it is clear that one can 
argue in the same way ; for if we are able and wish to 
do a thing, it will be done ; and so too will those things 
which desire, anger, and reasoning urge us to do, if we 
have the power. For this reason also, if a man has 
an eager desire, or intention, of doing a thing, it will 
probably be done ; since, as a rule, things that are 
about to happen are more likely to happen than those 
which are not. And if all the natural antecedents 
have happened ; for instance, if the sky is cloudy, it 
will probably rain. And if one thing has been done 
with a view to another, it is probable that the latter 

271 



ARISTOTLE 

yeyovev, /cat rovro cIkos yeueadai, otov el de^eXios, 
Kat OLKia. 

26 Ilepl 8e fxeyedovs /cat fMiKporrjros rGiv Trpayfidrcov 
/cat [xeL^ovo? re /cat iXdrTovos /cat oAcos" jxeyaXcov 
/cat fiLKpcov e/c rcot' Trpoeiprjfievcov 'qp.lv earl (fiovepov 
ecprjTai yap eV rot? avp^^ovXevTiKols nepi, re /xe- 
yedovs ayadcov /cat Trept rou p.eit,ovos drrAcos" /cat 
eAarroi'os". cScrr cTret /ca^' eKaarov rcov Xoyiov 
TO TTpoKeipievov TeXos dyaOov ecmv, otov to av/j,- 
(fiepov /cat TO KaXov /cat to St'/caiov, (jiouepov otl 8t' 

27 eKeivwv X-qnTeov ras" aufi^crets" ttolctlv. to 8e Trapd 
raura rt ^rjTelv Trepl jxeyidovs ctTrAct)? /cat vrrepox'fj^ 
KevoXoyelv icrTiv KvpicoTepa yap ccrrt tt/oos" ri^t* 
XP^io.v Tcov KadoXov tol Kad^ e/caara twv rrpay- 
fjbaTojv. TTepl p,€i> ovv SvvaTOV /cat dSvudTov, /cat 
TTOTepov yeyovev 7} oi) yeyovev /cat earat -^ ou/c 
earat, ert Se Trept ^xeyedovs Kal p.iKpoT'qTos tojv 
TrpayfiaTCov eipiqadio raura. 

20. AotTToi' Se 77e/3t tcx)v kolvcov TTLcrrecov diraaiv 
eLTTelv, eveiTrep eiprjTai Trepl tojv ISIojv. eicrt 8* 
at KOLvat TTtcrrei? Si»o ra> yevei, irapdheiyixa /cat 
evdvjxrjpba- rj yap yvcofMr] p,epos evdvp,rjp,aTos eVriV. 

2 TTpdJTOv p,ev ovv TTepL 7TapaSeiyp,aTos Xeywp,ev' 
o/xoLOv yap eTrayojyfj to vapdheiyp^a, rj S' eV- 
aywyrj dp)(TJ . 

YlapaSeLy/JudTOiv 8' e't'STy Svo' ev /xev ydp ecm, 
TTapaheiypLOTOs ethos to Xeyeiv 7rpdyp,aTa Trpo- 
yeyevrjueva, ev 8e to avrov iroieZv. tovtov 8' ev 

3 f.i€v TTapa^oXrj ev Se Xoyoi, otov ol AlacoTreioL /cat 
Ai^y/cot. ecrrt 8e to /xev Trpay/xara Ae'yeiP'^ tolovSc 

1 Spengel's alteration of the Paris ms. (A*^) reading Tropa- 
delyfiara \^7ei»'. 



RHETORIC, II. XIX. 25— xx. 3 

will also be done ; for instance, if a foundation 
has been laid, a house will probably be built. 

What we have previously said clearly shows the 
nature of the greatness and smallness of things, of 
the greater and less, and of things great and sraall 
generally. For, when treating of deliberative 
rhetoric," we spoke of greatness of goods, and of the 
greater and less generally. Therefore, since in each 
branch of Rhetoric the end set before it is a good, 
such as the expedient, the noble, or the just, it is 
evident that all must take the materials of amplifica- 
tion from these. To make any further inquiry as to 
magnitude and superiority absolutely would be waste 
of words ; for the particular has more authority than 
the general for practical purposes. Let this suffice 
for the possible and impossible ; for the question 
whether a thing has happened, or will happen, or 
not ; and for the greatness or smallness of things. 

20. It remains to speak of the proofs common to 
all branches of Rhetoric, since the particular proofs 
have been discussed. These common proofs are of 
two kinds, example and enthymeme (for the maxim 
is part of an enthymeme). Let us then first speak of 
the example ; for the example resembles induction, 
and induction is a beginning.* 

There are two kinds of examples ; namely, one 
which consists in relating things that have happened 
before, and another in inventing them oneself. The 
latter are subdivided into comparisons or fables, such 
as those of Aesop and the Libyan." It would be an 

« i. 7. 

''Asa starting-point and first principle of knowledge. 

" The Libyan fables were of African origin. They are 
mentioned by Quintilian (Inst. Orat. v. 11. 20) and belonged 
to the class of animal fables. 

T 273 



ARISTOTLE 

Ti, coairep el Tt? ^eyoi otl Set Trpos ^aaiXea napa- 
1393 b a/ceua^ea^at /cat /Jbrj idv AiyvTrrov x^ipcvaaadai' 
Kal yap Aapelos ov nporepov Sie^rj nplv Avyvinov 
Xa^elv, Xa^cbv Se ScejSr], Kal ttoXlv E.ep^rjs ov 
TTporepov eTTexeiprjae Trplv eXa^ev, Xa^wv he Sie^rj' 
ware /cat ovros eav Xd^r), Sia^ijaeraf Sto ovk 

4 eTTLTpeiTreov . rrapalSoXr) Se to. Sco/cpart/ca, olov 
el Tts" XeyoL on ov Set KXrjpojrovs ap)(eiv ofxoiov 
yap ojOTrep av el tls rovg ddXrjra^ KXrjpotr] p,r] ot 
dv hvvwvrai dycx)vit,eadai dXX ot av Xd^ojOLV, rj 
rcov TrXcor-rjpojv dv riva Set Kv^epvdv KXrjpaxreiev, 
CO? Se'ov Tov Xa)(6vTa dXXd fxr] tov eTTtardfMevov . 

5 Aoyos Se', olog 6 TiTrjaixdpov rrepl OaActptSos" 
Kal AlacoTTov vnep rod Srjfjiaywyov. Hrrjcrlxopos 
fjiev yap, eXofjuevcov arparrjyov avroKpdropa rdv 
'IfiepaLOJV ^dXapLv Kal /iieXXovrcov (f)vXaKrjv StSoi^at 
TOV aw/xaros , rdXXa StaAep^^ets" elirev avrols Xoyov 
(hs Ittttos Karelx^ Xeificova fxovog, iXdovrog S' 
iXd(f)ov Kal hia(f)9eLpovros rrjv vofj,rjv ^ovXofievos 
rifxajp-qaaaOaL rov eXa<j>ov rjpcjora nvd dv6pa>7Tov 
el Swatr' dv //.er' avrov KoXdaai rov eXa(f>ov, 6 8' 
e<f)7]a€v, idv Xd^r] p^^aAti^ov Kal avros dva^fj ctt' 
avrov e^oiv aKovria' avvoj-ioXoyrjaavro? he Kal 
dva^dvros , dvrl rov rificopijcraadat, avros ehov- 

" The irapa^oX-r) as understood by Aristotle is a comparison 
and application of cases easily supposable and such as occur 
in real life, for the purpose of illustrating the point in ques- 
tion ; the fable, on the other hand, is pure fiction. 

274 



RHETORIC, II. XX. 3-5 

instance of the historical kind of example, if one 
were to say that it is necessary to make preparations 
against the Great King and not to allow him to 
subdue Egypt ; for Darius did not cross over to 
Greece until he had obtained possession of Egypt ; 
but as soon as he had done so, he did. Again, 
Xerxes did not attack us until he had obtained 
possession of that country, but when he had, he 
crossed over ; consequently, if the present Great 
King shall do the same, he will cross over, wherefore 
it must not be allowed. Comparison is illustrated 
by the sayings of Socrates ; for instance, if one were 
to say that magistrates should not be chosen by lot, 
for this would be the same as choosing as representa- 
tive athletes not those competent to contend, but 
those on whom the lot falls ; or as choosing any of 
the sailors as the man who should take the helm, as 
if it were right that the choice should be decided by 
lot, not by a man's knowledge.** 

A fable, to give an example, is that of Stesichorus 
concerning Phalaris, or that of Aesop on behalf of 
the demagogue. For Stesichorus, when the people 
of Himera had chosen Phalaris dictator and were on 
the point of giving him a body-guard, after many 
arguments related a fable to them : "A horse was 
in sole occupation of a meadow. A stag having 
come and done much damage to the pasture, the 
horse, wishing to avenge himself on the stag, asked 
a man whether he could help him to punish the stag. 
The man consented, on condition that the horse 
submitted to the bit and allowed him to mount him 
javelins in hand. The horse agreed to the terms 
and the man mounted him, but instead of obtaining 
vengeance on the stag, the horse from that time 

275 



ARISTOTLE 

Xevacv tJSt] tco dvOpcoTTO). " ovrco he kox v/xeis," 
^91 > " opdre fxy ^ovXo/xcvol rovs TroAe/xtoy? 
rLfjbojprjaaadai, ravro TrdOrjre rco lttttco- rov /xeu 
yap x^^Xlvov e^ere 'qSr], iXofievot arpariqyov avro- 
Kparopa- idv 8e (^vXaKr^v ScDre /cat dva^rjvaL 

6 idcrrjTC, SovXevaere rjSr} OaAa/otSt." AtaojTTos 8e 
ev liap,cp avvTjyopcov hr^ixaycoyo) KpivopLevcp irepl 
Oavdrov e^-q dXcorreKa Sta^aivovaav TTOTa/jiov dir- 
ayadrjvat els cf)dpayya, ov hvvap,eviqv 8' eK^rjvai ttoXvv 
Xpovov KaKOTTadeXu , /cat Kvvopa'iards ttoXXovs 
ex^oOai avrrjs' exlvov 8e TrXavcofievov , cos etSev 
avrrjv, KaroiKreipavra epcordv el d(f)eXoL avrrjs 
rovs KWopa'Cards' rrjv 8e ovk edv ipo/xevov 8e 
Ota Tt, on ovroL f.iev c/jdvai tJSt] fjbov TrX-qpecs elal 
Kal oXiyov eXKOvcTLV aljxa' edv he rovrovs d^eXrj, 
erepoi eXdovres Tretvcovres eKTnovvrai p,ov rd 
XoLTTOv alfxa. " drdp /cat vjxds," ^^''^, " to 

1394 a dvSpes HdfMioL, ovros fiev ovhev en ^Xdi/jei (ttXov- 
(jios yap ecrnv)- idv 8e rovrov dTTOKreivqre, erepoi 
Tj^ovai TrevTjres, ot vpiXv dvaXcvaovat rd Kotvd 

7 KXeirrovres ." elal 8' ot Aoyot hrjjjirjyopiKoi, /cat 
exovaiv ayaOdv rovro, on Trpdyp,ara jxev evpelv 
ofioia yeyevTjfieva ;;^aAe7roi/, Xoyovs Se paov 
TTOLrjaai ydp 8et ojanep /cat irapa^oXas, dv ns 
SvvqraL rd ofioiov opdv, cnrep paov ecrnv e/c (f>iXo- 

8 ao^ias. paco fxev ovv TTOplaaadai rd 8ta rcbv 
Xoycov, XPV^''H'^'^^P^ ^^ TTpds rd ^ovXevaaadai 
rd 8ta ribv TTpayfidrcov ofxoLa ydp d)s em rd ttoXv 
rd jxeXXovra rots yeyovocriv . 

' " Literary knowledge " (Jebb) ; " literature " (Cope, 
276 



RHETORIC, II. XX. 5-8 

became the man's slave. So then," said he, " do 
you take care lest, in your desire to avenge your- 
selves on the enemy, you be treated like the horse. 
You already have the bit, since you have chosen a 
dictator ; if you give him a body-guard and allow 
him to mount you, you will at once be the slaves of 
Phalaris." Aesop, when defending at Samos a 
demagogue who was being tried for his life, related 
the following anecdote. " A fox, while crossing a 
river, was driven into a ravine. Being unable to get 
out, she was for a long time in sore distress, and a 
number of dog-fleas clung to her skin. A hedgehog, 
wandering about, saw her and, moved with com- 
passion, asked her if he should remove the fleas. 
The fox refused and when the hedgehog asked the 
reason, she answered : ' They are already full of 
me and draw little blood ; but if you take them away, 
others will come that are hungry and will drain what 
remains to me.' You in like manner, O Samians, 
will suffer no more harm from this man, for he is 
wealthy ; but if you put him to death, others will 
come who are poor, who will steal and squander your 
public funds." Fables are suitable for public speak- 
ing, and they have this advantage that, while it is 
difficult to find sirailar things that have really hap- 
pened in the past, it is easier to invent fables ; for 
they must be invented, like comparisons, if a man 
is capable of seizing the analogy ; and this is easy if 
one studies philosophy." Thus, while the lessons con- 
veyed by fables are easier to provide, those derived 
from facts are more useful for deliberative oratory, 
because as a rule the future resembles the past. 

Introd. p. 256, who, however, in his annotated ed. explains : 
" intellectual study and mental exercises in general "). 

277 



ARISTOTLE 

9 Aet 8e ;^/3?^CT^at tols TrapaSety/zacrt fj,rj e^ovra 
fiev ivdvfirjfiara (hs airohei^eaLV (rj yap Triaris 
Slot Tourcuv), e^ovra 8e cos fiaprvpLots, iiriXoyq) 
■)(p(x>pievov rots ivOvfX'qfxaaLV' TrporidefMeva fxkv yap 
€OLK€v €Traycoyfj, tols Se prjropiKols ovk oIk€lov 
€7Taycoyrj ttXtjv ev oXiyoLS, eTTtXeyofxeva Se fMap- 
rvpioLs, 6 8e fxdprvs Travraxov mdavos. 8t6 /cat 
TrporidevrL p,ev dvdyKr) ttoXXo. Xiyeiv, eTnXeyovri 
he /cat eV Ikouov' fxaprvs yap Tciaros Kal els 
Xp'Tjcnjxos. TToaa fiev ovv e'lSr] TrapaSecyfxdrcov, 
/cat 77609 avTOis /cat nore ;^/37yo'Teoi', eLprjrai. 

21. He pi 8e yvcopcoXoyias, prjdivros tL iari 
yvcofiT], fidXiar' dv yevoi.ro (f>avep6v rrepl ttolojv 
re Kal TTore /cat riaiv dpfiorrei XPV^^^'' '^4^ yvcopbo- 

2 Xoyelv ev rols Xoyois. ecrn 8e yv(x)p,rj dTr6(f>avai,s, 
ov fxevroi Trepl rcbv /ca^' eKaarov, olov ttoXos ris 
*I<f)LKpdrr)s, aAAa KadoXov /cat ov rrepl Trdvrojv 
KadoXov, olov on ro evdv rw KapbTrvXo) evavriov, 
aAAa TTepl ogwv at Trpd^eis elai, Kal alperd rj 
(f)evKrd ecrn irpos ro irpdrreiv. coot' eTvel rd iv- 
dvp.rjp.ara 6 TTepl rovroiv avXXoyiap.6s eon a)(eS6v, 
rd re avpTrepdap.ara rcJov ev9vp.r)p,driov Kal at dp)(al 
d<f)aLpe9evros rod avXXoyiap,ov yvcop,ai elai, olov 

)(pr] 8' ov TTod , OS Tts" dpri(f>p(x)v Tre^u/c' dvqp, 
TTalSas Trepiacrcos eKhthdoKeadai ao(f)ovs. 

.,rovro p.€v ovv yvwp.rj' irpoaredeicrqs 8e rrjs alrias 
/cat rod 8ia ri, €vdvp,r)p.d eon ro diTav, olov 

" If we have no enthymemes, we must use examples 
instead of them ; for they are useful for persuasion, 
although they do not really demonstrate anything. If we 
have enthymemes, we must use examples in corroboration 
of them (see 21. 3 note). 

278 



RHETORIC, II. XX. 9— xxi. 2 

If we have no enthymemes, we must employ- 
examples as demonstrative proofs, for conviction is 
produced by these ; but if we have them, examples 
must be used as evidence and as a kind of epilogue 
to the enthymemes.'* For if they stand first, they 
resemble induction, and induction is not suitable to 
rhetorical speeches except in very few cases ; if they 
stand last they resemble evidence, and a witness is in 
every case likely to induce belief. Wherefore also 
it is necessary to quote a number of examples if they 
are put first, but one alone is sufficient if they are put 
last ; for even a single trustworthy witness is of use. 
We have thus stated howmany kinds of examples there 
are, and how and when they should be made use of. 

21. In regard to the use of maxims, it will most 
readily be evident on what subjects, and on what 
occasions, and by whom it is appropriate that maxims 
should be employed in speeches, after a maxim has 
been defined. Now, a maxim is a statement, not how- 
ever concerning particulars, as, for instance, what sort 
of a man Iphicrates was, but general ; it does not even 
deal with all general things, as for instance that the 
straight is the opposite of the crooked, but with the 
objects of human actions, and with what should be 
chosen or avoided with reference to them. And as the 
enthymemeis,we may say,* the syllogism dealing with 
such things, maxims are the premises or conclusions 
of enthymemes without the syllogism. For example : 

No man who is sensible ought to have his children taught 
to be excessively clever,* 

is a maxim ; but when the why and the wherefore 
are added, the whole makes an enthymeme ; for 
instance, 

" Putting the comma after ax^Sov. " Eur. Medea, 296. 

279 



ARISTOTLE 

XOipi'S yo-p aXXrjS TjS ^xovoLV apytas, 
^96vov Trap' dcrrwv dX(f)dvovaL Svcr/jievrj. 

1394 b Koi TO 

ovK eariv 09 rts Trdvr^ dvr^p evhaifiovel . 
/cat TO 

OVK eoTLV dvSpoJv OS ris car iXevdepos 
yuiofir], TTpos Se ra> ixofJ-dvo) ivdvfirjfxa' 

3 el B-q iuTL ypcofirj ro €lpit)p.evov , dvdyK-q rerrapa 
eihr] elvai yvojpLiqs' 17 ydp /xer' einXoyov carat r) 

4 dvev iinXoyov. dTToSei^ccos p.ev ovv Seop^cvaL 
elaiv oaat TrapdSo^ov ri Xeyovaiv rj dp,(f)LaP7)rov- 
fxevov oaat he p,rjSev Trapdho^ov, dvev eTnXoyov. 

5 rovrcov S' dvdyKrj to.? P'CV hid ro TrpoeyvcoadaL 
p,7]hev heZadai eTTiXoyov, otov 

dvhpl 8' vyialveiv dpiarov eartv, cos y r^puv hoKel' 

(fjaiverai, ydp rots ttoXXoXs ovrw rds 8' a/xa Xeyo- 
fievas 8T7Aa<: etvai eTTL^Xei/jaaiv , otov 

ovhels epaarrjs os ns ovk del ^iXel. 

6 rcov 8e p,er emXoyov at p^ev evdvp.'qp.aros P'Cpos 
elaiv, ojairep 

" " The idle habits which they contract " (Cope). 

» Euripides, Hthenehoea (frag. 661, T.O.F.). 

* Euripides, Hecuba, 858. 

'' Maxims with an epilogue are (1) imperfect enthymemes, 
or (iJ) enthymematic in character, but not in form ; those 
without an epilogue are (1) such as are well known, or (2) 
such as are clear as soon as they are uttered. 

280 



RHETORIC, II. XXI. 2-6 

for, not to s]:)eak of the charge of idleness brought against 
them," they earn jealous hostility from the citizens. 

Another example : 

There is no man who is happy in everything ; * 
or, 

There is no man who is really free. 

The latter is a maxim, but taken with the next verse 
it is an enthymeme : 

for he is the slave of either wealth or fortune." 

Now, if a maxim is what we have stated, it follows 
that maxims are of four kinds ; for they are either 
accompanied by an epilogue or not.** Now all those 
that state anything that is contrary to the general 
opinion or is a matter of dispute, need demonstrative 
proof; but those that do not, need no epilogue,'' 
either because they are already known, as, for in- 
stance, 

Health is a most excellent thing for a man, at least in our 
opinion,^ 

for this is generally agreed ; or because, no sooner 
are they uttered than they are clear to those who 
consider them, for instance. 

He is no lover who does not love always." 

As for the maxims that are accompanied by an 
epilogue, some form part of an enthymeme, as 

^ Something added as a supplementary proof, the why 
and the wherefore ; in iii. 19 it is used for the peroration of 
a speech. 

^ From Simonides or Epicharmus. 

Euripides, Troades, 1051. 

281 



ARISTOTLE 

Xpy] S ov 7To6 ocrns apri(j>pa>v , 

at 8' ivOv/jLTjfMarLKal p.iv, ovk iudvfjbTJfzaros 8e 
fiepos' aiTTep /cat p^dXiar evSoKipovanv. elal 8' 
ayrat ei^ oaais ep^cfiaiverat rov Xeyopivov ro atrLov, 

OLOV eV TO) 

aOdvarov opyrjv prj ^vXaaae dvrjrog ojv 

TO pev yap (jydvat, purj 8etv del ^vXdrreiv ttjv opy^v 
yvcopr], TO 8e TrpoaKeipevov " Ovtjtov ovra " to 
hid TL Xeyei. opoLov 8e /cat to 

dvaTa XPV "^^^ dvaTov, ovk dOdvaTa tov dvaTov 
<f>poveiv. 

7 ^avepov ovv e/c tcov elprjpevojv iroaa re et87y 
yvcoprjs, /cat Tvepl rrdlov ^KaoTov dppoTTei' irepl 
pkv yap TCOV dp<f>ia^7]Tovp,ivix)v rj TrapaSo^cov pr] 
dvev iniXoyov, dAA' 7J TvpodivTa tov eTriXoyov 
yvcji)p,r) ;^/3^CT^at tco avpTrepdapaTC, otov et tls 
eiTTOi " iyd> pev ovv, iTTeiSri oirre (ftdoveZadai 8et 
ovT* dpyov elvai, ov <j)rjpi, )(prjvat Tratheveadat," rj 

TOVTO TTpoetTTOVTa €7T€L7T€LV TCX €p7Tpoa0€V. TTCpl 

8e TCOV prj TrapaSo^cov dS-qXcov 8e, TrpocrTidivTa to 

8 8ioTt OTpoyyvXojTaTa. dppoTTet, 8 iv TOtS" tocov- 
Tot? /cat Ta AaKa)V(.Kd dTToc^deypaTa /cat Ta 
alviypaTa>Srj , olov et rt? Xiyet onep TiT-qorixopos 

1395 a iv AoKpols etTTev, OTL ov Set v^piords etvai, ottcos 

9 prj ol Terrtyes" x^P^^^^ aScooLV. appoTTCL Se 
yvcopoXoyelv rjXiKLa pev irpecr^vTepoig, irepl Se 

« See § 2. 

'' They partake of the nature of, but not of the form of, 
enthymemes, 

« Author unknown {T.O.F. p. 854). 

282 



RHETORIC, II. XXI. 6-9 

No one who is sensible, etc.," 

while others are enthymematic, but are not part of an 
enthymeme ; ^ and these are most highly esteemed. 
Such are those maxims in which the reason of what 
is said is apparent : for instance, 

Being a mortal, do not nourish immortal wrath ; " 

to say that one should not always nourish immortal 
wrath is a maxim, but the addition " being a mortal " 
states the reason. It is the same with 

A mortal should have mortal, not immortal thoughts. "^ 

It is evident, therefore, from what has been said, 
how many kinds of maxims there are, and to what 
it is appropriate to apply them in each case. For 
in the case of matters of dispute or what is contrary 
to the general opinion, the epilogue is necessary ; 
but either the epilogue may be put first and the 
conclusion used as a maxim, as, for example, if one 
were to say, " As for me, since one ought neither to 
be the object of jealousy nor to be idle, I say that 
children ought not to be educated " ; or put the 
maxim first and append the epilogue. In all cases 
where the statements made, although not para- 
doxical, are obscure, the reason should be added as 
concisely as possible. In such cases Laconic apo- 
phthegms and riddling sayings are suitable ; as, for 
instance, to say what Stesichorus said to the Locrians, 
that they ought not to be insolent, lest their cicadas 
should be forced to chirp from the ground.* The 
use of maxims is suitable for one who is advanced 

<* According to Bentley, from Epicharmus. 
« Meaning that the land would be devastated and the 
trees cut down. 

283 



ARISTOTLE 

rovrcov cbv k^ireipos tls eariv, cos ro ^ikv fj,r] 
rrjXiKovTov ovra yv coixoXoye.lv OLTTpeTres wanep /cat 
TO ixvdoXoyelv , irepl 8' &v aneipos, rfXiOtov /cat 
dTTatSevTOV. (jrjfMetov 8' lkovov ol yap aypoLKOi, 
fiaXtara yviofiorvTTOi. elal /cat paStcos anocfiaivovraL. 

10 Ka^oAou 8e /x?) ovros KadoXov elrreLV /jbaXiara 
apixorrcL iv ax^rXtaafMoJ /cat Seivcucret, /cat eV 

11 TOUTOts" r; apxojxevov tj aTTohei^avra. XPV^^'^'' ^^ 
8et /cat rat? redpvXrjuevaLS /cat /cotP'ats' yvcvfiais, 
eav chai ;)^/)7^crt//,of Sta yap to eti^at KOivai, cos opio- 
XoyovvTCov aTrdvTCOv, opdcos ep^etv hoKOvaiv, olov 
TrapaKaXovvri iiri ro KivSweveiv pi,rj dvaap.ivovs 

els olcovos dpicrros dpLvvecrOat irepl Trdrprjs, 

/cat 6771 TO rjrrovs ovras 

^vvos 'EvyaAio?, 

/cat eVt TO dvaipeZv tcov ixOpcov Ta TCKva /cat pbrjSev 
dSiKovvTa 

vr^TTLOs OS naTcpa /cretVaj 7rat8as' KaraAetTret, 

12 ' Ert eVtat rait' TrapoifMicbv /cat yvcopuai elaiv, 

13 otoi/ Trapot/xta " 'ArTt/co? TrdpoLKOS." Set 8e ra? 
yvcopias Xeyetv /cat Trapo. to, BeSrjpioaLevfieva {Xeyco 
8e SeSrjpiocnevpieva olov to VvcoOl aavTov /cat to 
MrySev ayat-), oVav -^ to t^^o? <f)aiveadai, fieXXr) 
^cXtlov, r) TTadrjTLKcos etpr)pi,ev7j ■fj. ecTt 8e nadr)- 
TiKTj p,€v, otov ei Tt? opyL^opLevos (f>airi ipevSos 

" Iliad, xii. 243. " Iliad, xviii. 309. « i. 15. 14. 

"* Cf. Thucydides, i. 70, where the Corinthians complain 
of the lack of energy shown by the Spartans, as compared 
with their own restless and troublesome neighbours, the 
Athenians. 

284 



RHETORIC, II. XXI. 9-13 

in years, and in regard to things in which one has 
experience ; since the use of maxims before such an 
age is unseemly, as also is story-telling ; and to 
speak about things of which one has no experience 
shows foohshness and lack of education. A sufficient 
proof of tliis is that rustics especially are fond of 
coining maxims and ready to make display of them. 
To express in general terms what is not general is 
especially suitable in complaint or exaggeration, and 
then either at the beginning or after the demonstra- 
tion. One should even make use of common and 
frequently quoted maxims, if they are useful ; for 
because they are common, they seem to be true, 
since all as it were acknowledge them as such ; for 
instance, one who is exhorting his soldiers to brave 
danger before having sacrificed may say, 

The best of omens is to defend one's country," 

and if they are inferior in numbers. 

The chances of war are the same for both,* 

and if advising them to destroy the children of the 
enemy even though they are innocent of wrong. 

Foolish is he who, having slain the father, suffers the 
children to live." 

Further, some proverbs are also maxims ; for 
example, " An Attic neighbour." <* Maxims should 
also be used even when contrary to the most popular 
sayings, such as " Know thyself" and " Nothing in 
excess," either when one's character is thereby likely 
to appear better, or if they are expressed in the 
language of passion. It would be an instance of the 
latter if a man in a rage were to say, "It is not 

285 



ARISTOTLE 

elvai d)s Sei yLyvaxjKeiv avrov ovros yovv el 
eyiyvwaKev eavrov, ovk av irore arparr^yeiv 
rj^iojcrev. to Se '^9os ^eXriov, on ov Set, (Lanep 
(fiaori, ^iXeiv (Lg jxiarjaovras aAAa /xoiXXov fiiaecv 

14 los (f>iXrj(yovras . Set Se rfj Ae'^et ttiv TTpoaipecnv 
auvSrjXovv, ei Se pirj, ttjv atrtav emXeyeLV, olov rj 
ovTcvs eliTOvra, on " Set ^tAetv o?);^ cooTrep (f)aaLv, 
aXX* (OS aei ^iXriaovTa- im^ovXov yap ddrepov," 
rj coSe " OVK apiaKei Se /iot to Xeyofxevov Set yap 
rov y' aXrjdLvov (f)iXov ws (j)tXiqaovTa det (fnXelv." 
/cat " oj)Se TO pbTjhkv ayav Set yap rovs ye KaKovs 

1395 b dyav iitaelv." 

15 "E;^ouo't S' ets rovs Xoyovg ^orjOeiav fjbeydXrjv 
[xiav jJbev Srj Sta r-^v ^opriKorriTa rcbv aKpoarcov 
Xdipovai yap, idv ns KadoXov Xeycov €7TLTV)(rj ra)v 
So^oJv as eKelvoL Kara p.epos exovatv. o Se Xeyco, 
SrjXov earai c5Se, dfj,a Se /cat ttcos Set awTas" dijpeveiv. 
rj fxev yap yvwfMT], coarrep e'iprjrat, aTTO^avais Kad- 
oXov earriv, x^ipovai Se KadoXov Xeyofievov o Kara 
fiepos TTpoiJTToXaji^dvovres rvyxdvovaLV olov et ns 
yeiroai rv^ot KexpfjP'^vos rj tckvocs ^avXois, diro- 
Se'^aiT* av rod ecTTovTOS on 

ovhev yeLTovias ;^aAe7raiTepoi', 

'rj on ovhev rjXidiiorepov reKvonouas. ware Set 
(jroxdX,eoQ ai irGis rvyxdvovai rrola TTpovnoXaji- 
pdvovres, eW^ ovro) rrepl rovrcov KadoXov Xeyeiv. 

16 ravrrjv re 8rj e;^et fjbiav XPV^''^ '^^ yvcofioXoyeXv , 



"» "Want of cultivation and intelligence "(Cope). "Amour- 
propre'" (St. Hilaire). 

'' In reference to their own particular case. 

286 



RHETORIC, II. XXI. 13-16 

true that a man should know himself; at any rate, 
such a man as this, if he had known himself, would 
never have claimed the chief command." And one's 
character would appear better, if one were to say 
that it is not right, as men say, to love as if one 
were bound to hate, but rather to hate as if one were 
bound to love. The moral purpose also should be 
made clear by the language, or else one should add 
the reason ; for example, either by saying " that it 
is right to love, not as men say, but as if one were 
going to love for ever, for the other kind of love 
would imply treachery " ; or thus, " The maxim does 
not please me, for the true friend should love as if 
he were going to love for ever. Nor do I approve 
the maxim ' Nothing in excess,' for one cannot hate 
the wicked too much." 

Further, maxims are of great assistance to speakers, 
first, because of the vulgarity" of the hearers, who are 
pleased if an orator, speaking generally, hits upon 
the opinions which they specially hold.* What I 
mean will be clear from the following, and also how 
one should hunt for maxims. The maxim, as we 
have said, is a statement of the general ; accordingly, 
the hearers are pleased to hear stated in general 
terms the opinion which they have already specially 
formed. For instance, a man who happened to have 
bad neighbours or children would welcome any one's *" 
statement that nothing is more troublesome than 
neighbours or more stupid than to beget children. 
Wherefore the speaker should endeavour to guess 
how his hearers formed their preconceived opinions 
and what they are, and then express himself in 
general terms in regard to them. This is one of 
the advantages of the use of maxims, but another 

287 



ARISTOTLE 

/cat erepav KpeLrrco' rjOtKovs yap Trotet rous Aoyovs. 
rjdos S exovcrtv ol Xoyoi, iv oaots SijXr] rj vpoaLpeais • 
at 8e yvcofMai Trdaat rovro ttolovoi Sta to airo- 
(fiaiveadai rov rrjv yvcopirjv Xdyovra KaOoXov Trepl 
Tcov TrpoaiperaJv, (har av ^j^pT^arat wglv at yvcS/xai, 
Kal )(^pr]aTO'qd7) (jiaiveadat iroLovat rov Xeyovra. 
irepl fxev ovv yviofirjs, Kal rt eoTt /cat Troaa clStj 
avrrjs /cat ttojs ;\;p')7crTeov avrfj Kal riva (IxjiiXeiav 
€X€L, elprjodco roaavra. 

22. Uepl S' ivdv/JirjpidTwv KadoXov re etVco/xet', 
Ttva rpoTTov Set ^rjreiv, /cat pbera ravra rov£ 
roTTOvg- dXXo yap elSog eKaripov rovrcov lariv. 

2 oTt pikv ovv ro evdvp^ripLa auXXoycafios rig icmv, 
etprjrai Trporepov, /cat ttcoj CTuAAoyta/io?, /cat rt 

3 hiacjiipei rcov SiaXcKTLKoJv ovre yap TToppcoOev 
ovre TTOLvra Set Xapi^dvovras avvdyeiv ro p,€V yap 
daa(f)€g Sia ro fxrJKog, ro Se aSoAeap^ta Sta ro 
<f)av€pd Xeyetv. rovro yap airiov Kal rov TTidavoi- 
repovs etvai rovs aTratSeuTOfS" rdJv TTeTraiSevfJieviov 
iv rolg oxXols, wanep (f>aalv ol TTOirjral rovs 
aTTaihevrovg Trap oxXco jMovaLKCoripcos Xeyeiv ot, 
fjb€V yap rd Koivd Kal KadoXov Xeyovaiv, ol 8 e^ 
Sv tcracrt, /cat rd iyyvs. wen ovk i^ aTrdvnov 
rcov SoKovvrwv aAA' e/c rcov cbpLafievcov XcKreov, 

1396 a olov T^ roLS Kpivovaiv rj ovs aTToSexovrai . /cat 
rovro S', ort ovrco (f>aiverai, SrjXov elvai tj Trdaiv 

" The conclusion must not be reached by means of a long 
series of arguments, as it were strung together in a chain : 
cp. i. 2. 12, where tiie hearers are spoken of as unable to 
take in at a glance a long series of arguments or " to follow a 
long chain of reasoning" {ouSi Xoyl^effOat wbppuOiv). 

288 



RHETORIC, II. XXI. 16— xxii. 3 

is greater ; for it makes speeches ethical. Speeches 
have this character, in which the moral purpose is 
clear. And this is the effect of all maxims, because 
he who employs them in a general manner declares 
his moral preferences ; if then the maxims are good, 
they show the speaker also to be a man of good 
character. Let this suffice for what we had to say 
concerning maxims, their nature, how many kinds of 
them there are, the way they should be used, and 
what their advantages are. 

22. Let us now speak of enthymemes in general 
and the manner of looking for them, and next of 
their topics ; for each of these things is different in 
kind. We have already said that the enthymeme is 
a kind of syllogism, what makes it so, and in what it 
differs from the dialectic syllogisms ; for the con- 
clusion must neither be drawn from too far back * nor 
should it include all the steps of the argument. In 
the first case its length causes obscurity, in the 
second, it is simply a waste of words, because it 
states much that is obvious. It is this that makes 
the ignorant more persuasive than the educated in 
the presence of crowds ; as the poets say, " the 
ignorant are more skilled at speaking before a 
mob." ^ For the educated use commonplaces and 
generalities, whereas the ignorant speak of what they 
know and of what more nearly concerns the audience. 
Wherefore one must not argue from all possible 
opinions, but only from such as are definite and 
admitted, for instance, either by the judges them- 
selves or by those of whose judgement they approve. 
Further, it should be clear that this is the opinion 

* Euripides, Hippolytus, 989. 

u 289 



ARISTOTLE 

7] Tols TrXelaTois. /cat fxrj fxovov avvdyeLV e/c roJv 
avayKaiixiv, dAAa kol e/c ra)V (Ls cttI ro ttoXv. 

4 Upcorov iikv ovv Set Xa^elv on Trepl ov Set 
Xeyetv /cat avXXoyi^eadai, c'ire ttoXltiko) aruXXoyiaficp 
eW* OTTOtcpovv, avayKoiov /cat ra rovro) ^x^tv 
VTTapxovra, ■^ iravra tj eVta* fMTjSev yap e^oiv ef 

5 ouSevos" OLV e^ois avvdyeiv. Xeyco S' otov tto)? av 
Swalfxeda crvpu^ovXeveLV ^ Adrjvaiois et TroAe/xiyreoi/ 
T] p.7] TToXep.'qTeov , /Jbrj e^ovres tLs rj Svvafiis avrcov, 
vorepov varJTiKrj 7] iret^iKri ry dp.(f>o}, /cat avrrj rroarj, 
/cat TTpoaoBoL rives ^ ^t'Aot /cat ix^poi, ert 8e rtj^as" 
TToXdfjiovs TTCTToXejjf'qKaai /cat ttoj?, /cat raAAa ra 

6 roiavra; ^ eTraivetu, et jiti^ exoifjuev rrjv iv HaXapilvt, 
vavp,ax^OLV rj rrjv iv MapaOcovL P'dx'qv t] rd vnep 
'Hjoa/cAetScuv Trpax^evra rj dXXo tl rcov tolovtcdv ; 
e/c ydp rdjv VTrapxovrcov t) Sokovvtcov VTrapx^iv 

7 KaXa)v eTTaivovcri, iravres. o/jlolcos Se /cat ipeyovaiv 
e/c rcDv ivavricov, aKOTTOvvres ri VTrapx^i rotovrov 
avTots T] 8o/cet VTrapx^i'V, otov ore rovs "EXXrjvas 
KareSovXctyaavro, /cat rovs Trpos rov ^dp^apov 
(TVixp.ax^<yOi.jiivovs /cat dpiarevaavras rjvhpaTTO- 
hiaavro Alyivijras /cat IlortSataras', /cat oaa 
dXXa roiavra, /cat et ri dXXo roiovrov ajjidprrjua 
VTrdpx^'' OLvroLS. o)S S' avrojs /cat ot Karrjyopovvrcs 
/cat oi aTToAoyoy/ievot e/c rcav' VTTapxovrcuv okottov- 

8 fxevoL Karrjyopovat, /cat aTToAoyouj/rai. ouSev Se 
290 



RHETORIC, II. xxii. 3-8 

of all or most of the hearers ; and again, conclusions 
should not be drawn from necessary premises alone, 
but also from those which are only true as a rule. 

First of all, then, it must be understood that, in 
regard to the subject of our speech or reasoning, 
whether it be political or of any other kind, it is 
necessary to be also acquainted with the elements 
of the question, either entirely or in part ; for if you 
know none of these things, you will have nothing 
from which to draw a conclusion. I should like to 
know, for instance, how we are to give advice to the 
Athenians as to making war or not, if we do not 
know in what their strength consists, whether it is 
naval, mihtary, or both, how great it is, their sources 
of revenue, their friends and enemies, and further, 
what wars they have already waged, with what 
success, and all similar things ? Again, how could 
we praise them, if we did not know of the naval 
engagement at Salamis or the battle of Marathon, 
or what they did for the Heraclidae, and other 
similar things ? for men always base their praise 
upon what really are, or are thought to be, glorious 
deeds. Similarly, they base their censure upon 
actions that are contrary to these, examining whether 
those censured have really, or seem to have, com- 
mitted them ; for example, that the Athenians sub- 
jugated the Greeks, and reduced to slavery the 
Aeginetans and Potidaeans who had fought with 
distinction on their side against the barbarians, and 
all such acts, and whatever other similar offences 
may have been committed by them. Similarly, in 
accusation and defence, speakers argue from an 
examination of the circumstances of the case. It 
makes no difference in doing this, whether it is a 

291 



ARISTOTLE 

Si,a(/)€p€t TTepl ^Adrjvaicov r) AaKeSaifMovtcov rj 
dvdpcL)7Tov •^ deov ravTo rovro Spdv /cat yap 
av/jL^ovXevovra rep 'A;)^iAAet /cat inaLvovvra /cat 
i/jeyovra /cat Kariqyopovvra /cat aiToXoyoTJixevov 
VTTep avrov ra VTrdpxovra t^ SoKovvra VTrapx^iv 
XrjTTreov, iv' e/c tovtojv Xeycop,€v iTraivovvTes rj 
ijieyovres et Tt /caAov ■^ alaxpov VTrapx^L, /car- 
rjyopovvT€s S' i} aTToAoyoy/^tevot ei rt Si/catoi' •^ aSt/cor, 
avfJi^ovXevovTes S' et Tt crvfMt^epov ^ ^Xa^epov. 
9 opLoicDS Se TOUTOi? /cat Trept TTpdyp.aros otovovv, 
olov TTepl hiKaioavvrjs , et dya^ov' i^ /x?) dyadov, 
e/c rcijv' VTTapxovrcDv rfj SiKaiocrvvrj /cat to) dyada>. 

10 "Ocrr' i7T€iSr] /cat Travres" ovrco ^alvovrai diro- 
SetKvvvres, idv re aKpi^icnepov edv re /xaXaKwrcpov 

1396 b cruAAoytXcut'Tat (ou yap e^ aTrai/TCov Xap,^dvov(nv 
dAA' e/c TcDv' Trept eKaarov VTrap^ovrcov , /cat Sta 
Tou Adyou StJAov oVt aSurarot' d'AAcos" heLKvvvai), 
<j>avepov on avay/caiov, axTTrep ev roZg romKoig, 
TTpcorov TTepl eKacxTOV ex^tv e^etAey/xeVa Trept rdjv 

11 evSexofievwv /cat tcDv eTrt/catpoTarajv, Trept 8e rcSt' 
e^ VTToyvLov yiyvofxevcov i^rjretv rov avrov rpoTTOv, 
drro^XeTTOvra p,rj els dopiara dAA' et? rd imdpxovra, 
TTepl (Lv 6 Xoyos, /cat Trepiypd^ovras on nXelara 
/cat iyyvrara rov TTpdy pharos ' oaco p,ev yap dv 
TrAeto) ex'rj'TO.L rcov VTTapxovrcov , roaovrcp paov 
heiKvvvat, ocro) 8' iyyvrepov, roaovrcp oiKeiorepa 

12 /cat ■^rrov Koivd. Xeyoi 8e Kovud fjuev ro eTTaivelv 
rov 'A;^tAAea on dvOpcorros /cat on rwv rjfitdecov 



" Or, " by means of the speech it is impossible to prove 
anything otherwise " (Cope). 

* i. 14. irpCoTov : i.e. " the speaker's chief care should be . . ." 

292 



RHETORIC, II. xxii. 8-12 

question of Athenians or Lacedaemonians, of a man 
or a god. For, when advising Achilles, praising or 
censuring, accusing or defending him, we must grasp 
all that really belongs, or appears to belong to him, 
in order that we may praise or censure in accordance 
with this, if there is anything noble or disgraceful ; 
defend or accuse, if there is anything just or unjust ; 
advise, if there is anything expedient or harmful. 
And similarly in regard to any subject whatever. 
For instance, in regard to justice, whether it is good 
or not, we must consider the question in the light 
of what is inherent in justice or the good. 

Therefore, since it is evident that all men follow 
this procedure in demonstration, whether they reason 
strictly or loosely — since they do not derive their 
arguments from all things indiscriminately, but from 
what is inherent in each particular subject, and 
reason makes it clear that it is impossible to prove 
anything in any other way "• — it is evidently neces- 
sary, as has been stated in the Topics,^ to have 
first on each subject a selection of premises about 
probabilities and what is most suitable. As for those 
to be used in sudden emergencies, the same method 
of inquiry must be adopted ; we must look, not at 
what is indefinite but at what is inherent in the 
subject treated of in the speech, marking off as many 
facts as possible, particularly those intimately con- 
nected with the subject ; for the more facts one has, 
the easier it is to demonstrate, and the more closely 
connected they are with the subject, the more suit- 
able are they and less common." By common I mean, 
for instance, praising Achilles because he is a man, 

« The more suitable they will be, and the less they will 
resemble ordinary, trivial generalities. 



ARISTOTLE 

Kai on €7n to "lAiov iarparevaaro' ravra yap 
/cai ctAAots" virdp^ei ttoXKoZs, cSot' ovhev fjudXXov 6 
TOiovros 'A;)^tAy\ea iiraLveZ rj ALOfiT^Srjv . t'Sta Se a 
fi-qScvl aXXo) avii^e^rjKev rj rw 'A;^iAAet, olov to 
aTTOKTeXvat tov "^KTopa tov apLorov tojv Tpoycov 
/cat TOV Y^vKvov, OS €KcoXva€V dVai^as" aTTO^aiveiv 
aTpoiTos a)v, /cat otl vewraTos /cat ovk evopKog 
cjv eoTpdrevaev, /cat oaa aAAa rotaura, 

13 Et? pL€V OVV TpOTTOS TTJS eKXoyijS KoX TTpCOTOS 
OVTOS O TOTTLKOS, TO. 8e aTOLJ(eLa Tdv ivOvflTjIXOLTCOV 

Xeycofjbev (crrotx^Xov 8e Xeyco /cat tottov evdviMrjixaTos 
TO axjTo). TTpcoTov 8' eLTTCOfiev rrepl cov dvayKoiov 

14 €L7T€LV rrpwTov. eoTt ydp tcov evdvfxrjfxdTcov etSr] 
ovo' Ta fiev ydp Set/CTt/ca icmv otl eariv rj o^k 
ecTTtv, Ta 8' iXeyKTLKd' /cat 8La(f)€peL wanep eV 

15 TOLS BtaXcKTiKoTs eXeyxos /cat avXXoyiajxos. eort 
8e TO jxkv 8et/crt/cov ivdvjirjp.a to e$ ofioXoyov- 
fievcov avvdyeiv, to 8e iXeyKTLKov to Ta dvojio- 

16 Xoyovjxeva avvdyeiv. axehov p,ev ovv rjpZv nepl 
eKaoTiov Tcov clScov tcov xRV^^H-^^ '<^ctt dvayKaloiv 
exovTai ol tottol' i^eiXeyixevai ydp at TT/aoracret? 
TTepl eKaoTov elaw, coot' e^ (hv Set (f)ipei.v ra 
ivdvjiijfiaTa tottojv TTepl dyadov tj /ca/cou -^ koXov 
7] aiaxpov rj SiKaiov rj dhiKov, koX Trepl tcov rjdcJjv 
/cat TTadrjfidTCov /cat e^ecov (haavTOJS elXrijijiivoL 

17 rjjilv vrrdpxovai rrporepov ol tottol. ert 8' dXXov 

1397 Bl TpOTTOV KadoXoV TTepl aTTOVTUiV Xd^wficv, /Cat 

" The demonstrative enthymeme draws its conclusion 
294 



RHETORIC, IL xxii. 12-17 

or one of the demigods, or because he went on the 
expedition against Troy ; for this is apphcable to 
many others as well, so that such praise is no more 
suited to Achilles than to Diomedes. By particular 
I mean what belongs to Achilles, but to no one else ; 
for instance, to have slain Hector, the bravest of the 
Trojans, and Cycnus, who prevented all the Greeks 
from disembarking, being invulnerable ; to have 
gone to the war when very young, and without 
having taken the oath ; and all such things. 

One method of selection then, and this the first, 
is the topical. Let us now speak of the elements of 
enthymemes (by element and topic of enthymeme I 
mean the same thing). But let us first make some 
necessary remarks. There are two kinds of enthy- 
memes, the one demonstrative, which proves that a 
thing is or is not, and the other refutative, the two 
differing hke refutation and syllogism in Dialectic. 
The demonstrative enthymeme draws conclusions 
from admitted premises, the refutative draws con- 
clusions disputed by the adversary.* We know 
nearly all the general heads of each of the special 
topics that are useful or necessary ; for the proposi- 
tions relating to each have been selected, so that 
we have in like manner already established all the 
topics from which enthymemes may be derived on 
the subject of good or bad, fair or foul, just or 
unjust, characters, emotions, and habits. Let us 
now endeavour to find topics about enthymemes in 
general in another way, noting in passing ^ those 

from facts admitted by the opponent ; the refutative draws 
its conclusion from the same, but the conclusion is one 
which is disputed by the opponent. 

* Or, " noting in addition " (Victorius) ; or, " pointing 
out, side by side " (Jebb). 

295 



ARISTOTLE 

XeycofMev TrapaarjfMaivofJbevoi rovs iXeyKTLKovs Kal 
Tovs aTToSeiKTLKOvs Kal rovs ruiv ^aivofxevcDV 
evdvfirjfxdrojv, ovk ovrwv he ev6vfir]fj,dTa>v, eVetTrep 
ovSe avXXoyiarfxoJv . hr^Xcodevriov he tovtwv, Trepl 
rojv Xvaeojv /cat evardaeojv hioplacofiev, TTodev 
Set TTpos TO. evdvpirjixara <^epeiv. 

23. Ecrri 8' els fiev r ottos rcbv heiKTiKCJV e/c 
Tixiv evavTLcov Set ydp aKoirelv el to) evavrico to 
evavTLOV VTrapx^t, dvaipovvra p.ev el jxtj VTrdpxei, 
KaraaKevdt,ovra he el VTrdpx^i, olov ore to crco- 
(^povelv dyaOov to ydp dKoXacnaiveiv ^Xa^epov . rj 
<hs ev Tcp MeacrrjviaKcp- el ydp 6 TroAe/xo? atrto? 
Tcuv irapovTOiv KaKwv, fieTa ttjs elp7]V7js Set enav- 
op6coaaa6ai. 

eLTTep yap ovhe tols KaKCJs hehpaKoaiv 
aKovaicos hiKaiov els opy-^v rreaelv, 
ovh dv dvayKaaOeis tls ev hpdarj Tcvd, 
TTpoarJKOv eoTi Twh' 6<f)eiXeadat "xapiv. 

dAA eiTTep eoTLv ev ^poTols ^evhrjyopelv 
TTidava, vopnt^eLV XP''] ere /cat tovvoutlov, 
aTTtCTr' dXrjdi] TToXXd avu^aiveiv ^poTols. 

2 "AXXos eK TUiv 6p.oioiv TTTcLaeixiv ofiolcos ydp 
Set VTTdp\eiv r) jMrj VTrdpx^tv, olov otl to hiKaiov 
ov TTav dyaOov Kal ydp dv to hiKaiaJS' vvv S' ov)( 
alpeTov TO St/catoj? aTTodavetv . 

3 "AXXos €K Tcov TTpos dXXiqXa- el ydp daTepw 
v7rdpx€L TO KaXws ^ hiKaLuts TTOLrjaai, doTepo) to 

"» Assuming that self-control is good, then if the opposite 
of ffood (that is, bad) ran be predicated of lack of self- 
control, this proves the truth of the first proposition ; other- 
wise, it may be refuted. 

296 



RHETORIC, II. xxii. 17— xxiii. 3 

which are refutative and those which are demon- 
strative, and those of apparent enthymemes, which 
are not really enthymemes, since they are not 
syllogisms. After this has been made clear, we will 
settle the question of solutions and objections, and 
whence they must be derived to refute enthymemes. 
23. One topic of demonstrative enthymemes is 
derived from opposites ; for it is necessary to con- 
sider whether one opposite is predicable of the other, 
as a means of destroying an, argument, if it is not, 
as a means of constructing one, if it is ; "■ for instance, 
self-control is good, for lack of self-control is harmful ; 
or as in the Messeniacus,^ 

If the war is responsible for the present evils, one must 
repair them with the aid of peace. 

And, 

For if it is unfair to be angry with those who have done 
wrong unintentionally, it is not fitting to feel beholden to 
one who is forced to do us good.<' 

Or, 

If men are in the habit of gaining credit for false state- 
ments, you must also admit the contrary, that men often 
disbelieve what is true.** 

Another topic is derived from similar inflexions, for 
in like manner the derivatives must either be pre- 
dicable of the subject or not ; for instance, that the 
just is not entirely good, for in that case good would 
be predicable of anything that happens justly ; but 
to be justly put to death is not desirable. 

Another topic is derived from relative terms. For 
if to have done rightly or justly may be predicated 
of one, then to have suffered similarly may be 

" Cf. i. 13. 2 note. « Authorship unknown. 

<* Euripides, Thyestes (Frag. 396, T.O.F.). 

297 



ARISTOTLE 

7T€7Tov6ivai, Kol €1 KcXevaai, koI ro TreTroLrjKevai,, 
OLOV d)s 6 reXcvvrjs AiOfjueSojv rrepl rcbv reXoJv " el 
yap fiTjS* vfuv alaxpov ro TrcoXelv, ouS' rj/juv ro 
coveXadai." /cat el ru) TreTrovdori ro KaXcos rj 
Si/catoj? vrrapxei, /cat raJ TTonjaavri, /cat et rep 
TTOLiqaavri, /cat ra> TreTTOvOori. eari 8* iv rovrco 
irapaXoyLcraadaf et yap ScKaicos erradev rt, St/catcos 
iriiTovOev , aAA' tacjs ovx vtto gov. 8l6 Set aKoirelv 
X<J^pt'S €L d^Log 6 TTO^cbv TTaOeiv /cat o nocTjcras 
1397 1> TTOtT^o-at, etra XRV^^^*- orrorepuis dp/jborrec' iviore 
yap Sta^oivet ro roLovrov /cat ovhev KojXvei, axxTTcp 
iv rep 'AA/cyLtata»vt ra» SeoSeKrov 

pL-qripa he rrjv arjv ov rig iarvyei ^porcov; 

(/)r](n S aTTOKpivofJievos " dXXd SiaXa^ovra XPV 
aKOTTelv." epofjbevT]^ Be rrjs 'AA^eCTt^ota? tto)?, 
VTToXa^cov <j>rjaL 

rrjv fj,€v davelv eKpivav, ifie Se firj Kravelv. 

/cat OLOV Tj TTepl Ar}p,oa6evovs Slkt] /cat rdJv dno- 
i<ret,vavra)v NiKavopa- eVet yap St/cata>s" eKpidiqaav 
aTroKrelvai, St/cato;? eSo^ev aTTodavelv. /cat irepl rod 
Q-q^rjaLV dirodavovros, Tvepl ov eKeXevae KplvaL el 
St/catos" "^v drrodaveLV, cos ovk dStKov ov ro diTOKrelvai 
rov hiKaicos aTrodavovra. 

" The argument is that if there was no disgrace in selling 
the right of farming the taxes, there could be none in 
purchasing this right. 

^ Pupil of Plato and Isocrates, great friend of Aristotle, 
the author of fifty tragedies and also of an " Art " of Rhetoric. 
Alcmaeon murdered his mother Eriphyle. Alphesiboea, his 
wife, says to him, Was not your mother hated ? To this he 
replied, Yes, but there is a distinction ; they said she de- 
served to die, but not at my hands. 

298 



RHETORIC, II. xxm. 3 

predicated of the other ; there is the same relation 
between having ordered and having carried out, as 
Diomedon the tax-gatherer said about the taxes, " If 
selhng is not disgraceful for you, neither is buying 
disgraceful for us." " And if rightly or justly can be 
predicated of the sufferer, it can equally be predicated 
of the one who inflicts suffering ; if of the latter, 
then also of the former. However, in this there is 
room for a fallacy. For if a man has suffered justly, 
he has suffered j ustly, but perhaps not at your hands. 
Wherefore one must consider separately whether the 
sufferer deserves to suffer, and whether he who inflicts 
suffering is the right person to do so, and then make 
use of the argument either way ; for sometimes 
there is a difference in such a case, and nothing 
prevents [its being argued], as in the Alcmaeon of 
Theodectes ^ : 

And did no one of mortals loathe thy mother ? 

Alcmaeon replied : " We must make a division before 
we examine the matter." And when Alphesiboea 
asked " How ? ", he rejoined, 

Their decision was that she should die, but that it was not 
for me to kill her. 

Another example may be found in the trial of 
Demosthenes and those who slew Nicanor." For 
since it was decided that they had justly slain him, 
it was thought that he had been justly put to death. 
Again, in the case of the man who was murdered at 
Thebes, when the defendants demanded that the 
judges should decide whether the murdered man 
deserved to die, since a man who deserved it could 
be put to death without injustice. 

* Nothing is known of this trial. 

^99 



ARISTOTLE 

4 "AAAo? e/c rov [j,dXXov Kal rjrrov, otov " el fir]S* 
OL deoL TTavra laaai, a\oXfj oi ye dvdpojTTOi' 
rovro yap eariv, ei cp jUoAAov dv inrdpxoi p.7) 
virapx^i, hr^Xov on owS' w 'rjrrov. ro 8' ori rovs 
TrXrjarLOV rvTrrei 6g ye Kal rov narepa, e/c rov, el 
ro rjrrov virapx^i', Kal ro /jbdXXov vnapx^i, Kad* 
oTTorepov dv Sej] Sel^ai, eW^ on VTrapx^t eW* on 

5 ov. en ei fiT^re p,dXXov fjbijre ■^rrov o6ev e'ip'qrai. 

Kal aos fJ-ev OLKrpos TratSas- dnoXeaas Trarijp' 
Olveijs 8' ap' ovxl KXeivov aTToXeaas .yovov ; 

Kal on, el p,rjhe Qyjaevs rjStKTjaev, ov8' 'AAef- 
avSpos, Kal el p-rjS' ol TvvSapiSai, oyS' 'AXe^avSpog, 
Kal el HdrpoKXov "EiKrcop, Kal ^A^cXXea 'AAe'f- 
avSpos. Kal el firjS' ol dXXoi rexyvrai (f)avXoi, ov8' 
ol (f)t.X6a'ocf)oi. Kal el fJ.TjB' ol arparrjyol (jtavXoi, 
on TjrrcdvraL TroAAa/cts", ovB* ol ao(f)iaraL /cat 
on. "el Set rov ISiiorrjv rrjs vp^erepas Bo^rjs ctti- 
p,eXeLcr9ai, Kal vp,ds rrjs rcbv 'EiXXiqva)v." 

6 "AAAos" e/c rov rov ^j^/adt'ov aKOTrelv, otov ws 
\<j)iKpdrr]s ev rfj rrpos 'App,68(,ov, on " el irplv 

TTOirjaai rj^lovv rrjs elKovos rvx^lv edv TTOLijau), 



"* The argument is that since men beat their fathers less 
commonly than they do their neighbours, if they beat their 
fathers they will also beat their neighbours, and the Paris 
MS. in a longer form of the argument has an explanatory 
addition to this effect, inserting after virdpxa the words 7-oi>s 
"yap Trar^pas ^ttov Tv-nrovaiv •^ tovs ir'K-qcriov. 

In a similar passage in the Topics (ii. 10) eiV6j (or Sokovv) 
is inserted after fidWov and ^ttov. Welldon suggests that 
here also the reading should be rb ^ttov f//c6i and t6 /laWov 
flKds (Grote, Aristotle, p. 294). 

* From the Meleager of Antiphon (T.O.F. p. 885). 

300 



RHETORIC, II. XXIII. 4-6 

Another topic is derived from the more and less. 
For instance, if not even the gods know everything, 
hardly can men ; for this amounts to saying that if 
a predicate, which is more probably affirmable of one 
thing, does not belong to it, it is clear that it does 
not belong to another of which it is less probably 
affirmable. And to say that a man who beats his 
father also beats his neighbours, is an instance of 
the rule that, if the less exists, the more also exists." 
Either of these arguments may be used, according 
as it is necessary to prove either that a predicate is 
affirmable or that it is not. Further, if there is no 
question of greater or less ; whence it was said. 

Thy father deserves to be pitied for having lost his children ; 
is not Oeneus then equally to be pitied for having lost an 
illustrious offspring ? '' 

Other instances are : if Theseus did no wrong," 
neither did Alexander (Paris) ; if the sons of 
Tyndareus did no wrong, neither did Alexander ; 
and if Hector did no wrong in slaying Patroclus, 
neither did Alexander in slaying Achilles ; if no other 
professional men are contemptible, then neither are 
philosophers ; if generals are not despised because 
they are frequently defeated,*^ neither are the 
sopliists ; or, if it behoves a private citizen to take 
care of your reputation, it is your duty to take care 
of that of Greece. 

Another topic is derived from the consideration 
of time. Thus Iphicrates, in his speech against 
Harmodius, says : " If, before accomphshing any- 
thing, I had demanded the statue from you in the 

* In carrying off Helen. 
■* The Paris ms. has OapaTouvTai, " are put to death." 

301 



ARISTOTLE 

eSoTe av TTOirjaavrL 8' ap' ov Scoaere; fjbrj roivvv 
fMeXXovres fiev inncrx^elade, TTaOovre? S' d(/)aLp€lade." 
1398 a /cat TrdXiv Trpos ro Qrj^aiovs Stetvat OiAittttov ety 
TTjV 'AttlkiJv, on " et irplv ^orjdrjaai els Oco/cets" 
Tj^iov, viriaxovro dv droTTov ovv el Siorc Trpoeiro 
Koi eTTiarevae fMrj Scr^aovaiv ." 
7 "AAAos" eK rwv elprj/xevcov Ka9^ avrovs Trpog rov 
eLTTOvra' otacpepet, oe 6 Tpoiros, otov ev ra> TevKpcp' 
o) exp'qcraTo ^l^iKpdrrjS Trpos ^ ApLcrTO<f)dJVTa, irr- 
epofievos el TTpohoirj dv rds vavs eVt XPVI^^'^''^' °^ 
(pacTKovros oe eira eiveu av puev cov Aptcrro- 
(j)cov ovK dv TTpohoiris, eyd) 8' cjv ^l^iKpdrrjs; " 
Set 8' VTTapxeiv /u-aAAov dv SoKovvra dStKYJaai 
eKelvov eL he fiij, yeXolov dv <f)aveLr], el Trpos 
^ ApLareih-qv KaTTjyopovvra rovro tls eiTTeiev, dXXd 
Trpos aTTLOTLav rov Karrjyopov oXcos ydp ^ovXer at 6 
Karyjyopcov ^eXnayv etvaL rov <j)evyovros' rovr* o6v 
e^eXeyx^i'V aet. KaOoXov 8 droTTOs ecrriv, orav ns 
eTTLTtna dXXoLS d avros TTOtel rj TTOirjaeiev dv, rj Trpo- 
rpeTTj] TTOietv d avros p-r} TTOieZ p,rj8e TTOirjaeiev dv. 

" Fragment of a speech of Lysias. It was proposed to 
put up a statue to the famous Athenian general Iphicrates 
in honour of his defeat of the Spartans (392 b.c). This was 
later opposed by Harmodius, probably a descendant of the 
tyrannicide. The speech, which is considered spurious, was 
called rj irepi TTjs elKOi'os. 

* Or, " the ways of doing this are various " (Jebb). 

" The illustration is lost or perhaps purposely omitted as 
well known. The Teucer was a tragedy of Sophocles, 

•* It would be absurd to use such an argument against 
the accusation of a "just man" like Aristides, and to pre- 
tend that he is more likely to have committed the crime. It 

302 



RHETORIC, II. xxiii. 6-7 

event of my success, you would have granted it ; 
will you then refuse it, now that I have succeeded ? 
Do not therefore make a promise when you expect 
something, and break it when you have received it." ** 
Again, to persuade the Thebans to allow Philip to 
pass through their territory into Attica, they were 
told that " if he had made this request before helping 
them against the Phocians, they would have pro- 
mised ; it would be absurd, therefore, if they refused 
to let him through now, because he had thrown 
away his opportunity and had trusted them." 

Another topic consists in turning upon the op- 
ponent what has been said against ourselves ; and 
this is an excellent method.^ For instance, in the 
Teucer " . . . and Iphicrates employed it against 
Aristophon, when he asked him whether he would 
have betrayed the fleet for a bribe ; when Aristophon 
said no, " Then," retorted Iphicrates, " if you, 
Aristophon, would not have betrayed it, would I, 
Iphicrates, have done so ? " But the opponent must 
be a man who seems the more likely to have com- 
mitted a crime ; otherwise, it would appear ridiculous, 
if anyone were to make use of such an argument in 
reference to such an opponent, for instance, as 
Aristides ^ ; it should only be used to discredit the 
accuser. For in general the accuser aspires to be 
better than the defendant ; accordingly, it must 
always be shown that this is not the case. And 
generally, it is ridiculous for a man to reproach 
others for what he does or would do himself, or to 
encom-age others to do what he does not or would 
not do himself. 

must only be used when the opponent's character is suspect, 
and lends itself to such a retort. 

303 



ARISTOTLE 

8 "AAAos" i^ opiafMov, olov on to Sat/jiovLov ovSev 
icTTLv aAA r) deos rj deov epyov Kairoi ocms o'lerai 
deov epyov elvai, rovrov avdyKii) otecrdat Kal deovs 
elvai. Kai cos ^l(f)LKpdrrjs , on, yevvaioraros 6 
^eXnoTOS' Kal yap 'Ap^oSto) /cat ^ Apiaroyeirovi 
ovhev nporepov VTrrjp^^e yevvalov Trplv yevvalov n 
irpd^ai. Kal on avyyeviarepos auros" " rd yovv 
epya avyyevecrrepd ion rd ifid rot? 'ApfioSiov 
Kal ^ ApioToyeirovos r) rd ad." Kal cog eV rw 
^AXe^dvSpo), on Trdvres dv ofjioXoyTJcrecav rovs /J-r) 
KoajXLOvs ovx evog acopboros dyairdv diroXavatv . Kal 
8t' o Tta>Kpdr7]s ovK e(f>rj ^ahil,€iv d)s ^ApxeXaov 
v^pLV ydp e(f)r) etvai rd p,rj Svvacrdat dpLVvaadai 
opboicos €v TTadovra, ayoTrep Kal KaKcos. Trdvres 
ydp o6toi opiadpievoL Kal Xa^ovres to tl ian, 
ovXXoyL^ovrai TTepl Sv Xeyovaiv. 

9 "AAAos" e/c rov TToaaj^MS , olov iv tols tottlkoIs 
Trepl Tov 6pdd)s. 

10 "AXXos eK SiaLpecrecos , otov et TrdvTes Tpicov 
€V€K€V dSiKovcTLV T^ TovSc ydp ev€Ka •^ TovSe ^ 
Touoe* /cat ota pt,ev ra ovo aovvarov, oia oe to 
rpiTOV ovh^ avToi ^aaiv. 



" The reference is obviously to Socrates, who claimed that 
a daimonion (a certain divine principle that acted as his 
internal monitor) checked his action in many cases. When 
accused of not believing in the gods, he was able to prove, 
by his definition of the daimonion, that he was no atheist. 
Similarly, Iphicrates, by his definition of yfwaioi and (xvy- 
yevrjs could refute the allegation that he was ignoble and 
show that his deeds were more akin to those of Harmodius 
and Aristogiton than to those of his opponents. Paris could 
say that he was not intemperate, because he was satisfied 
with Helen alone. Lastly, Socrates refused an invitation 

304 



RHETORIC, II. xxiii. 8-lo 

Another topic is derived from definition. For in- 
stance, that the daimonion "■ is nothing else than a 
god or the work of a god ; but he who thinks it to 
be the work of a god necessarily thinks that gods 
exist. When Iphicrates desired to prove that the 
best man is the noblest, he declared that there was 
nothing noble attaching to Harmodius and Aristo- 
giton, before they did something noble ; and, " I 
myself am more akin to them than you ; at any 
rate, my deeds are more akin to theirs than yours." 
And as it is said in the Alexander ^ that it would be 
generally admitted that men of disorderly passions 
are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one woman's 
person alone. Also, the reason why Socrates refused 
to visit Archelaus, declaring that it was disgraceful 
not to be in a position to return a favour as well as 
an injury .° In all these cases, it is by definition and 
the knowledge of what the thing is in itself that 
conclusions are drawn upon the subject in question. 

Another topic is derived from the different significa- 
tions of a word, as explained in the Topics, where the 
correct use of these terms has been discussed.*^ 

Another, from division. For example, " There are 
always three motives for wrongdoing ; two are 
excluded from consideration as impossible ; as for 
the third, not even the accusers assert it." 

to visit Archelaus, king of Macedonia, because he would 
be unable to return the benefits received, which would imply 
his being put to shame, and make the invitation a kind of 
insult. 

" Of Polycrates. 

" " Just as it is to requite them with evil " (Jebb). 

"* Supplying [XeXeKrat] wepl rod opOQs [xp^^c^ai avroU]. 
Others render : " in reference to the use of the word opdQs " 
(but dpdus does not occur in the passage in the Topics, i. 
15). A suggested reading is irepl toijtov opOGi^ etprjTau 

X 305 



ARISTOTLE 

11 "AAAo? 6^ eTTayojyrjg, olov Ik rrjs UeTrap-qOias , 
1398 bOTt Trepi Tcov TCKVcov at yvvaLK€? TTavraxov 8t- 
opit^ovai TaXrjdes' rovro fj,€v yap ^Adiijvrjai. Mavrlq. 
rib prjTopi a/x^tcr^r^Towrt irpos tov vlov rj p^T^rrjp 
a7T€<f)rjV€v , rovro Se Qt^^rjcnv ^lafirjvLov Kal YiriX- 
^covos ap,^L(j^T)rovvr(xiV rj AojSojvIs aTrehet^ev 
*lcrfj,r)VLOv rov vlov, /cat 8ta rovro QerraXtaKOV 
lafirjVLov ivo/jiL^ov. /cat TrdXiv €k rov vofxov rov 
QeoBcKrov, el rot? /ca/ccD? eTnfjueXrjdeLaL rcov 
dXXorpicov LTTTTOiv ov TrapaStSoacrt rovs oIk€lovs, 
ouSe rots' dvarpeipaai rds dXXorplas vavs' ovkovv 
el ojJiOLCog e(f) aTravrcov, /cat rot? /ca/ccu? (f)vXd^aai 
rrjv dXXorpiav ov ■)(priareov earlv els rrjv olKeiav 
aoirrjpiav. /cat ws 'AA/ct8a/xa?, on irdvres rovs 
ao<f)Ovg ripLCjaiv Yidpiot yovv 'Ap;^tAo;^ov KaiTrep 
pXda(f)rjjjLov ovra rerifju-^Kaai, /cat Xtot "Ofxrjpov 
ovK ovra TToXiriKov , /cat MvriXrjvaloi Jja7r(f)d) Kaiirep 
yvvaiKa oSaav, Kal Aa/ceSat/xoi/tot Xt'Acoi^a rcov 
yepovrcov eTTolrjaav TJKLora ^iXoXoyoi ovres, Kal 
'IraAtcarat YivOayopav , /cat AapifjaKrjvol 'Ara^- 
ayopav ^evov ovra edaifjav Kal rip,cbaLV en /cat 
vvv . . . ori *Adr]vatoL rols SoAwvos" vo/xols xPV^^~ 
p.evoL evhaLfJLovTjaav Kal Aa/ceSat^ov-tot rots Av- 
Kovpyov, /cat Qij^rjcriv dfjLa ol Trpoardrai ^tAocro^ot 
eyevovro Kal evhaipbovrjaev rj ttoXls. 

" Mantias had one legitimate son Mantitheus and two 
illegitimate by a certain Plangon. Mantias at first refused 
to acknowledge the latter as his sons, imtil the mother 
declared they were. 

* The name of the mother ; or simply, " the woman of 
Dodona," like " the woman of Peparethus." 

" Others read iroXh-qv, " although he was not their fellow- 
citizen " (but Chios was one of the claimants to his birthplace). 
306 



RHETORIC, II. XXIII. 11 

Another, from induction. For instance, from the 
case of the woman of Peparethus, it is argued that , 
in matters of parentage women always discern the 
truth ; similarly, at Athens, when Mantias the orator 
was litigating with his son, the mother declared 
the truth ; '^ and again, at Thebes, when Ismenias 
and Stilbon were disputing about a child, Dodonis ''' 
declared that Ismenias was its father, Thettaliscus 
being accordingly recognized as the son of Ismenias. 
There is another instance in the " law " of Theo- 
dectes : "If we do not entrust our own horses to 
those who have neglected the horses of others, or 
our ships to those who have upset the ships of others ; 
then, if this is so in all cases, we must not entrust 
our own safety to those who have failed to preserve 
the safety of others." Similarly, in order to prove 
that ' men of talent are everywhere honoured, 
Alcidamas said : " The Parians honoured Archi- 
lochus, in spite of his evil-speaking ; the Chians 
Homer, although he had rendered no pubhc services ;^ 
the Mytilenaeans Sappho, although she was a 
woman ; the Lacedaemonians, by no means a people 
fond of learning, elected Chilon one of their senators ; 
the Italiotes honoured Pythagoras, and the Lampsa- 
cenes buried Anaxagoras, although he was a for- 
eigner, and still hold him in honour. . . .'* The 
Athenians were happy as long as they lived under 
the laws of Solon, and the Lacedaemonians under 
those of Lycurgus ; and at Thebes, as soon as those 
who had the conduct of affairs became philosophers ,« 
the city flourished." 

"* Something has fallen out, what follows being intended 
to prove that the best rulers for a state are the philosophers. 

* Epaminondas and Pelopidas. One would rather expect, 
" as soon as philosophers had the conduct of aiFairs." 

307 



ARISTOTLE 

12 AAAos" €K Kpiaecos TTcpl rod avrov rj ofMOtov rj 
evavrcov, ndXiarra jxkv el Travres kol del, et 8e ari, 
aAA OL ye TTAeiaroL, rj crocpoi., rj navres rj ol TrAetcrTOi, 
7] ayadoi. rj el avrol ol Kpivovres, rj ov£ aTTO- 
Sexovrat ol Kpivovres, 17 of? fxrj otov re ivavrlov 
KpLvetv, otov roXs Kvploig, rj oh p.r] KaXov rd ivav- 
rta Kpiveiv, otov deois rj Trarpl rj StSacr/caAot?, 
oiairep ro els ML^iSrjjjilSrjv etnev AvroKXrjs, el 
raXs jxev aepLvaZs deals Ikovcos ^tx^v eV ^Apelcp 
TTaycp Sovvat StKrjv, Mi^LSrjfiiSjj 8' ov. t) wanep 
ZiaTTcpw, on ro drroOvrjcrKeiv KaKov ol deol yap 
ovrct) KeKpiKaoLV drreOvrjCKOv ydp dv. tj cos 
ApiarLTTTTOs TTpds YlXdrojva eirayyeXriKwrepov ri 
eiTTOvra, co? wero' " dXXd jxrjv o y eraipos rjfji,dJv, 
€<p7j, " ovdev roLovrov," Xiyoiv rov HojKpdrrjv. 
Kac YiyrjaLTTTTOs ev AeX(f)oXs rjpa>ra rov deov, 
TTporepov Kexprjfievos ^OXvjXTrlaaLV, el avrat ravrd 
1399 a ooKeZ aTTcp rip TTarpl, cos alaxpov ov rdvavrla 
enrelv. Kai TTepi rrjs 'EXevrjs cos ' laoKpdrrjs 
eypai/jev on anovSala, e'lTrep Srjcrevs exptvev Kal 
TTepi AXegavopov , ov at deal rrpoeKpivav, Kal nepl 
Evayopov, on crTTOvSaXos, worrep ^laoKpdrrjs ^rjalv 

" Athenian ambassador to Sparta (371 B.C.), whose ajf- 
gressive policy he attacked. His argument is that, if the 
Eumenides could agree without any loss of dignity to stand 
their trial before the Areopagus, as described in Aeschylus, 
surely Mixidemides could do the same. Nothing is known 
of Mixidemides, but it is clear that he refused to submit 
his case to it, when charged with some offence. 

* The story is told of Agesipolis (which others read here) 
in Xenophon, Ilellenica, iv. 7. 2. The Argives, when a 
Lacedaemonian army threatened to invade their territory, 
were in the habit of alleging that it was festival time, when 
there should be a holy truce. This obviously left the door 
308 



RHETORIC, II. XXIII. 12 

Another topic is that from a previous judgement 
in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter, 
if possible when the judgement was unanimous or 
the same at all times ; if not, when it was at least 
that of the majority, or of the wise, either all or 
most, or of the good ; or of the judges themselves or 
of those whose judgeraent they accept, or of those 
whose judgement it is not possible to contradict, for 
instance, those in authority, or of those whose judge- 
ment it is unseemly to contradict, for instance, the y 
gods, a father, or instructors ; as Autocles * said in 
his attack on Mixidemides, " If the awful goddesses 
were content to stand their trial before the Areopagus, 
should not Mixidemides .'' " Or Sappho, " Death is an 
evil ; the gods have so decided, for otherwise they 
would die." Or as Aristippus, when in his opinion 
Plato had expressed himself too presiunptuously, 
said, " Our friend at any rate never spoke like that," 
referring to Socrates. Hegesippus,* after having 
first consulted the oracle at Olympia, asked the god 
at Delphi whether his opinion was the same as his' 
father's, meaning that it would be disgraceful to con- 
tradict liim. Helen was a virtuous woman, wrote 
Isocrates, because Theseus so judged ; the same ap- 
plies to Alexander (Paris), whom the goddesses chose 
before others. Evagoras was virtuous, as Isocrates 

open to fraud, so Agesipolis (one of the Spartan kings) con- 
sulted the oracle of Zeus at Olympia to ask whether he was 
to respect such a truce. The reply of the oracle was that 
he might decline a truce fraudulently demanded. To confirm 
this, Agesipolis put the same question to Apollo : " Is your 
opinion as to the truce the same as that of your father 
(Zeus)?" " Certainly," answered Apollo. Agesipolis there- 
upon invaded Argos. The point is that really Apollo had 
little choice, since it would have been disgraceful for the son 
to contradict the father. 

309 



ARISTOTLE 

Kovcov yovv hvaTvxrjoa'S , TrdvTas rovg aXXovs 
TrapaXiTTcov , cos ^vayopav rjXBev. 

13 ' AaXos €«• rciiv /JbepcoVy wanep iv rots tottlkols, 
TTOta KLvrjais t] ^'^XV' V^^ 7^9 V "^^^^ TrapaSetyfia 
€K rod TicoKpdrovs rov SeoSeKrov " els ttoZov 
lepov Tjae^rjKev; rivas OeoJv ov rertfJbrjKev Sv rj 
ttoXls vofjiL^ei; " 

14 "AAAo?, iTreiBrj inl rcbv TrXecarcov avp.^aiveL cocrd^ 
€7T€a6aL n ro) avrcp dyadov /cat KaKov, e/c rov 
(XKoXovdovvros TrporpeTreiv rj drrorpeTreLv /cat /car- 
Tjyopetv rj dTToXoyeladai /cat erraiveZv rj ifjeyeiv. 
OLov rfj TTaiBcvcrei ro ^dovelcrdai dKoXovdet /ca/cor, 
TO 8e ao^ov etvai dyaOov ov roivvv Set rraiheveadai, 
<j>9oveia6aL yap ov Set* Set p,€v ovu TratSeuecr^at, 
ao(f)6v yap elvai Set. o roTTOs ovros iariv rj 
KaAAtTTTTou ri^vrj TvpoaXa^ovaa /cat ro hvvarov 
/cat raAAa, ws etprjrai,. 

15 "AXXos, orav Trepl Svolv /cat dvriK€ifJ,€voiv r) 
7Tporp€7T€iv Tj dTTorpiiTeiv ^ejj, /cat rep rrporepov 
elprjfxevip rpoTTCp em dp.(f>olv XP^'^^^'" ^i'0.(f>^P^i- 
Se, oTt e/cet fiev rd rv^ovra dvrLriderai, ivravda 
Se rdvavria. otov Upeta ovk eta rov vlov Srjfi- 
rjyopelv idv fxev ydp, €<f)rj, rd St/caia Xdyjjs, oi 
dvdpwrroi ue pnaijaovaLV , idv Se rd aSt/ca, ol deoi. 
Set iiev ovv Srjfjirjyopelv edv fiev ydp rd St/cata 

" After his defeat at Aegospotami (405 b.c.) the Athenian 
general Conon, fearing for his life, took refuge with 
Evagoras, king of Cyprus — a proof, according to Aristotle, 
of the goodness of the latter. 

*" If the genus can be affirmed of any subject, then one or 
other of the species, which make up the genus, must also be 
predicable of it. If the proposition to be maintained is, 

310 



RHETORIC, 11. XXIII. 12-15 

says, for at any rate Conon" in his misfortune, 
passing over everyone else, sought his assistance. 

Another topic is that from enumerating the parts, 
as in the Topics : What kind of movement is the 
soul ? for it must be this or that.^ There is an 
instance of this in the Socrates of Theodectes : " What 
holy place has he profaned ? Which of the gods 
recognized by the city has he neglected to honour .'' " 

Again, since in most human affairs the same thing 
is accompanied by some bad or good result, another 
topic consists in employing the consequence to ex- 
hort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or blame. 
For instance, education is attended by the evil of 
being envied, and by the good of being wise ; there- 
fore we should not be educated, for we should avoid 
being envied ; nay rather, we should be educated, 
for we should be wise. This topic is identical with 
the " Art " of Callippus, when you have also in- 
cluded the topic of the possible and the others which 
have been mentioned. 

Another topic may be employed when it is neces- 
sary to exhoi't or dissuade in regard to two opposites, 
and one has to employ the method previously 
stated in the case of both. But there is this differ- 
ence, that in the former case things of any kind 
whatever are opposed, in the latter opposites. For 
instance, a priestess refused to allow her son to 
speak in public ; " For if," said she, " you say what 
is just, men will hate you ; if you say what is unjust, 
the gods will." On the other hand, " you should 

the soul is moved, it is necessary to examine whether any 
of the different kinds of motion (increase, decrease, decay, 
change of place, generation, alteration) can be predicated of 
the soul. If not, the generic predicate is not applicable, 
and the proposition is refuted. 

311 



ARISTOTLE 

Aeyrjg, ol Ocoi ae (^iXifjaovaiv , iav 8e ra aSi/ca, 
ol avdpcoTTOi. rovrl 8' iarl ravro rco Xeyofjbevo) 
TO eXog TTpiaadai /cat tovs aXas' /cat rj ^Xaiaojaig 
rovT eariv, orav hvolv ivavriotv eKarepo) dyadov 
/cat KaKov €7Trjrat, ivavria eKarepa eKarepois. 

16 "AAAo?, eTTeihrj ov ravra (f)av€p(x)s eTraivovai 
/cat a(j>avcx)s, aAAa (f}av€pco? fxev ra St/cata /cat ra 
KaXa iiraivovaL /LtaAtora, tSta 8e ra avp,(f)epovra 
p,dXXov povXovrai, e/c rovrojv Treipdadai avvdyeiv 
darepov rcbv yap rrapaho^cov ovros 6 r ottos Kvpiu)- 
raros icrrcv. 

17 "AXXog e/c rov dvdXoyov ravra avp,^aLV€LV' olov 
o I(pLKparr]? rov vtov avrov veojrepov ovra rrjs 
rjiXiKiag, on jxeyas rjv, XetrovpyeZv dvayKa^ovrojv , 
€L7T€V on €L Toi)? fieydXovs rcbv rraihiov dvSpas 
vofiii^ova-L, rovs /jLLKpovs rd)v dvhpdyv iralhas elvai 

i399h iffrjc/yLovvrai. /cat QeoScKr-qs iv raJ vo/xoj, ort 
TToAtTas" fiev TTOicXade rovs ixLado<j)6povs, olov 
Hrpd^aKa /cat ^aplSrjfiov 8ta rrjv eTrtet/cetaiv- 
(f)vydha9 8 ov TTOLrjcere rovg iv rocs p.Lado(f)6poLS 
dvT]K€ara BiaTreTrpaypbevovs ; 

18 "AXXos e/c rov ro avfx^aZvov idv rj ravrov, on 
/cat e^ cov avp,^aiveL ravrd' olov 'E>€vo<f>dvrjs eXeyev 
on, ofioLws dae^ovaiv ol yeveaOai ^doKovres rovs 

" The bad with the good. The exact meaning of 
pXalawcris (see Glossary) has not been satisfactorily explained. 
In the definition given of the retortion of a dilemma, the two 
opposite things would be speaking truth or untruth ; the two 
opposite consequences, pleasing men and pleasing God. 

* e.g. a man may say that an honourable death should be 
preferred to a pleasant life, and honest poverty to ill-acquired 
wealth, whereas really he wishes the opposite. " If then his 
words are in accordance with liis real wishes, he must be 
confronted with his public statements ; if they are in accord- 
312 



RHETORIC, II. xxni. 15-18 

speak in public ; for if you say what is just, the 
gods will love you, if you say what is unjust, men 
will." This is the same as the proverb, " To buy 
the swamp with the salt " "■ ; and retorting a dilemma 
on its proposer takes place when, two things being 
opposite, good and evil follow on each, the good and 
evil being opposite like the things themselves. 

Again, since men do not praise the same things 
in public and in secret, but in public chiefly praise 
what is just and beautiful, and in secret rather wish 
for what is expedient, another topic consists in 
endeavouring to infer its opposite from one or 
other of these statements.* This topic is the most 
weighty of those that deal with paradox. 

Another topic is derived from analogy in things. 
For instance, Iphicrates, when they tried to force his 
son to perform public services because he was tall, 
although under the legal age, said : " If you consider 
tall boys men, you must vote that short men are 
boys." Similarly, Theodectes in his " law," " says : 
" Since you bestow the rights of citizenship upon 
mercenaries such as Strabax and Charidemus on 
account of their merits, will you not banish those 
of them who have wrought such irreparable mis- 
fortunes } " 

Another topic consists in concluding the identity 
of antecedents from the identity of results .<^ Thus 
Xenophanes said : " There is as much impiety in 

ance with the latter, he must be confronted with his secret 
wishes. In either case he must fall into paradox, and con- 
tradict either his publicly expressed or secret opinions " 
{Sophistici Elenchi, ii. 12, Poste's translation). 

* This "law" (already mentioned in 11) is said to have 
been an oration on the legal position of mercenaries. 

* Cause and effect. 

313 



ARISTOTLE 

deovs TOLS OLTTodavelv Xiyovaiv d(j,(f)or€pcos' yap 
crv/jL^aLveL fM-q cTvaL rovs deovs ttotc. /cat oXcos 
Be TO avfi^atvov ef eKarepov Xajx^aveiv (hs ravro 
aei' fieAAere oe Kptvetv ov Trepi, iaoKparovs oAAa 
TTepl iTTLTrjSevfiaTos , el XPV 4'^Xoao<^elv ." koL otl 
TO SiSovai yrjv /cat vSwp SovXeveLV eariv, /cat ro 
fxerex^LV rijs Koivrjs elprjvrjs Troielv ro npoa- 
rarrofievov. XrjTTTeov 8' OTTorepov av fj ■)(^prj(niJ.ov . 

19 "AAAo? e/c rov firj ravro rovg avrovs ael alpeladai 
varepov rj Trporepov, dAA' dmTraAiv, olov rohe ro 
evOvjjbTjfjia, " el ^evyovres fiev ep,a-)(op.eda ottcos 
KareXOcofMev, KareXdovres 8e <f)€V^6p,€9a oncos fir) 
fxaxiop'eOa-" ore p/iv yap ro p^eveiv avrl rov 
pidx^odai rjpovvro, ore 8e ro p,rj p,dx€adai, dvrl 
rov p,r) p,€vecv. 

20 "AAAo? ro ov eveK av etrj H) yevoiro, rovrov 
ev€Ka (f>dvai elvai rj yeyevrjadat, olov el SoL-q av 
ris rivl tv' d<f)eX6p,€VOS XvTnjarj. 69ev /cat rovr 
etprjrat, 

TToXXoXs 6 Sai/jLajv ov /car' evvoiav <f)€pcov 
/xeydAa 8t8ajcrti^ evrvx^jp-o-r^ , dAA' ti^a 
rds avp,<f)opds Xd^coaiv e7TL(f)aveaTepas . 
/cat ro e/c rov M.eXedypov rov * AvrL<f)U)vrog , 

" Isocrates, Antidosis, 173. 

" The peace concluded between the Greeks (although the 
Lacedaemonians held aloof) and Alexander the Great after 
the death of Philip of Macedon (336 B.C.). 

* Lysias, xxxiv. 11. 

"* i.e. after their return, they preferred to leave the city 
rather than fight. This is Cope's explanation, but the 
meaning of the clause ori tx.iv . . . -^povvro is then some- 
what obscure. A more suitable interpretation would be: 
"At one time they preferred to return from exile at the 
price of fighting: at another, not to fight, at the price of 

314 



RHETORIC, 11. xxiii. 18-20 

asserting that the gods are born as in saying that 
they die ; for either way the result is that at some 
time or other they did not exist." And, generally 
speaking, one may always regard as identical the 
results produced by one or other of any two things : 
" You are about to decide, not about Isocrates alone, 
but about education generally, whether it is right to 
study pliilosophy." "■ And, " to give earth and water 
is slavery," and " to be included in the common 
peace ^ implies obeying orders." Of two alter- 
natives, you should take that which is useful. 

Another topic is derived from the fact that the 
same men do not always choose the same thing 
before and after, but the contrary. The following 
enthymeme is an example : " If, when in exile, we 
fought to return to our country [it would be mon- 
strous] if, now that we have returned, we were to 
return to exile to avoid fighting " ! " This amounts 
to saying that at one time they preferred to hold 
their ground at the price of fighting ; at another, 
not to fight at the price of not remaining."* 

Another topic consists in maintaining that the 
cause of something which is or has been is something 
which would generally, or possibly might, be the cause 
of it ; for example, if one were to make a present 
of something to another, in order to cause him pain 
by depriving him of it. Whence it has been said : 

It is not from benevolence that the deity bestows great 
blessings upon many, but in order that they may suffer 
more striking calamities.* 

And these verses from the Meleager of Antiphon : 

being exiled a second time (St. Hilaire)," but one does not 
see how this can be got out of the Greek. 
' The author is unknown. 

315 



ARISTOTLE 

ovx tva Krdvcoat Orjp^, ottojs 8e fjidprvpes 
dperrjs yevcovrai MeAecty/DO) Trpos 'EAActSa. 

/cat TO e/c rov Aiavros rov QcoSeKTOV, on 6 
Aiofn]S7]s TTpoeiXero 'OSucrcrea ov np-wv, dAA' Iva 

T^TTCOV fl 6 OLKoXovdoJV €vS€)(^€Tat ydp TOVTOV €V€Ka 

TTOLrjaai. 

21 "AAAos" Koivog /cat rots dp,(f)La^T]TovaL /cat rols 
crufM^ovXevovcn, aKoireZv to, TTporpevovra /cat diro- 
rpeTTOvra, /cat d)v eve/ca /cat TTparrovcrc /cat <f)€vyov- 
aiv ravra ydp ecrrtv a idv p,kv vrrdpx'fj Bel Trpdrreiv 
[edv Se p,rj v7Tdp)(r}, p,rj Trpdrreiv], olov el bvvarov 
/cat pdBiov /cat oj^eXipLov t) avrcp 7} ^t'Aots", 17 j8Aa- 
^epov exBpoZs /cat eTn^rjpLov, rj iXdrrcov rj ^7)p,la 
Tov TTpdyp,aT09. /cat TrporpeTTOvrai 8' e/c Toirra»v 
/cat dTTOT penovr ai e/c tcDv ivavricov. e/c 8e tcuv 

1400 a ct^T'^^' TOUTcoi/ /Cat KaTrjyopovai /cat d'H-oAoyowraf 
e/c /xev rcDv dTTorpeTroj^cot' aTToAoyowrat, e/c 8e 
rdJv TTpoTpeTTovroiv Karrjyopovaiv . eari 8' o tottos' 
ovros oXt] re^vr] t] re Ila/x^tAou /cat •^ KaAAtTTTroy. 

22 "AAAos" e/c TcSt' BoKovvrcov p,ev yiyveadai d- 
Tiiaroiv 84, on ovk dv eSo^av, el p,r) -^v r) eyyvs 
r^v. /cat on p,dXXov t^ ydp rd ovra rj rd elKora vtto- 
Xap-^avovaiv et ovv aTnarov /cat pr) cIkos, dXrjdes 
dv eh]' ov yap 8td ye to et/cos" /cat mdavov 80/cet 
ovTMS. olov 'AvSpoKXijs eXeyev 6 riiT^eus" /car- 

« Frag. 2 (T-G^.F. p. 792). 

" Iliad, X. 218 ; cp. T.C.F. p. 801. 

* By pointing out what is likely to deter a man from 
committing a crime, and vice versa. 

<* The argument is : we accept either that which really is, 
or that which is probable ; if then a statement is made which 

316 



RHETORIC, II. xxiii. 20-22 

Not in order to slay the monster, but that they may be 
witnesses to Greece of the valour of Meleager." 

And the following remark from the AJax of Theo- 
dectes, that Diomedes chose Odysseus before all 
others,^ not to do him honour, but that his companion 
might be his inferior ; for this may have been the 
reason. 

Another topic common to forensic and dehberative 
rhetoric consists in examining what is hortatory and 
dissuasive, and the reasons which make men act or 
not. Now, these are the reasons which, if they 
exist, determine us to act, if not, not ; for instance, 
if a thing is possible, easy, or useful to ourselves or 
our friends, or injurious and prejudicial to our 
enemies, or if the penalty is less than the profit. 
From these grounds we exhort, and dissuade from 
their contraries. It is on the same grounds that we 
accuse and defend ; for what dissuades serves for de- 
fence,'' what persuades, for accusation. This topiccom-' 
prises the whole " Art " of Pamphilus and Callippus. 

Another topic is derived from things which are 
thought to happen but are incredible, because it 
would never have been thought so, if they had not 
happened or almost happened. And further, these 
things are even more likely to be true ; for we only 
believe in that which is, or that which is probable : 
if then a thing is incredible and not probable, it will 
be true ; for it is not because it is probable and 
credible that we think it true.*^ Thus, Androcles ^ of 

is incredible and improbable, we assume that it would not 
have been made, unless it was true. 

« Athenian demagogue and opponent of Alcibiades, for 
whose banishment he was chiefly responsible. When the 
Four Hundred were set up, he was put to death. Pitthus 
was an Athenian deme or parish. 

317 



ARISTOTLE 

7]yop<Lov rod vofxov, cTret idopvft-qaav avrcp eLTTOvri 
Seovrat ol vojxol vofMov rod Siopdcoaovros' Kal 
yap OL i)(dv€s aAos", Kairoi ovk cIkos ovSe mdavov 
€v aXfJbT) rp€<f)Ofj,€Vovs Selcrdat dAds", /cat rd (yrep,(j)vXa 
iXaiov Kalroi aTnorov, i^ Sv e'Aatov yiyverai, ravra 
SeladaL iXatov." 

23 "AAAos" iXeyKTLKos, ro ra dvofjboXoyov/jbeva oko- 
Trelv, et ri avopLoXoyovpLevov ck Trdvrcov kol xpoviov 
/cat Trpd^eojv /cat Xoyojv, x^P''^ P-^^ ^'"'^ '''^^ dpi(f)L- 
a^-qrovvrog, olov " kol <j)rjal pb€V ^iX^lv vpids, 
ovviopuocre Se rot? rpiaKovra," x^P'-s S' ^'^' o-vtov, 
" /cat </)rjal pukv elvai pie ^iXohiKov , ovk e;^et. Se 
aTToSei^ai hehiKaapbivov ovSepuLCW Blktjv," x^P''^ 
8 €77 avrov /cat rov dp,(f)La^rjrovvros , " /cat odrog 
p,€V ov oeoaveiKe TrcoTTor ovoev, eycx) oe /cat ttoAAovs 
XeXvpbai vp,wv." 

24 "AAAo? rot? 'TTpohtape^X7]p,ivois /cat dv6pa>7TOis 
/cat TTpdypbacTLv , rj SoKovai, ro Xeyeiv rrjv alriav 
rod TTapaho^ov earn ydp ri St' o <j)aiverai. olov 
v7TO^€^Xr)p.€V7]s rivos rov avrrjs vtov Std ro daird- 
t^eaOai iSoKCL avvelvai rw pbetpaKLcp, Xexdevros 
Se rov alriov iXvd-q r] Sta^oX'q' /cat olov iv rep Atavn 
ro) QeoSeKrov 'OSvaaevs XeyeL Trpos rov Aiairra, 
StoTi avhpeiorepos cov rod Aiavros ov So/cet. 

25 "AAAo? aTTo rod alriov, dv re vnapxi), on €.cm, 
Kov pt.rj VTrdpxij, on ovk ecrnv dpi,a ydp ro atnov 
Kal ov atnov, Kal dvev alriov ovdev ecrnv. olov 
AecoBdpbas d7ToXoyovp,evos eXeye, Karrjyoprjaavros 
Qpaav^ovXov on rjv arrjXlrrjS' y€yovd)s ev rfj 

" Understanding dia^e^Xijcrdai. Others read firj (for ^) 
doKovffi, " when there seems no reason to suspect them." 
318 



RHETORIC, II. XXIII. 22-25 

Pitthus, speaking against the law, being shouted at 
when he said " the laws need a law to correct them," 
went on, " and fishes need salt, although it is neither 
probable nor credible that they should, being brought 
up in brine ; similarly, pressed olives need oil, 
although it is incredible that what produces oil 
should itself need oil." 

Another topic, appropriate to refutation, consists 
in examining contradictories, whether in dates, 
actions, or words, first, separately in the case of the 
adversary, for instance, " he says that he loves you, 
and yet he conspired with the Thirty ; " next, 
separately in your own case, " he says that I am 
litigious, but he cannot prove that I have ever 
brought an action against anyone " ; lastly, sep- 
arately in the case of your adversary and yourself 
together : "he has never yet lent anything, but I 
have ransomed many of you." 

Another topic, when men or things have been 
attacked by slander, in reality or in appearance,** 
consists in stating the reason for the false opinion ; 
for there must be a reason for the supposition of 
guilt. For example, a woman embraced her son in' 
a manner that suggested she had illicit relations with 
him, but when the reason was explained, the slander 
was quashed. Again, in the AJax of Theodectes, 
Odysseus explains to Ajax why, although really more 
courageous than Ajax, he is not considered to be so. 

Another topic is derived from the cause. If the 
cause exists, the effect exists ; if the cause does not 
exist, the effect does not exist ; for the effect exists 
with the cause, and without cause there is nothing. 
For example, Leodamas, when defending himself 
against the accusation of Thrasybulus that his name 

319 



ARISTOTLE 

aKpoTToAei, aAA eKKoijjai em rcov rpiaKOVTa, ovk 
evSex^crdai e(f)7)' iidWov yap av Trtcrrevetv avTcp 
rovg rptaKovra iyyeypap,jX€vrj? rrjg exdpag Trpos 
rov hrjjxov. 

26 "AAAos", et iveSex^ro ^eXriov dXXcjs 17 ivSex^TO-i' 
(Lv Tj avfM^ovXevet t] TTpdrrei rj Trenpaxe aKOTreZv 

^iooh (j)av€p6v yap on el /jltj ovtcos ex^t, ov Treirpax^v 
ovSels ydp ckcov rd (f>avXa koI yiyvcooKinv irpo- 
aipetrat. eart Se tovto ipevSog- TroAAawrts" yap 
varepov yiyverai SrjXov ttcos rjv irpd^ai ^eXriov, 
TTporepov 8e dhrjXov. 

27 "AAAo?, orav Tt ivavriov p,eXXr^ TrpdrreadaL toXs 
TTeTrpay/jLevois, a/xa OKOTrelv olov 'E.evo<f)dv'qs 'EAca- 
rais ipcoTcoatv el dvwai rfj AevKodea /cat dprjvwaLU, 
^ p.iq, ovve^ovXevev, el jxev deov inroXafx^dvovaL, 
fxrj dprjvelv, el 8' dvdpcoTrov, fjbrj Oveiv. 

28 "AAAo? r OTTOS TO eK rdJv dfjuaprrjOevrajv /car- 
Tjyopelv T] dTToXoyelaSai, olov ev rfj K^apKivov 
Mrj^eia ol fiev KarrjyopovaLV otl tovs TralSas dn- 
CKreivev, ov (jiaivecrdai yovv avrovs' rjfxapre ydp 
rj MrySeta irepl ttjv dTrocrroXrjV rcov Traihcov 77 8' 

" The names of traitors were inscribed on a brazen pillar 
in the Acropolis. Leodamas supported the oligarchical, 
Thrasybulus the democratical party. In answer to the 
charge that he had had his name removed from the pillar 
when his party came into power, Leodamas replied that, 
if he had been originally posted as an enemy of the people 
and a hater of democracy, he would have preferred to keep 
the record, as likely to increase the confidence of the Thirty 
in him, than to have it erased, even though it branded him 
as a traitor. 

* If a person has not taken the better course, when he 
had the chance of doing so, he cannot be guilty. 

* Leucothea was the name of the deified Ino. She was 
the daughter of Cadmus and the wife of Athamas king of 
820 



RHETORIC, II. XXIII. 25-28 

had been posted in the AcropoHs " but that he had 
erased it in the time of the Thirty, declared that 
it was impossible, for the Thirty would have had 
more confidence in him if his hatred against the 
people had been graven on the stone. 

Another topic consists in examining whether there 
was or is another better course than that which is 
advised, or is being, or has been, carried out. For 
it is evident that, if this has not been done,** a 
person has not committed a certain action ; because 
no one, purposely or knowingly, chooses what is bad. 
However, this argument may be false ; for often it 
is not until later that it becomes clear what was the 
better course, which previously was uncertain. 

Another topic, when something contrary to what 
has already been done is on the point of being done, 
consists in examining them together. For instance, 
when the people of Elea asked Xenophanes if they 
ought to sacrifice and sing dirges to Leucothea,'' or 
not, he advised them that, if they believed her to be 
a goddess they ought not to sing dirges, but if they 
believed her to be a mortal, they ought not to 
sacrifice to her. 

Another topic consists in making use of errors 
committed, for purposes of accusation or defence. 
For instance, in the Medea of Carcinus,** some accuse 
Medea of having killed her children, — at any rate, 
they had disappeared ; for she had made the mis- 
take of sending them out of the way. Medea herself 

Thebes. The latter went mad and, in order to escape from 
him, Ino threw herself into the sea with her infant son 
Melicertes. Both became marine deities. 

<* Tragic poet, contemporary of Aristophanes {T.O.F. 
p. 798). 

Y 321 



ARISTOTLE 

aTToXoyeZrai on ovk av rovs TratSa? aAAa top 
'Idaova dv OLTreKTetvev rovro yap rnjuaprev dv fxr] 
TTOiriaaaa, eiVep koL ddrepov eTTOi-qaev. ecm S 
o TOTTOS" OUTOS" Tov ivdvfji'qfjbaros /cat to ethos oXt) 
•q TTporepov Qeohcopov Texvrj. 

29 "AXXos d-TTO rod ovopLoros, olov cos 6 So^o/cAt^j 

aa<f)OJS JjiSripd) /cat <j>opovaa rovvop,a, 

Kol CVS ev TOLS rcjv decbv CTraivoLS elcodacTL Xeyeiv, 
KOI CVS K.6vcvv Spacrv^ovXov dpaav^ovXov ckolXcl, 
KOL 'HpoSiKos Spaavp,axov " del 6paovp,axos 
el," /cat IlaiAoi^ " aet av ttcvXos el," /cat ApaKovra 
TOP vop,oderr}v, on ovk dvdpcvTTOV ol v6p,oi dXXd 
hpdKovTos' xaXeiTol ydp. /cat chs rj Ev/Dt7rt8ou 

*E/Ca^7^ €t<r TTjV ^ A(f)poSLT7]V 

/cat rovvop, opdcvs a<f>poavv7]s dp^ei Beds. 
/cat CVS Xai/OT^/xwp' 

Yievdevs eaop,evrjs avp,^opds e7Tcvvvp,os. 

30 Eu8o/ct/xet 8e p,dXXov rcvv evdvp.rjp.dTcov rd 
eXeyKTLKa rcvv dTroSeiKTLKcov 8ta to avvaycoyrjv 
{jLev ivavncvv elvai ev p,LKpcv to eXeyKTiKov ev- 
Ovfirjixa, Trap' dXXrjXa Se ^avepd etvac rev aKpoarfj 



° An early edition, afterwards enlarged. It must have 
contained something more than the topic of " errors " to be 
of any use. 

" Sophocles, Tyro, Frag. 597 {T.G.F.). The reference is 
to Sidero {(xidrjpoi, iron), the cruel stepmother of Tyro. 

« Thompson's rendering (Introd. to his ed. of Plato's 
Gorgias, p. 5). " Colt " refers to Polus's skittishness and 
frisking from one subject to another. 

<« Troades, 990. 

322 



RHETORIC, 11. XXIII. 28-30 

pleads that she would have slain, not her children, 
but her husband Jason ; for it would have been a 
mistake on her part not to have done this, if she had 
done the other. This topic and kind of enthymeme 
is the subject of the whole of the first " Art " of 
Theodorus.'' 

Another topic is derived from the meaning of a 
name. For instance, Sophocles says, 

Certainly thou art iron, like thy name.* 

This topic is also commonly employed in praising the 
gods. Conon used to call Thrasybulus " the man 
bold in counsel," and Herodicus said of Thrasy- 
machus, " Thou art ever bold in fight," and of Polus, 
. " Thou art ever Polus (colt) by name and colt by 
nature," " and of Draco the legislator that his laws 
were not those of a man, but of a dragon, so severe 
were they. Hecuba in Euripides ** speaks thus of 
Aphro-dite : 

And rightly does the name of the goddess begin like the 
word aphro-syne (folly) ; 

and Chaeremon " of Pentheus, 

Pentheus named after his unhappy future. 

Enthymemes that serve to refute are more popular 
than those that serve to demonstrate, because the 
former is a conclusion of opposites ■'^ in a small compass, 
and things in juxtaposition are always clearer to the 

* Frag. 4 {T.G.F.). The name Pentheus is from Trevdos 
(sorrow). 

f "Admitting the apparent correctness of the opposing 
argument, we may prove the contradictory of its conclusion 
by an unassailable argument of our own, which is then 
called an elenchus " (Thomson, Laws of Thought, § 127). 

323 



ARISTOTLE 

fjbd^ov. TTOVTCov 8e /cat rcbv iXeyKTiKcbv /cat rajv 
SeiKTiKaJv crvXXoyiafiwv Oopv^elrai ixaXiara ra 
roiavra oaa dp)(Ofieva Trpoopaiac jMrj ro) eTnTToXrjs 
elvai (a/xa yap /cat avrol icf) avroXs ;(ai/)oi'at 
■npoaiadavofjLevoL) , /cat oacov rocrovrov varcpl^ov- 
aiv (LaO^ dfxa elprjfievojv yvojpil^eiv. 

24. 'Ettci S' ivSex^rat rov fxev etvai ovXXoyi- 
afiov, rov Se fxr] elvac jMev (f>aiveadai hi, dvdyKrj /cat 
evdvjxrjpua to jxev elvai dv6viJ,T]p,a, ro 8e /xt) eti'at 
^aiveadai he, eVetVe/j ro eV^y/x7^/xa cruXXoyLap^os rt?. 
2 ToTTot 8' etcrt rd)v ^aivop,evcov evOvprip,droiv els 
1401 a /xev o Trapa r-qv Xe^iv, /cat royroy ev p,ev p,epos, 
warrep ev rols StaAe/crt/cots", ro p,rj avXXoyt,adpLevov 
cwp,7T€paap,arLKd)s ro reXevraiov elireZv, ovk dpa- 
ro /cat ro, dvdyKrj dpa ro /cat ro. /cat rot? ev- 
6vp,T^p,aai ro avv€arpap,p,evcos /cat dvrLKeLp,eva}s 
elrrelv (f)aiveraL evdvprjp,a- rj yap roiavrrj Xe^is 
Xiopo. earlv evdvp.iqp.aros. /cat eoiKe ro roiovrov 
elvai TTapd ro ax'rjP'a rrjs Xe^ecos. eart he els ro 
rfi Aefet avXXoyiari,Kd)s Xeyeiv XPI^''!^^^ "^o crvX- 
Xoytap-ibv TToXXcbv /ce^oAata Xeyeiv, on rovs fJ>€v 
eacoae, rois 8' erepots erLfxojpiqae , rovs 8' "KXXrjvas 
rjXevdepcoaev eKaarov p,ev yap rovrcov e^ dXXojv 
dTTehelxdr], avvreOevriov he <f>aiverai, /cat e/c rovrcxyv 
TL yiyveadat. 

"Ev he ro TTapd rrjv 6pt.o}vvp,iav , cos rd (f>dvai 
cnrovhatov elvai p,vv, d(f)* ov y earlv rj ripnoirdrrj 
7Taad)v reXeri]- rd yap fMvar'^pia Tracrcbv rLpLicordrrj 



" Isocrates, Evagoras, 65-69. 

* Or equivocation, in which a single term has a double 
meaning. 
324 



RHETORIC, II. XXIII. 30— xxiv. 2 

audience. But of all syllogisms, whether refutative 
or demonstrative, those are specially applauded, 
the result of which the hearers foresee as soon as 
they are begun, and not because they are superficial 
(for as they hsten they congratulate themselves 
on anticipating the conclusion) ; and also those 
which the hearers are only so little behind that they 
understand what they mean as soon as they are 
dehvered. 

24, But as it is possible that some syllogisms may 
be real, and others not real but only apparent, 
there must also be real and apparent enthymemes, 
since the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism. 

Now, of the topics of apparent enthymemes one 
is that of diction, which is of two kinds. The first, 
as in Dialectic, consists in ending with a conclusion 
syllogistically expressed, although there has been no 
syllogistic process, " therefore it is neither this nor 
that," " so it must be this or that " ; and similarly 
in rhetorical arguments a concise and antithetical 
statement is supposed to be an enthymeme ; for such 
a style appears to contain a real enthymeme. This 
fallacy appears to be the result of the form of ex- 
pression. For the purpose of using the diction to 
create an impression of syllogistic reasoning it is 
useful to state the heads of several syllogisms : 
" He saved some, avenged others, and freed the 
Greeks " ; " for each of these propositions has been 
proved by others, but their union appears to furnish 
a fresh conclusion. 

The second kind of fallacy of diction is homonymy.^ 
For instance, if one were to say that the mouse is an 
important animal, since from it is derived the most 
honoured of all religious festivals, namely, the 

325 



ARISTOTLE 

reXer-^. tj et ri? Kvva iyKCDfXLd^cuv rov iv rco 
ovpavcp ovfiTTapaXafi^dvei 7) rov Ildva, on UlvSapos 
€(f)rja€v 

(L noLKap, 6v re /xeyaAa? deov Kvva TravroSaTrov 

KoXeOVatV 'OXvfjbTTLOt. 

7] oTt TO /XT^SeVa elvai Kvva dniMorarov icrrtv, 
(jjare to Kvva SrjXov otl tLjxlov. Kal to kolvojvlkov 
(f>dvat TOP 'Epfirjv elvai /xaAtcrra tcov decjv p,6vo? 
yap /caAetrat kolvos 'Kpp,rjs. /cat to tov Xoyov 
€Lvai CTTovSaioraTOV , otl 01 dyadol dvSpes ov XPV" 
fiaTcov aXXd Xoyov elalv d^iof to ydp Xoyov d^Lov 
ovx aTrXcos Aeyerat. 
3 "AAAos" TO hLTjprjjxevov avvTiOevTa Xeyeiv rj to 
ovyKeLfMevov hiaipovvTa' eirel ydp Taindv So/cet 
elvai ovK ov TavTov TroAAa/ctj, oiroTepov ;Yp7^cri/>tai- 
repov, TOVTO Set TToielv. earn 8e tovto KvOvSij/juov 
Aoyos", otov TO elSevac otl Tpirjprjs iv Ileipatet 
iaTLV €Kacrrov ydp olhev. Kal tov rd (rrotxeia 



" Deriving ixvcrripia {fj-veiv, to close the lips) from fiv^ 
(mouse). 

*" A fragment from the Parthenia (songs sung by maidens 
to the accompaniment of the flute). Pan is called " the dog 
of Cybele," the great nature-goddess of the Greeks, as being 
always in attendance on her, being himself a nature-god. 
The fact that Pindar calls Pan "dog" is taken as a 
glorification of that animal. 

•= KOLvbs "EiptxTjs is a proverbial expression meaning 
" halves ! " When anyone had a stroke of luck, such as 
finding a purse full of money in the street, anyone with 
him expected to go halves. Hermes was the god of luck, 
and such a find was called epfiaiou. KoivuyiKds is taken to 
mean (1) liberal to others, or (2) sociable. 

<• X670S : (1) speech ; (2) account, esteem. 

326 



RHETORIC, II. XXIV. 2-3 

mysteries "■ ; or if, in praising the dog, one were to 
include the dog in heaven (Sirius), or Pan, because 
Pindar said,* 

O blessed one, whom the Olympians call dog of the Great 
Mother, taking every form, 

or were to say that the dog is an honourable animal, 
since to be without a dog is most dishonourable. 
And to say that Hermes is the most sociable of the 
gods, because he alone is called common ; *= and that 
words are most excellent, since good men are con- 
sidered worthy, not of riches but of consideration ; 
for Xoyov a^ios has a double meaning .'^ 

Another fallacy consists in combining what is 
divided or dividing what is combined. For since a 
thing which is not the same as another often appears 
to be the same, one may adopt the more convenient 
alternative. Such was the argument of Euthydemus, 
to prove, for example, that a man knows that there 
is a trireme in the Piraeus, because he knows the 
existence of two things, the Piraeus and the trireme ; « 
or that, when one knows the letters, one also knows 

* Very obscure and no explanation is satisfactory. The 
parallel passage in Sophistici elenchi (20. 6) is : " Do you 
being in Sicily now know that there are triremes in the 
Piraeus ? " The ambiguity hes in the position of " now," 
whether it is to be taken with " in Sicily " or with " in the 
Piraeus." At the moment when a man is in Sicily he cannot 
know that there are at this time triremes in the Piraeus ; 
but being in Sicily he can certainly know of the ships in the 
Piraeus, which should be there, but are now in Sicily (Kirch- 
mann). St. Hilaire suggests that the two clauses are : Do 
you now, being in Sicily, see the triremes which are in the 
Piraeus? and. Did you when in Sicily, see the triremes 
which are now in the Piraeus ? The fallacy consists in the 
two facts (being in the Piraeus and the existence of triremes 
in Sicily), true separately, being untrue combined. 

S27 



ARISTOTLE 

eTTiarajxevov otl to t"77os" olSev to yap eiros to 
avTo eoTLv. /cat cTret to his tooovtov voachhes, 
firjSe TO €v (f)dvai vyietvov elvaf oltottov yap el 
Ta Svo ayada ev KaKov eoTiv. ovtoj jxev ovv iXcy- 
KTiKov, cohe he heiKTLKov ov yap eoTiv ev ayadov 
hvo /ca/ca. oAos" he 6 tottos TrapaAoyicrrt/cos". TrdXcv 
TO UoAvKpaTovs els Qpacrv^ovXov, art TpiaKOVTa 
Tvpavvovs KaTcXvaev ovvTidrjaL yap. t] to ev tu) 
OpeoTTj Tcp SeoheKTov eV hcaipeaecos yap icrriv. 

SiKaiov ecrriv, rj tls av KTeivr] rroaiv, 

aTTodvTjaKeLv TavTrjv, /cat to) ■naTpi ye Tificopelv 
Tov vlov ovKovv /Cat TatJra TTeTrpaKraf avvTedevTa 
1401 b yap 'lacos ou/ceVt hcKatov. etrj §' av /cat irapd ttjv 
eXXen/jtv d(f)aipelTac yap to vtto tlvos. 

4 "AXXos he TOTTOS TO hetviocrei KaTaaKevdt^ew ■^ 
dvaaKevat^eiv . tovto h* eoTiV oTav, /xi) hei^as otl 
eTToirjaev, av^tjarj to Trpdyfjua- TTOieZ yap <j>aiveadaL 
t) (hs ovTe TTeTToiriKev , OTav 6 ttjv atriW ex<^v av^j], 
7] cos TTeTTOLTjKev, OTOV 6 KOTrjyopwv opyit^rjTai. ovk- 
ovv ecrriv evdvixrjpia' TrapaXoyit^eTai yap 6 a/c/aoar?)? 
OTt, eTTolrjaev 7) ovk eiroiriaev, ov heheiypuevov . 

5 "AXXos TO €K arjpbeiov dcruXXoyicrTov yap Kal 
TOVTO. olov e'l Tis XeyoL " Tois TToXeat avp,<f>epovaLV 
ol epdjvTes' 6 yap 'Apfiohlov Kal ^ ApioToyevrovos 



" Thrasybulus deposed the thirty individuals and put 
down the single tyranny which they composed ; he then 
claimed a thirtyfold reward, as having put down thirty 
tyrannies. 

" Frag. 5 (T.G.F.). 
328 



RHETORIC, 11. XXIV. 3-5 

the word made of them, for word and letters are the 
same thing. Further, since twice so much is un- 
wholesome, one may argue that neither is the 
original amount wholesome ; for it would be absurd 
that two halves separately should be good, but bad 
combined. In this way the argument may be used 
for refutation, in another way for demonstration, if 
one were to say, one good thing cannot make two 
bad things. But the whole topic is fallacious. Again, 
one may quote what Polycrates said of Thrasybulus, 
that he deposed thirty tyrants,** for here he combines 
them ; or the example of the fallacy of division in 
the Orestes of Theodectes ^ : "It is just that a woman 
who has killed her husband " should be put to death, 
and that the son should avenge the father ; and this 
in fact is what has been done. But if they are com- 
bined, perhaps the act ceases to be just. The same 
might also be classed as an example of the fallacy 
of omission ; for the name of the one who should put 
the woman to death is not mentioned. 

Another topic is that of constructing or destroying 
by exaggeration, which takes place when the speaker, 
without having proved that any crime has actually 
been committed, exaggerates the supposed fact ; for 
it makes it appear either that the accused is not 
guilty, when he himself exaggerates it, or that he is 
guilty, when it is the accuser who is in a rage. 
Therefore there is no enthymeme ; for the hearer 
falsely concludes that the accused is guilty or not, 
although neither has been proved. 

Another fallacy is that of the sign, for this argu- 
ment also is illogical. For instance, if one were to 
say that those who love one another are useful to 
States, since the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton 

329 



ARISTOTLE 

epois KareXvae rov rvpavvov "l7T7Tap)(ov ." -^ et 
Tis AeyoL on KXeTrrrjg l^tovvaios' Trovrjpog ydp' 
aavAAoyLOTOv yap kol rovro' ov yap nds rrovrfpos 
KAeTrrrjs, dAA' o KXiirnqs ird^ TTOvrjpos. 

6 "AAAo? Sea TO avfi^e^rjKos, otov o Xiyet HoAu- 
KpaTTjs etV rovs /xu?, on i^o-^drjaav S(,arpay6vT€s 
Tas vevpds. r^ el ns (ftair] ro i-nl SeiTrvov KXrjdrjvai 
nfiiarrarov Sid ydp rd jxtj KXrjdrjvai 6 ^A^^iXXevs 
ep.rjviae rois ^A^aioig iv Tet'eSa)- o 8' cos dnp,a- 
lop^evos ep.rjviaev, avve^rj Se tovto irri rov p.-q 
KXrjdrjvai. 

7 "AAAos" rd rrapd rd iTTOjxevov, otov iv rw 'AAe^- 
avSpo), on p,€yaX6iJjvxo9' inrepiScbv ydp rrjv ttoXXcov 
dpLiXiav iv rfj "ISjj Sierpi^e KaO^ avrov on ydp 
ol p.eyaX6ipvxoi roiovroi, Kai ovros fieyaXotfruxos 
So^eiev dv. /cat inei KaXXcoTTiarrjs /cat vvKratp vrAa- 
varai, p,oixos' roiovroi yap. dp,oiov Si /cat on iv 
rois lepois ol Trruoypi koX aSovai /cat dp^ovvrai, /cat 
on roXs (/)vydcnv e^eanv oik€iv ottov dv diXojaiv 
on yap rots SoKovaiv cvSaifjioveiv vnapx^i ravra, 
/cat ots" ravra VTrapx^i, So^aiev dv €vSaip,ov€iv . 

" Herodotus, ii. 141. The story was that, when 
Sennacherib invaded Egypt, a host of field-mice devoured 
all the quivers, bowstrings and leather shield-holders of the 
Assyrians. Apollo was called Smintheus {ff/jLivdos, mouse) 
and was represented on coins with a mouse in his hand, 
either as the mouse-slayer and protector of crops, or because 
the animal was sacred to him. The story, alluded to else- 
where, was of Greek, not of Egyptian origin. Similar 
330 



RHETORIC, II. XXIV. 5-7 

overthrew the tyrant Hipparchus ; or that Dionysius 
is a thief, because he is a rascal ; for here again the 
argument is inconclusive ; not every rascal is a thief 
although every thief is a rascal. 

Another fallacy is derived from accident ; for in- 
stance, when Polycrates says of the mice, that they 
rendered great service by gnawing the bowstrings." 
Or if one were to say that nothing is more honourable 
than to be invited to a dinner, for because he was 
not invited Achilles was wroth with the Achaeans at 
Tenedos ; whereas he was really wroth because he 
had been treated with disrespect, but this was an 
accident due to his not having been invited.* 

Another fallacy is that of the Consequence .'^ For 
instance, in the Alexander (Paris) it is said that Paris 
was high-minded, because he despised the companion- 
ship of the common herd and dwelt on Ida by himself; 
for because the high-minded are of this character, 
Paris also might be thought high-minded. Or, since 
a man pays attention to dress and roams about at 
night, he is a libertine, because libertines are of this 
character. Similarly, the poor sing and dance in the 
temples, exiles can live where they please ; and 
since these things belong to those who are apparently 
happy, those to whom they belong may also be 
thought happy. But there is a difference in condi- 

panegyrics on ridiculous things or animals included pots, 
counters, salt, flies, bees, and such subjects as death, sleep, 
and food. 

" Sophocles, The Gathering of the Greeks {T.G.F. p. 161), 
a satyric drama. His not being invited was a mere accident 
of the disrespect. 

* Assuming a proposition to be convertible, when it is not ; 
it does not follow, assuming that all the high-minded dwell 
by themselves, that all who dwell by themselves are high- 
minded. 

3S1 



ARISTOTLE 

Sta^e/oet Se rep ttcos" 8to /cat et? t'j)!' eXXeiif/LV 
e^TTLTTrei. 

8 "AAAos" rrapa ro dvairiov cos" atrtoi', oior to) afia 
7] fMera rovro yeyovevai' ro yap fxera rovro oj? 
8ia rovro Xafx^dvovcri., /cat /xaAtora 06 et' rat? 
TToAiTetatS", otov co? o ArjfJidSrjs rrjv Arjixoo-Oevovs 
TToXireiav Trdvrcov ra>v KaKtov alriav fier^ eKetvrjv 
yap o-vve^rj 6 iroXepLO's. 

9 "AAAos" Trapd rrjv eXXcupLV rod rrore /cat ttcDs", 
otov on St/catCDS" ^AXe^avSpos eXa^e rrjv 'EXevrjv 
atpeais yap avrfj iSoOr^ Trapd rov Trarpos. ov yap 
del laws, dXXd ro irpcorov /cat yap 6 TTorrjp p-^XP^ 

1402a rovrov Kvptos. 'q et ris <pai,rj ro rvTrreiv rovs 
iXevOepovs v^piv elvai- ov yap rrdvrws, dXX orav 
dpxj) x^^P^^ dSiKcov. 
10 "En wanep iv roZs epicrriKoXs, Trapd ro ctTrAcDs" 
/cat p,r) aTrXdjs, dXXd rl, yiyverai ^ai,v6p,evos 
avXXoyLap,6s- olov iv p.kv rols StaAe/crt/coiS', on 
iarl ro p,r) ov ov earn yap ro p,rj ov p,rj ov. /cat on 
iTTLar7]r6v ro dyvwarov eon yap iTncm]r6v ro 
dyvcoarov on dyvcocrrov . ovrcu /cat ev rot? prjropi- 
Kols iarrl (jjaLvofxevov ivdvfjirjp,a vapd ro p,rj dTrXcjs 
€LK0S, aXAa n et/co?. ecrrt oe rovro ov KavoAov, 
oiOTTep /cat ^Ayddojv Aeyct 

" The poor want to get money ; the rich dance and sing 
to amuse themselves, or to show that they can do as they 
like. Exiles can certainly live where they like in a foreign 
land, but would prefer to live in their own country ; the rich, 
who are not exiles, travel to amuse themselves. 

*" The first " is " means " has a real, absolute existence " ; 
the second " is " merely expresses the identity of the terms of 
the proposition, and is particular ; but the sophistical reasoner 
takes it in the same sense as the first. The same applies to 
the argument about the unknown. 

332 



RHETORIC, II. XXIV. 7-10 

tions ; " wherefore this topic also falls under the head 
of omission. 

Another fallacy consists of taking what is not the 
cause for the cause, as when a thing has happened 
at the same time as, or after, another ; for it is 
believed that what happens after is produced by the 
other, especially by politicians. Thus, Demades de- 
clared that the policy of Demosthenes was the cause 
of all the evils that happened, since it was followed 
by the war. 

Another fallacy is the omission of when and how. 
For instance, Alexander (Paris) had a right to carry 
off Helen, for the choice of a husband had been 
given her by her father. But (this was a fallacy), for 
it was not, as might be thought, for all time, but 
only for the first time ; for the father's authority only 
lasts till then. Or, if one should say that it is wanton 
outrage to beat a free man ; for this is not always 
the case, but only when the assailant gives the first 
blow. 

Further, as in sophistical disputations, an apparent 
syllogism arises as the result of considering a thing 
first absolutely, and then not absolutely, but only 
in a particular case. For instance, in Dialectic, it 
is argued that that which is not is, for that which 
is not is that which is not ^ ; also, that the unknown 
can be known, for it can be known of the unknown 
that it is unknown. Similarly, in Rhetoric, an ap- 
parent enthymeme may arise from that which is not 
absolutely probable but only in particular cases. 
But this is not to be understood absolutely, as 
Agathon says : 

333 



ARISTOTLE 

rax ^^ "^^^ ei/cos" avro rovr etvai Xeyoi, 
PpoTOiCTL TToAAa Tvyxoiveiv ovK eiKora. 
yiyverai yap ro irapa to eiKog, coore etVo? /cat to 
TTapa TO €LKos. el 8e tovto, ecrrat to fxrj et/cos" 
cIkos. dXX' ovx (xttXcos, aAA' wanep /cat im tcov 
ipiOTLKcbv TO Kara ri /cat irpos tL /cat irfj ov irpoa- 
Tidefieva Trotet ttjv crvKo^avTiav , /cat ei^avda 
TTapa TO €i/co? etvat fxr] olttXcos dXXa tl ei/co?. 
11 ecrrt 8 e/c tovtov tov tottov rj Kopa/co? Tixyf] 
crvyK€iiJ,€vr]- av re yap /xi^ evo^os rj rfj atrta, otov 
dadevTjs cov at/cta? (fievyrf ov yap et/cos" /cav evoxos 
(jov, olov av Icrxvpos a)V ov yap et/cos", ort et/co? 
e/xeAAe Sofetv. ojJbOLcos 8e /cat em rcDt' oAAcov •^ 
yap evoxov dvayKiq rj jxt] evoxov elvai ttj atVta' 
(/)aiV€Tai fiev ovv dp,(j>6repa et/cora, ecrrt 8e to /xei^ 
ei/co?, TO 8e oi);)^ aTrAcDs" aAA' coarrep etpT^rat. /cat 
TO TOV TjTTio 8e Aoyot' KpeiTTCo TToieiv tout' iaTLV. 
/cat ivT€vdev St/catco? ihvax^patvov ol dvdpojTrot 
TO UptoTayopov iTrdyyeXfjua- ipevSos tg yap icTTC, /cat 
oi)/c dXrjde^ dXXd (f>aLv6p,€Vov eiKOs, /cat ev ou8e/Ata 
Texvrj oAA ev pr^TopiKfj Kat epioTLKfj. /cat Trept 
/Ltev ivdvfirjiMarcov /cat tcDi' oVtcov /cat Ta)!/ <f>ai,vo- 
fievcov eiprjTaL. 

25, riept 8e Auoeo)? exdp-evov icm tcov eiprj- 

fMevcDV eLTTelv. eari 8e AJeti' rj dvTLovXXoyLcrdfxevov 

2 •^ evcrraaLV iveyKovTa. to jxkv ovv dvTicrvXXoyi- 

" This utterance of Protagoras gave particular offence as 
apparently implying that the weaker cause was really 
identical with the worse, so that to support it was to support 
injustice. But, considering the high moral character ascribed 
to Protagoras, it seems more probable to take the formula as 
a statement of the aim of all ancient orators — how to over- 
come stronger arguments by arguments weaker in themselves. 

S34 



•RHETORIC, II. XXIV. 10— xxv. 2 

One might perhaps say that this very thing is probable, 
that many things happen to men that are not probable ; 

for that which is contrary to probability nevertheless 
does happen, so that that which is contrary to probabil- 
ity is probable. If this is so, that which is improbable 
will be probable. But not absolutely ; but as, in 
the case of sophistical disputations, the argument 
becomes fallacious when the circumstances, reference, 
and manner are not added, so here it will become 
so owing to the probability being not probable 
absolutely but only in particular cases. The " Art " 
of Corax is composed of this topic. For if a man is not 
likely to beguilty of what he is accused of, for instance 
if, being weak, he is accused of assault and battery, his 
defence will be that the crime is not probable ; but 
if he is likely to be guilty, for instance, if he is 
strong, it may be argued again that the crime is not 
probable, for the very reason that it was bound to 
appear so. It is the same in all other cases ; for a 
man must either be likely to have committed a 
crime or not. Here, both the alternatives appear 
equally probable, but the one is really so, the other 
not probable absolutely, but only in the conditions 
mentioned. And this is what " making the worse 
appear the better argument" means. Wherefore 
men were justly disgusted with the promise of 
Protagoras " ; for it is a lie, not a real but an apparent 
probability, not found in any art except Rhetoric and 
Sophistic. So much for real or apparent enthymemes. 
25. Next to what has been said we must speak of 
refutation. An argument niay be refuted either by 
a counter-syllogism ^ or by bringing an objection. 

* In which the contrary of an opponent's conclusion is 
proved. 

335 



ARISTOTLE 

^eadai hrjXov on e/c tcDv avrcov tottcov ivSex^rai 
TTOielv ol fxev yap auXXoyLafMol e/c rcov ivho^cov, 

3 hoKovvra 8e ttoAAo, ivavria d.AA'^Aots" iariv. at 8 
evardaeis (f>€povrai Kaddvep /cat et" Tot? roTTLKols, 
rerpa^cbs' i} ya/3 e^ iavrov t) e/c tou 6p.oiov 'q e/c 

4 Tou ivavTLOV 7J e/c tcDv KeKpLfievcov. Xeyoj Be d<f>' 
1402 b iavrov /xeV, otov et Trept epcorog e'ir] to ivdvfi'qfjia 

COS" crTToySatos", tJ evaracns St;^a>s" •^) ya/> KadoXov 
ecTTovra on Trdoa eVSeia TTOvrjpov, -x) /cara jxepos 
on ovK dv iXeyero K.avvLos epwg, et yu.-)^ T^crav' /cat 

5 TTOvrfpol eporres. arro 8e tou evavnov evcrraaLS 
(f>iperai, olov et to iudvfirjfjba rjv on 6 dyados dvTjp 
Trdvras rovs (j>iXovs €v Trotel, dXX oi38' o fioxdyjpog 

6 /ca/cois-. (XTTO 8e tow 6[j,olov, et •^v to ivOvfirjijua 
on ol KaKCos TrerrovdoTes del p^iaovaLV, on aXX 

7 oi)8' Ol ei5 TTeiTOvdore? del <^LXovaiv. at 8e Kpiaeis 
at (XTro TOJP' yvcoplfjicov dvSpcbv, olov et Tt? ivdvfirjixa 
eiTTev on, tol? jxedvovai. 8et crvyyvco/xrjv ex^iv, 
dyvoovvres yap dpLaprdvovoiv , evoraai? on ovkovv 
6 ritTTa/co? aiveTo?" ov yap dv p.eit,ovs t,r]p.ia^ 
evo/jboOeTrjoev idv ns p,edvoiv d/xapravrj. 

8 'E77et Se rd evdv/xijixaTa Xeyerai e'/c rerrapcov, 
rd Se rerrapa ravr^ earlv etKos TrapaSeiyfia 
reKp,rjpLOV arj[j.elov, eon Se rd jxev e'/c rdJv cl>? CTrt 
ro TToXv t) ovrctjv t] SoKovvrcov avvr]yp.eva evdvpitj- 



" i.e. the opponenfs enthymeme. 

'' Love is regarded as a desire, and therefore as bad as any- 
other desire. It is here included under the general head of 
want. 

* Incest : Ovid, Metamorphoses, ix. 451.. 

"* The contrary of *' good men do good to all their friends " 
is "bad men do harm to all their friends," but this is not 

S36 



RHETORIC, II. XXV. 2-8 

It is clear that the same topics may furnish counter- 
syllogisms ; for syllogisms are derived from probable 
materials and many probabilities are contrary to one 
another. An objection is brought, as shown in the 
Topics, in four ways : it may be derived either from 
itself,** or from what is similar, or from what is 
contrary, or from what has been decided. In the 
first case, if for instance the enthymeme was intended 
to prove that love is good, two objections might be 
made ; either the general statement that all want ^ 
is bad, or in particular, that Caunian love " would 
not have become proverbial, unless some forms of 
love had been bad. An objection from what is 
contrary is brought if, for instance, the enthymeme 
is that the good man does good to all his friends ; it 
may be objected: But the bad man does not do 
harm [to all his friends]. '^ An objection from what is 
similar is brought, if the enthymeme is that those 
who have been injured always hate, by arguing that 
those who have been benefited do not always love. 
The fourth kind of objection is derived from the 
former decisions of well-known men. For instance, 
if the enthymeme is that one should make allowance 
for those who are drunk, for their offence is the 
result of ignorance, it may be objected that Pittacus 
then is unworthy of commendation, otherwise he 
would not have laid down severer punishment for a 
man who commits an offence when drunk. 

Now the material of enthymemes is derived from 
four sources — probabilities, examples, necessary signs, 
and signs. Conclusions are drawn from probabilities, 
when based upon things which most commonly occur 

always true. Jebb gives the objection as: "No, the bad 
man does not do evil to all his enemies." 

z 837 



ARISTOTLE 

fxara ck ra)v elKorojv, ra Se St' eVaycoy^S" Sta rov 
ofxoiov, 7) €v6g 7) nXeiovcov, orav Xa^ajv to KaOoXov 
elra avXkoyiarjT ai ra Kara fxepos Sta Trapaheiy- 
fMarog, ra 8e Si' avayKaiov /cat ovros Sto, reK/jurjpLov, 
ra Se Sia rov KadoXov •^ rod iv fxipei ovros, idv 
re ov idv re fXT], Sta crrjfjbeicDV , ro Se et/co? ov ro 
del dXXd TO ws em ro ttoXv, <f)avepov on ra roiavra 
p,ev rwv evdv jjirjpidr ojv dec eari Xveiv (f)epovra ev- 
9 arauiv, rj Se Aycrts" (f)aLvop,evrj dXX ovk aXrj6r]S aef 
ov yap on. ovk eiKog, Xvei 6 evLcrrdfievog, dXX on 

10 OVK dvayKalov. Sto Kal del ean rrXeoveKrelv ano- 
Xoyovpievov pboXXov rj Kariqyopovvra Sta rovrov 
rov TTapaXoyiafjiov eirel yap o p,ev Karr^yopajv 
St' eiKorcov diTohetKvvaiv , earn Se ov ravro Aycrai 
■^ on OVK eLKos t] on ovk dvayKaZov, aet S e;^et 
evaraaiv ro <x)S enl ro ttoXv' ov yap dv rjv eiKos 
dXX del Kal dvayKaZov 6 Se Kpirr^s olerai, dv 
ovrco Xvdi], T] OVK etKos etvai rj ovx avrto Kpireov, 
TTapaXoyit.op-evos , wairep eXeyop.ev ov yap e/c 
rwv dvayKaiwv Set avrov [xovov Kpivecv, aAAa /cat 
e/c ru)v etKorajv rovro ydp ean ro yvwfxrj rfj 
dpiarj] Kplvetv. ovkovv cKavov dv Xvarj on ovk 
dvayKalov, aAAa Set Xveiv on, ovk eiKos. rovro 
Se avp-^ijaerai, edv fj rj evaraais p.dXXov cl»? enl 

11 TO TToAu. evhex^rai Se etrat rocavrrjv SixoJS, rj 



" Translating de/ inserted by Vahlen before Scroy. 
* That is, if the arfrument is shown to be not " necessary." 
« The important point in the conchision drawn is that the 
judge thinks it is not his business to decide, because the 
argument is not necessary, whereas his duty is to decide, not 
about tilings that are necessary but about things that are 
probable. 



RHETORIC, II. XXV. 8-11 

or seem to occur ; from examples, when they are 
the result of induction from one or naore similar cases, 
and when one assumes the general and then con- 
cludes the particular by an example ; from necessary 
signs, when based upon that which is necessary and 
ever " exists ; from signs, when their material is the 
general or the particular, whether true or not. Now, 
the probable being not what occurs invariably but 
only for the most part, it is evident that enthymemes 
of this character can always be refuted by bringing 
an objection. But the objection is often only 
apparent, nob real ; for he who brings the objection 
endeavours to show, not that the argument is not 
probable, but that it is not necessary. Wherefore, 
by the employment of this fallacy, the defendant 
always has an advantage over the accuser. P'or 
since the latter always bases his proof upon prob- 
abilities, and it is not the same thing to show that 
an argmnent is not probable as to show that it 
is not necessary, and that which is only true for the 
most part is always liable to objection (otherwise it 
would not be probable, but constant and necessary), — 
then the judge thinks, if the refutation is made in 
this manner,^ either that the argument is not prob- 
able, or that it is not for him to decide," being deceived 
by the fallacy, as we have just indicated. For his 
judgement must not rest upon necessary arguments 
alone, but also upon probabilities ; for this is what 
is meant by deciding according to the best of one's 
judgement. It is therefore not enough to refute an 
argument by showing that it is not necessary ; it 
must also be shown that it is not probable. This 
will be attained if the objection itself is specially 
based upon what happens generally. This may take 

389 



ARISTOTLE 

TO) ■)(pova) Tj rois Trpay/jiacnv , Kvpiayrara 8e, et 
1403 a afKpolv €L yap TO. TrXeovaKLS^ ovrco, rovr' iarlv 
€lk6s pioXkov. 

12 Kverai he /cat ra aiqpieZa /cat ra 8ia arifxeiov 
ivdvp.rip,aTa elp-qpiiva, Kav fj VTrdpxovra, coarrep 
iXexdrj iv rots Trpcorois' on yap acwAAdytoTdv 
ecTTi TToiv aripi,elov, hrjXov rjpuv e/c rcov dvaXxrrLKcov . 

13 Trpos" oe rd TrapaheLyp.arojhrj rj avrrj Xvais Kal rd 
ecKora' eav re yap excojxev tl ov^ ovtoj, XeXvrat, 
on ovK avayKalov, el Kal rd TrXeico 7} TrXeovaKLS 
dXXojs' edv re /cat to, nXeio} /cat rd irXeovaKLS 
ovrcD, jJbax^reov, r) ort to irapdv ovx o/xotov rj ovx 

14 d/u.ota»s" '^ Sia(f)opdv ye rtva e;^;€t. rd 8e re/c/xr^pia 
/cat T€Kp.r]pLa)Srj evdvp.-qp.ara /card ^ev to dcryAAd- 
ytcrrot' ou/c ecrrat Aucrat (S^Aov 8e /cat rov9^ yjpuv 
€K Tojv dvaXvTiKcov) , AetTrerat 8' co? ovx vndpxei 
rd Xeyopuevov SeLKVvvaL. el 8e <f>avep6v /cat ort 
VTrdpx^i /cat on reKpu-qptov, dXxjrov rjSrj yiyverat, 
TOVTO' TTavra ydp yiyver at aTTohei^et TJSrj (f)avepd. 

26. To 8' av^eiv /cat pt,eiovv ovk ecrnv evdv- 
fiijpLarog crroLxeZov rd ydp avro Xeyo) arotxeiov 
Kal TOTTov ean ydp arotxeiov Kal r ottos, els o 

" XP^''V • • • TrpdyfiacLv, If XP^''V ^^ taken to mean the 
date, there are the following alternatives. The date may be 
questioned, the facts admitted ; both date and facts may be 
questioned ; both date and facts may be admitted, but 
circumstances may have altered (a pound was worth twenty 
shillings in 1914, not in 1924). Others take XP^''V to mean 
the greater number of times the same fact has occurred, 
irpdy/iaffi the more numerous facts that increase probability. 
But XP^^V can hardly bear this meaning (see Jebb's note). 

* i. 2. 18; or, "at the beginning," i.e. of this book. 

" Anal, priora, ii. 27. 

'' On the other side, in the opponent's favour. 

3^0 



RHETORIC, II. XXV. 11— xxvi. 1 

place in two ways, from consideration either of the 
time or of the facts.* The strongest objections are 
those in which both are combined ; for a thing is 
more probable, the greater the nmnber of similar 
cases. 

Signs and enthymemes based upon signs, even if 
true, nxay be refuted in the manner previously 
stated ^ ; for it is clear from the Analytics " that no 
sign can furnish a logical conclusion. As for enthy- 
memes derived from examples, they may be refuted 
in the same manner as probabilities. For if we have 
a single fact that contradicts the opponent's example, 
the argument is refuted as not being necessary, even 
though examples, more in number and of more 
common occurrence, are otherwise ^ ; but if the 
majority and greater frequency of examples is on 
the side of the opponent, we must contend either 
that the present example is not similar to those cited 
by htm, or that the thing did not take place in 
the same way, or that there is some difference. 
But necessary signs and the enthymemes derived 
from them cannot be refuted on the ground of not 
furnishing a logical conclusion, as is clear from the 
Analytics <= ; the only thing that remains is to prove 
that the thing alleged is non-existent. But if it is 
evident that it is true and that it is a necessary sign, 
the argument at once becomes irrefutable ; for, 
by means of demonstration, everything at once 
becomes clear.® 

26. Amplification and depreciation are not ele- 
ments of enthymeme (for I regard element and topic 
as identical), since element (or topic) is a head under 

* That is, "when the tekmerion is converted into a syl- 
logism." For tekmerion see i. 2. 16. 

341 



ARISTOTLE 

TToAAa ivdvjji'qfxara eyLtTTtTTTet . to 8' av^eiv /cat 
fxeiovv earlv €v6vfjiT]fj,ara rrpog to Set^ai otl fjbeya 
7] fiLKpov, axTTTep Kal OTL dyadov rj KaKov rj SiKaiov 
2 17 aSiKov Kal tGjv aSXoiv oriovv. Tavra S' ecrrt 
TTCti^a TTcpl a ol avX\oyiap.ol Kal to. ivdviJ,i]p,aTa' 
<ZaT el jjbTjBe tovtwv eKaoTov ivdvpurjpbaTos tottos, 

3 ouSe TO av^eiv Kal fieiovv. ovBe to. XvTiKa ivdvfirj- 
fxaTa ethos tl cctIv a'AAo tcov KaTaaKevaamKcov 
hrjXov yap otl XveL puev rj Sei^as t] evoTaaLv eveyKcov, 
dvraTToSeLKVvovcTL Be to dvTLKeip^evov, olov el 
eSeL^ev otl yeyovev, ovtos otl ov yeyovev, el S' 
OTL ov yeyovev, ovtos otl yeyovev. oiore avTrj 
fiev ovK dv e'lri 'q 8La<f)opd- tois" avTols yap xp<J^vTaL 
djj,<j)6TepoL' OTL yap ovk ecmv rj ecrrLv, evdvp,rjpLaTa 

4 <j)epovaLV rj 8 eVcrraaiS" ovk eoTLv evdvfxrjpLa, dXXd 
Kaddrrep ev Tols tottlkol? to elirelv So^av TLvd e^ 
'^S' ecTTaL SrjXov otl ov cryAAeAoytarat •^ otl ipevBos 

5 TL e'iXrji^ev. errel he hr) Tpia ecrrlv d Set rrpay- 
fxaTevOrjvaL rrepL tov Xoyov, virep /xev rrapaheLy- 
fidTajv Kal yvcofjLcov Kal ev6vp.rjp,dTCL>v Kal oXcvs rdjv 
TTepl Tr)v hLavoLav, oOev t€ evTroprjcrofMev Kal d)S 

1403 b avTa XvaofMev, elp-qcrOco r]pA,v ToaavTa, Xolttov he 
hieXOelv TTepl Xe^ecos Kal ra^eo)?. 

" "Intellectual capacity, as evinced in language (or 
actions), and seen when the actors argue or make an appeal 
to the feelings of others, in other words, w^hen they reason or 
plead with one of the other dramatis personae in the same 
sort of way as a rhetor might do " (By water on the Poetics, 
2, 1450 a 6, where the text is speaking of the didi'oia of the 
actors in a play). 



342 



RHETORIC, II. XXVI. 1-5 

which several enthymemes are included, but they 
are enthymemes which serve to show that a tiling 
is great or small, just as others serve to show that 
it is good or bad, just or unjust, or anything else. 
All these are the materials of syllogisms and enthy- 
memes ; so that if none of these is a topic of 
enthymeme, neither is amplification or depreciation. 
Nor are enthymemes by which arguments are refuted 
of a different kind from those by which they are 
established ; for it is clear that demonstration or 
bringing an objection is the means of refutation. 
By the first the contrary of the adversary's con- 
clusion is demonstrated ; for instance, if he has 
shown that a thing has happened, his opponent 
shows that it has not ; if he has shown that a thing 
has not happened, he shows that it has. This, there- 
fore, will not be the difference between them ; for 
both employ the same arguments ; they bring for- 
ward enthymemes to show that the thing is or that 
it is not. And the objection is not an enthymeme, 
but, as I said in the Topics, it is stating an opinion 
which is intended to make it clear that the adversary's 
syllogism is not logical, or that he has assumed some 
false premise. Now, since there are three things in 
regard to speech, to which special attention should 
be devoted, let what has been said suffice for ex- 
amples, maxims, enthymemes, and what concerns 
the intelligence " generally ; for the sources of a 
supply of arguments and the means of refuting 
them. It only remains to speak of style and arrange- 
ment. 



343 



1. EttclStj rpia icrrlv d Set Trpay/jLarevOrjvai 
Trepi Tov Xoyov, ev jxev e/c tcvojv at TriCTrets" eaovrat, 
hevrepov Se rrepl rrjv Xe^iv, rpirov 8e ttws xPV 
rd^ai TO, p^ep-q rov Xoyov, rrepl p,ev tCov mcerecov 
e'iprjraL, /cat eV ttogcov, otl eV rpicjv elai, /cat raura 
TTOta, /cat Sto. Tt TOCTayra p,6va' rj yap rco avroi rt 
TTeTTOvdevai, ol Kpivovres, rj ru) ttolovs rivas VTToXap,- 
Pdv€iv Tovg Xcyovras, -i^ raJ a77-o8e8et;^^at Treidovrai 
TTOvres. etprjTaL Se /cat rd ivdvp,rip,ara, TTodev 
Set TTopit^eGOaf ecrrt yayo to. //.ej^ ciSt^ rcov ivdvp,rj- 
pbdrcov, ra 8e tottoi. 

2 Ilept 8e TTy? Xe^ews ixop'^vov ecrrtv etTreti/' ou 
ydp diTOXpy] TO €X€LV d Set Aeyett', dAA' dvdyKrj 
/cat ravra cLg Set eiTrelv, /cat cru/x^aAAeTat ttoAAo. 

3 Trpos" TO <j)avrjvai ttolov riva rov Xoyov. ro p,ev 
ovv irporrov H^tjr'^Or) Kara (f)vaiv, orrep tt4^vk€ 
TrpdjTov, avra rd Trpdypuara e/c rivcov ep^et rd 
TTidavov Scvrepov Se to ravra rfj Ae^et SiadeaOaL' 
rpirov Se towtcov, o hvvapnv p,kv e;\;et p,€yicrrrjv. 
ovTTO) S i7nK€X€LprjraL, rd Trepl rrjv VTroKpiaiv, 
/cat ya/o et? tt^v rpayiKrjv /cat paipipSiav oipe 
TTaprjXdev VTT€Kpivovro ydp avrol rds rpaymhlas 
344 



BOOK III 

1. There are three things which require special 
attention in regard to speech : first, the sources of 
proofs ; secondly, style ; and thirdly, the arrange- 
ment of the parts of the speech. We have already 
spoken of proofs and stated that they are three in 
number, what is their nature, and why there are 
only three ; for in all cases persuasion is the result 
either of the judges themselves being affected in a 
certain manner, or because they consider the speakers 
to be of a certain character, or because something 
has been demonstrated. We have also stated the 
sources from which enthymemes should be derived 
— some of them being special, the others general 
commonplaces. 

We have therefore next to speak of style ; for it 
is not sufficient to know what one ought to say, but 
one must also know how to say it, and this largely 
contributes to making the speech appear of a certain 
character. In the first place, following the natural 
order, we investigated that which first presented 
itself — what gives things themselves their persuasive- 
ness ; in the second place, their arrangement by 
style ; and in the third place, delivery, which is of 
the greatest importance, but has not yet been treated 
of by any one. In fact, it only made its appearance 
late in tragedy and rhapsody, for at first the poets 

345 



ARISTOTLE 

OL TTOiTjTaL TO TTpCOTOV . SrjXoV OVV OTl Kol TTCpl 

rr]v prjTopiK'qv icm ro tolovtov wanep /cat Trepl 
rrjv TTOiTjTLK'qv' oTTcp erepoi rives €7Tpayfj,aT€vdr]aav 

4 /cat TXavKcov 6 Tijto?. ecrri 8e avrr) fxev iv r^ 
(fxjovfj, TTOJs avrfj Set ;i^p7^cr^at Trpos" eKaarov Trddos, 
olov 7TOT€ pbeydXr) /cat ttotc p.iKpa /cat TTore P'^arj, 
/cat 7Ta>£ rols rovois, olov o^eta /cat ^apeia /cat 
P'^crrj, /cat pvOpLolg ricrt Trpos eKacrrov. rpia yap 
icrri TTepl aiv aKO-rrovaiv ravra 8' ecrrt /jueyedos 
apfiovia pvdfjbos. td fxev ovv ddXa a)(^eh6v e/c rwv 
ayd>v(jiv ovrot Xafx^dvovcnv, /cat Kaddjrep €K€l 
fielt^ov Svvavrai, vvv rcov TTOirjrcbv ol VTTOKptrai, 

. /cat Kara rovg ttoXltikovs dycjvas 8ta rrjv fJ-o)^- 

6 drjpiav Tcov TToXireicov . ovttco Se cruy/cetrat Te)(y7j 
TTepl avTOJV, 67761 /Cat ro TTepl rrjv Xi^iv oipe rrpo- 
rjXdev KOL 8o/cet ^opriKov etvai, /caAcos" inroXa/j,- 
U0i& ^avojjievov. aAA' oAr^S" ovcrr]s TTpos So^av rrjs 
TTpayfiareiag rrjs Trepl rrjv prjropiKrjv, ovk opdcos 
exovros, dXX ws dvayKaiov rrjv eTTtp,iXeiav ttoit^- 
reov, eTret ro ye SiKaiov firjSev TrXeioj ^rjrelv Trepl 
rov Xoyov t] (Ls p^rjre XweZv jxrjre eixfypaivetv 
hiKatov yap avrdls dycovit^eadai rots TTpdyp.aaLV, 
ware rdXXa e^co rod dnoSel^aL Trepiepya eariv 
dXX ofxcos jxeya Svvarai, Kaddrrep etprp-ai., Sid 

6 rrjv rov dKpoarov fMoxdrjpiav . ro fiev oSv rrjs 
Xe^eois ofjbcos e^^t rt p,iKp6v dvayKaiov ev Trdcrrj 
StSacT/caAio.' Sta^e'/oet ydp ri Trpos ro BrjXdJaaL 

" Since the authors of tragedies acted their own plays, 
there was no need for professional actors, nor for instruction 
in the art of delivery or acting. This explains why no attempt 
had be^n made to deal with the question. Similarly, the 
rhapsodists (reciters of epic poems) were at first as a rule the 
composers of the poems themselves. 

346 



RHETORIC, III. I. 3-6 

themselves acted their tragedies." It is clear, there- 
fore, that there is something of the sort in rhetoric 
as well as in poetry, and it has been dealt with by 
Glaucon of Teos among others. Now delivery is a 
matter of voice, as to the mode in which it should 
be used for each particular emotion ; when it should 
be loud, when low, when intermediate ; and how the 
tones, that is, shrill, deep, and intermediate, should 
be used ; and what rhythms are adapted to each 
subject. For there are three qualities that are con- 
sidered, — volume, harmony, rhythm. Those who use 
these properly nearly always carry off the prizes in 
dramatic contests, and as at the present day actors 
have greater influence on the stage than the poets, 
it is the same in pohtical*" contests, owing to the 
corruptness of our forms of government. But no 
treatise has yet been composed on delivery, since 
the matter of style itself only lately came into 
notice ; and rightly considered it is thought vulgar.^ 
But since the whole business of Rhetoric is to in- 
fluence opinion,** we must pay attention to it, 
not as being right, but necessary ; for, as a matter 
of right, one should aim at nothing more in a speech 
than how to avoid exciting pain or pleasure. For 
justice should consist in fighting the case with the 
facts alone, so that everything else that is beside 
demonstration is superfluous ; nevertheless, as we 
have just said, it is of great importance owing to the 
corruption of the hearer. However, in every system 
of instruction there is some slight necessity to pay 
attention to style ; for it does make a difference, for 

* In the law courts and public assembly. 
« Cope prefers: "is thought vulgar, and rightly so 
considered." 

'' Or, "is concerned with appearance." 

• 347 



ARISTOTLE 

(LSI 7] wSl emelv' ov fievTOi roaovrov, aXX aTTOvra 
(f)avra(TLa raur' iarl /cat -npos tov aKpoarrjV Sto 
ovhels ovTco yecDfJieTpeZv SiSacr/cet. 

7 'E/cetvTy [jb€V ovv orav eXOrj ravro rroL'qaeL rfj 
VTTOKpiTiKfj, iyKex^tprJKaai, Se ctt' oXiyov irepi 
avrrjs elireZv rtves, olov Qpaavfxaxos iv rois eAeot?" 
/cat ecrrt ^ucreojs" to VTroKpiriKov ctvai, /cat drexvo- 
repov, Trepl he rrjv Xd^iv evrexyov. 8to /cat roZs 
rovro Svvafji€VOLS ytVerat ttolXlv ddXa, Kaddirep 
/cat Tot? /caret rrjV VTTOKpiaiv pT^ropaiv ol yap 
ypa^ojxevoL Xoyoi fieX^ov Icrxvovac 8ta ttjv Xe^tv 
ij Ota rr]v otavotav. 

8 "Hp^avTO ixev ovv KLvrjaat to TrpcoTOV, woTrep 
7T€(f}VK€v, OL TTOLTjTaL' Ta ydp ovopuaTa /xtjLtTy/xara 
ioTLV, VTTTJp^e Se /cat rj (fxDvrj TrdvTOJV p.ipi.rjTLKa)- 
TaTov Tcjv pi,opiitiv 'qp.lv Sto /cat at Tcxvai. avv- 
eaTTjaav, rj t€ paijjcphia /cat 17 VTTOKpLTiKrj /cat oAAat 

9 ye. CTTei S' ol TTotrjTal X4yovT€s evi^dr] Bid Trjv 
Xe^iv ehoKOVv TTopiaaadai ttjv So^av, Sid tovto 

7TOL7]TlKr] TTpCOTT] lyiv€TO Ac'^tS", oXoV Tj TopyiOV. 

/cat vvv eVt ol TroAAot tcov diraiSevTcov tovs toiov- 
Tovs oiovTai hiaXeyeadat KaXXiaTa. tovto 8 ovk 
ecTTtv, dAA' cTepa Xoyov /cat TTOLrjaccos Ae^t? ecniv. 
hrjXoZ 8e to crvp,^aZvov ovSe ydp ol Tdg TpaywSiag 

TTOLOVVTeS CTt ^pcDl^at TOV aVTOV TpOTTOV, oAA* 

oiOTtep /cat e/c tcov T€Tpapj€Tpojv ets" to laix^eZov 
p,€T€^rjaav Std rd to) Adyw tovto tcov pbCTpcov 

" i.e. style, delivery, and acting, which are of no use to 
serious students. 

* A treatise on Pathos. 

348 



RHETORIC, III. I. 6-9 

the purpose of making a thing clear, to speak in 
this or that manner ; still, the difference is not so 
very great, but all these things <* are mere outward 
show for pleasing the hearer ; wherefore no one 
teaches geometry in this way. 

Now, when delivery comes into fashion, it will have 
the same effect as acting. Some writers have 
attempted to say a few words about it, as Thrasy- 
machus, in his Eleoi ^ ; and in fact, a gift for acting 
is a natural talent and depends less upon art, but in 
regard to style it is artificial. Wherefore people 
who excel in this in their turn obtain prizes, just as 
orators who excel in delivery ; for written speeches 
owe their effect not so much to the sense as to the 
style. 

The poets, as was natural, were the first to give 
an impulse to style ; for words are imitations, and 
the voice also, which of all our parts is best adapted 
for imitation, was ready to hand ; thus the arts of 
the rhapsodists, actors, and others, were fashioned. 
And as the poets, although their utterances were 
devoid of sense, appeared to have gained their reputa- 
tion through their style, it was a poetical style that 
first came into being, as that of Gorgias." Even 
now the majority of the uneducated think that such 
persons express themselves most beautifully, whereas 
this is jiot the case, for the style of prose is not the 
same as that of poetry. And the result proves it ; 
for even the writers of tragedies do not employ it 
in the same manner, but as they have changed from 
the tetrametric to the iambic metre, because the 
latter, of all other metres, most nearly resembles 

« Of Leontini in Sicily, Greek sophist and rhetorician 
(see Introduction). 

349 



ARISTOTLE 

ofioiorarov elvai rojv dXXcov, ovroj Kal rwv ovo- 
fjidrcov acfieLKaaiv oaa napa rrjv SidXeKTov iariv, 
ots" ot TTpcorov eKocrf-WW , /cat en vvv ol rd e^dfjicrpa 
TToiovvres' 8to yeXoZov jxip^eladai roijrovs ot avrol 
10 ovK€TL ■)(^pcbvraL eKeivcp rco rpoiro). ojare (f)av€p6v 
on ovx aTTavra oaa rrepl Aef eojs" eanv eLTrelv, aKpi^o- 
Aoyqreov rjfilv, aAA' oaa Tvepl roiavrrjs otas Xeyojxev. 
7T€pl 8 eKCLV-qs ctprjTat iv rots nepl TTOLrjTLKrjs. 
1104 b 2. "Ecrrco ovv eKelva redecoprjfieva, Kal cbptadoj 
Xe^ecos dperr) aa<f)rj elvar arjp.eiov yap on 6 Xoyos, 
idv firj Sr)Xoi, ov 7TOLT]a€L ro iavrov epyov Kal 
pLrjT€ raTTeivrjV fMifjTe VTrkp to d^icop^a, dXXd rtpi- 
TTOvaav rj yap TToirjnKrj tacos ov raTTeLvrj, oAA' 

2 ov TTpcTTovaa Xoyto. tcov S' dvop^drcxiv Kal prjp,dni)V 
aa(f)7J p,€v TTOLeX rd Kvpia, [xrj raireLvr^v 8e aAAa 
K€Koap,r)p,evrjv rdXXa ovof-iara oaa e'iprjrai €v rotg 
TTcpl TTOLrjTLKrjs- TO ydp i^aXXdi^ai TTOieZ (f>aiv€aBai 
a€p,voTepav oiair^p ydp Trpog tovs $€vovs ot 
avdpoiTTOL Kai irpos tovs iroXiTas, to avTO ird- 

3 a)(^ovaL Kal Trpos ttjv Xi^iv. 8to Set ttol^iv ^evrjv 
TTjU SidXeKTov OavpaaTol ydp tcov aTrovrcov elaiv, 
TjSv Se TO davp^aaTov. iirl p,€V ovv tcov p,eTpa)V 

TToXXd T€ TTOiei TOVTO, Kal dpfMOTTCL €K€L' vXioV 

ydp i^iarrfKe Trepl d Kal rrepl ovs 6 Xoyos' iv Be 

« i.e. the poetic style. See Poetics, 22, where the choice 
of words and the extent to which out-of-the-way words and 
phrases may be used in poetry is discussed. 

* " Nouns and verbs " is a conventional expression for all 
the parts of speech. Cp. Horace, Ars Poetica, 24.0, " non ego 
inornata et doniinantia nomina solum | verbaque," where 
dominantla is a literal adaptation of Kvpia (see Glossary), the 
usual Latin equivalent for which is propria. 

" Ch. 21. 

"* It is impossible to find a satisfactory English equivalent 
S50 



RHETORIC, III. I. 9— II. 3 

prose, they have in Hke manner discarded all such 
words as differ from those of ordinary conversation, 
with which the early poets used to adorn their 
writings, and which even now are employed by the 
writers of hexameters. It is therefore ridiculous to 
imitate those who no longer employ that manner of 
writing. Consequently, it is evident that we need 
not enter too precisely into all questions of style, but 
only those which concern such a style as we are 
discussing. As for the other kind of style, ** it has 
already been treated in the Poetics. 

2. Let this suffice for the consideration of these 
points. In regard to style, one of its chief merits 
may be defined as perspicuity. This is shown by 
the fact that the speech, if|jtd£esnotmake the 
meaning clear, will not perform its proper luncttOTTr 
neither "must It be mean, nor above the dignity of 
the subject, but appropriate to it ; for the poetic 
style may be is not mean, but it is not appropriate 
to prose. Of nouns and verbs it is the proper ones 
that make style perspicuous * ; all the others which 
have been spoken of in the Poetics" elevate and 
make it ornate ; for departure from the ordinary 
makes it appear more dignified. In this respect 
men feel the same in regard to style as in regard to 
foreigners and fellow-citizens. Wherefore we should 
give our language a " foreign ** air " ; for men admire 
what is remote, and that which excites admiration 
is pleasant. In poetry many things conduce to this 
and there it is appropriate ; for the subjects and 
persons spoken of are more out of the common. But 
for the terms ^ivos, ^eviKos, rh ^evi^ov, as applied to style. 
" Foreign " does not really convey the idea, which is rather 
that of something opposed to " home-like," — out-of-the way, 
as if from " abroad." Jebb suggests " distinctive." 

351 



ARISTOTLE 

Tolg i/jiXoLs XoyoLs 7roXXa> iXdrroaiv rj yap virodeai'S 
eXarrcov, inel Kal ivravda, el SovXo? KaXXLeTTOiTO 
rj Xiav vios, dTrpeTreurepop, rj nepl Xlav uiKpwv 
aAA eoTi /cat ev Tovroig eTnavareAAoiMevov Kat, 

4 av^av6[j.€vov to rrpeTTov. 8t6 Set Xavddveiv ttolovv- 
ra?, /cat /xi) So/ceiv Xlyeiv TTeTrXaajjiivojs dXXd 
7T€cf>VK6ra)S' Tovro yap mOavov, e/ceivo 8e rovvav- 
TLov COS yap TTpos im^ovXevovra Sia^aXXovrai, 
KadaTTep rrpos rovs o'lvovs rovs jJ,epi.iyp,evovs, Kal 
olov rj QeoScopov ^covrj Trenovde Trpos rrjv rcov 
dXXojv VTTOKpurcxiv' rj p,ev yap rov Xeyovros eocKcv 

5 eii^at, at S dXXorpiai. /cAeTrrerat S' ev, idv rt? 
e/c Trjs elcxidvias StaAe/crou eKXiyojv avvridfj' oirep 
YiVpnrihrjS Trotet /cat VTrihei^e npcoros. 

"OvTcov 8 ovofidrcov Kal prjpidrcDV i^ (Lv 6 Xoyos 
avve(7T7]Kev, rojv Se ovofidTcov roaavr* exovriov 
elhrj oaa redecxjprjrai iv rots rrepl Trotijcrcojs, 
Tovrcov yXcorrais fJ>€v Kal SlttXols dvojxaai /cat 
TTeTTOirjfMivoLS oXiyaKis Kal dXiyaxov ■)(prjariov 
{oTTOv 8e, varepov epovjMcv, ro re 8ta Tt etprjrai' 

6 €7tI to jxell,ov yap e^aXXdrrei tov irpeTTOVTos .) to 
8e Kvptov Kal TO otKelov Kal p,eTa^opd pLOvai 
XP'qcnp'OL TTpos rrjv tG)v tpLXaJv Xoycov Xe^iv. arjjielov 
he, OTt TovTois fjLovois Trdvres XP^^^^^' '^'dvTes yap 
fj,€Ta(f)opals SiaXeyomai Kal toIs oiKeiois Kal rols 
Kvpiois' cocrre hrjXov cos dv ev ttoijj tls, earai t€ 
^evLKOv Kal Xavddveiv evhex^TaL Kal aa^rjvieZ. 



" Cp. Horace, Ars Poetica, 46, where it is said that the 
choice and use of words requires subtlety and care, skill in 
making an old word new by clever combination {callida 
iunctura) being especially praised. ^ Chs. 3 and 7. 

852 



RHETORIC, III. II. 3-6 

in prose such methods are appropriate in much fewer 
instances, for the subject is less elevated ; and even 
in poetry, if fine language were used by a slave or y/ 
a very young man, or about quite unimportant 
matters, it would be hardly becoming ; for even here 
due proportion consists in contraction and amplifica- 
tion as the subject requires. Wherefore those who 
practise this artifice must conceal it and avoid the 
appearance of speaking artificially instead of natu- 
rally ; for that which is natural persuades, but the 
artificial does not. For men become suspicious of 
one whom they think to be laying a trap for them, as 
they are of mixed wines. Such was the case with 
the voice of Theodorus as contrasted with that of 
the rest of the actors ; for his seemed to be the 
voice of the speaker, that of the others the voice of 
some one else. Art is cleverly concealed when the 
speaker chooses his words from ordinary language " 
and puts them together like Euripides, who was the 
first to show the way. 

Nouns and verbs being the components of speech, 
and nouns being of the different kinds which have 
been considered in the Poetics, of these we should 
use strange, compound, or coined words only rarely 
and in few places. We will state later * in what places 
they should be used ; the reason for this has already 
been mentioned, namely, that it involves too great 
a departure from suitable language. Proper and 
appropriate words and metaphors are alone to be 
employed in the style of prose ; this is shown by 
the fact that no one employs anything but these. 
For all use metaphors in conversation, as well as 
proper and appropriate words ; wherefore it is clear 
that, if a speaker manages well, there will be some- 

2 A 353 



ARISTOTLE 

7 avTT) h rjv rj rod prjropiKov Xoyov aperrj. rcov 8' 
ovofjbarcDv rw fxev ao<f)LcrTfj ofMcovv/jbLai ;;^prycriju.ot 
{TTapa ravras yap KaKovpyet) , rw TroLrjrfj Se 

1405 a avvaJvv/JiLai. Xeyco he Kvpid re Kal avvcovvfia, 
oLov ro TTopeveadai /cat to ^ahit,eiv ravra yap 
ap,^6repa /cat Kvpia Kal avviovvpba aXXrjXois. 

Tt pi,ev ovv Tovrcov eKaarov iari, /cat TToaa elBrj 
p,era(f)opds, /cat oVt rovro TrXelarov hvvarai Kal 
ev TTOL-qaeL /cat iv Xoyois, etpr^rai, Kaddrrep e'Ae- 

8 yo/jiev, ev rots Trepi TTOLrjrLKTJs' roaovrco 8' iv 
Xoyu) del fidXXov ^iXoTroveicrdai nepl avra>v, oao) 
e^ eXarrovcov ^orjOrj/jidrcov 6 Xoyos earl rcov 
(xerpajv. /cat ro aa(f)€S Kal ro rjSv Kal ro ^eviKov 
exei [jidXiara rj fxeracf^opd. Kal Xa^elv ovk ecrriv 

9 avrrjv vap^ dXXov. heZ he Kal rd inWera Kal ra? 
p,eraj>opds dpp,orrovcras Xeyecv. rovro 8' earat 
€K rod dvdXoyov el he fxij, dnpeTres ^avelrai hid 
ro TTapdXXnXa rd evavria ixdXiara cbatvecrdai . 
aAAa oet aKonetv, coy vecp (potvLKis, ovrco yepovri 

10 Tf ov ydp rj avrrj TrpeireL ecrd-qs. Kal edv re 
KoapLeZv ^ovXrj, diro rcov ^eXrcovoiv rojv ev ravr<h 
yevei <f)epeiv rrjv ^era(f>opdv, edv re ipeyeLV, dno 
roiv ^eipovcxiv . Xeyco 8' olov, eVei rd evavria iv 
rco avrcp yevei, ro <f)dvai rov p,ev Trrco^evovra 
evx^crdai, rov he evxdfMevov rrrcoxeveiv, on dpLc/xo 
airrjaeis, ro eipr]p,evov iarl TTOieiv cos Kal ^IcfyiKpdnjs 

" This is a parenthetical note. * Chs. 21, 22. 

' The diflferent kinds of words. 

** Poetics, 22. 9 : " for this alone cannot be borrowed 
from another." 

« Begging (as a beggar does) and praying (as a priest 
might) are both forms of asking, and by substituting one 
for the other, you can amplify or depreciate. 
354 



RHETORIC, HI. ii. 7-io 

thing " foreign " about his speech, while possibly the 
art may not be detected, and his meaning will be 
clear. And this, as we have said, is the chief merit of 
rhetorical language. (In regard to nouns, homonyms 
are most useful to the sophist, for it is by their aid 
that he employs captious argiunents, and synonyms 
to the poet. Instances of words that are both 
proper and synonymous are " going " and " walk- 
ing " : for these two words are proper and have the 
same meaning.) " 

It has already been stated, as we have said, in 
the Poetics,^ what each of these things " is, how many 
kinds of metaphor there are, and that it is most 
important both in poetry and in prose. But the 
orator must devote the greater attention to them in 
prose, since the latter has fewer resources than 
verse. It is metaphor above all that gives per- 
spicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air, and it cannot 
be learnt from anyone else ; ^ but we must make 
use of metaphors and epithets that are appropriate. 
This will be secured by observing due proportion ; 
otherwise there will be a lack of propriety, because 
it is when placed in juxtaposition that contraries are 
most evident. We must consider, as a red cloak 
suits a young man, what suits an old one ; for the ^ 
same garment is not suitable for both. And if we 
wish to ornament our subject, we must derive our 
metaphor from the better species under the same 
genus ; if to depreciate it, from the worse. Thus, to 
say (for you have two opposites belonging to the 
same genus) that the man who begs prays, or that 
the man who prays begs (for both are forms of 
asking) " is an instance of doing this ; as, when 



355 



] 



ARISTOTLE 

KoAAtat' /jurjTpayvpT'qv dXX^ ov SaSov)(^ov. 6 S' 
€(f>rj d/JivrjTov avrov etvac ov yap av jJL-qrpayvprrjV 
avTov KaXelv, dXXd 8aSov)^ov dfj.(f)OJ yap rrepl 
deov, dX\d TO fiev ripnov ro Se cvTip,ov. Kai 6 p,kv 
hiovvcTOKoXaKas , avrol 8 avrov? T€)(yiras koXovolv 
ravra S afxcjiOi iJi.era(j>opd, rj jxkv pviraivovrixtv rj 
8e TOVvavTLOv . /cat ol fiev XrjoTal avrovs TTopLcrrds 
KaXovai vvv Sto e^eari Xeyeiv rov dhiKriaavra jxev 
dfjuaprdvetv, rov S apbaprdvovra dSi/c^crat, /cat rov 
KXeipavra Kal Xa^elv /cat TTopdrjaaL. ro Se <l>s 6 
T'^X€<f)os EvpiTTiSov <f>r]aL, 

K(ji)7Tr)s dvdaaeiv, Kdno^ds et? Mvalav 

d7Tp€7T€s, OTL p,ett,ov TO dvdaacLv 7j Kar* d^iav ov 

11 /ce/cAe77Tat ovv. ecrrt 8e /cat ev rats avXXa^atg 

dfjuapria, edv fMTj rjSeLag fj crr^ixeZa (j)CDvrjs, olov 

Alovvctcos TTpoaayopevet 6 )(aXKovg ev rots eXeyeiois 

Kpavyrjv KaAAtoT??^? 

rrjv TToirjaiv, on dp,^ai <f)OJvai' (f>avX7] 8e tJ fiera- 
<j>opd rals dcrqixoLS (fxovals. 

" wSee i. 7. 32. 

* Head of a distinguished Athenian family which held 
the office of torch-bearer at the Eleusinian mysteries. A 
man of notoriously dissipated character, he took some part 
in politics. 

" The dqiSovxos or hereditary torch-bearer ranked next to 
the hierophant or chief priest. In addition to holding the 
torch during the sacrifices, he took part, in the recitation of 
the ritual and certain purificatory ceremonies. The 
/xrjTpaytjpraL or mendicant priests collected alms on behalf of 
various deities, especially the great Mother Cybele (whence 
their name). They includea both men and women of 
profligate character, addicted to every kind of lewdness. 

356 



RHETORIC, III. II. 10-11 

Iphicrates " called Callias * a mendicant priest instead 
of a torch-bearer, Callias replied that Iphicrates hini- 
self could not be initiated, otherwise he would not 
have called him mendicant priest but torch-bearer '^ ; 
both titles indeed have to do with a divinity, but the 
one is honourable, the other dishonourable. And 
some call actors flatterers of Dionysus, whereas they 
call themselves " artists." Both these names are 
metaphors, but the one is a term of abuse, the other 
the contrary. Similarly, pirates now call themselves 
purveyors '^ ; and so it is allowable to say that the 
man who has committed a crime has " made a 
mistake," that the man who has " made a mistake " 
is " guilty of crime," and that one who has com- 
mitted a theft has either " taken " or " ravaged." 
The saying in the Telephus of Euripides, 

Ruling over the oar and having landed in Mysia, 

is inappropriate, because the word " ruling " exceeds 
the dignity of the subject, and so the artifice can be 
seen. Forms of words also are faulty, if they do not 
express an agreeable sound ; for instance, Dionysius 
the Brazen * in his elegiacs speaks of poetry as 

the scream of Calliope ; 

both are sounds, but the metaphor is bad, because 
the sounds have no meaning.-'^ 

■* Cf, "'convey' the wise it call" {Merry Wives, I. iii.). 
Either the euphemistic or unfavourable application of the 
term may be adopted. 

« According to Athenaeus, xv. p. 669, he was a poet and 
rhetorician who recommended the Athenians to use bronze 
money. 

f A scream is neither articulate nor agreeable, like the 
sound of poetry, although both are voices or sound, and to 
that extent the metaphor is correct. 

357 



ARISTOTLE 

12 'Ert oe ov TToppcodev Set, dAA' e/c tojv crvyyevcou 
Kai Tcov 6jj,o€LSiov fj,eTa(f)€p€LV TO. dvcovvfxa owo- 
fxaafxeycos, o Xex^^v S^Aot icmv on avyyeves, 

1405 b otov €v rep alviypbarL rep €v8oKLp,ovvri, 

dvSp elSov TTvpl p^aA/cov evr' avept KoXXijaavra' 

dva>vvp,ov yap ro irddos, eari S' a/x0a> irpoadems 
Tts"* KoXXrjo-iv roivvv etrre rrjv rrjs OLKvas Trpoa^oXrjv . 
Kai oAoJS" e/c rcDi^ ev fjVLyp,€vcov ecm p,€ra<f)opds 
Xa^elv eTrtet/ceis" p^era^popal yap atvirrovrai, axrrc 

13 SrjXov orL ed p,erevrjV€KraL. Kai diro KaXcov 
KaXXo? 8e 6v6p,aros ro fxev, wairep AiKvp,VLog 
Xeyei, ev roZs ipo^oLS rj rqj arjpLaivop,ivcp, /cat 
alaxos Se waavrcos. ert 8e rpirov, o Xvei rov 
aocjuariKov Xoyov ov yap co? e^ry ^pvacov ovdeva 
alaxpoXoyeiv , eiTrep ro avro arjp,aiveL rohe dvrl 
rov rohe elireLV rovro yap ecm i/jevSos' ecm yap 
dXXo d'AAoy Kvpccorepov /cat (xjp,oLcop,evov fjidXXov 
/cat oiKeiorepov rep TTotelv ro irpdyp^a Tvpo 6p,p.dra)v. 
eVi ovx opbotcos e)(ov cnqp^aivet rohe /cat rohe, oicrre 
/cat ovrcvs dXXo dXXov /coAAtov /cat aio^tot' dereov 
dp,(f)a> /xev yap ro KaXov /cat to ala^pov cnrjp.ai- 
vovcLv, dAA' ovx V K^^^ov 7} ovx fl o.i'f^XP'^^' V 
ravra p,ev, dXXd pidXXov /cat rjrrov. rd? he pera- 
(/)opds evrevdev oloreov, dTTO kclXcov t] rfj (ficovfj 
•^ T7^ hvvdp,eL •^ rfj otjseL rj dXXrj rivl aladrjcrei. 
hia(f)epei h eLTreiv, otov pohohaKrvXos '^d)s /xdAAov 
7j (boLVLKoSdKrvXos, 7] en (f)avX6repov epvdpo- 
haKrvXos. 



» Athenaeus, p. 452. 
* Rhetorician and sophist or Heraclea in Pontus. 

358 



RHETORIC, III. 11. 12-13 

Further, metaphors must not be far-fetched, but 
we must give names to things that have none by 
deriving the metaphor from what is akin and of the 
same kind, so that, as soon as it is uttered, it is 
clearly seen to be akin, as in the famous enigma, 

I saw a man who glued bronze with fire upon another. 

There was no name for what took place, but as in 
both cases there is a kind of application, he called 
the application of the cupping-glass " gluing." " And, 
generally speaking, clever enigmas furnish good 
metaphors ; for metaphor is a kind of enigma, so that 
it is clear that the transference is clever. Metaphors 
should also be derived from things that are beautiful, 
the beauty of a word consisting, as Licymnius says, 
in its sound or sense, and its ugliness in the same. 
There is a third condition, which refutes the sophist- 
ical argument ; for it is not the case, as Bryson ^ said, 
that no one ever uses foul language, if the meaning 
is the same whether this or that word is used ; this 
is false ; for one word is more proper than another, 
more of a hkeness, and better suited to putting the 
matter before the eyes. Further, this word or that 
does not signify a thing under the same conditions ; 
thus for this reason also it must be admitted that 
one word is fairer or fouler than the other. Both, 
indeed, signify what is fair or foul, but not qua fair 
or foul ; or if they do, it is in a greater or less 
degree. Metaphors therefore should be derived from 
what is beautiful either in sound, or in signification, 
or to sight, or to some other sense. For it does 
make a difference, for instance, whether one says 
" rosy-fingered morn,"rather than " purple-fingered," 
or, what is still worse, " red-fingered." 

S59 



ARISTOTLE 

14 Kat ev Tols imdeTOi^ ecrri fxev ra? eTTidiaeis 
voielcrdaL arro (f)avXov rj atcr^pou, otov 6 fjbrjrpo- 
cf)6vTr]s, ecTTL 8 dno tov ^eXriovos, olov 6 varpos 
a^vvTCDp' Kat 6 YiLjjiCxivihris , ore p,ev iStSov jxiadov 
oXiyov avTcp 6 viKiqaas tols opevaiv, ovk rjOeXe 

TTOteiV COS" 8v(T)^€paLV<jOV et? 'qfllOVOVS TTOLCLV, €7761 

8' LKavov eSioKev, eTToirjae 

^alper* deXXoTToScov dvyarpes lttttcov 

KaiTOL Kac rchv ovojv dvyarepe^ rjaav. €tl to 

15 avro VTTOKopi^eadaL . eari 8' o viTOKopLafxos, os 
cXarrov TTOieZ /cat to KaKov /cat ro dyadov, oiairep 
/cat o * ApLcrrocfidvrjs aKOJTTTei €v rots Ba^vXcovloLS , 
olvtI fjiev -)(pvaiov ^pvotSapLov , olvtI 8' Ifjiariou 
t/xaTt8a/3tov, avTt 8e Aot8optas" XoL8opr]fj,dTLov /cat 
vooTjfidrLov. evXa^elaOaL 8e Set /cat Traparripelv 
€V dfj,(f)oiv TO jxeTpiov. 

3. To, 8e i/jvxpd €v T€TTapai ytyverai Kara ttjv 
Xi^iv, €V T€ rots StTT-Aot? ovo/jbaorLV , otov AvK6(f>pwv 

TOV TroXvTTpoaCOTTOV OVpaVOV TTJg H€yaXoKOpV(f)OV 

yrjs /cat dKrrjv 8e arevoTropov , /cat at? Vopyiag 
(x)v6p,al,€, 7TTCD)(6p,ovaos KoXa^, €7nopKTJ<yavTag /cat 
uosa. KarevopK-qcravras. /cat a>? 'AA/ci8a/x.as" " p.€vovs 
fjbev TTjv i/jvx^v TrXr)povp,€vrjv, TrvpLXpcov 8e rrjv 
oi/fLV yiyvofjievrjv ," /cat " reXea(j>6pov w-qOr] rr^v 
TTpoOvpLiav avToJv yevqaccrdai," /cat " reX€a(f)6pov 
TTjv TTeiOd) rdJv Xoycov Kariarrjaev ," /cat " Kvavo- 

" Euripides, Orestes, 1588. In the preceding line Mene- 
laus accuses Orestes as a matricide and ready to heap 
murder on murder, to which Orestes replies, you should 
rather call me the avenger of my father Agamemnon, who 
had been murdered by his wife Clytaemnestra, the mother 

360 



RHETORIC, III. II. 14— III. 1 

As for epithets, they may be apphed from what is 
vile or disgraceful, for instance, " the matricide," or 
from what is more honourable, for instance, " the 
avenger of his father." " When the winner in a mule- 
race offered Simonides a small sum, he refused to 
write an ode, as if he thought it beneath him to 
write on half-asses ; but when he gave him a suffi- 
cient amount, he wrote. 

Hail, daughters of storm-footed steeds ! " 
and yet they were also the daughters of asses. 
Further, the use of diminutives amounts to the same. 
It is the diminutive which makes the good and the 
bad appear less, as Aristophanes in the Babylonians 
jestingly uses " goldlet, cloaklet, affrontlet, disease- 
let " instead of " gold, cloak, affront, disease." But 
one must be careful to observe the due mean in 
their use as well as in that of epithets. 

3. Frigidity of style arises from four causes : first, 
the use of compound words, as when Lycophron " 
speaks of" the many-faced sky of the mighty-topped 
earth," " narrow-passaged shore " ; and Gorgias of 
" a beggingT-poet flatterer," " those who commit 
perjury and those who swear right solemnly.*^ " 
And as Alcidamas says, " the soul full of anger and 
the face fire-coloured," " he thought that their zeal 
would be end-accomplishing," " he made persuasive 
words end-accomplishing," and " the azure-coloured 

of Orestes. "Matricide" and "avenger of his father" 
show the good and bad sides of the deed of Orestes. 

* Frag. 1 {P.L.G. iii. p. 390). The winner of the mule- 
race was Anaxilaus of Rhegium. 

" A sophist, not the poet (author of the obscure Alexander 
or Cassandra), who was later than Aristotle. 

"* Lobeck conjectured KareinopKriffavTas, " who commit 
out-and-out perjury." 

361 



ARISTOTLE 

XPfJ^v TO rrjs daXdrrrjs eSa^os"" Trdvra yap ravra 
TTOirjTiKa Sid rrjv hirrXcoaLV (j)aiv€raL. 

2 Mta (x,er ovv avrrj alria, fMia 8e to ;^;/D7^o'^at 
yAcorrats", otov A.VK6(l)pcov 'E.ep^rjv rriXcopov dvBpa, 
Kal YiKLpcov atvvLS dvrjp, Kal 'AA/ctSa/^as" d6vpp.a 
Trj TTOLifjaei, /cat Trjv Trjg (f)vaeco? aTaadaXtav , /cat 
aKpaTcp TTJ^ 8t,avoias opyfj TeOriyp,lvov . 

3 TpiTov S iv ToZs eTTi^erots" to tj jjuaKpoZs rj 
a/caipois" rj ttvkvoIs xPV^^^'-' ^^ H'^^ 7^9 TTOLTjoet 
TTpeTTGL ydXa XevKov eLTrelv, iv 8e Xoyo) Ta p.kv 
anpeTTeoTepa, Ta he, dv rj /cara/copTy, e^eXeyx^i 
/cat TTotet (f)av€p6v otl TToirjais icniv' irrel Set ye 
XprjcrdcLL avTols' e^aXXdrTet yap to eloiOos, /cat 
^evLKrjv TTOieZ Trjv Xe^tv. dXXd Set aTOxdt,eadaL 
Tov fierpLov, eTret pLeZt^ov TTOieZ /ca/cov tov eiK-fj 
Xeyeiv r) p,€v yap ovk e;\;et to ev, rj Se to /ca/ccDj. 
Sto Ta 'AA/ciSa/xavTos" ijjvxpd ^atVeraf ov yap 
rjSvafiaTL ;^p7yTat dAA' cos e'SeV/xari toZs eTTideTOis, 
ovTco TTVKvoZs Kal pi.eit,oaL /cat cTrtSTyAots", otov ovx 
IhpoJTa dXXd TOV vypov iSpcoTa, /cat ovk els "ladp^ia 
aXX els Trjv tcov ^Icrdpt.iojv vavrjyvpLv , Kal ovxl v6pi,ovs 
dXXd Tovs Twv TToXeojv ^aoiXeZs vopuovs, Kal ov 
Bp6p,cp dXXd Spo/xata Trj ttjs tjj^xV^ ^PP-fi> '^^^ 
OVX} H-ovaeZov dXXd to Trjs (f>vaecos TrapaXa^ojv 
fjiovcreZov, Kal OKvdpojTrov Trjv (j^povTiha ttjs ^vxrjs, 
Kal ov xdpiTos dXXd TravSijfjiov xdpiTos hrjpnovpyos , 

" Sciron and Sinnis were both robbers slain by Theseus, 
but Lycophron turns Sinnis into a ■yXGyrTa, using it adjectiv- 
ally =" destructive " ; cf. (Tcvos, "harm"; fflvrrji = (rivvi^. 

* The meaning of wapaKa^ihv is quite obscure: various 
renderings are " having taken to himself," " received," 
" grasped," " inherited. The word fiovaelov, originally a 
haunt of the Muses, came to mean a school of art or literature. 

362 



RHETORIC, III. III. 1-3 

floor of the sea," for all these appear poetical because 
they are compound. 

This is one cause of frigidity ; another is the use 
of strange words ; as Lycophron calls Xerxes " a 
monster of a man," Sciron " a human scourge <* " ; 
and Alcidamas says " plaything in poetry," " the 
audaciousness of nature," " whetted with unmiti- 
gated wrath of thought." 

A third cause is the use of epithets that are either 
long or unseasonable or too crowded ; thus, in poetry 
it is appropriate to speak of white milk, but in prose 
it is less so ; and if epithets are employed to excess, 
they reveal the art and make it evident that it is 
poetry. And yet such may be used to a certain 
extent, since it removes the style from the ordinary 
and gives a " foreign " air. But one must aim at the 
mean, for neglect to do so does more harm than 
speaking at random ; for a random style lacks merit, 
but excess is vicious. That is why the style of 
Alcidamas appears frigid ; for he uses epithets not 
as a seasoning but as a regular dish, so crowded, so 
long, and so glaring are they. For instance, he does 
not say " sweat " but " damp sweat " ; not " to the 
Isthmian games " but " to the solemn assembly of 
the Isthmian games " ; not " laws," but " the laws, 
the rulers of states " ; not " running," but " with a 
race-like impulse of the soul " ; not " museum," but 
" having taken up the museum of nature " ^ ; and 
" the scowling anxiety of the soul " ; " creator," not 
' of favour," but " all-popular favour " ; and " dis- 

The fault appears to consist in the addition of r^s (pvaew, but 
it is diiTicult to see why. Cope confesses his inability to 
understand the passage. Jebb translates : " he does not 
say, ' having taken to himself a school of the Muses,' but 
' to Nature's school of the Muses.' " 

363 



ARISTOTLE 

Kac OLKovojxo? TTJs TciJv OLKovovTcov rjSovijs, Kai, ov 
/cAaSot? aAAa tols rrjg vXrjs KXdSots aTTeKpvtJjev, 
Kal ov TO arco/xa Trapt^fXTnax^v aAAa rrjv rod a(x)p,aros 
alaxvvTjv, Kal dvTLfxi/jLOv rrjv rrjs ^v^ri? iiTLdvp-iav 
{rovro 8' a/j.a /cat SlttXovv Kal iTriderov, ware 
7TOLr]fj,a ytverat), Kal ovtojs e^eSpov ttjv ttjs 
{xoxdripias vTvep^oXrjv. Sto ttoltjtlkcos Xeyovres 
TTj OLTTpeTTeia to yeXolov Kal to ijjvxpov i/jLTroiovcri, 
/cat TO aaa(f)€s 8ta ttjv dSoXeaxi'O.v oTav yap 
yiyvciiaKovTi eTTep,^dXXrj, StaAwet to aa<f)€S rco 

€7naKOT€LV OL 8' dvdpWTTOL TOt? StTlAotS' XP^^'^^''' 

OTav dvcvvvfiov fj Kal 6 Xoyos evavvdeTos, olov to 
XpovoTpi^eiv dAA' dv ttoXv, ttovtios ttoitjtlkov . 8to 
1406 b ;!^p7yo-tyLtcuTar')7 Tj SlttXt] Ae^t? toZs hL0vpap,^o7ToioZs' 
ovTOL yap ifjocficoSeL?' at 8e yAcDTTat Tot? eTTOTrotoi?' 
aefxvov yap Kal avOaSe^- rj fieracftopd 8e TOt? ta/u.- 
jSetois" TouTois" yap vvv xpdJvTat, wairep e'iprjTai. 
4 Kat eri rerapTov to ipvxpov iv Tat? iJ,eTa(j>opals 
yiyv€Taf elal yap Kal fjb€Ta(f)opal (XTrpeTret?, at p,€V 
Sta TO yeXoiov (xpcbvTai yap Kal ol KcofMCoSoTTOLol 
pbeTa^opais) , at 8e 8ta to aejxvdv dyav Kal TpayiKov 
daacf)€Ls 8e, dv Troppcodev. olov Topyiag " ;)^Aa>pa 
/cat dvaifxa rd Trpdyfiara " ' " av Se TavTa alaxpd)S 
fjuev ecrrreipa?, /ca/ccD? Se edeptaas'" ttoltjtlkojs 
yap dyav. Kal (os 'AA/ctSap-aj ttjv (f>LXocro<f>iav 



" On this passage Thompson {Gorgias, p. 179) says: 
" The metaphor of reaping and sowing is a mere common- 
place . . . but * pallid and bloodless affairs ' is a phrase 
which would need apology even from a modern." On the 
other hand, it is difficult to see what objection there is to 
calling the Odyssey "a beautiful mirror of human life." 
Another reading is Ivaifj-a, which Cope translates "events 

364 



RHETORIC, 111. III. 3-4 

penser of the pleasure of the hearers " ; "he hid," 
not " with branches," but " with the branches of the 
forest " ; " he covered," not " his body," but " the 
nakedness of his body." He also calls desire 
" counter-initiative " of the soul " — an expression 
which is at once compound and an epithet, so that 
it becomes poetry — and " the excess of his depravity 
so beyond all bounds." Hence those who employ 
poetic language by their lack of taste make the 
style ridiculous and frigid, and such idle chatter pro- 
duces obscurity ; for when words are piled upon one 
who already knows, it destroys perspicuity by a 
cloud of verbiage. People use compound words, 
when a thing has no name and the word is easy to 
combine, as xpovoTpLJitlv, to pass time ; but if the 
practice is abused, the style becomes entirely poetical. 
This is why compound words are especially employed 
by dithyrambic poets, who are full of noise ; strange 
words by epic poets, for they imply dignity and 
self-assertion ; metaphor to writers of iambics, who 
now employ them, as we have stated. 

The fourth cause of frigidity of style is to be found 
in metaphors ; for metaphors also are inappropriate, 
some because they are ridiculous — for the comic 
poets also employ them — others because they are too 
dignified and somewhat tragic ; and if they are far- 
fetched, they are obscure, as when Gorgias says : 
" Affairs pale and bloodless " " ; " you have sown 
shame and reaped misfortune " ; for this is too much 
like poetry. And as Alcidamas calls philosophy " a 

fresh with the blood in them." If the two extracts are taken 
together, it is suggested (apparently by the editor of Cope's 
notes) that the sense may be : " things green and unripe 
(flushed with sap), and this was the crop which you . . .," 
the adjectives referring to green and unripe stalks of corn. 

365 



ARISTOTLE 

eTTLTeLXicrfia rcbv vofxcov, /cat rrjv ^OSvcrcreiav KaAov 

dvdpOJTTLVOV ^lov KOLTOTTrpOV, /Cttt " OvSeV rOLOVTOV 

ddvpfia rfj TTOiijcret 7Tpoa(j>epa)v" aTravra yap 
ravra dmdava Bid rd elprjixeva. ro he Topyiov 
els TTjV )(€XiS6va, eTTcl /car' avrov Trerop^evt) dcfyrJKe 
TO TreptTTco/xa, dpiara rcov TpayiKcov elne ydp 
" Alcrxpdv ye c3 OtAo/xi^Aa." opvidi fiev ydp, el 
eTToirjaev, ovk alaxpdv, Trapdevco Se alaxpdv. ev 
ovv eXoihoprjcrev elncov o rjv, aAA' ovx o eariv. 

4. "EoTt Be /cat 'q eiKcbv /xera^o/aa- Sta(f>epei 
ydp pbiKpov orav fiev ydp ecTrrj rov 'A;^tAAea 

d)S Se Xectiv enopovaev, 

eiKcov ecrriv, orav Be " Xecov CTTopovae," p.era^opd' 
Bid ydp rd dp.(f)co dvBpeLovs etvai, Trpocrqyopevae 

2 fiereveyKag Xeovra rov ^A^iXXea. ;j^p7^crt/xov Se tJ 
eiKcbv /cat ev Xoyw, dAtya/ct? Se'* TTOtrjriKov ydp. 
otcrreat Se warrep at p.era^opal' p.eTa</)opal ydp 

3 etat Bta(f}€povcrai, rep elprjp.evu). eicrt S' eiKoves 
otov Tjv ^ AvBporiuiv els 'IBpiea, on ofioios rots e/c 
rdju Beaficbv kvvlBlois' eKelvd re ydp TrpoamTrrovra 
BaKvei, /cat 'IBpiea Xvdevra e/c rd>v Beap-ajv elvai 
XO-Xerrov. /cat (Ls QeoBdfias et/ca^ev 'ApxiBap,ov 
Kv^evo) yeayfMerpelv ovk eVtcrra/xeVo) ev rep dvdXoyov 
ecrrai ydp /cat d Ey^evos" *ApxiBap.os yecop,€rpiK6s • ' 
/cat TO iv rij nroXireia rfj IlAaTaivos", on ol revs 

" Or, " a barrier against the laws." This is the general 
meaning of e-jriTeixKr/xa, a border fortress commanding an 
enemy's country. 

* Compare Iliad, xxii. 164 tvaunov wpro Xediu ws. 

" Pupil of Isocrates and historical writer. Idrieus was a 
prince of Caria, who had been imprisoned. 

<* Meaning that there was no difference between Euxenus 

366 



RHETORIC, III. III. 4— IV. 3 

bulwark of the laws," " and the Odyssey " a beautiful 
mirror of human life," and " introducing no such 
plaything in poetry." All these expressions fail to 
produce persuasion, for the reasons stated. As for 
what Gorgias said to the swallow which, flying over 
his head, let fall her droppings upon him, it was in 
the best tragic style. He exclaimed, " Fie, for 
shame, Philomela ! " ; for there would have been 
nothing in this act disgraceful for a bird, whereas it I 
would have been for a young lady. The reproach 
therefore was appropriate, addressing her as she was, 
not as she is. 

4. The simile also is a metaphor ; for there is very 
little difference. When the poet says of Achilles,** 

he rushed on like a Hon, 
it is a simile ; if he says, " a lion, he rushed on," it 
is a metaphor ; for because both are courageous, he 
transfers the sense and calls Achilles a lion. The 
simile is also useful in prose, but should be less 
frequently used, for there is something poetical about 
it. Similes must be used like metaphors, which only 
differ in the manner stated. The following are ex- 
amples of similes. Androtion " said of Idrieus that 
he was like curs just unchained ; for as they attack 
and bite, so he when loosed from his bonds was 
dangerous. Again, Theodamas likened Archidamus 
to a Euxenus ignorant of geometry, by proportion ; <* 
for Euxenus " will be Archidamus acquainted with 
geometry." Again, Plato in the Republic * compares 

without a knowledge of geometry and Archidamus with a 
knowledge of geometry. The proportion of geometrical 
knowledge will remain the same, so that Archidamus can 
be called an ungeometrical Euxenus, and Euxenus a geo- 
metrical Archidamus (see note " on p. 370 for "by pro- 
portion "). * 469 D. 

367 



ARISTOTLE 

redvecorag aKvXevovres ioLKacn roZs KVVihiois, a 
rovs Xidovs SaKvet, rod ^dXXovros ovx aTrro^eva. 
Kat, 7] €is Tov SrjfJiov, OTL ofMoios vavKXrjpoj laxvpcp 
fjiev V7TOKcocf)(x) Se. /cat r) els ra fidrpa raJv TTOirjrcov, 
OTL eot/ce rots' avev kolXXovs (hpaiois' ol fxev yap 
1407a oLTTavdiqcravres , to, Se StaXvOevra ov^ ofMota (^atVerat. 
/cat rj nept/cAeous" et? Sa/Atous", eot/ceVat avrovg 
TOLS TratStotS" a rov ipco/jiov Sex^rai p,ev, KXaiovra 
Se. /cat etV Boicorovg, on o/jLOlol tols Trpivois' 
rovs T€ yap Trpivovg v<j>' avrcov KaraKoirreadai., 
/cat rovs Botcurous" vpos aXXrjXovs ^.a^oixevovs . 
/cat o Arjfioadevrjs rov hijp,ov, on opuoLos eon rols 
ev rols ttXolols vavricoaiv. /cat to? o Ar]ixoKpdrrjs 
e'lKaae rovs p'qropas rals rLrdais at ro ^cu/xtcr/xa 
KaraTTLVovaai rip aiaXo) rd TratSta napaXei^ovaLV . 
Kat (hs ^Avnadevrjs K.rj<f)La6Sorov rov Xetrrov 
Xi^avojru) eiKaaev, on aTToXXv/xevos ev<f>paiv€L. 
rrdaas yap ravras /cat ojs eiKovas /cat oJs" fX€ra<f)opds 
e^ean Xeyeiv wore ocrat dv evSoKificoaiv (Ls 
fji€ra(f>opal Ae;^^etcrat, BijXov on aSrai /cat eiKOves 
eaovrai, /cat at eiKoves /Ltera^opat Xoyov Seofievai. 
4 aet Se Set rrjv pi.era(f)opdv rrjv e/c rov dvdXoyov 
dvraTTohihovaL /cat eVt ddrepa rojv o/jLoyevdjv olov 

" 488 A. * 601 B. 

* If metrical restrictions have been removed and they are 
read as prose. 

368 



RHETORIC, III. IV. 3-4 

those who strip the dead to curs, which bite stones, 
but do not touch those who throw thenx ; he also 
says that the people is like a ship's captain who 
is vigorous, but rather deaf;** that poets' verses 
resemble those who are in the bloom of youth but 
lack beauty ; * for neither the one after they have 
lost their bloom, nor the others after they have been 
broken up,'' appear the same as before. Pericles said 
that the Samians were like children who cry while 
they accept the scraps.** He also compared the 
Boeotians to holm-oaks ; for just as these are beaten 
down by knocking against each other,^ so are the 
Boeotians by their civil strife. Demosthenes com- 
pared the people to passengers who are seasick.^ 
Democrates said that orators resembled nurses 
who gulp down the morsel and rub the babies' lips ' 
with the spittle .» Antisthenes likened the skinny 
Cephisodotus to incense, for he also gives pleasure 
by wasting away. All such expressions may be used 
as similes or metaphors, so that all that are approved 
as metaphors will obviously also serve as similes 
which are metaphors without the details. But in 
all cases the metaphor from proportion should be 
reciprocal and applicable to either of the two things 
of the same genus ; for instance, if the goblet is the 

** Meaning that they did not appreciate the benefits re- 
ceived from the Athenians, who conquered the islands 
(440 B.C.). 

« Or, " are cut down by axes, the handles of which are 
made of their own wood." 

' It is disputed whether Demosthenes is the orator or the 
Athenian general in the Peloponnesian War. The point of 
the comparison is that in a democracy the general instability 
of political conditions makes the people sick of the existing 
state of things and eager for a change. 

" Aristophanes, Knights, 715-718. 

2 B 369 



ARISTOTLE 

€i rj <f)idXr} aCTTTts" Aiovvaov, /cat rrjv acrTrtSa dpfjuoTret 
Xeyeadai <f)LdX7]v "Apeog. 

5. fiev odv Xoyos avvrider at e'/c rovTOiv. 
ecTTL 8' dp-)(7] TTJs Ae^eoj? to eXXr^vi^eLV rovro 8' 

2 euriv iv Trevre, Trpwrov jxev iv rot? avvSeafxoig, 
dv aTToSiSo) Tts" COS 7Te<f)VKaaL rrporepoi /cat varepoi 
yLyveadai dXXijXcov, otov evioi dTrairovaiv, oiairep 
o fxev /cat o eyco fiev aTratret tov 8e /cat ror o 8e. 
8et 8e ecfj? ficfMvrjrai dvTa77o8t8ovat dAATyAot?, /cat 
/LtT^Te jjbaKpdv aTraprdv /Jbijre arjvheap,ov irpo avv- 
Sea/Jiov dTToSiSovai, rod dvayKaiov oXLya^ov yap 
apfxoTTet,. " eyd) 8 , CTret fioi €L7T€v {^Xde yap 
KAecov Seo/Jbevos re /cat d^Lcov) iTTopevoiMrjv napa- 
Xa^ojv avrovs-" iv rovrois yap TroAAot Trpo rov 
dTToSodrjaofxevov crvvSea/jbov Trpocfifie^XrjvraL avv- 
Sea/jiOL. idv 8e ttoXv rd /xera^u yivryrai rov 

3 eTropevo/jbrjv, aaa^ig. ev fiev Srj ro ev iv rot? 
avvSiaiJiOLs, Sevrepov 8e ro rots tSiot? dvo/xacrt 

4 Aeyeti' /cat firj rocs TTepiixovo'iv. rpirov, firj 
dfK^L^oXois' ravra Si, dv p,rj rdvavria TrpoaLprjrai. 
ovep TTOiovaiv, orav /ji,r)d€v [xkv €)(U)ai, Xiyeiv, 
TTpoaTTOLCovrai 8e rt Xiyeiv ol ydp roiovrot, iv 



" As the shield is to Ares, so is the goblet to Dionysus. 
Proportion is defined {Ethics, v. 3. 8) as "an equality of 
ratios, implying four terms at the least," and the proportional 
metaphor is one in which the second term is to the first as 
the fourth is to the third ; for then one can by metaphor 
substitute the fourth for the second, or the second for the 
fourth. Let A be Dionysus, B a goblet, C Ares, D a shield. 
Then by the definition, the goblet is to Dionysus as the shield 

370 



RHETORIC, HI. iv. 4— v. 4 

shield of Dionysus, then the shield may properly be 
called the goblet of Ares.** 

5. Such then are the elements of speech. But 
purity, which is the foundation of style, depends 
upon five rules. First, connecting particles should 
be introduced in their natural order, before or after, 
as they require ; thus, fxev and e'yw /xev require to 
be followed by 8e and 6 SL Further, they should 
be made to correspond whilst the hearer still re- 
collects ; they should not be put too far apart, nor 
should a clause be introduced before the necessary 
connexion ^ ; for this is rarely appropriate. For 
instance, " As for me, I, after he had told me — for 
Cleon came begging and praying — set out, taking 
them with me." For in this phrase several connecting 
words have been foisted in before the one which is 
to furnish the apodosis ; and if the interval between 
" I " and " set out " is too great, the result is 
obscurity. The first rule therefore is to make a 
proper use of connecting particles ; the second, to 
employ special, not generic terms. The third con- 
sists in avoiding ambiguous terms, unless you de- 
liberately intend the opposite, like those who, having 
nothing to say, yet pretend to say sometliing ; such 
people accomplish this by the use of verse, after the 

is to Ares. The metaphor consists in transferring to the goblet 
the name belonging to its analogue the shield. Sometimes 
an addition is made by way of explanation of the word in its 
new sense, and the goblet may be described as the shield of 
Dionysus and the shield as the goblet of Ares. The shield 
and the goblet both come under the same genus, being 
characteristics of a deity, and can therefore be reciprocally 
transferred (Poetics, 21. 4). 

* The apodosis. dTroSi86vaL is used in the sense of intro- 
ducing a clause answering to the TrpoTaais, and dwodoa-is for 
this answering clause. 

371 



ARISTOTLE 

■noLTjaei Xeyovai ravra, olov 'E^TreSo/cATys" <f>evaKit,€L 
yap TO kvkXio ttoXv 6v, Kal Trdaxovcriv ol aKpoaral 
OTTep OL TToAAot TTapo. Tot? fidvTeaLV orau yap 
Xeycoaiv dp,(f)i^oXa, crvixTrapavevovaLV . 

i^polaog "AXvv Sta^as" fMeydXrjv dp)(rjv KaraXvaei. 

Kat hid TO oXws eXarrov elvai diJ,dprrjp.a, 8ta rcov 
uoTby€Vcov rov TTpdyfMaros Xeyovaiv ol p,dvr€i,s' rvxot 
yap av tls p.dXXov ev rolg dpriaap.oZs dprta 'q 
TTepLoraa eiTTcbv jxdXXov t] TToaa €)(€i, Kal to otl 
ecrrat rj to 7t6t€, 8i6 ol ■)(^prjap.oX6yoi ov npocr- 
opit,ovTai TO 7t6t€. dnavTa St] raura oixoia' coot' 

5 dv flT) TOIOVTOV TiVOS €V€Ka, <l>€VKT€OV . TCTapTOV, 

(1)9 IlpcuTayopag Ta yevq tcov ovop,dTCOV hirjpei, 
dppeva Kal d'^qXea Kal (jKevrf Set ydp aTToStSdt'ai 

6 Kal TavTa opddJs' " rj 8' iXdovaa Kal StaAep^^etaa 
wx^To." TTejjbTTTGV, €V TO) Ttt TToXXd Kal oXiya Kal 

ev OpOdJS 6vop,dl,€lV " OL 8' iX96vT€S eTVTTTOV fl€." 

'OAcos" 8e Set evavdyvcooTov elvaL to yeypap,- 
p,evov Kal €V(f)paaTov eaTL Be to aino. oirep ol 
TToXXol avvheapioi ovk exovaLv oyS' a p,rj pdhLov 



" Of Agrigentum (c. 490-430), poet, philosopher, and 
physician. Among other legends connected with him, he is 
said to have thrown himself into the crater of Etna, so that 
by suddenly disappearing he might be thought to be a god. 
His chief work was a poem called Nature, praised by 
Lucretius. The principles of things are the four elements, 
fire, air, water, and earth, which are unalterable and in- 
destructible. Love and hate, alternately prevailing, regulate 
the periods of the formation of the world. The existing 
fragments corroborate Aristotle's statement. 

* Herodotus, i. 53, 91. Croesus consulted the Delphian 
oracle whether he should attack Cyrus the Persian or not. 

372 



RHETORIC, III. V. 4-6 

manner of Empedocles." For the long circumlocution 
takes in the hearers, who find themselves affected 
like the majority of those who listen to the sooth- 
sayers. For when the latter utter their ambiguities, 
they also assent ; for example, 

Croesus, by crossing the Halys, shall ruin a mighty 
dominion.'' 

And as there is less chance of making a mistake 
when speaking generally, diviners express themselves 
in general terms on the question of fact ; for, in 
playing odd or even, one is more likely to be right 
if he says " even " or " odd " than if he gives a 
definite number, and similarly one who says " it will 
be " than if he states " when." This is why sooth- 
sayers do not further define the exact time. All such 
ambiguities are alike, wherefore they should be 
avoided, except for some such reason.'' The fourth 
rule consists in keeping the genders distinct — mas- 
culine, feminine, and neuter,** as laid down by Prot- 
agoras ; these also must be properly introduced : " She, 
having come {fem^ and having conversed [fem^ with 
me, went away." The fifth rule consists in observing 
number, according as many, few, or one are referred 
to : " They, having come {pi), began to beat {pi.) me." 
Generally speaking, that which is written should 
be easy to read or easy to utter, which is the same 
thing. Now, this is not the case when there is a 
number of connecting particles, or when the punctua- 

Encouraged by the ambiguous oracle, he did so, but was 
utterly defeated. 

" The deliberate intention to mislead. 

■* (XKevri, "inanimate things," the classification probably 
being male, female, and inanimate, not the grammatical one 
of masculine, feminine, and neuter. 

373 



ARISTOTLE 

BiaoTL^ai, axmep ret 'H/)a/cAetroi». to. yap 'Hpa- 
KXeirov Siaari^at epyov 8ta ro dSrjXov elvai 
TTorepco TTpoctKevraL, rco varepov rj rw irporepov, 
olov iv rfj oipxfj OLvrov rov cruyypdfj,iJ,aros' (f>rjal 
yap " rov Xoyov rovS* iovrog del d^vveroi dvdpcoTTOi 
yiyvovr ai'" dSrjXov yap to dei, irpos OTTorepo) 
7 Stacrrt^at, eri 8e Trotet CToAot/ct^eiv to fXTj dno- 
StSovat, idv fj.r} €7nl,€vyvvrjs djx^oZv o dpfMorref 
olov 7] ilf6(f)ov ^ xpd^H'^i "^^ 1^^^ i8a)v o^^ kolvov, ro 
§ aiadofMevos kolvov. daa(f)7J 8e /cat dv p,rj Trpodels 
etTTT^S", fieXXcov noXXd fjbera^v ifM^dAXeiv olov 
" efJbeXXov yap 8taAe;^^eis" e/cetVoj rdSe /cat raSe 
/cat c58e TTopeveadat," aXXd fjirj " efxeXXov yap 
BtaXexdcl? TTopeveadai, clra raSe /cat raSe /cat 
c58e iydvero." 

6. EtV oyKov 8e rrjs Xe^ecos ovfx^dXXerat rdSe, 
TO Xoyo) XPV^^^'' ^^^ ovojxaros , olov firj kvkXov, 
oAA' iTTLTTeSov ro €K rov fieaov laov. ei? 8e avv- 

2 ro/Jbiav ro ivavriov, dvrl rov Xoyov 6vop.a. /cat 
idv alaxpov ^ drrpeTres' idv p,ev iv rco Xoyw fj 
alaxpov, rovvofia Xiyeiv, idv 8 iv rep 6v6p,ari, 

3 rov Xoyov. /cat p.era^opaZs SrjXovv /cat rots 

4 iTTiOeroLs, evXa^ovp^evov ro TToir^riKov . /cat ro ev 

" Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535-475). His chief work 
was on Nature. From the harshness of his language and 
the carelessness of his style he was called 6 aKoreii'ds (the 
obscure). According to him, fire was the origin of all 
things; all things become fire, and then fire becomes all 
other things. All things are in a constant state of flux ; all 
is the same and yet not the same. Knowledge is founded 
upon sensual perception, but only the gods possess know- 
ledge in perfection. 

374. 



RHETORIC, III. V. 6— VI. 4 

tion is hard, as in the writings of Herachtus." For 
it is hard, since it is uncertain to which word 
another belongs, whether to that which follows or 
that which precedes ; for instance, at the beginning 
of his composition he says : "Of this reason which 
exists * always men are ignorant," where it is un- 
certain whether " always " should go with " which 
exists " or with " are ignorant." Further, a solecism 
results from not appropriately connecting or joining 
two words with a word which is equally suitable to 
both. For instance, in speaking of " sound " and 
" colour," the word " seeing " should not be used, 
for it is not suitable to both, whereas " perceiving " 
is. It also causes obscurity, if you do not say at the 
outset what you mean, when you intend to insert a 
number of details in the middle ; for instance, if 
you say : "I intended after having spoken to him 
thus and thus and in this way to set out " instead 
of " I intended to set out after having spoken to him," 
and then this or that happened, in this or that 
manner. 

6. The following rules contribute to loftiness of 
style. Use of the description instead of the name 
of a thing ; for instance, do not say " circle," but " a 
plane figure, all the points of which are equidistant 
from the centre." But for the purpose of conciseness 
the reverse — use the name instead of the description. 
You should do the same to express anything foul or 
indecent ; if the foulness is in the description, use 
the name ; if in the name, the description. Use 
metaphors and epithets by way of illustration, taking 
care, however, to avoid what is too poetical. Use 

'' Or, " although this reason exists for ever men are born 
. . . without understanding " (Welldon). 

375 



ARISTOTLE 

TToAAo. 7TOL€lV, 07T€p ol TTOLTjral TTOlOVatV €v6s OVTOS 

Xifjbevos oficos Xeyovcri 

Xifjuevag els ^A)(a'CKovs 

SeXrov fiev atSe TToXvdvpoL hLaTTrv)(a.L. 

5 Koi fMT] iTTit^exryvvvai, aXX eKarepcp CKarepov, 
" rrjs yvvaiKog rrjg rjfxeTepas." iav Se avvTOfiaJS , 

6 ro^^vavriov " rrjg r]p,erepas yvvaLKos." koL /xera 
avvSeajjiov Xeyeiv iav 8e cn)vr6p.oJS, dvev fiev 

noisL crvvSea/Jiov, fjurj darvvSera Se, 0101^ " TTopevdels Kol 

7 SiaAep^^et?," " TTopevdels SteXexOrju ." Kalro ^Avrt,- 
fxdxov XRV^'^H'^^f ^$ <^^ P'V ^X^^ Xeyew, o eKeivos 
TTOtel €7TL rod TevfXTjacrov, 

€OTi Tis" 'qvcfjioeis oXtyos Xo^os' 

av^erai yap ovrcos et? dVetpov. eort 8e rovro 
/cat evrt dyaddiv /cat KaKuyv, ottojs ovk ^x^l, onorepcog 
dv fj p^pTyCTt/x.oj'. 66 ev Kol rd 6v6p,ara ol TTOtrjral 
<j>ipovai, ro d^opSov /cat ro dXvpov fxeXog- e/c rojv 
ar€pT]cr€cov yap €TTi(j)epovaLV' evSoKtfMel yap rovro 
iv rais p,era(f>opals Xcyop^evov ratg dvdAoyov, olov 
ro <j)dvai rrjv adXiTLyya elvai fxeXos aXvpov. 

7. To 8e rrpeTTOv e^et tj Xe^ts, iav fj TTadrjriK'q 

re /cat tjOlkti /cat rols inroKeip.ivoLS' rrpdyfiaaiv 

2 dvdiXoyov. ro S' dvdXoyov iariv, idv /XT^re irepl 

evoyKOJV avroKa^hdXcos Xeyr^rai p.'qre nepl €vr€Xd)v 

aep,vd)s, firjS ctti rd) evreXel ovofMori iTrfj KoapLOS' 

"» Euripides, Iphig. Taur. 727. 

' In Boeotia. The quotation is from the Thebaid of 
Antimachus of Clares (c. 450 b.c). The Alexandrians 
placed him next to Homer amonj< the epic poets. In his 
eulogy of the little hill, he went on to attribute to it all the 

876 



RHETORIC, III. VI. 4— VII. 2 

the plural for the singular, after the manner of the 
poets, who, although there is only one harbour, say 

to Achaean harbours, 
and, 

Here are the many-leaved folds of the tablet." 

You should avoid linking up, but each word should 
have its own article : ri/s yuvatKos rrjs r^/^erepas. But 
for conciseness, the reverse : rrys rjfjierepas ywaiKos. 
Employ a connecting particle or for conciseness omit 
it, but avoid destroying the connexion ; for instance 
" having gone and having conversed with him," or, 
" having gone, I conversed with him." Also the 
practice of Antimachus is useful, that of describing 
a thing by the qualities it does not possess ; thus, 
in speaking of the hill Teumessus,* he says, 

There is a little wind-swept hill ; 

for in this way amplification may be carried on ad 
infinitum. This method may be applied to things 
good and bad, in whichever way it may be useful. 
Poets also make use of this in inventing words, as 
a melody " without strings " or " without the lyre " ; 
for they employ epithets from negations, a course 
which is approved in proportional metaphors, as for 
instance, to say that the sound of the trumpet is a 
melody without the lyre. — 

7. Propriety of style will be obtained by the ex- 
pression of emotion and character, and by proportion 
to the subject matter. Style is proportionate to the 
subject matter when neither weighty matters are 
treated offhand, nor trifling matters with dignity, 
and no embellishment is attached to an ordinary 

good qualities it did not possess, a process which could 
obviously be carried on ad infinitum. 

m 



ARISTOTLE 

et Se fi'q, KcoyLtcoSta ^atverac, otov rroiel KX€0(f>(jjv' 
ofMOiojs yap eVta eXeye /cat et ecTTetev dv " TTorvia 

3 (TUKT}.' TTadrjTLKTj 8e, iav fxev r^ v^pis, opyi^o- 
fievov Ae'^ts", iav Se dae^rj /cat alaxpo-, Svax^pai- 
vovros /cat evXa^ov/juevov /cat Aeyecv, iav Se eV- 
atvera, ayajiivcos, idv Se eAeetva, raTretvo)?, /cat 

4 €7rt Toit' aAAojv Se 6p.oi(x>s. Tndavol Se to Trpdypia 
/cat 7^ ot/ceta Aeft?* TrapaXoyt^eraL yap rj i/jv^r) tu? 
dXrjOojg Xeyovros, on eTrt rots" rotoi^^ot? ovrcos 
exovcrtv, war olovrai, et /cat )U,t^ ovrcos e'x^i, co? 
o Xeycov, rd 7Tpdyp,ara ovrcos ^X^^^' '^^'■^ cruv'- 
ojJLOioTTadel 6 aKovcov del rco TradrjrLKcos Xiyovri, 

5 /cav" fjirjOev Xiyrj. Sto ttoAAoi KaraTrXijrrovaL rovs 
dKpoards Oopv^ovvreg. 

6 Kat rjdiKrj Se aw-Ty tJ e/c tcDv cnrjfJLeicov Sel^is, 
orL dKoXovdeZ rj dpp,6rrovaa iKacrrcp yeVet /cat 
e^et. Xiyco Se yivos /Mev Kad' rjXcKLav, otov ttois 
rj dvrjp 7j yepcov, /cat yvvrj ^ dvqp, /cat AaKcov t] 
SerraXos, e^ets" Se, Kad' a? ttoios" ti? to) ^iV' 

7 ou yap Ka9 a77aaav e'^tt" ot ^tot ttoloL riveg. idv 
ovv /cat ra ovo/jbara OLKeZa Xeyrj rfj e^et, 770t7ycret 
TO rjdos' ov yap ravra ov8 (Laavrcog aypolKog 
dv Kat TT€7Taihevp.evos enreiev. nacrxovai Se Tt 
ot aKpoaral /cat a) KaraKopcos ;\y)a»t'Tat ot Aoyo- 
ypd<f>oi, "rig S' ou/c oiSei/;" " diravres taraatv" ofio- 



" By some identified with the tragic poet spoken of in the 
Poetics, 2. His manner of expression, due to the wish to 
use fine language, was ridiculous owing to its being out of 
harmony with the subject. Others consider that he was not 
a poet at all but an orator. Trbrvia was a title of respect, 
applied to females, whether they were goddesses or ordinary 
women. 

878 



RHETORIC, III. VII. 2-7 

word ; otherwise there is an appearance of comedy, 
as in the poetry of Cleophon,* who used certain 
expressions that reminded one of saying " madam 
fig." Style expresses emotion, when a man speaks 
with anger of wanton outrage ; with indignation 
and reserve, even in mentioning them, of things foul 
or impious ; with admiration of things praiseworthy ; 
with lowhness of things pitiable ; and so in all 
other cases. Appropriate style also makes the fact 
appear credible ; for the mind of the hearer is 
imposed upon ^ under the impression that the speaker 
is speaking the truth, because, in such circumstances, 
his feelings are the same, so that he thinks (even if 
it is not the case as the speaker puts it) that things 
are as he represents them ; and the hearer always 
sympathizes with one who speaks emotionally, 
even though he really says nothing. This is why 
speakers often confound their hearers by mere noise. 
Character also may be expressed by the proof from 
signs, because to each class and habit there is an 
appropriate style. I mean class in reference to age 
— child, man, or old man ; to sex — man or woman ; 
to country — Lacedaemonian or Thessalian. I call 
habits those moral states which form a man's char- 
acter in life ; for not all habits do this. If then 
anyone uses the language appropriate to each habit, 
he will represent the character ; for the uneducated 
man will not say the same things in the same way as 
the educated. But the hearers also are impressed 
in a certain way by a device employed ad nauseam 
by writers of speeches :" " Who does not know ? " 
" Everybody knows " ; for the hearer agrees, because 

' Or, " draws a wrong conclusion." 
" Alluding to Isocrates. 

379 



ARISTOTLE 

Xoyet yap 6 aKovajv alaxwofxevos, OTTCog fxerexj} 
ovTTep /cat OL d'AAot Trdvres. 

8 To 8' evKaipcjs y] p-rj evKaipojs ;^p7ycr^at kolvov 

9 aTTavrwv rcov clBcbv ecrriv. o-kos S' ctti Trdcrrj 
U08h VTrep^oXfj to dpvXovpevov Set yap avrov avrcp 

TrpoeTTLTrX-qTreLV So/cet yap dXrjdes elvai, errel ov 

10 XavOdvet. ye o Trotet rov Xeyovra. ctl rot? dvd- 
Xoyov p,rj TTaaLV dp,a xp-qcraadai- ovroj yap /cAeTrrerai 
o aKpoarrjS . Xeyco 8e otov idv rd 6v6p.ara crKXrjpd 
jj, p,rj /cat rjj (f)a)vfj /cat rat TrpoactiTTOJ /cat rot? 
appLorrovaw el he p.ij, <f>avep6v yiverai eKacrrov 
6 eariv. edv Se to p,ev to Se pufj, Xavddvei ttolwv 
TO avTO. edv ovv Ta paXaKd OKXrjpdJg /cat ra 
CKXrjpd /xaAa/ccDs" XeyrjTai, aTriOavov yiyveTai. 

11 To, 8e 6v6p,aTa Td SnrXd /cat ra eTrideTa TrXeLU) 
/cat TO. ^eVa /LtaAtcrra dpp^oTTet XeyovTi TradrjTLKCos' 
cruyyvujp^rj ydp 6pyi^op,€va) KaKov (f)dvai ovpavo- 
p.TjKe? ?} TTeXcjopiov eLTTelv. /cat oTav e^j] Tjhrj tovs 
dKpoards /cat TTOL-qcrrj evOovaidaai rj eTraivois rj 
iftoyocs 7] dpyfj t] (f>iXia, otov /cat ^IcroKpoT-qs Trotet 
iv Tcp TravqyvpLKcp evl re'Aei, " <j)rip.ri Se /cat yvcop,rj 
/cat " ot Ttves" eTXrjcrav" ^OeyyovTai re yap Ta 
ToiavTa evdov(Tidt,ovTes , cSore /cat d7ro8e';)(;oi^ai 
hfjXov OTL 6p,oia)s e)(ovTes. Sid /cat tt^ TrotT^aet 
rjpp,ocrev' evOeov ydp -q iroirjaLs. rj Srj ovrco Set, 

" Or, " to all the special rules given above." 

"" The exaggeration should be brought forward first, by 
way of forestalling the objection, and accompanied by some 
limiting phrase. Quintilian (Inxt. Oral. viii. 3. 37) gives 
as examples : " so to say," " if I may be allowed to say so." 

" Adaptation of voice, features, etc., to the subject. 

■* § 186, where fivvM-r] is the reading, translated "name" 
above (lit. memory) for the sake of the jingle, which also 

380 



RHETORIC, III. VII. 7-11 

he is ashamed to appear not to share what is a matter 
of common knowledge. 

The opportune or inopportune use of these devices 
apphes to all kinds of Rhetoric." But whenever one 
has gone too far, the remedy may be found in the 
common piece of advice — that he should rebuke 
himself in advance ; ^ then the excess seems true, 
since the orator is obviously aware of what he is doing. 
Further, one ought not to make use of all kinds of 
correspondence <' together ; for in this manner the 
hearer is deceived. I mean, for instance, if the 
language is harsh, the voice, features, and all things 
connected should not be equally harsh ; otherwise 
what each really is becomes evident. But if you do 
this in one instance and not in another, the art 
escapes notice, although the result is the same. If 
mild sentiments are harshly expressed or harsh 
sentiments mildly, the speech lacks persuasiveness. 

Compound words, a number of epithets, and 
" foreign " words especially, are appropriate to an 
emotional speaker ; for when a man is enraged it is 
excusable for him to call an evil " high-as-heaven " or 
" stupendous." He may do the same when he has 
gripped his audience and filled it with enthusiasm, 
either by praise, blame, anger, or friendliness, as 
Isocrates does at the end of his Panegyricus ^ : " Oh, 
the fame and the name ! " and " In that they endured." 
For such is the language of enthusiastic orators, and 
it is clear that the hearers accept what they say in a 
sympathetic spirit. Wherefore this style is appro- 
priate to poetry ; for there is something inspired in 
poetry. It should therefore be used either in this 

appears in the Greek of Isocrates. All the mss. of Aristotle 
give ypufiTiv here, which shows that it is a misquotation. 

381 



ARISTOTLE 

r/ [xer elpcoveias, oirep Vopyias eVotet /cat ra ev 
TO) ^aiSpo). 

8. To Se axrjP'O- ttjs Xi^ecog hel jji-qre €p,p,€Tpov 
€LvaL p,'qT€ dppvOfjiov TO fj,€v yap OLTridavov (ttc- 
TTAaadat yap SokcI) /cat dp,a /cat i^iarrjaiv irpoa- 
e;\;etr yap Trotet to) opbolcp, nore irdXiv rj^cL. 
(LcTTTep ovv rojv KrjpvKwv irpoXapL^dvovai Ta iraihia 
TO " TLva alpetrai eTrirpoirov 6 d7TeXev6€povp.evo5 ; 

2 KXecova." ro 8e dppvdfMov diTepavrov, Set Se 
TTeTTepdvdai p,ev, pur] pberpcp be' drjSes yap /cat 
ayvojoTov to dtreLpov. TrepaiveTai he dpiOpcp TrdvTa' 
6 he Tov axrip-aros ttjs Xe^ecos dpt6p,6s pvdp.6s 

3 eaTLv, ov /cat ra p,eTpa r/XT^/xara. Sto pvdp,6v Set 
ex^tv TOV Xoyov, pbeTpov 8e /x?y- TToirjpi,a yap eorat. 
pv9p,ov Se p,'^ a/c/jt^cos" rovro Be ecrrai,, edv fie^pc 

TOV fj. 

4 Td)v 8e pvdpbdjv 6 p,ev r^pcoos aep^vos oAAa 
XeKTLKTJs dppioviag he6p.evos, 6 8' tap,^os aiJrT^ 

" 238 D, 241 E. In the first of these passages Socrates 
attributes his unusual tlow of words to the inspiration of the 
nymphs, and tells Phaedrus not to wonder if he seems to be 
in a divine fury, for he is not far from breaking out into 
dithyrambs. An example of the irony (a term implying a 
certain amount of contempt (ii. ■2. 25)) of Gorgias is given in 
the Politics (iii. 2). When asked how a person comes to be 
a citizen, he answers : "as those are mortars which have been 
made by mortar-makers, so those are Larissaeans who have 
been made by artisans {Stjfiiovpyovs) ; for some of these were 
Larissa-makers {8rifMovpyo>ji). There is a play on the double 
meaning of 87)/juovpy6s, (1) artisan. (2) magistrate, lit. people- 
maker. Larissa-makers means makers of Larissaeans in 
such numbers that they might be regarded as makers of 
Larissa itself. It has also been suggested that XapKToirotovs 
may mean "kettle-makers,"' from Xapica "a kettle," so 

582 



RHETORIC, III. VII. 11— VIII. 4 

way or when speaking ironically, after the manner 
of Gorgias, or of Plato in the Pkaedrus."^ 

8. The form of diction should be neither metrical 
nor without rhythm. If it is metrical, it lacks per- 
suasiveness, for it appears artificial, and at the same 
time it distracts the hearer's attention, since it sets 
him on the watch for the recurrence of such and 
such a cadence ; just as, when the public criers ask, 
" Whom does the emancipated ^ choose for his 
patron ? " the children shout " Cleon." If it is 
without rhythm, it is unlimited, whereas it ought to 
be limited (but not by metre) ; for that which is 
unlimited is unpleasant and unknowable. Now all 
things are limited by number, and the number 
belonging to the form of diction is rhythm, of which 
the metres are divisions." Wherefore prose must be 
rhythmical, but not metrical, otherwise it will be a 
poem. Nor must this rhythm be rigorously carried 
out, but only up to a certain point. 

Of the different rhythms the heroic is dignified, 
but lacking the harmony of ordinary conversation ; 
the iambic is the language of the many, wherefore 

called from having been first made at Larissa, but this seems 
unnecessary. The point is that Gorgias maintained that all 
were citizens who were made so by the magistrates, that 
citizenship was a manufactured article (see W. L. Newman's 
note on the passage, and W. H. Thompson's Appendix to 
his edition of Plato's Gorgias). 

'' He did not generally possess full rights of citizenship. 
The point of the illustration is that the hearer looks for the 
cadence just as confidently as, when a freedman is asked what 
patron he selects, every one expects him to say " Cleon." 

" Bywater's emendation for T/xr]Ta. of the mss. Aristotle 
seems to be referring to the Pythagorean theory that 
" number " is the regulating force in all things, and in giving 
shape to language "number" is rhythm, which reduces a 
formless mass of words to order. 

383 



ARISTOTLE 

eaxLv Tf Ae'fts" 17 tcov ttoXXwv Sto /LtaAtcrra Trdvrcov 
TUiv jJieTpoiV ta/x^eta ^Oeyyovrai Xiyovres. Set 8e 
aefMvorrjra yeveadai /cat eKOTrjaai. 6 Se rpo^^alos 
1409a KophaKLKcx)T€pos' hrjXol §6 TCI r€rpdfjb€Tpa' eari, yap 
rpox^pos pvOfios rd rerpdp,€rpa. AetTrerat Se 
TTaiav, (h i)(p6jvTO p,ev oltto Qpaavfidxov dp^dfxevoc, 
ovK €l)(ov Se Aeyetr rt? rjv. 

"EoTt Se rpiros 6 Traudv, /cat ixofMevos twv ei- 
prjfievwv rpia yap Trpog Su' ecrrtV, iKeivwv Se o 
jU.ei' e;^ Trpos" eV, o Se hvo rrpos eV. €)(€TaL Se Taji/ 
Aoytov ToiTO)!^ o rjfiLoXios' ovTos S ecrrlv 6 rraidv. 

5 ot jLtev ow d'AAot Sia re rd elprjp.iva d(f)€T€OL, /cat 
StoTt p,€TpLKoi' 6 Se Tratdv XrjTTTeo^' diro puovov 
yap OVK ean p^erpov tojv p-qdevrcov pvdp,ojv, ware 
p.dXicrra Xavddveiv . vvv p,€v ovv ^(pcLvraL to) eVt 
Traidvt /cat dp^opevoi, Set Se Sta^epetv rrjv reXeirrrjV 

6 TT^? apx^jS. eoTi Se Traidvos hvo e'ihr] dvrLKeip,€va 
dAA-j^Aots", &v TO pkv €V dpxfi dpp.orrei, cSaTrep 
/cat xpdJvraf ovros S iarlv ov dpx^c p,€v rj p,aKpd, 
reXevrcoai Se Tpet? ^pax^laL, 

AaXoyeves etre AvKiav 

KOt 

XpvareoK6p,a "E/care Trat Atos". 

erepos S' e^ evavria^, ov ^pax^lat dpxovai r/aets", 
■f] Se fiaKpd TeAeurata* 

/xerct Se yav vhard t' a»/ceardv' rjcfydvLae vv^. 

" The heroic rhythm (dactyls, spondees, and anapaests) is 
as 1 to 1, two short syllables being equal to one long; 
trochaic and iambic 2 to 1 on the same principle ; paean, 
3 to 2 (three shorts and one long), being the mean between 
the other two. '' Understanding Kai reXevTQvTfs. 

" All three attributed to Simonides (Frag. 26 b: P.L.O.). 

384 



RHETORIC, III. vm. 4-6 

of all metres it is most used in common speech ; 
but speech should be dignified and calculated to 
rouse the hearer. The trochaic is too much hke the 
cordax ; this is clear from the tetrameters, which 
form a tripping rhythm. There remains the paean, 
used by rhetoricians from the time of Thrasy- 
machus, although they could not define it. 

The paean is a third kind of rhythm closely related 
to those already mentioned ; for its proportion is 
3 to 2, that of the others 1 to 1 and 2 to 1, with 
both of which the paean, whose proportion is 1|^ to 1, 
is connected." All the other metres then are to be 
disregarded for the reasons stated, and also because 
they are metrical ; but the paean should be retained, 
becjiuse it is the only one of the rhythms mentioned 
which is not adapted to a metrical system, so that 
it is most likely to be undetected. At the present 
day one kind of paean alone is employed, at the 
beginning as well as at the end ; ^ the end, however, 
ought to differ from the beginning. Now there are 
two kinds of paeans, opposed to each other. The 
one is appropriate at the beginning, where in fact it 
is used. It begins with a long syllable and ends with 
three short : 

AaXoyevts | etVe AvKf\av (" O Delos-born, or it may be 
Lycia "), 

and 

XpvffebKifxld "E/care | iral AtSs (" Golden-haired far-darter, 
son of Zeus ). 

The other on the contrary begins with three short 
syllables and ends with one long one : 

fieTo, 8^ ydv \ v8aT& t wKeavbv ri\<pdvXae ' vv^ ("after earth 
and waters, night obscured ocean "). 

2 c 385 



ARISTOTLE 

ovros 8e reXeirrrjv Troier rj yap ^pa^^ia Sta to 
dreXrjs eivai TTOiel koXo^ov. dAAot Set rfj fiaKpa 
(XTTOKOTTTeudaL Kal StjXrjv elvai rrjv reXevr-qv, firj 
Sea rov ypa<^ea, fxr^Se Sta rrjv ■napaypa(f)'^v, dXXa 
7 Sta rov pvdfjiov. on fiev ovv cvpvdfiov Set ett'at 
TTjV Xe^iv Kol fjbr) dppvdp,ov, Kal rives €vpv6[jt,ov 

TTOIOVOL pvdixol Kal TTcD? €XOVT€9, eipTjTaL. 

9. Trjv Se Xe^iv avdyKT] elvat •^ elpofMevqv Kal 
ra> avvhiajxix) /xtW, oioirep at eV rots' St^upa/x^ot? 
dva^oXat, ^ KarearpafMiJievrjv Kal 6p,oiav rats rcov 
dpxdiojv TTOirjrcov dvTi.crrp6(f)OLS • rj fxkv ovv elpo- 

2 pLevrj Xe^LS rj dp^o-ia iariv " 'HpoSorov Qovpiov 
i^S' Lcrropl.r]g a77oSet^ts"" ravrrj yap nporepov /xev 
drravreSy vvv Se ov ttoXXoI y^payvrai. Xeyoj Se 
elpop.evtjv , rj ovSev e;^et re'Ao? /ca^' avr'^v, dv p,r) 
TO TTpdyfJia Xeyo/xevov TeXeLcodi]. eart Se dr^Se? 
Std TO aTretpov ro yap re'Aos" Travrcs ^ovXovrai 
Kadopdv. hiOTTep eirl rots Kap.TTrrjpcnv eKTTveovai 
Kal eKXvovraf Trpoopdjvreg yap to irepag ov Kap,- 

3 vovoL TTpoTepov. rj p,ev ovv elpopevrj Trjg Ae'^eo)? 
ioTtv T^Se, KaT€arTpap,pevr] Se rj iv TreptdSots* Xeyco 
Se TTcpioSov Xi^w €)(ovaav dp^rjv Kal TcXevTrjv 

liOd h avrrjv Kad avTrjv Kal pi,4ye6os cvovvotttov. rjSela 
S' r) ToiavTrj Kal evjJLadrjs, T^Seta p,kv Std to ivavTLws 
ex^iv Tcp direpavTw , Kal on dei tl oterat e;;^etv d 
dKpoaTrjs [Kal] TTeTrepavdac n avTco' to Se /XT^Sei^ 
TrpovoeXv etvat p,rj8€ dvvew drjSes. evpadrjs Se', drt 
€vp.vrjp.6vevTos . tovto Se, on dptd/j.6v ejfet rj 

« A dash below the first word of a line, indicating the end 
of a sentence. 

* Ka/jiTrTrjp€i, properly the turninj^-point of the 5/ai'Xos or 
double course, is here used for the goal itself. 
386 



RHETORIC, III. VIII. 6— IX. 3 

This is a suitable ending, for the short syllable, being 
incomplete, mutilates the cadence. But the period 
should be broken off by a long syllable and the end 
should be clearly marked, not by the scribe nor 
by a punctuation mark," but by the rhythm itself. 
That the style should be rhythmical and not un- 
rhythmical, and what rhythms and what arrange- 
ment of them make it of this character, has now 
been sufficiently shown. 

9. The style must be either continuous and united 
by connecting particles, like the dithyrambic pre- 
ludes, or periodic, like the antistrophes of the ancient 
poets. The continuous style is the ancient one ; for 
example, " This is the exposition of the investigation 
of Herodotus of Thurii." It was formerly used by 
all, but now is used only by a few. By a continuous 
style I mean that which has no end in itself and only 
stops when the sense is complete. It is unpleasant, 
because it is endless, for all wish to have the end in 
sight. That explains why runners, just when they , 
have reached the goal,^ lose their breath and strength, 
whereas before, when the end is in sight, they show 
no signs of fatigue. Such is the continuous style. 
The other style consists of periods, and by period I 
mean a sentence that has a beginning and end in 
itself and a magnitude that can be easily grasped. 
What is written in this style is pleasant and easy to 
learn, pleasant because it is the opposite of that 
which is unlimited, because the hearer at every 
moment thinks he is securing something for himself 
and that some conclusion has been reached ; whereas 
it is unpleasant neither to foresee nor to get to the end 
of anything. It is easy to learn, because it can be 
easily retained in the memory. The reason is that 

387 



ARISTOTLE 

ev TreptoooLs Xd^is, o Trdvrcov evfMvrjfjbovevTorarov. 
Oio /cat ra /xerpa Trdvres fMvrjfMovevovcn /juoiXXou rojv 
4: x^^W OLpidfMov yap e;^ei o) p.erpeirai. Set Se rrjv 
irepLooov /cat rfj hiavoia rereXeicbcrdai, /cat /ii] 
SiaKOTTTeadai axjTrep rd TiO(/)okX€ov? lafz^ela, 

KaAuSojv /xet' T^'Se yata ncAoma? -xi^ovo^' 

Tovvavriov yap eoTLV VTroXa^eiv raj SLaLpelaOaL, 
cjcxTTep /cat evrt rou elprj/jievov rrjv KaAuSojt'a etvai 
T-^S" rieAoTTot't'Tycrou. 

5 Ile/3to8os' Se ij /xev eV /ccuAotj, 17 8' d^eAr^?. ecrrt 
8' €v KcoXoi? p.ev Aeft? 77 rereXeicofJuevrj re /cat 
SirjprjfxevTj /cat euap-aTri^eucrTOS", /Ui) et" T7y hiaipiaeL 
woTTep Yj elprjjjievr] irepiohos, dXX oXrj. kcoXov 8' 
ecrrt to erepov pLopiov ravrr)?. d(f>eXi] 8e Ae'yco rrjv 

6 jJiovoKcoXov . 8et 8e /cat to. /ccuAa /cat rds rrcpLoBovs 
fiT^re fivovpov? elvai /ji-qre fxaKpas. to [xev yap 
jjbLKpov TTpocnrraieiv TroAAd/cts" Trotel tov dKpoaTrjv 
dvdyKTj ydp, orav ert 6pp.cbv iirl ro Troppco /cat ro 
jjberpov, ov e^et ev eavTOj opov, dvrLGTraaOfj Travaa- 
fievov, otov TTpocTTTTaLeLv ycyveadat, 8td tt^v dvri- 
Kpovaiv. rd Se fiaKpd dnoXeLTreaOai ttolcl, oiairep 
ol i^orrepoi aTroKdp,7TrovT€S tov repp-aros' aTTO- 
XeiTTOVcn ydp /cat ouTot rovg avfiTrcpiTTarovvras. 
6p,OLCos 8e /cat at irepiohoi al p,aKpal ovaai Adyo? 

" tQ)v x'^^V '• lit. what is poured forth promiscuously : 
in flowing, unfettered language (Liddell and Scott). 

'' Really from the Meleager of Euripides, Frag. 515 
{T.G.F.). The break in the sense comes after 7ara, IleXoTrt'as 
xOovos really belonging to the next line : iv avmrdpOfiois iridC 
^Xow' evdalnova. As it stands in the text, the line implies 
that Calydon was in Peloponnesus, which of course it was 
not. The meaning then is : " This is the land of Calydon, 

388 



RHETORIC, III. IX. 3-6 

the periodic style has number, which of all things is 
the easiest to remember ; that explains why all learn 
verse with greater facility than prose,* for it has 
number by which it can be measured. But the 
period must be completed with the sense and not 
stop short, as in the iambics of Sophocles,^ 

This is Calydon, territory of the land of Pelops ; 

for by a division of this kind it is possible to suppose 
the contrary of the fact, as in the example, that 
Calydon is in Peloponnesus. 

A period may be composed of clauses, or simple. 
The former is a complete sentence, distinct in its 
parts and easy to repeat in a breath, not divided like 
the period in the line of Sophocles above, but when 
it is taken as a whole." By clause I mean one of 
the two parts of this period, and by a simple period 
one that consists of only one clause. But neither 
clauses nor periods should be curtailed or too long. 
If too short, they often make the hearer stumble ; 
for when he is hurrying on towards the measure of 
which he already has a definite idea, if he is checked 
by the speaker stopping, a sort of stumble is bound 
to occur in consequence of the sudden stop. If too 
long, they leave the hearer behind, as those who do 
not turn till past the ordinary limit leave behind 
those who are walking with them. Similarly long 
periods assume the proportions of a speech and 

with its fertile plains in the country over against Pelopon- 
nesus " (on the opposite side of the strait, near the mouth 
of the Corinthian gulf). 

* It does not consist in simply dividing off any words 
from the context as the speaker pleases, but the parts of the 
sentence as a whole are properly constructed and distin- 
guished and the sense also is complete. 

389 



ARISTOTLE 

ytverai /cat ava^oXfj ofjuoiov, axjrc yiveTai o 
ecTKOJiJje ArjfMOKpLTog 6 Xio? els MeXavnnTLSrjV 
TTOLijaavra dvrl rcbv dvTLcrrp6(j>o)v dva^oXds , 

ol r avTO) KaKOL revx^t dvrjp aXXco /ca/ca reu^wi', 
77 he jjiaKpd dva^oXrj ra> TTonjaavrL KaKLomr)' 

app^orreL yap ro tolovtov /cat elg rovs /xa/cpo- 
KcoXovs Xeyetv. at re XLav ^paxvKcoXoL ov TTepioSos 
yiyverar npoTrerij ovv dyei, rov dKpoarrjv. 
7 Ti]s Se ev kcoXols Xe^ecos rj p,ev SLrjprjp^evr] earlv 
7] 8e dvTLKetp,evr] , 8irjp7]p,evT] p,ev olov " TToXXdKis 
e9avp,aaa tcov rds TTavrjyvpeis crvvayovrcov /cat 
rovs yvfiviKovg dyajvas Karaarrjadvroiv ," dvTi- 
Keip,€V7) 8e, ev fj eKarepcp rw KcoXcp rj npos 
1410 a evavricp evavriov avyKeiraL rj ravro eiret^evKrai 
TOLS evavTtoLS, OLOV " ap,(f)OTepovs S covqaav, Kai 
Tovs V7Top,eLvavras /cat rovs dKoXovdijaavrag- rols 
fiev ydfi TrXeio) Ti]s olkol TTpoaeKT-qcravro, rolg 
Se iKavrjv rrjv olkol KareXnrov." evavria V7Top.ovr) 
dKoXovd7]ais , LKOvov TrXeZov. " ware /cat rot? 
XP'TjP'drcov 8eop,evoLS /cat tols dTToXavaai ^ovXo- 
p.evois'' dTToXavais KT'qaei dvrt/cetrat, /cat ert 
" arupL^aivet, TToXXdKCS ev ravrais /cat rovs (jypo- 
vip.ovs drvxelv /cat tovs d^povas Korropdovv." 
evdvs p,ev T(x)v dpLareiiov 7]^ta>dr]crav, ov ttoXv 
he varepov rrjv dpx'rjv rrjs daXdrrrjs eXa^ov." 
" TrXevaai p.ev hid rrjs rjTreipov, Tre^evaai he Std 

" A well-known musician. 

' Of Melos. He wrote ramblinj? dithyrambic preludes 
without strophic correspondence. Others take dva/3oX7j to 
mean an entire ode. 



RHETORIC, III. IX. 6-7 

resemble dithyrambic preludes. This gives rise to 
what Democritus of Chios " jokingly rebuked in 
Melanippides,* who instead of antistrophes composed 
dithyrambic preludes : 

A man does harm to himself in doing harm to another, 
and a long prelude is most deadly to one who composes it ; " 

for these verses may be applied to those who employ 
long clauses. Again, if the clauses are too short, 
they do not make a period, so that the hearer himself 
is carried away headlong. 

The clauses of the periodic style are divided or op- 
posed ; divided, as in the following sentence : " I have 
often wondered at those who gathered together the 
general assemblies and instituted the gymnastic con- 
tests "; ^ opposed, in which, in each of the two clauses, 
one contrary is brought close to another, or the same 
word is coupled with both contraries ; for instance, 
" They were useful to both, both those who stayed 
and those who followed ; for the latter they gained in 
addition greater possessions than they had at home, 
for the former they left what was sufficient in their 
own country. Here " staying behind," " following," 
" sufficient," " more " are contraries. Again : " to 
those who need money and those who wish to enjoy 
it " ; where " enjoying " is contrary to " acquiring." 
Again : "It often happens in these vicissitudes that 
the wise are unsuccessful, while fools succeed " : " At 
once they were deemed worthy of the prize of valour 
and not long after won the command of the sea " : 
" To sail over the mainland, to go by land over the 

" Hesiod, Works and Days, 265. The second line is a 
parody of 266, i] di ko-kt] ^ovKt] r^J ^ovXevcravri. KaKicrrri. 
■* The beginning of Isocrates' Panegyricus. 

391 



ARISTOTLE 

TTJs daXaTrrjs, rov /juev 'EAAr^o-Trot-ror ^ev^as, rov 
o "Adix) Siopv^as." " Kal cf>va€L TroXiras ovras 
vofj,(v rrjs TToAeo)? arepeaOai." " ol fxev yap 
avToJv KaKcos aTTcoXovro, ol S' ala)(pcbs eaJadrjaav." 
" tSta p,kv ToXs ^ap^dpots oiKerais p^pT^a^at, KOLvfj 
oe TToXXovs Twv ovfifjidxojv TTcpiopdv SovXevovras ." 
" 7^ ^cjvras' €^€Lv T] reXevrrjcravras KaraXeiipeiv." 
/cat o ets" YleidoXaov tis eLTre /cat AvKocf^pova ev 
TO) OLKaarrjpLO), " ovtol S' u/xa? oi/cot fiev ovres 
CTTcoXovv, iXdovres S' cos vp,ds icovrjvrac." aTravra 

8 yap ravra Trotet ro eiprjfievov . rjSela S' iarlv iq 
roiavrrj Xc^is, on rdvavria yvcjjpLfnorara Kal 
TrapdXXrjXa fiaXXov yva)pi/j,a, Kal otl eocKe avX- 
Xoyiaficp' 6 yap e'Aeyp^o? avvaycoyrj rcov dvn- 
Keip^ivajv ecnriv. ^ 

9 ^ Avrideais p-ev ovv ro rotovrov icmv, TrapiawaLS 
8 edv taa Ta KwXa, Trapo/xotwcrts" 8' edv 6p.oLa 
rd ea)(ara exj] eKdrepov ro kcoXov. dvdyKrj 8e 
t) ev apxfj y] eVt reXevrijg ^x^i-v. Kal apx^] p.kv 
del rd 6v6p,ara, rj Se reXevrrj rds ia^dras avXXa^ds 
rj rov avrov ov6/j,aros rrrcoaeis rj ro avro 6vop,a. 



" " To dwell with us " (Jebb). The point seems to be 
that the barbarian domestics were in a comfortable position 
as compared with those of the allies who were reduced to 
slavery ; and there is a contrast between the desire of getting 
servants for private convenience, while in a matter affecting 
public life indifference w:as shown. 

* All the above quotations are from the Panegyricus : 
1, 35, 41, 48, 72, 89, 105, 149, 181, 186, with slight variations. 
The last quotation is part of the sentence of which the 
beginning appears in 7. 11 above. The whole runs :" And 
how great must we consider the fame and the name and the 

392 



RHETORIC, III. IX. 7-9 

sea, bridging over the Hellespont and digging 
through Athos " : " And that, though citizens by 
nature, they were deprived of the rights of citizenship 
by law " : " For some of them perished miserably, 
others saved themselves disgracefully " : " Privately 
to employ barbarians as servants,** but publicly to 
view with indifference many of the allies reduced to 
slavery " : " Either to possess it while living or to 
leave it behind when dead." * And what some one 
said against Pitholaus and Lycophron '^ in the law- 
court : " These men, who used to sell you when they 
were at home, having come to you have bought you." 
All these passages are examples of antithesis. This 
kind of style is pleasing, because contraries are easily 
understood and even more so when placed side by 
side, and also because antithesis resembles a 
syllogism ; for refutation is a bringing together of 
contraries. 

Such then is the nature of antithesis ; equality of 
clauses is parisosis ; the similarity of the final 
syllables of each clause paromoiosis. This must take 
place at the beginning or end of the clauses. At 
the beginning the similarity is always shown in 
entire words ; at the end, in the last syllables, or 
the inflexions of one and the same word, or the 
repetition of the same word. For instance, at the 

glory which those who have highly distinguished themselves 
in such deeds of valour will either have when living or will 
leave behind after their death." 

* They murdered Alexander, tyrant of Pherae, being in- 
stigated by their sister, his wife. Nothing is known of the 
case referred to. According to Cope, the meaning is: 
" When they were at Pherae, they used to sell you as slaves, 
but now they have come to buy you " (referring to bribery 
in court). Others take ibveiadai in a passive sense: "they 
have been bought," i.e. have had to sell themselves to you. 

393 



ARISTOTLE 

iv oipxfj l^^v '^O' roiavra " dypov yap eXa^ev apyov 
■nap' avrov," 

SojprjTOL T eTTeXovTO TrapapprjToi t' eTrieaaiv 

€7tI TeXevTTJs 8e " ojrjdrjaav avrov Traihlov rero- 
KevaL, aAA avrov aXriov yeyovevai," " €v TrXeioTais 
8e ^povTiai /cat iv eAa;^tcrrats" iXTrlaiv." Trrtoais 
8e ravTov " a^ios Se OTadrjvai ;)(aAKo£»s', ovk d^tos 
(x)v X'^Xkov." ravro 8' 6vop,a " av 8' avrov /cat 
^djvra eXeyes KaKcog /cat vvv ypd(f>eis KaKcbg." 
1410 b <^'^o avXXa^rjs^ 8e " rt at' CTrades Sclvov, et ai'8/> 
ei8e? apyov; " can 8e a/xa iravra e^etv raurd, 
/cat avrtdeacv etvac ravro /cat Trdpiaov /cat 6p,OLO- 
riXevrov. at 8' ap;;(ai roiv Trepiohcov ax^Sov iv 
10 TOts" 0eo8e/CT€tots" i^T^pLO/xrjvrai,. etcrt 8e /cat 
ijtevhets dvrtdiaeLS, olov /cat 'Kmx^PP'OS erroUt, 

TO/ca /iev ev tt^i^coi/ eycov T^t', rd/ca 8e Trapd ri]voig 
iyojv. 

10. 'Evret 8e SLCopiarat rrept toutoiv, TTodev 
Xeyerai rd dorela /cat to. evSoKip-ovvra XeKriov. 
TTOLciv fjb€v ovv earl rod €V<j)vovs rj rov yeyvfxva- 
2 afjiivov, 8et^at Se rrj? p,€d68ov ravrrjg. etrrojiJLev 
ovv /cat SiapidfjirjaiofieOa' dp^rj 8' earco tj/jllv avrrj. 
rd ydp fxavOdveiv paSto)? rjSv <f>vaei Trdcriv ecrrt, 

« Aristophanes, Frag. 649 (Kock, Com. Att. Frag. i. 1880). 

" Iliad, ix. 526. 

" 'I'he text is obviously corrupt. 

<* See Introduction. 

« Roemer's text has dperai (excellences). 

f There is no real antithesis, the sense of both clauses being 
the same. 
394 



RHETORIC, III. IX. 9— X. 2 

beginning : 'Aypbv yap eXajSev dpyov Trap avrov,'* 
" for he received from him land untilled " ; 

dtjjpTjTol t' eweXovTO Trapdppr^rol r iirieaaw^ " they were 
ready to accept gifts and to be persuaded by words ; " 

at the end : lorjOrja-av avToy vratStov reroKcVai, aAA 
avTov ahiov yijovevai," " they thought that he was 
the father of a child, but that he was the cause of 
it " ; €V TrAeiarais Se (ppovria-i. Kal ev eAtt^^iarais 
eXiriaiv, " in the greatest anxiety and the smallest 
hopes." Inflexions of the same word : d^(.os Se 
crraOrjvai YaXKoOs, ovk a^tos wv X'^'^koO, " worthy of 
a bronze statue, not being worth a brass farthing." 
Repetition of a word : a-v 8' avrov Kal ^Qi'ra eXeyes 
itaKcus Kal vvv ypdtfyeis KaKws, " while he lived you 
spoke ill of him, now he is dead you write ill of him." 
Resemblance of one syllable : ti ai' eTrades Seti/oi/, 
€t ai'Sp' ciSes dpyov, " what ill would you have 
suffered, if you had seen an idle man ? " All these 
figures may be found in the same sentence at once — 
antithesis, equality of clauses, and similarity of end- 
ings. In the Theodectea'^ nearly all the beginnings ^ 
of periods have been enumerated. There are also 
false antitheses, as in the verse of Epicharmus : 

tSku fikv iv r-qvoiv iywv ^v, ro/ca 5^ irapa Trjvois iydiv, " at one 
time I was in their house, at another I was with them." ' 

10. Having settled these questions, we must next 
state the sources of smart and popular sayings. They 
are produced either by natural genius or by practice ; 
to show what they are is the function of this inquiry. 
Let us therefore begin by giving a full list of them, 
and let our starting-point be the following. Easy 
learning is naturally pleasant to all, and words mean 

395 



ARISTOTLE 

Ta 8e ovofiara ar^jjuatveL n, ware oaa rwv ovo- 
fj,aro)V TToiei tj/jliv fidOrjaiv, rj^Lorra. at fiev ovv 
yXoJrrat dyvcore^, rd Se Kvpia 'ia^xev. rj Be fxera- 
(jiopd TToiel rovro fjudXiara- orav yap eiTrrj to yrjpas 
KaXafirjv, eTTOLrjae pLddrjaiv koL yvaiatv Std rov 

3 yevovg- dfjicfxo yap dTrrjvdrjKora. Troiovai p,ev oSv 
/cat at Tcov Troirjr ojv eiKoves to avro' SioTrep dv eS, 
acerelov ^aiverai. ecm yap rj cIkiLv, Kaddirep 
€LprjraL TTporepov, jj,era<j>opd hia^lpovaa TrpoOeaei' 
Sto Tjrrov rjSv, ori pLaKporepcos' /cat ov Aeyet <v? 
rovro eKeivo' ovkovv ovhk ^Tyret rovro rj ipv)cq. 

4 dvdyKrj Srj /cat Ae^ij^ /cat evdvp.rjp.ara ravr' elvai 
aareZa, oaa Troiel rjp.Zv puddrjaiv ra^elav. 8io 
ovre rd eViTToAata ra)v evdvp.rjp,dro}v evhoKLjiel 
{eTTLTToXata ydp Xeyop.ev rd rravrl hrjXa, /cat a 
p.rjhev Set ^rjrijcrai.) , ovre oaa elprjpieva dyvoovp,eva 
eariv, dXX oacov r) dp,a Xeyopuevcov rj yvwacs 
yiverai, /cat et p.rj irporepov VTrrjpx^v, tj p.LKp6v 
var epithet rj htdvoia- yiyverai ydp olov p,ddrjatg, 
e/cetVcos" Se ovberepov . 

5 Kara p,ev ovv rrjv Sidvoiav rov Xeyop,evov ra 
rotavra evhoKLp,eZ rcov evdvpirjp.drcov, Kard he rrjv 
Xe^LV rip p,ev a)(rjp,arL, edv avrLKetfJuevcos Xeyrjrai, 

" Odyssey, xiv. 213 dW l/j-wris KoXdfxrjv yi a itofiai 
eiaopbtiivra | yiyvibffKeiv. The words are those of Odysseus, 
whom Athene had changed into an old beggar, to Eumaeus, 
his faithful swineherd, in whose house he was staying un- 
recognized. 

* irpoaOiaeL : the addition of the particle of comparison 
(is. irpodiaei (the reading of the Paris ms.) would mean, 
(1) *' manner of setting forth" (Cope), or (2) " a metaphor, 
with a preface " (Jebb) (but the meaning of this is not clear). 
The simile only says that one thing resembles another, not, 

S96 



RHETORIC, III. X. 2-5 

something, so that all words which make us learn 
something are most pleasant. Now we do not know 
the meaning of strange words, and proper terms we 
know already. It is metaphor, therefore, that above 
all produces this effect ; for when Homer "■ calls old 
age stubble, he teaches and informs us through the 
genus ; for both have lost their bloom. The similes 
of the poets also have the same effect ; wherefore, if 
they are well constructed, an impression of smartness 
is produced. For the simile, as we have said, is a 
metaphor differing only by the addition of a word,* 
wherefore it is less pleasant because it is longer ; it 
does not say that this is that, so that the mind does 
not even examine this. Of necessity, therefore, all 
style and enthymemes that give us rapid information 
are smart. This is the reason why superficial 
enthymemes, meaning those that are obvious to all 
and need no mental effort, and those which, when 
stated, are not understood, are not popular, but only 
those which are understood the moment they are 
stated, or those of which the meaning, although not 
clear at first, comes a little later ; for from the 
latter a kind of knowledge results, from the former 
neither the one nor the other." 

In regard to the meaning of what is said, then, 
such enthymemes are popular. As to style, popu- 
larity of form is due to antithetical statement ; for 

like the metaphor, that it is another ; since the speaker does 
not say this, the result is that the mind of the hearer does not 
go into the matter, and so the chance of instruction, of 
acquiring some information, is lost. 

' The meaning is : the two kinds of enthymemes mentioned 
last do convey some information, whereas the superficial 
enthymemes teach nothing, either at once, or a little later, 
when reflection has made the meaning clear. 

397 



ARISTOTLE 

otov " /cat rrjv rols aAAotj Koivrjv elpijvT^v vofxi- 
t,6vro}v roZs avrcov ISlol? rroXefMov" avrLKeirai, 

6 TToAe/xo? elprivrj. rols S' ovofiaatv, iav exj] fJ-era- 
(f)opdv, /cat ravrrjv fi'qT^ aXXorpiav , x^XeTTOv yap 
avvihelvy fnjr^ iTrmoXaLov , ovhkv yap ttolcl Trdax^tv. 
en el irpo o/jifidrajv TToiel' opdv yap Set rd Trpar- 
TOfxeva fjidXXov 7^ fxeXXovra. Set dpa rovrcov 
aroxdl,ead at rpicov, pi,era<f>opds dvTiddaecos iv- 
epyeias. 

7 Tcov Se p.era(j>op(x}v rerrdpiov ovaojv evSoKLfMovcrt 
1411 a /LiaAtcrra at /car' dvaXoylav, wcnrep HepiKXrjs e(f>rj 

rr)v veoTTjra rrjv aTToXofjuevrjv iv to) TroAe/xo) ovrws 
rjcjiaviadai e/c rrjs ttoXccos waTrep et tls rd eap e/c 
Tov eviavTov e^e'Aot. /cat AeTrrtvrjg Trepl Aa/ceSat- 
piovicov, ovK edv TrepuheZv ttjv 'EAAaSa €T€p6(f)daXp,ov 
yevofMevTjv. /cat Kry^tCToSoTos" CTTrouSa^oi^TO? ^dprj- 
Tos evdvvas Sovvai irepl rov OXvvdiaKov Tr6Xep.ov 
rjyavdKrei, (/)daKcov et? TTvlyjxa rov Srjfiov e^ovra 
rds evdvvas Treipdadai Sovvai. /cat TrapaKaXcbv 

» Isocrates, Philippus, 73. 

* In the Poetics (21) metaphor and its four classes are 
defined : " Metaphor consists in assigning to a thing the 
name of something else ; and this may take place either 
from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from 
species to species, or proportionally. An instance of a 
metaphor from genus to species is ' here stands my ship,' 
for * standing ' is a genus, * being moored ' a species ; from 
species to genus : ' Odysseus truly has wrought a myriad 
good deeds,' for ' myriad ' is a specific large number, used 
for the generic ' multitude ' ; from species to species : 
' having drawn off the life with the l^ronze ' and ' having cut 
it with the unyielding bronze,' where 'drawn off' is used in 
the sense of ' cut,' and ' cut ' in the sense of ' drawn off,' both 
being species of 'taking away.'" For the proportional 
metaphor see note on 4. 4 above. 

S98 



RHETORIC, III. X. 5-7 

instance, " accounting the peace that all shared 
to be a war against their private interests," " where 
" war " is opposed to " peace " ; as to words, they 
are popular if they contain metaphor, provided it be 
neither strange, for then it is difficult to take in at 
a glance, nor superficial, for then it does not impress 
the hearer ; further, if they set things " before the 
eyes " ; for we ought to see what is being done 
rather than what is going to be done. We ought 
therefore to aim at three things— metaphor, anti- 
thesis, actuality. 

Of the four kinds of metaphor * the most popular are 
those based on proportion. Thus, Pericles said that 
the youth that had perished during the war had dis- 
appeared from the State as if the year had lost its 
springtime.'' Leptines, speaking of the Lacedae- 
monians, said that he would not let the Athenians 
stand by and see Greece deprived of one of her eyes. 
When Chares was eager to have his accounts for the 
Olynthian war examined, Cephisodotus indignantly 
exclaimed that, now he had the people by the throat, 
he was trying to get his accounts examined '^ ; on 
another occasion also he exhorted the Athenians to 

" i. 7. 34. 

"* ev6vva was the technical term for the examination of 
accounts to which all public officers had to submit when 
their term of office expired. Cephisodotus and Chares were 
both Athenian generals. " Having the people by the throat " 
may refer to the condition of Athens financially and his un- 
satisfactory conduct of the war. But the phrase eis nvlyfia 
Tov dijfiov exovra is objected to by Cope, who reads dyayofra 
and translates : " that he drove the people into a fit of 
choking by his attempts to offer his accounts for scrutiny 
in this way," i.e. he tried to force his accounts down their 
throats, and nearly choked them. Another reading 
suggested is dyxovra (throttling so as to choke). 

399 



ARISTOTLE 

TTork rovs ^A9r)vaLOVs et? Ey/8otav eTnaLriaoyievovs 
e(j)rj heZv i^ievai to MiArtaSou if)rj^i(Tixa. /cat 
^l(f)tKpdrr]g cTTreiaafjuevcov ^AOrjvaLcov irpos 'Em- 
Savpov /cat rrjv vapaXtav rj-yavaKrei, (f)daKOJV 
avToi)? rd e^dSta rov 7ToXep,ov TraprjprjadaL. /cat 
HeidoXaos rrjv YldpaXov porraXov rov Srjfjiov, 
HrjOTOv Se riqXiav rov YleLpaiicjos . /cat rTept/cA"^? 
rrjV Klyivav d^eAetv eKeXevae rrjv Xijpirjv rov 
rietpateoj?. /cat MoipoKXrjs ovdev e(f)r) TTOvrjpo- 
repos etvaL, ovofidaas rivd ra)v eTneiKcbv ckcIvov 
fjuev yap eTTirpircov roKcov TrovrjpeveadaL, avrov 
8e eTTtSe/caTcoj/. /cat ro ^ Ava^avSptSov lapu^cLov 
VTTep rchv dvyarepcov Tvpos rov ydpuov iyxpovi- 
^ovacov, 

V7T€prjp,€poi fioL Tcov yd/Jicov at Trapdivoi. 

/cat TO YVoXv^vKTOv els aTTOTrXrjKTLKOv Tiva IjTreucr- 
LTTTTOV, TO fMrj SvvaadaL rjcrvxi'O-v dyeiv vnro rrjs 
TV-XTjS €V TTevTCcrupiyycp voacp SeSefievov. /cat 
KTy^tcrdSoTos" Tas rpt-^peis e/caAet /xvXcovag Trot/ci- 
Xovs, 6 Kwa>v 8e rd KarrrjXeZa rd *ArrtKd ^tStVta. 

" This may refer to a decree of Miltiades which was so 
speedily carried out that it became proverbial. The expedi- 
tion was undertaken to assist Euboea against Thebes. 

* By making peace, Iphicrates said that the Athenians 
had deprived themselves of the opportunity of attacking and 
plundering a weak maritime city, and so securing provisions 
for the war. The word e^65ia properly means provisions 
for a journey and travelling expenses. 

" The Paralus and Salaminia were the two sacred galleys 
which conveyed state prisoners. 

<* It commanded the trade of the Euxine. 

* Moerocles was a contemporary of Demosthenes, and an 
anti-Macedonian in politics. He seems to have been a 
money-grubber and was once prosecuted for extortion. The 

400 



RHETORIC, III. X. 7 

set out for Euboea without delay " and provision 
themselves there, like the decree of Miltiades." " 
After the Athenians had made peace with Epidaurus 
and the maritime cities, Iphicrates indignantly de- 
clared " that they had deprived themselves of pro- 
visions for the war." * Pitholaus called the Paralus " 
" the bludgeon of the people," and Sestos " the corn- 
chest ^ of the Piraeus." Pericles recommended that 
Aegina, " the eyesore of the Piraeus," should be re- 
moved. Moerocles, mentioning a very " respectable " 
person by name, declared that he was as much a 
scoundrel as himself ; for whereas that honest man 
played the scoundrel at 33 per cent, he himself was 
satisfied with 10 per cent.® And the iambic of 
Anaxandrides,-^ on girls who were slow to marry, 

My daughters are "past the time " of marriage. 

And the saying of Polyeuctus ^ upon a certain 
paralytic named Speusippus, " that he could not keep 
quiet, although Fortune had bound him in a five- 
holed pillory of disease." Cephisodotus called the 
triremes " parti-coloured mills,"'' and [Diogenes] the 
Cynic used to say that the taverns * were " the 

degree of the respectability (or rather, the swindling 
practices) of each is calculated by their respective profits. 

f Poet of the Middle Comedy: Frag. 68 (Kock, Com. 
Att. Frag. ii.). The metaphor in vireprjfxepoL is from those 
who failed to keep the term of payment of a fine or debt. 
Cope translates : " I find (moi) the young ladies are . . ." 

Athenian orator, contemporary of Demosthenes. 

* As grinding down the tributary states. They differed 
from ordinary mills in being gaily painted. 

» Contrasted with the Spartan " messes," which were of 
a plain and simple character, at which all the citizens dined 
together. The tavern orgies, according to Diogenes, repre- 
sented these at Athens. 

2d 401 



^ 



ARISTOTLE 

Alo-lcov Se, OTL els St/ceAtW rrjv ttoXlv i^ex^av 
TOVTo yap fX€ra(f)opa /cat npo opLjxarcov. kol 
ware ^orjaai rr]v 'EAAaSa"* /cat rovro rpoirov 
TLva p,eTa(f)Opa /cat Trpo ofifMOLTajv. /cat oiarrep 
Kt^^ktoSotos' evXa^eZadai e/ce'Aeue p,rj ttoXKcls ttoltj- 
aaxji ras crvvSpofjids . /cat ^IcroKpdrrjs rrpos rovs 
avvTpe-)(ovras ev rals Travrjyvpeaiv . /cat olov iv 
TO) eTTiracpKx), Stort d^iov rjv irrl ro) rdcfxx) toj ra>v 
ev SaAa/iti't TeXevrrjadvTCov Keipaadat, ttjv 'EAAaSa 
cos avyKaradaTTTOfievrjs rfj dperfj avrcov rrjs 
iXevdepias' el p,ev yap elirev oTt d^Lov BaKpvaai 
avyKaradaTTTO/xevrjs rrjs aperies, p.era</)opd /cat 
1411 b Trpo ofiixarcov, to 8e " ttj dperfj rrjs iXevdeptas " 
avrideaiv rtva €)(et. /cat u)s 'l(f>iKpdTr)s eiTTev 
7] yap 686s fJ-OL Tibv X6ya>v Sia fjueucov rojv 
^dprjTi 7TeTTpayp.evct)v eariv " p,era(j)opd /car' 
avaXoyiav , /cat to Std p.4aov Trpo op^fidrcov TTOiei. 
Kai TO (f)avaL TrapaKaXelv tovs kcvSvvovs toIs 
KivSvvoLS ^O'qdrjaovTas , Trpo opijxdrwv fxeTa^opd. 
/cat KvKoXeoiv VTrep Xa^ptoy " ovhe ttjv iKerrjpiav 
aLa)(Vv6evTes avrov, ttjv et/cova ttjv )(aXKrjv " ' 
p,eTa(f>opd yap iv raJ Trap6vTL, dXX ovk del, aXXd 
irpo ofifxdrcov KivSvvevovros yap avTov LKerevei 
7) eiKcov, TO dipv)(ov Stj ep^ifjvxov, to V7r6fjLVT]p.a 
Tcov Trjs TToAeajs" epycov. /cat " TrdvTa Tpoirov 
fxiKpov <^povelv fieXcTcovTes " ' to yap fieXcTav 



" Athenian orator, opponent of Demosthenes. 

* Referring to the disastrous Sicilian expedition. 

' Philippus, 12. Both ffwdpoixd^ and awrpixovTa^ refer to 
the collecting of a mob in a state of excitement. 

** The statue of Chabrias, erected after one of his victories, 
represented him as kneeling on the ground, the position 
402 



RHETORIC, III. X. 7 

messes " of Attica. Aesion" used to say that they 
had " drained " the State into Sicily,^ which is a 
metaphor and sets the thing before the eyes. His 
words " so that Greece uttered a cry " are also in a 
manner a metaphor and a vivid one. And again, 
as Cephisodotus bade the Athenians take care not 
to hold their " concourses " too often ; and in the 
same way Isocrates, who spoke of those " who rush 
together " in the assemblies.'' And as Lysias says 
in his Funeral Oration, that it was right that 
Greece should cut her hair at the tomb of those who 
fell at Salamis, since her freedom was buried along 
with their valour. If the speaker had said that it 
was fitting that Greece should weep, her valour 
being buried with them, it would have been a 
metaphor and a vivid one, whereas " freedom " by 
the side of " valour " produces a kind of antithesis. 
And as Iphicrates said, " The path of my words leads 
through the centre of the deeds of Chares " ; here 
the metaphor is proportional and the words " through 
the centre " create vividness. Also, to say that one 
" calls upon dangers to help against dangers " is a 
vivid metaphor. And Lycoleon on behalf of Chabrias 
said, " not even reverencing the suppliant attitude of 
his statue of bronze,"*^ a metaphor for the moment, 
not for all time, but still vivid ; for when Chabrias is in 
danger, the statue intercedes for him, the inanimate 
becomes animate, the memorial of what he has done 
for the State. And " in every way studying poor- 
ness of spirit," * for " studying " a thing implies to 

which he had ordered his soldiers to take up when awaiting 
the enemy. The statue was in the agora and could be seen 
from the court. Lycoleon points to it, and bases his appeal 
on its suppliant attitude. 

« Isocrates, Panegyricus, 151. 

403 



ARISTOTLE 

aug'ett' Tt earlv. Kal on tov vovv 6 deos <j)Oi)s 
avrjifjev iv rfj ipvxfj' ajx(f)0) yap StjXoX tl. " ov yap 
hiaXvofieOa rous" rroXep.ovs, aAA' ava^aXk6p,€.da'" 
ap,(f>ci) yap eari fjbeXXovra, /cat 7y ava^oXj] Kal tJ 
roiavTT] elp-rjvT). /cat ro ras crvvdiJKas (f)dvai 
rporraiov etvat, ttoXv ko-XXlov raju iv tols TToXefMOLS 
yivofievcDV ra p,kv yap inrep jxiKpfhv /cat /Atas" 
rvx^]?, avrai 8' virep Travros rov TroAe/xou ' ' ' dfJi.(f)co 
yap VLKrjS crTy/iteta. on Kal at noXeis toj ifjoycp 
ra)v dvdpcoTTCov fxeydXas evdvvas StSoaatv rj yap 
evOvva pXd^T) ns 8t/cata ioriv. 

11. 'Ort fiev ovv rd acrreta e/c fj,€Ta<f)opds re 
TTJs dvdXoyov Xeyerai Kal rep Trpo 6p,p,drcov Troielv, 
eiprjraL. XcKreov Se rt Xeyop.ev irpo 6p,p,drcov, 
2 /cat n TTOLovai yiyverai rovro. Xcyco B-^ Trpo 
ofJbpbdrwv ravra rroietv, oaa ivepyovvra air]p,aiv€L. 
olov rov dyaBov dvSpa <f)dvai etvat rerpdycovov 
p.€Ta(f>opd' dp,(f)a> yap reAeta, aAA' ov orjfjiaLvet 
ivepyeiav . dXXd ro " dvdovaav e^ovros rrjv aKfJuriv" 
ivepycia, Kal ro " ae 8' wanep d^erov" ivepyeia, 
Kal 

rovvrevdev ovv "YiXXrjves a^avres noaiv 
ro a^avres evepyeia Kal iJ,€ra<f>opd. Kal (os 

" Metaphor from species to genus (p. 398, n.), " studying " 
being a species of " increasing." As a rule one studies to 
increase some good quality, not a bad one. 

* Ibid. 172. " Ibid. 180 (apparently from memory). 

^ eOdvi'a (see note on p. 399) further implies the punish- 
ment for an unsatisfactory statement of accounts. 

' Simonides, Frag. 5 {P.L.G. ii.). Both a good man and 
a square are complete as far as they go, but they do not 
express actuality. f Isocrates, Philippus, 10. 

" Ibid. 127. This speech is an appeal to Philip to lead 
the Greeks against Persia. As a sacred animal could roam 
404 



RHETORIC, III. X. 7— XI 2 

increase it." And that "reason is a light that God 
has kindled in the soul," for both the words reason 
and hght make something clear. " For we do not 
put an end to wars, but put them off," ^ for both 
ideas refer to the future — putting off and a peace of 
such a kind. And again, it is a metaphor to say that 
such a treaty is " a trophy far more splendid than 
those gained in war ; for the latter are raised in 
memory of trifling advantages and a single favour of 
fortune, but the former commemorates the end of 
the whole war " ; " for both treaty and trophy are 
signs of victory. Again, that cities also render a 
heavy account to the censure of men ; for rendering 
an account <* is a sort of just punishment. 

11. We have said that smart sayings are derived 
from proportional metaphor and expressions which 
set things before the eyes. We must now explain 
the meaning of " before the eyes," and what must 
be done to produce this. I mean that things are set 
before the eyes by words that signify actuality. For 
instance, to say that a good man is " four-square " * 
is a metaphor, for both these are complete, but the 
phrase does not express actuality, whereas " of one 
having the prime of his life in full bloom "^ does; 
similarly, " thee, like a sacred animal ranging at 
will " " expresses actuality, and in 

Thereupon the Greeks shooting forward with their feet * 

the word " shooting " contains both actuality and 

where it pleased within the precincts of its temple, so Philip 
could claim the whole of Greece as his fatherland, while 
other descendants of Heracles (whom Isocrates calls the author 
of Phihp's line) were tied down and their outlook narrowed by 
the laws and constitution of the city in which they dwelt. 
'' Euripides, Iphig. Aul. 80, with oopi for -rroaiv. 

405 



ARISTOTLE 



Kixprjrai "OfMTjpos rroXXaxov rw ra difivxa e/xj/ru^^a 
3 Xeyeiv 8ta tt^s" fxera^opdg . iv Trdat he tco evep- 
yciav TToietv euSo/ct/xet, olov iv roXaSe, 

avTL£ eVt SaTTeSovBe KvXivBero Acta? dvaiB-qs, 



eTrrar o lotos, 
Kal 

€7TL7TT€a9aL {JLeveatvcov, 
Kal 
1412 a €1^ yaiT] Loravro AtAatd/x.ei'a XP^^^ daai, 

Kal 

atxP'r] 8e arepvoLO Sieacrvro fjbatfxaxoaa. 

ev Trdai yap tovtols Sta ro €p,i/jvxa etvat ivep- 
yovvra <j)aiveTaL' ro dvaLaxvvTelv yap Kal fiai,p.dv 
/cat ToAAa ivepyeia. ravra 8e Trpoarjipe Sta rrjs 
/car at'aAo'ytat' fj,era</)opds' (vs yap 6 XWos vpos 
rov Hi.av(f)ov, 6 dvaiaxwrdiv irpos rov dvaiaxw- 
4 rovfjuevov. TTOiel Be Kal iv rat? evhoKijxovaais 
eLKocTLV evrt tcDv ai/jvxcuv ravra' 

Kvprd, (jtaXripioixivra- Trpo fxev r aXX\ avrdp eV 
oAAa* 

KLVovjxeva yap Kal ^covra Troiet rravra, y 3' ivepyeia 
KLvrjacs. 
6 Aei Se iJ,era(j>ipeiv , Kaddnep etprjrai Trporepov, 
aiTO OLKeicov Kal p,rj <f>av€pdjv, olov Kal iv <f)iXo- 
ao<f)ia TO ofioLOV Kal iv voXv Siexovai decopeiv 
evcrroxov, waTrep ^Apxvras €(/)7] ravrov elvai 
BiaiTTjT'qv Kal ^wfiov eV djjt,(f)a} yap ro dSiKov- 

" Odyssey, xi. 598, with iirtLra vidoifSe for ^tI SdveS6vde. 
406 



RHETORIC, III. XI. 2-5 

metaphor. And as Homer often, by making use of 
metaphor, speaks of inanimate things as if they were 
animate ; and it is to creating actuahty in all such 
cases that his popularity is due, as in the following 
examples : 

Again the ruthless stone rolled down to the plain." 
The arrow flew.* 

[The arrow] eager to fly [towards the crowd]." 
[The spears] were buried in the ground, longing to take 
their fill of flesh.'* 

The spear-point sped eagerly through his breast." 

For in all these examples there is appearance of 
actuality, since the objects are represented as 
animate : " the shameless stone," " the eager spear- 
point," and the rest express actuality. Homer has 
attached these attributes by the employment of the 
proportional metaphor ; for as the stone is to 
Sisyphus, so is the shameless one to the one who is 
shamelessly treated. In his popular similes also he 
proceeds in the same manner with inanimate things : 

Arched, foam-crested, some in front, others behind ; ' 

for he gives movement and life to all, and actuality 
is movement. 

As we have said before, metaphors should be drawn 
from objects which are proper to the object, but not 
too obvious ; just as, for instance, in philosophy it 
needs sagacity to grasp the similarity in things that 
are apart. Thus Archytas said that there was no 
difference between an arbitrator and an altar, for 
the wronged betakes itself to one or the other. 

" Iliad, xiii. 587. " Ibid. iv. 126. <* Ihid. xi. 574. 
« Ihid. XV. 541. 

f Ibid. xiii. 799. The reference is to the " boiling waves 
of the loud-roaring sea." 

407 



ARISTOTLE 

/xevov Kara<j>evy€i. rj et ris <j)airi dyKvpav Kal 
Kpefxadpav to avro etvac dixcfxjL) yap ravro ri, 
aAAa Sta^epet to) dvcodev /cat Karcodev. /cat to 
" cv/JbaXiadaL rds TroXeis" iv ttoXv SUxovari, ravro, ev 
eTTi^aveia /cat Sum/xeat to 'iaov. 
6 "EoTt 8e /cat to. doreia rd TrActora 8ta jiera- 
(f)opdg /cat e/c tow TTpoe^arrardv ixdXXov ydp 
yiyverai orjXov on e/xade irapd ro ivavritos €)(€iv, 
/cat eot/C€ Xeyeiv rj ipvx'f) " <J^S dXrjOcbs, eyd) 8' 
rjnaprov." /cat rd)v aTTO^Oeyjidroiv 8e Ta aaTeta 
ioriv e/c tou //.t^ o (f>r]ai Xeyeiv, olov ro rod Tirrjcn- 
Xppov, on ol rernyes eavroZs ;^a/id^ev daovrai. 
Kal rd €v jjviyfjLeva 8ta ro avro rjSea- jxadrjois 
ydp, /cat Xeyer at fjbera^opd. /cat o Xeyet QeoScopos, 
ro Kaivd Xeyeiv. yiyver at he, orav TrapdSo^ov fj, 
Kal p,T^, cog CKelvog Xeyei, rrpos rrjv efMnpoadev 
So^av, dXX waTTep ol iv rols yeXotoig rd Ttapa- 
TTeTTOLTjiJieva. orrep hvvarai Kal rd Trapd ypapLfxa 
oKcofjbixara' e^aTrard ydp. Kal iv rocs jxerpoig- 
ov ydp oioirep 6 aKovcov viriXa^ev 

" The anchor keeps a ship steady below, the pot-hook is 
above, and the pot hangs down from it. 

* Cope, retaining dvoinaXlcrOai (as if from ifonaXij^eip, 
aequalitatem restituere Bonitz, cf. avo/LuiXuais) says : " the 
widely dissimilar things here compared are the areas of 
properties and the state offices and privileges, which are to 
be alike eoualized," translating: "And the re-equalization 
of cities, when the same principle is applied to things stand- 
ing wide apart, viz. to surface (area) and powers (functions, 
offices)." {dv- is not negative, but = re.) But the passage 
quoted by Victorius from Isocratcs, Philippus, § 40 : ** for I 
know that all the cities of Greece have been placed on the 
same level ((b/xaXlaOai) by misfortunes" suggests this as a 

408 



RHETORIC, III. XI. 5-6 

Similarly, if one were to say that an anchor and a 
pot-hook hung up were identical ; for both are the 
same sort of thing, but they differ in this — that one 
is hung up above and the other below." And if one 
were to say " the cities have been reduced to the 
same level," this amounts to the same in the case 
of things far apart — the equality of " leveUing " in 
regard to superficies and resources.'' 

Most smart sayings are derived from metaphor, 
and also from misleading the hearer beforehand.'' 
For it becomes more evident to him that he has 
learnt something, when the conclusion turns out 
contrary to his expectation, and the mind seems to 
say, " How true it is ! but I missed it." And smart 
apophthegms arise from not meaning M^hat one says, 
as in the apophthegm of Stesichorus, that " the 
grasshoppers will sing to themselves from the 
ground." ^ And clever riddles are agreeable for the 
same reason ; for something is learnt, and the ex- 
pression is also metaphorical. And what Theodorus 
calls " novel expressions " arise when what follows 
is paradoxical, and, as he puts it, not in accordance 
with our previous expectation ; just as humorists 
make use of slight changes in words. The same 
effect is produced by jokes that turn on a change 
of letter ; for they are deceptive. These novelties 
occur in poetry as well as in prose ; for instance, 
the following verse does not finish as the hearer 
expected : 

preferable reading here, ih/xaXlffdat. meaning (1) have been 
levelled to the ground (although the Lexica give no instance 
of this use), (2) reduced to the same level of weakness. 

* Trpoe^awaTciv. Or, reading irpocre^aTraTav, " by adding de- 
ception." 

" See ii. 21. 8. 

409 



ARISTOTLE 

earetx^ 8' €X(jov vtto TTOcrcrl ;)^tjU,e^Aa' 

o o (hero TreSiAa ipeZv. rovrov 8' a/xa Xeyofievov 
Set S'^Aov clvai. ra 8e napa ypdpbfxa ttolcl ov)( o 
Aeyet Xiyeiv, dAA' o neraarpe^ei ovojxa, olov to 
SeoScopov etV NiVojva rov Kidapcohov " dpdrrei'" 
TrpoaTToieirai yap Xeyeiv to " dpdrrei ae" /cat 
i^aTTarS.' aAAo ya/) Aeyei* 8 to fxadovri rjSv, enel 
1412 b €1 /xiy v7ToXap,^dveL QpaKa etvat, ov So^ec dcrrelov 

1 elvcLL. /cat TO " ^ovXei avrov Tripaai." Set Se 
dp,(f)6repa TrpoorrjKovrcos XexBrjvaL. ovrco Se /cat 
Ta aoreta, otov to ^ap'at Adrjvatois^ rrjv ri^s 
OaXdrrrjs dpx^jv p>r] dpxrjv etvat TcDt' /ca/ccDv 
ovaadai ydp. t] (Lanep ^IcroKpdrrjs rrjv dpx^jv rf\ 
TToAet dpxrjv elvat rcov /ca/ccDv. djj.<jiorepoJS ydp o 
ovK dv cpijdrj Tt? epeZv, rovr* etprfrai, /cat iyvcoaOrj 
on dXrjdes' ro re ydp rrjv dpxrjv (f>dvaL dpxrjv etvat 
ovdev ao(f)6v dAA' ovx ovrco Xeyei aXX dXXcog, 

8 /cat dpx^jv ovx ^ etTrev aTTo^rjo'LV, dAA' ctAAo)?. ev 
drraai Se TOUTOts", edv TrpoorjKovrojg ro ovofMa eveyKrj 
ofioivvpuLa ^ p.era<f)opa, rore rd ev. olov " *Avd- 



« According to Cope, Qpq.TT el, " you are no better than 
a Thracian slave-girl. ' 

' There is obviously a play on rripaai (aor. 1 infin. of 
iripdu) and lUpffat (Persians), but no satisfactory inter- 
pretation of the joke has been suggested. 

" The paradoxical and verbal. " Suitably " may refer 
to the manner of delivery ; to being used at the proper time ; 
or to taking care that the word is one that may be used in 
the two senses. 

'* Philippus, 61 ; De Pace, 101. The point in the illus- 
trations lies in the use of dpxrit fii'st in the sense of " empire," 
then in that of "beginning." It could be said that the 

410 



RHETORIC, III. XI. 6-8 

And he strode on, under his feet — chilblains, 

whereas the hearer thought he was going to say 
" sandals." This kind of joke must be clear from 
the moment of utterance. Jokes that turn on the 
word are produced, not by giving it the proper 
meaning, but by perverting it ; for instance, when 
Theodorus said to Nicon, the player on the cithara, 
" you are troubled " (dparreL) ; for while pretending 
to say " something troubles you," he deceives us ; 
for he means something else.** Therefore the joke 
is only agreeable to one who understands the point ; 
for if one does not know that Nicon is a Thracian, he 
will not see any joke in it. Similarly, " you wish to 
destroy him (Trepo-at)." '' Jokes of both these kinds " 
must be suitably expressed. Similar instances are 
such witticisms as saying that " the empire of the 
sea " was not " the beginning of misfortunes " for 
the Athenians, for they benefited by it ; or, with 
Isocrates,*^ that " empire " was " the beginning of 
misfortunes for the city " ; in both cases that which 
one would not have expected to be said is said, and 
recognized as true. For, in the second example, to 
say that " empire is empire " shows no cleverness, but 
this is not what he means, but something else ; in 
the first, the apx') which is negatived is used in a 
different sense. In all these cases, success is attained 
when a word is appropriately apphed, either by 
homonym or by metaphor. For example, in the 
phrase Anaschetos (Bearable) is Unbearable,^ there 

" empire " of the sea was or was not " the beginning of mis- 
fortunes " for Athens ; for at first it was highly beneficial to 
them, but in the end brought disaster, and thus was the 
" beginning " of evil. 

" Usually translated, " There is no bearing Baring." 

411 



ARISTOTLE 

a^eros ovk dvaaxeros'" ofxajwiMcav d7T4(f)7ja€V , 
aAAd TrpoarjKovrojs , el dTjBijs. Kal 

OVK dv yevoto fj,dXXov ■>} ^dvos ieuog- 

rj ov fxdXXov ^ ere Set, to avro. /cat "ov Set rov 
^evov ^evov del etvaf" aAAoT/atov yap /cat tovto. 
ro avTo Kal ro ^ Ava^avSptSov ro iTratvovfMevov, 

KaXov y diToQavelv irplv Oavdrov hpdv d^iov 

ravrov yap icm rep elnetv d^iov yap dTTodavelv p.T) 
ovra d^tov drrodavetv, ^ d^iov y* dTToBavelv p,rj 
davdrov d^iov ovra, r^ p,rj rroLovvra davdrov d^ia. 
9 TO pi,€v ovv ethos TO avTO rijs Xe^ecos rovrojv dAA' 
oao) dv eXdrrovL /cat dvTLKetfievcos Xe)(9fj, rocrovru) 
ev8oKLfji,€L jxdXXov. TO 8' a'lriov on rj p^ddijcns Sta 
jj.ev ro dvriKeladaL p,dXXov, hid he ro ev dXiyco 
10 ddrrov yiverai. hei 8' aet Trpoaelvai r] rd irpog 
ov Xeyerac rj ro opdcbs Xeyeadai, el ro Xeyofxevov 
dXr]des Kal p,'^ eTTLTToXaiov eari yap ravra ^a)/)!? 
e^^Lv, olov " drToOvrjaKew Set p,rjdev dp,aprdvovra " ' 
dAA' OVK dareiov. " rrjv d^iav Set yap^elv rov 
d^Lov" dAA' OVK dareXov. dAA' edv dp,a dp.<j>(x) 
^XV " ^''^^ y diToQaveXv p.r] d^tov ovra rov 
dTTodaveZv." oao) S' dv TrXelco ^XV> ^ocxovrcp 
darreiorepov (j>aiverai, olov el Kal rd ov6p,ara 

" Kock, C.A.F. iii. 209, p. 448. In the two first examples 
"stranger" refers to a distant and reserved manner, as we 
say " don't make yourself a stranger " ; in the third ^ivos is 
apparently to be taken in the sense of " alien." Cope 
translates : " for that too is of a different kind " (foreign, 
alien to the two others ; aXKorpiov^ belonging to something or 
somebody else, opposed to olKetov). But the whole passage 
is obscure. 
412 



RHETORIC, III. XI. 8-10 

is a contradiction of the homonym, which is only 
appropriate, if Anaschetus is an unbearable person. 
And, " Thou shalt not be more of a stranger than a 
stranger," or " not more than you should be," 
which is the same thing. And again. 

The stranger must not always be a stranger, 

for here too the word repeated is taken in a different 
sense." It is the same with the celebrated verse of 
Anaxandrides , 

It is noble to die before doing anything that deserves 
death ; * 

for this is the same as saying that " it is worthy to 
die when one does not deserve to die," or, that " it 
is worthy to die when one is not worthy of death," 
or, " when one does nothing that is worthy of death," 
Now the form of expression of these sayings is the 
sanxe ; but the more concisely and antithetically 
they are expressed, the greater is their popularity. 
The reason is that antithesis is more instructive and 
conciseness gives knowledge more rapidly. Further, 
in order that what is said niay be true and not 
superficial, it must always either apply to a particular 
person or be suitably expressed ; for it is possible 
for it to have one quality and not the other. For 
instance, " One ought to die guiltless of any offence," 
" The worthy man should take a worthy woman to 
wife." There is no smartness in either of these 
expressions, but there will be if both conditions are 
fulfilled : " It is worthy for a man to die, when he 
is not worthy of death." The more special quahties 
the expression possesses, the smarter it appears ; 
for instance, if the words contain a metaphor, and a 

" Kock, C.A.F. ii. Frag. 64, p. 163. 

413 



ARISTOTLE 

fi€ra<f)opa etrj kol fjiera^opa roiaSt /cat avrideats 
Kal TTapiacoaLS, /cat e^ot ivepyeiav. 

11 Etcrt Se /cat at ei/coi^es", ojoTrep elpiqrai /cat ev" rot? 
ava>, aei evSoKtfiovcrai rpoTrov riva piera^opai. 
det yap e/c Syott' Xeyovrai, oiaircp r] avaXoyov 
[ji,€ra<f)opd' olov rj dcrms <^ap,€v iari <f)idXrj "Apeos, 

1413 a /cat t6$ov <f)6pfiLy^ dxopSo?. ovtco pcev ovv Xeyovaiv 
ovx oiTrXovv, TO S' elTrelv to ro^ov (jiopiMiyya rj ttjv 

12 aCTTTtSa (jytdXrjv dirXovv. kol cLKd^ovai 8e ovrcos, 
olov TndrjKcp avXrjrrjv, Xv-xyoi ^aKa^ofievcp fMvajTTa' 

13 dp,(f)co yap avvdyerai. ro Se ev iarlv orav fj,€ra- 
<f)opd fj- eWt yap elKaaai ttjv dcnriha ^ioXrj "Apeos 
Kal TO epeiTTLOv pdKei ot/cta?, /cat tov ^iKrjpaTov 
<j)dvai ^iXoKT-qTTjv elvai ScSrjyjjievov vtto YipdTVOs, 
ctiOTTep et/cacre %paavp.ayp'S Ihcbv tov NiKT^paTov 
rjTTTjfievov VTTO YIpdTvog paijja)SovvTa, KOfxcovTa 
Se /cat avxP'fjpov €tl. iv ols p.dXiaTa eKTriTTTOvaLV 
ol TTOirjrai, edv pirj €v, /cat idv €V, evSoKLfiovaiv . 
Xiyoj 8' OTav dTTohihwcnv , 

woTTep aeXivov ovXa to, aKeXrj (f>op€i, 
woTTep OtAa/x/xcov ^vyojxaxdJv tco KcopvKcp. 

Kal TO. ToiavTa irdw* ciKoves elaiv. at 8' cIkovcs 
OTL /xera^opat, etprjTai, rroXXdKis. 

" Or, reading al for del, "approved similes are. • . ." 
" In the simple metaphor " goblet " is substituted for 
" shield," but sometimes additions are made to the word as 
differently applied, such as " of y\res " and " without strings." 
These additions, besides involving greater detail (a char- 
acteristic of the simile), distinctly bring out the contrast of the 
two terms and make a simile, whereas the nietajilior simj)ly 
transfers the meaning. 

• In posture. 
414 



RHETORIC, III. XI. 10-13 

metaphor of a special kind, antithesis, and equality 
of clauses, and actuality. 

Similes also, as said above, are always in a manner 
approved metaphors ; * since they always consist of 
two terms, like the proportional metaphor, as when 
we say, for instance, that the shield is the goblet of 
Ares, and the bow a lyre without strings. But such 
an expression is not simple, but when we call the bow 
a lyre, or the shield a goblet, it is.^ And similes may 
be formed as follows : a flute-player resembles an 
ape," a short-sighted man a spluttering lamp ; for in 
both cases there is contraction.** But they are ex- 
cellent when there is a proportional metaphor ; for it 
is possible to liken a shield to the goblet of Ares and 
a ruin to the rag of a house ; to say that Niceratus 
is a Philoctetes bitten by Pratys, to use the simile of 
Thrasymachus, when he saw Niceratus, defeated by 
Pratys in a rhapsodic competition, still dirty with 
his hair uncut .^ It is herein that poets are especially 
condemned if they fail, but applauded if they succeed. 
I mean, for instance, when they introduce an 
answering clause : ^ 

He carries his legs twisted like parsley, 
or again. 

Like Philammon punching the leather sack. 

All such expressions are similes, and similes, as has 
been often said, are metaphors of a kind. 

^ Contraction of eyelids and flame. 

« Like Philoctetes on Lemnos after he had been bitten by 
the snake. 

* When the concluding corresponds with the introductory 
expression. This " answering clause " is called apodosis 
(p. 371), not restricted, as in modern usage, to the conclusion 
of a conditional sentence. 

415 



ARISTOTLE 

14 Kat at TTapoifJbiaL fMera^opal (xtt' etSous" eV etSd? 
eiaiv OLOV av ns <os dyaOov rreLaofxevo? avros 
eTTayayrjTai, elra ^Xa^fj, (Lg 6 KapTrddtos (/)r]ai, 
rov Xayo)' dp.(f)co yap to elpiqfievov TreTTOvdacrtv . 
odev fiev ovv rd dareXa Xeyerai Kal Stort, cr;^e8oj/ 
etprjraL to aiTiov. 

15 Etcrt 8e /cat cvSoKifiovcrai VTrep^oXal p,era^opai, 
OLOV ets" VTTC07TLa(7p,evov " w'qdrjre 8' dv avrov 
etvat crvKafilvcuv KdXadov "• epvdpov yap ri to 
VTTCxyTTLov, dXXd TO TToXv a(j)6hpa. TO he oiairep to 
/cat TOy VTTep^oXrj T-fj Ae^et hia(f)4povaa. 

oyoTTep ^iXd/JL/JLCDV ^vyofMaxdJv tw KcopvKcp' 
<I)7jdr]s S dv avTov ^LXdp.p.a>va elvai fjLaxdfMevov 

TO) KCOpVKO). 

wdTTep aeXivov ovXa Ta gkcXt] (ftopelv 

cprjdrjs 8 dv ov aKeXr} dXXd aeXtva e;\;etv ovtcos ovXa. 

16 etCTi 8e VTrep^oXal fMeLpaKicoSeis' a(f}ohp6T'qTa yap 
SrjXovaLV. 8t6 SpyL/^ofievoL Xeyovai fjbdXtcrTa' 

ovS €L fioi Toaa Soirj daa i/jdnaOog re Kovig t€. 
Kovprjv 8' ov ya/xeco 'AyafiefMvovos 'ATpet8ao, 
ovh^ et XP^^^^V *A(f)po8tT7) KaXXos ipt^oi, 
epya 8' ^AOrjvair]. 

MIS h xp<J^VTaL 8e /xoAtcrra tovtco ol ^AttlkoI prp-opes. 
8io TTpea^VTepcx) Xcyeiv dir penis . 

" Or, " he says it is a case of the Carpathian and the 
hare." An inhabitant of the island of Carpathus introduced a 
brace of hares, which so multiplied that they devoured all 
the crops and ruined the farmers (like the rabbits in Australia). 

* Iliad, ix. 385. 

* This must be taken as a parenthetical remark, if it is 
Aristotle's at all. 

416 



RHETORIC, III. XI. 14-16 

Proverbs also are metaphors from species to species. 
If a man, for instance, introduces into his house 
something from which he expects to benefit, but 
afterwards finds himself injured instead, it is as the 
Carpathian "■ says of the hare ; for both have ex- 
perienced the same misfortunes. This is nearly all 
that can be said of the sources of smart sayings and 
the reasons which make them so. 

Approved hyperboles are also metaphors. For 
instance, one may say of a man whose eye is all 
black and blue, " you would have thought he was a 
basket of mulberries," because the black eye is 
something purple, but the great quantity constitutes 
the hyperbole. Again, when one says " like this or 
that " there is a hyperbole differing only in the 
wording : 

Like Philammon punching the leather sack, 

or, " you would have thought that he was Philammon 
fighting the sack " ; 

Carrying his legs twisted like parsley, 

or, " you would have thought that he had no legs, 
but parsley, they being so twisted." There is some- 
thing youthful about hyperboles ; for they show 
vehemence. Wherefore those who are in a passion 
most frequently make use of them : 

Not even were he to offer me gifts as many in number as 
the sand and dust . . . but a daughter of Agamemnon, son 
of Atreus, I will not wed, not even if she rivalled golden 
Aphrodite in beauty, or Athene in accomplishments.* 

(Attic orators are especially fond of hyperbole.") 
Wherefore ^ it is unbecoming for elderly people to 
make use of them. 

<* Because they are boyish. 

2e 417 



ARISTOTLE 

12. Aet 8e fiT] XeXrjdevaL on a'AAiy eKdarco yivei 
apfioTTCL Ae^ts". ov yap -q avrr) ypa(f)LKr) Kal 
dycovLOTLKTj , ovSe Sr)fX7]yoptKr) Kat Slkuvlkt]. dfj,(f)Ct} 
Se avdyKT] etSeVat* to fxev ydp ianv eXXrjvi^eiv 
iTncrraadat, ro he /jltj dvayKdi^eaOat KaraaaoTrdv , 
av TL ^ovXrjraL [xeraSovvai rolg dXXots, onep 

2 Tracrxovacv ol /jltj iTnardfjievoL ypd(f)€Lv. ecrrt Se 
Aefi? ypa(f)iKr) {xkv rj dKptPeaTdTTj, dyojvcarLKTj Se 
7j VTroKpuTiKCDrdTrj. ravrrjg Se Svo ecSr]- rj p,kv 
ydp 'qOlk'tj r) Se Trad-qTiK-q. 8to Kal ol imoKpiral 
ra Toiavra rcov Spap-drcov hicoKovai, Kal ol TTOtrjral 
Tovs TOLOVTOvs. ^aard^ovTai Se ol dvayvcocmKoi , 
olov XaipT^jLtcuv (dKpi^rjs ydp cScrTrep Xoyoypd(f)Os) 
Kal AiKV/jivtos rcov hidvpajx^oTToidjv . Kal Trapa- 
^aXXojJLevoi ol p.ev rcJov ypa(f)i.Ka)v iv rots' dycocri 
arevol <f)aivovrai,y ol 8e rcjv prjropcov ev Xexdfvres 
lSlcotikoI iv rals ;^e/oo'tV. aiTLOv 8' ort iv to) dycovL 
dpfioTTei- 8to /cat ra vnoKptrLKa d(f>r]prjjjb€vr]g rrjs 
VTTOKplaecos ov Troiovvra ro avrcov epyov <f)aiveraL 
evrjdrj, olov rd re davvSera Kal ro TroAAa/cts" ro 
avrd etTTelv iv rfj ypa(f)LKf] dpda)s aTToSoKipbd^eraL, 
iv 8e dycDVLcrriKfj Kal ol prjropes -xpdjvraf eam 

3 ydp VTroKpirLKa. avdyKT) 8e f^era^aXXeLV ro avro 
Xiyovras' oTrep cu? TrpoohoTTOieZ rep vrroKplveaOaf 
" ovTos icrnv 6 KXei/jas vfiiov, oSros iariv 6 i^- 
aTTarijaas, ovtos 6 ro eaxo-rov TrpoSovvai iTTLX^iprj- 
aas." olov Kal ^LXrjp.a>v 6 VTTOKpLTrjg iiroUL ev 

« See 2. 13 of this book. 

* What follows, to the end of § 3, is of the nature of a 
parenthesis, not immediately connected with the subject of 
the chapter. 

* The variation in the form of the expression suggests a 
similar variation in the form of the delivery or declamation. 
418 



RHETORIC, III. XII. 1-3 

12. But we must not lose sight of the fact that a 
different style is suitable to each kind of Rhetoric. 
That of written compositions is not the same as that 
of debate ; nor, in the latter, is that of public speak- 
ing the same as that of the law courts. But it is 
necessary to be acquainted with both ; for the one 
requires a knowledge of good Greek, while the other 
prevents the necessity of keeping silent when we 
wish to communicate something to others, which 
happens to those who do not know how to write. 
The style of written compositions is most precise, 
that of debate is most suitable for delivery. Of the 
latter there are two kinds, ethical and emotional ; 
this is why actors are always running after plays of 
this character, and poets after suitable actors. How- 
ever, poets whose works are only meant for reading 
are also popular, as Chaeremon, who is as precise as 
a writer of speeches, and Licymnius " among dithy- 
rambic poets. When compared, the speeches of 
writers appear meagre in public debates, while those 
of the rhetoricians, however well delivered, are 
amateurish when read. The reason is that they are 
only suitable to public debates ; hence speeches 
suited for delivery, when delivery is absent, do not 
fulfil their proper function and appear silly. For 
instance, asyndeta and frequent repetition of the 
same word are rightly disapproved in written speech, 
but in public debate even rhetoricians make use of 
them, for they lend themselves to acting.^ (But one 
must vary the expression when one repeats the same 
thing, for this as it were paves the way for declama- 
tion •.'^ as, " This is he who robbed you, this is he 
who deceived you, this is he who at last attempted 
to betray you." This is what Philemon the actor 

419 



ARISTOTLE 

T€ rfj ' Ava^avBpiSov yepovroiiavia, ore Xeyei, 
" 'PaSdfjiavdvs Kal YlaXa[MT]SrjSj" /cat iv ru) rrpo- 
Xoyo) rd>v Euae^aiv to " iyoi'" lav yap ris ra 
Toiavra firj VTTOKpLvrjrai, ycverat " 6 rrjv hoKov 
(f>€pcov." 
4 Kat ra darvvSera waavrcos' " ■^XOov, dm^vrrjcra, 
eSeofJLTjV'" avayKTj yap VTTOKpiveadai Kal p,r] oJ? 
ev Xeyovra rep avrco rjdet Kal rovcp eLTrelv. en 
e)(ei thiov TL ra davvSera' iv Icrcp yap xpovcp ttoXXol 
SoKeX elprjadai' 6 yap avvSecrfMos ev TTOiel ra TroXXd, 
ojcrr idv i^aipedfj, Si^Xov on rovvavriov ecrrai ro 
ev TToXXd. e^ei ovv av^rjcrcv " rjXdov, SieXex^drjv , 
1414a LKerevaa'" iroXXd BokcX VTreptSeiv Sua eiTTev. 
rovro Se ^ovXerai TTOtelv Kal "Ofxrjpos iv rat 

Nipevs av Hvp,r)dev, 
Nipevs 'AyAatrys", 
^ipevs OS KdXXicrros. 

■nepl oS yap ttoXXo, e'lprjraL, dvdyKrj Kal TToXXaKig 
elpijcrdai' el ovv Kal TroXXdKcg, Kal noXXd SoKei, 
ware rfi^r^aev drra^ jjbvrjadels Sid rov TrapaXoyia/Jiov, 

" The meaning of this has not been satisfactorily explained. 
On the face of it, it seems to mean that the excellence of 
Philemon's delivery consisted in his way of declaiming 
passages in which the same words were repeated. Philemon 
is not to be confused with the writer of the New Comed}^ 
the rival and contemporary of Menander. 

* Used of a stiff, ungraceful speaker. 

* Spengel's reading here is: TroWd 5o^-e^ " vTrepeiSff Saa 
etvov," TToWd 5oKet being parenthetical, and virepfidtp Saa 

420 



RHETORIC, III. XII. 3-4 

did in The Old Mans Folly of Anaxandrides, when he 
says " Rhadamanthus and Palamedes," and when he 
repeats the word " I " in the prologue to The Pious. ^ 
For unless such expressions are varied by action, it 
is a case of " the man who carries the beam " '' in 
the proverb.) 

It is the same with asyndeta : " I came, I met, I 
entreated." For here delivery is needed, and the 
words should not be pronounced with the same tone 
and character, as if there was only one clause. 
Further, asyndeta have a special characteristic ; for 
in an equal space of time many things appear to be 
said, because the connecting particle makes many 
things one, so that, if it be removed, it is clear that 
the contrary will be the case, and that the one will 
become many. Therefore an asyndeton produces 
amplification : thus, in "I came, I conversed, I 
besought," the hearer seems to be surveying many 
things, all that the speaker said.'^ This also is 
Homer's intention in the passage 

Nireus, again, from Syme . . ., 
Nireus son of Aglaia . . ., 
Nireus, the most beautiful ...;** 

for it is necessary that one of whom much has been 
said should be often mentioned ; if then the name is 
often mentioned, it seems as if much has been said * ; 
so that, by means of this fallacy. Homer has increased 

elvov part of the quotation. Jebb translates : " I came, I 
spoke to him, I besought " (these seem many things) ; " he 
disregarded all I said " (which certainly gives a more natural 
sense to vTrepeldeu). 

<* Iliad, ii. 671 flf. 

« Cope translates : " they think that, if the name is often 
repeated, there must be a great deal to say about its owner " ; 
but can this be got out of the Greek (eiprjcrdai) ? 

421 



ARISTOTLE 

/cat jjLvqijLrjv TreTToir]K€v , ovSafMov vcnepov avrov 
Xoyov TTOLTjadfjbevos. 

5 H fM€V ovv Sr)fj,r}'yopiKrj Ae^t? Kal TravreXajs eoiKe 
rfj GKiaypacjiia' oato yap av ttXslojv fj 6 oxXos, 
TToppcoripoj Tj dea, 8to ra aKpi^rj rrepUpya Kal 
;^et/)a> (f>aiveraL iv dfM^orepots' rj 8e 8t/cavi/o) OLKpi- 
^earepa. ert Se fiaXXov rj ivl Kpirfj- iXdxi'OTOv 
yap iaTLV prjropLKrjg- evavvoTrrov yap fjbd?(Xov ro 
OLKeiov rod Trpdy/juaros Kal to dXXorpiov, Kal 6 
dyd)v direarLV, cocrre Kadapd rj Kpiais. 8io ov)( 
ol avTol ev rrdai rovrots evSoKifMovcn prjTopes' 
aXX oTTov fJidXiura VTroKptaecos, evrau^a i^/cicrra 
dKpl^eia evL. rovro Se, ottov (f>covrjs, /cat p.dXt,(jra 
OTTOV p.eydXrjs. 

*H ixkv OVV eTTiSeLKrLKrj Ae^t? ypa<f>LKa>rdTrj' 

G TO yap epyov avrrjs dvdyvojcFL^' Sevrepa 8e iq 
SiKaviKT]. ro 8e TTpoaSiaipeladai rrjv Xe^iv, ori 
rjhelav Set /cat fieyaXoTrpeTTTJ , mpUpyov ri yap 
fjidXXov T] aco<f>pova Kal iXevdepiov Kal et Tt? aAAr^ 
rjdovs dpertj ; ro yap rjSelav elvai, TTOCijaei SijXov 
on, ra elprjp^eva, etW/D opOoJS coptorai rj aperrj rrjg 
Xe^ecos' rivog yap eVe/ca Set aa(f)rj Kal jirj rarreLvrjV 
etvai dXXd Trpdnovaav; av re yap dSoXeaxfj, ov 

" Intended to produce the effect of finished work at a 
distance before a large number of spectators. 

* The meaning apparently is that there is no discussion, 
as might be the case when there were several judges, so 
that the decision is clear and unbiased. 01716;/ and dyufiffriKi) 
X^^ij are terms used for debate (e.(/. in the law courts) and 
the style suited to it (c/. § 1). Cope's editor refers to Cicero, 
Ad Atticum, i. 16. 8 ** remoto illo studio contentionis, quem 
vos [you Athenians] dyQva appellatis." Jebb translates: "the 

4>22 



RHETORIC, III. xn. 4-6 

the reputation of Nireus, though he only mentions 
him in one passage ; he has perpetuated his memory, 
although he never speaks of him again. 

The deliberative style is exactly like a rough 
sketch," for the greater the crowd, the further off is 
the point of view ; wherefore in both too much 
refinement is a superfluity and even a disadvantage. 
But the forensic style is more finished, and more so 
before a single judge, because there is least oppor- 
tunity of employing rhetorical devices, since the 
mind more readily takes in at a glance what belongs 
to the subject and what is foreign to it ; there is no 
discussion,^ so the judgement is clear. This is why 
the same orators do not excel in all these styles ; 
where action is most effective, there the style is 
least finished, and this is a case in which voice, 
especially a loud one, is needed. 

The epideictic style is especially suited to written 
compositions, for its function is reading ; '^ and next to 
it comes the forensic style. It is superfluous to 
make the further distinction that style should be 
pleasant or magnificent. Why so, any more than 
temperate, liberal, or anything else that indicates 
moral vix-tue ? For it is evident that, if virtue of 
style has been correctly defined, what we have said 
will suffice to make it pleasant. For why, if not to 
please, need it be clear, not mean, but appropriate ? 
If it be too diffuse, or too concise, it will not be 

turmoil is absent, so that the judgement is serene " (in a 
note, " unclouded "). 

« This does not seem to agree with the general view. 
Funeral orations of the nature of panegyrics, for instance, 
were certainly meant to be spoken ; but the ipyov or proper 
function of an epideictic may be said to consist in reading, 
in its being agreeable to read. Its riXos or end is to be read. 

423 



ARISTOTLE 

aa<j>rig, ovhe av avvrojMos. akXa SrjXov on to iiiaov 
apjxorrei. /cat to r^helav ra clprjfMeva TTOtrjaeL, av 

€V fXLX^TJy "^^ (Icodos KOL ^eVLKOV, KOL 6 pvdfMOS, Kal 

TO vidavov e/c tov TTpe-novTos. irepl fiev ovv ttjs 
Ae^eojs" €LprjTaL, Kal Koivfj Trepi arravTcov Kal tSta 
Tr€pl cKaoTov yevos' Xolttov Se Trepl Ta^ecos eiVetv. 

13. "EoTt he tov Xoyov hvo fJiepr)- dvayKaXov 
yap TO T€ TTpdyfia elTretv Trepl ov, Kal tot' dTTohel^at. 
Sio elnovTa p,rj OLTToSel^aL rj aTToSel^at fxrj rrpo- 
eLTTovTa dhvvaTov 6 t€ yap OLTToSeiKuvwv tl drro- 
heiKwai, Kal 6 TrpoXeycov eVe/ca tov aTToSel^ai 

2 TTpoXeyei. tovtcov Se to p,ev irpodeais eoTt to he 
TTLOTLg, warrep av e'l. tl? hieXoi oti to jjiev TTpo^Xrjfjia 

3 TO Se (XTroSet^is". vvv he htaipovo'i yeXotoiS' hLrjyrjcris 
yap 7TOV TOV hiKaviKov fiovov Xoyov ecniv, em- 
heiKTLKov he Kal hrjfiT^yopcKov ttcos evhex^TO-t 
etvai hi'qyrjaLV otav Xeyovaiv, ^ tol Trpos tov clvti- 

1414 b hiKov, Tj erriXoyov tojv dTToheiKTiKcuv ; TrpooL/xtov 
he Kal dvTLTrapa^oXrj Kal CTrdvohos ev TaZs hrj/xr}- 
yopiais TOTe yiveTai, otov avTiXoyia fj. /cat yap 
rj KaTrjyopia Kal rj drroXoyia TToXXaKLS, dXX ov)( 
■fj crvp,^ovXrj- dXX 6 emXoyos €tl ovhe hiKavLKoO 
rravTos, olov edv /xt/cpos" o Aoyo?, rj to rrpdyfia 

" The generally accepted divisions are: -irpoolfiiov (exordium), 
5LT}y7)cis (narrative), irlaris (proof), ivlXoyos (peroration). 
{8i7)yr](Tis is a species of wpddeais, which is used instead of it 
just before.) Aristotle objects that it is (as a rule) only the 
forensic speech which requires a regular dirj-y/jais, a full and 
detailed statement of what has happened before. In 
epideictic and demonstrative (deliberative) speeches, the 

424 



RHETORIC, III. xii. 6— XIII. 3 

clear ; but it is plain that the mean is most suitable. 
What we have said will make the style pleasant, if 
it contains a happy mixture of proper and " foreign " 
words, of rhythm, and of persuasiveness resulting 
from propriety. This finishes what we had to say 
about style ; of all the three kinds of Rhetoric in 
general, and of each of them in particular. It only 
remains to speak of arrangement. 

13. A speech has two parts. It is necessary to 
state the subject, and then to prove it. Wherefore 
it is impossible to make a statement without proving 
it, or to prove it without first putting it forward ; 
for both he who proves proves something, and he 
who puts something forward does so in order to 
prove it. The first of these parts is the statement 
of the case, the second the proof, a similar division 
to that of problem and demonstration. But the 
division now generally made is absurd ; for narrative 
only belongs in a manner to forensic speech, but in 
epideictic or deliberative speech how is it possible that 
there should be narrative as it is defined, or a refuta- 
tion; or an epilogue in demonstrative speeches ? ** 
In deliberative speeches, again, exordium, compari- 
son, and recapitulation are only admissible when 
there is a conflict of opinion. P'or both accusation 
and defence are often found in deliberative, but not 
qua deliberative speech. And further, the epilogue 
does not even belong to every forensic speech, for 
instance, when it is short, or the matter is easy to 

object of which is to prove something, there is no need of 
another existing division called the refutation of the adversary, 
and in the demonstrative there can be no room for an epilogue, 
which is not a summary of proofs and arguments. Thus 
the necessary divisions of a speech are really only two : 
■wpbdeai^ and TrLffris, or at most four. 

425 



ARISTOTLE 

cvfivrjixovevrov avfx^aLvei, yap rod /x-^kovs d(f>- 
aipelaSat. 

4 AvayKoia dpa jxopia npodeai^ Kal TTicms. tSia 
fj,€V oiv ravra, ra Se TrXetcTTa vpooipiLov Trpodeais 
TTLcrTLg ^TTiXoyos' ra yap Trpog rov dvrtSiKov rcov 
rmarecxiv ecrri, Kal rj avriTrapa^oXr} av^rjcns Tdv 
avTOV, cjare fxepos n roiv marecDV aTToSeLKWcn 
yap TL o TTotaJv rovro, dXX' ov ro 7rpoocp,Lov, ouS' 

5o eTTiAoyos", dAA' dvajJi,ijMvrjaKeL..f ^cnaL ovv, dv 
Tt? ra Toiavra Staipij, OTTep eTToiovv ot Trepl 0eo- 
o(opov, SnjyrjaLS erepov /cat eTnSL-qyrjortg Kal irpo- 
SLijyrjaLs Kal eXeyxo? Kal cTre^eXeyxo? . Set 8e 
etSo? Tt Xeyovra Kal hia(j>opdv ovofxa riQecrdai. 
el he pLTj, yiveraL Kevov Kal XrjpcbSes, olov AiKvp,vtos 
TTOtet ev rfj rexvr], €7rovpa>at,v ovopidl^ajv Kal dno- 
TrXdvrjCTLV Kal o^ovg. 

14. To iJ,ev ovv 7TpooLfj,i6v ecrriv dpxr) Xoyov, 
ovep ev TToirjaei TrpoXoyog Kal ev avX-^crei TrpoavXcov 
TTavra yap ap^ol ravr^ elai, Kal olov ohoTToirjais 
TO) emovri. ro p,ev ovv -npoavXiov ofxoLov rw rwv 
iTTiheLKriK(i)v TTpooLfMLcp' Kal ydp at avXrjrai, 6 ri 
dv ev e^Oicriv avXrjaai, rovro TTpoavXrjaavres 
ovvTJipav rep evSomficp, Kal ev rols eViSet/o-t/cots' 
Aoyot? Set ovro) ypd(/)eLV 6 ri ydp dv ^ovXrjrai 
€v6v eoTTOvra evSovvai Kal avvdi/jai. orrep irdvres 
TTOiovaw. TTapdheiyjxa ro rrj? ^laoKpdrovg 'EAevTyy 



" i.e. its use is to recall the main facts briefly (§ 4 end), 
which in a short speech is needless. 

* Plato, Phaednis, 266 d, where the additional kinds of 
narrative are omitted, and their place taken by wiaTwcn^ and 
iirnvicTuais (confirmation of the proof). 

426 



RHETORIC, III. xin. 3— xiv. 1 

recollect ; for in the epilogue what happens is that 
there is a reduction of length." — ^i 

fSo then the necessary parts of a speech are the ) 
statement of the case and proof. These divisions i 
are appropriate to every speech, and at the most 
the parts are four in number — exordium, statement, / 
proof, epilogue ; for refutation of an opponent is part -J 
of the proofs, and comparison is an amplification of 
one's own case, and therefore also part of the proofs ; 
for he who does this proves something, whereas the 
exordium and the epilogue are merely aids to 
memory.- Therefore, if we adopt all such divisions 
we shall be following Theodoras ^ and his school, 
who distinguished narrative, additional narrative, and 
preliminary narrative, refutation and additional re- 
futation. But one must only adopt a name to express 
a distinct species or a real difference ; otherwise, it 
becomes empty and silly, like the terms introduced 
by Licymnius in his " Art," where he speaks 
of "being wafted along," "wandering from the 
subject,"" and "ramifications."! 

14. The exordium is the beginning of a speech, as 
the prologue in poetry and the prelude in flute- 
playing ; for all these are beginnings, and as it were 
a paving the way for what follows. The prelude 
resembles the exordium of epideictic speeches ; for 
as flute-players begin by playing whatever they can 
execute skilfully and attach it to the key-note, so 
also in epideictic speeches should be the composition 
of the exordium ; the speaker should say at once 
whatever he likes, give the key-note and then attach 
the main subject. And all do this, an example 
being the exordium of the Helen of Isocrates ; for 

" Or, " diverting the judge's attention." 

427 



ARISTOTLE 

TrpootfXLov ovdev yap oIk€lov VTrapx^i Tot? epi- 
OTLKols Acai 'EAevTy. a/xa 8e /cat eap' eKTOTTLcrr), 
app,orTei firj oXov rov Xoyov o/jboeiSrj etvat. 
2 Aeyerat Se ra rcov eViSei/CTi/caiv Trpooip.ta ef 
CTTaLvov T] ifjoyov olov Vopyias p,kv eV rot 'OAu/x- 

TTLKO) AoyOJ " UTTO TToAAcDv d'^lOl daVjJ,dl,€CrdaLy CO 

avope? "EXXrjves' " inaLvel yap rovs rag ttov- 
-qyvpeis avvayovras' ^laoKparing Se ibeyei, otl rag 
p,ev rcov acofxarcov aperos ocopeaig ertfirjaav, rois 
So €V (j)povovaiv ovdev adXov inolrjaav. /cat drro 
crvfjb^ovXijg, olov on SeX rovs dyadovg rLp,dv, hio 
/cat avros 'ApLarciSrjv eVatvei, r) rovg roiovrovs 
OL fi-rjre evSoKLfxovat firire cf)avXoL, dXX' oaoL 
1415 a aya^ot oWe? aSTyAot, cLuTTcp 'AAe^arSpo? o 

4 YlpiafMov ovros yap crvpi^ovXeveL. ert S' e/c tcDi/ 
ot/cai't/ccov TTpooipbicov rovro S' icrrlv e/c tcDv Trpo? 
Tov aKpoarrjv, el nepl TrapaSo^ov Aoyo? •^ Trepl 
XaXeTTOv t) Trepi reOpvXrjfievov ttoXXols, coare 
avyyvcxip.rp) ^xetv, olov Xoi/atAos" 

vvv 8' ore rrdvra SeSaorai. 

Ta /xer out' TcDv' e77iSet/CTt/ca;t' Xoycjjv Trpooip,ia e/c 
TOUTCov, e'^ eiraivov, e/c i/joyov, e'/c TTporpo-jrrjg, e^ 
aTTorpoTTTJs, e'/c raji/ Trpo? toi/ dKpoarijv Set Se t} 
^et'a 7/ ot/ceta eti^at to. ei^Socrt/xa to) Aoycu. 

5 Ta Se TOW Si/ca»'i/cov Trpooipua Set Xa^elv ore 

" The subject of the oration was the praise of Helen, but 
Isocrates took the opportunity of attacking the sophists. 
This exemphfies his skill in the introduction of matter not 
strictly proper to, or in common with, the subject. The 
key-note is Helen ; but the exordium is an attack on the 
Eristics, with special allusion to the Cynics and Megarians. 

* Of Samos, epic poet, author of a poem on the Persian 
f28 



RHETORIC, III. XIV. 1-5 

the eristics and Helen have nothing in common." 
At the same time, even if the speaker wanders from 
the point, this is more appropriate than that the 
speech should be monotonous. 

In epideictic speeches, the sources of the exordia 
are praise and blame, as Gorgias, in the Olympiacus, 
says, " Men of Greece, you are worthy to be admired 
by many," where he is praising those who instituted 
the solemn assemblies. Isocrates on the other hand 
blames them because they rewarded bodily excel- 
lences, but instituted no prize for men of wisdom. 
Exordia may also be derived from advice, for instance, 
" one should honour the good," wherefore the speaker 
praises Aristides, or such as are neither famous nor 
worthless, but who, although they are good, remain 
obscure, as Alexander, son of Priam ; for this is a 
piece of advice. Again, they may be derived from 
forensic exordia, that is to say, from appeals to the 
hearer, if the subject treated is paradoxical, difficult, 
or commonly known, in order to obtain indulgence, 
like Choerilus ^ : 

But now when all has been allotted. 

These then are the sources of epideictic exordia — 
praise, blame, exhortation, dissuasion, appeals to the 
hearer. And these exordia " may be either foreign 
or intimately connected with the speech. 

As for the exordia of the forensic speech, it must 

war, from which this half-line and the context preserved in 
the Scholiast are taken. He complains that whereas the 
poets of olden times had plenty to write about, the field of 
poetry being as yet untilled, it was now all apportioned, and 
he, the last of the poets, was left behind, unable to find " a 
new chariot for the race-course of his song." 
* ivd6<Tt/xa here = Trpooi^ia. 

429 



ARISTOTLE 

ravTO Svvarai onep rcov Spa/Jidrcov ol irpoXoyoL 
/cat rwv eiTcbv ra TTpooi[Jt,ia' to. piev yap rcov St- 
6vpap,^a)v opt,oLa rols €7rtSet/CTt/cots" 

8ta ak Koi Tea Scbpa etVe aKvXa. 

6 iv 8e Tois" Aoyots" /cat eWcrt helyp.d ecm tov Xoyov, 
Iva TTpoecSaxn rrepl ov rjv 6 Xoyos /cat p,rj KpefjurjTat 
'q Starota* to yap dopcarov TrXava' 6 Sou? ovv 
wanep els ttjv xetpa tt)v dp)(7jv Trotet ixdp^evov 
6.KoXovd€LV ra> Xoyco. Std tovto 

p,rjvi,v aetSe ^ea, 

dvSpa p,oL kvveTTe p,ovaa, 

rjyeo p,oc Xoyov a'AAov, ottcos 'Aata? aTro yairjs 
rjXdev is EivpcoTTTjv rrdAe/xos' p,iyas. 

/cat ot rpayiKol SrjXovcrt rrepl to Spapua, kclv p,r) 
€vdvs (oanep KvpiTTcSr^s, oAA iv toj TrpoXoytp ye 
7TOV, coairep /cat ^ocjyoKXrjs 

ipbol TTaTrjp ■^v YloXv^os. 

/cat Tj /cco/iOjSta waavTcos. to p,€v ovv dvay/cato- 
TaTOV epyov tov TrpooipiLov /cat tStov tovto, 87]Xcoaai 
tL ioTL TO TeXos ov eVe/ca d Xoyos. hioirep av 
BrjXov rj /cat pt,iKp6v to Trpdypua, ov ;^p7^crreov 

7 vpooLpbio). TO. 8e oAAa €1897 of? ;)^/otaj^ai, larpev- 

» A parenthetical remark to the effect that epideictic 
exordia are different. Those of a forensic speech are like 
prologues and epic exordia, but it is different with epideictic, 
which may be wild, high-flown, as in the example given from 
an unknown author. 

* That is, forensic speeclies. Spd/nacn has been suggested 
for \6yois. 

' Iliad, J. 1. '^ Odyssey, i. 1. 

430 



RHETORIC, III. XIV. 5-7 

be noted that they produce the same effect as 
dramatic prologues and epic exordia (for those of 
dithyrambs resemble epideictic exordia : 

For thee and thy presents or spoils)." 

But in speeches ^ and epic poems the exordia provide 
a sample of the subject, in order that the hearers 
may know beforehand what it is about, and that the 
mind may not be kept in suspense, for that which is 
undefined leads astray ; so then he who puts the 
beginning, so to say, into the hearer's hand enables 
him, if he holds fast to it, to follow the story. Hence 
the following exordia : 

Sing the wrath, O Muse." 

Tell me of the man, O Muse."* 

Inspire me with another theme, how from the land of 
Asia a great war crossed into Europe.* 

Similarly, tragic poets make clear the subject of their 
drama, if not at the outset, like Euripides, at least 
somewhere in the prologue, like Sophocles, 

My father was Polybus.'' 

It is the same in comedy. So then the most essential 
and special function of the exordium is to make clear 
what is the end or purpose of the speech ; wherefore 
it should not be employed, if the subject is quite 
clear or unimportant. All the other forms of exordia 
in use are only remedies," and are common to all three 

* From Choerilus (§ 4). 

f Sophocles, Oed. Tyr. 774. But this can hardly be called 
the prologue. 

» That is, special remedies in the case of the hearers suffer- 
ing from *' inattention, unfavourable disposition, and the 
like" (Cope). 

431 



ARISTOTLE 

fjiara /cat Koivd. Aeyerat Se ravra e/c re rov 

XeyovTos Kal rov OLKpoarov Kal rov Trpdyfjiaros 

KOI rod ivavrlov. Txepl avrov [xev /cat rov dvrL- 

Slkov, oaa irepl Sia^oXrjv Xvaai /cat TTOLrjaai, 

eoTt 8e ovx o/xolcos- dTToXoyovp.ivcp fxev yap 

TTpwrov rd rrpos Bia^oXTjv, Karrjyopovvri S' iv to) 

iTTcXoycp. St o Se, ovk dSrjXov rov /xev yap 

drroXoyovixevov , orav fieXXjj elcrd^etv avrov, dvay- 

Kolov { dveXelv rd KOiXvovra, axrre Xvreov TrpoJrov 

rrjv Bta^oX-qv rep Se Sca^dXXovrt ev ra> eTTiXoyco 

Sia^Xr^reov, Iva pLvrjpiovevacocn fidXXov. 

To, 8e 77pos" rov aKpoarrjv e/c re rov evvovv 

TTOiTJaaL /cat e/c rov opycaai, /cat iviore Se e/c rov 

TTpoaeKrLKOv -^ rovvavriov ov yap del avfji(f>epeL 

7TOL€LV TTpoaeKrLKOv, 8to TToXXol €19 ye'AcuTtt TTeipuiv- 

rai TTpodyetv. els 3e evfidOeiav aTravra dvd^ei, 

idv Tts" ^ovXr^r ai, Kal rd eTneiKrj </>ai.veadaf rrpoa- 

1415 b e;(ot»CTt ydp fj,dXXov rovrois. rrpoaeKriKol he rols 

p,eydXots, rols lSlols, rots davfMaarols, rols rjBeatv 

8t6 Set epbTTOtelv cos Trepl roiovrcov 6 Xoyos. idv 

Se /x')7 TTpocreKriKovs, on jxiKpov, ort ovhev rrpos 

eKeivovs, on XvTrrjpov. 

8 Aet Se fXTj Xavddveiv on Trdvra e^oj rov Xoyov 

rd roiavra' rrpds (f>avXov ydp aKpoarrjv Kal rd 

e^o) rov TTpdyfMaros aKOVovra, irrel dv (jltj tolovtos 
4,32 



RHETORIC, III. XIV. 7-8 

branches of Rhetoric. These are derived from the 
speaker, the hearer, the subject, and the opponent. 
PVom the speaker and the opponent, all that helps 
to destroy or create prejudice. But this must not be 
done in the same way ; for the defendant must deal 
with this at the beginning, the accuser in the 
epilogue. The reason is obvious. The defendant, 
when about to introduce himself, must remove all 
obstacles, so that he must first clear away all pre- 
judice ; the accuser must create prejudice in the 
epilogue, that his hearers may have a livelier re- 
collection of it. 

The object of an appeal to the hearer is to make 
him well disposed or to arouse his indignation, and 
sometimes to engage his attention or the opposite ; 
for it is not always expedient to engage his attention, 
which is the reason why many speakers try to make 
their hearers laugh. As for rendering the hearers 
tractable, everything will lead up to it if a person 
wishes, including the appearance of respectability, 
because respectable persons command more atten- 
tion. Hearers pay most attention to things that are 
important, that concern their own interests, that are 
astonishing, that are agreeable ; wherefore one 
should put the idea into their heads that the speech 
deals with such subjects. To make his hearers in- 
attentive, the speaker must persuade them that the 
matter is unimportant, that it does not concern them, 
that it is painful. 

But we must not lose sight of the fact that all 
such things are outside the question, for they are 
only addressed to a hearer whose judgement is poor 
and who is ready to listen to what is beside the case ; 
for if he is not a man of this kind, there is no need 

2 F 433 



ARISTOTLE 

Tj, ovdev Set TTpooLfjiLov, dAA' T^ ocrov to Trpdyfjua 
€LiT€iv K€(f)aXaia>Scbs , cva €)(rj wcrTrep crwfia Ke(f>aXt]v. 
9 en ro TrpoaeKriKovs ttol€lv Travroiv rcjov [xepcjv 
KOLVov, iav Berj' Travraxov yap dvcdai /ioAAof •^ 
apxop^evot. Sto yeXolov iv oLpxfj rdrreiv, ore 
fxaXicTra Trdvreg irpoaixovres aKpoojvTai. ware 
07T0V dv fj Kaipos, XeKreov " /cat /xot Trpoaexere 
rov vovv ovdev yap p,dXXov ep,6v rj v/Jberepov " 
Kal " epcx) yap vpuv olov ovheTTOiTTore " d/cTj/coare 
heivov ri ovroj davpLaarov. rovro 8' eariv, atanep 
e(f)rj YlpoSiKos, ore vvardloiev ol dKpoarai, irap- 

10 efjb^dXXeiv rrjs 7T€vrrjKovra8pd)(p,ov avrois. ort Se 
Trpos rov dKpoarrjv ovx y^rep dKpoarijs, SrjXov 
TTOvres yap 17 hia^dXXovaiv rj (f>6^ov? drroXvovrai 
ev rols TTpooLp.ioLS. 

dva^, ipdj p.ev ov^ ottojs aTTOvSrjs vrro. 

ri ^pocfxcd^T) ; 

/cat ot TTovqpov ro Ttpdyp-a e^ovres r} hoKovvres' 
TTavraxov yap ^eXriov hiarpi^eiv r^ ev rep rrpdyp^ari. 
810 ot SouAot ov rd epwrcopieva Xeyovaiv dXXd rd 

11 kvkXco, /cat 7Tpooip,(,d^ovraL. TTodev S' evvovs Set 
TTOieiv, etprjrai, /cat rd)v dXXojv eKacrrov rcov 
roLovrcov. evret 8' ev Xeyerai 

" i.e. to claim the hearer's attention at the beginning, for 
every one is keen to listen then, but later on attention 
slackens. 

" The hearer qua hearer should be unbiased, but in fact 

434 



RHETORIC, III. XIV. 8-11 

of an exordium, except just to make a summary 
statement of the subject, so that, hke a body, it 
may have a head. Further, engaging the hearers' 
attention is common to all parts of the speech, if 
necessary ; for attention slackens everywhere else 
rather than at the beginning. Accordingly, it is 
ridiculous to put this " at the beginning, at a time 
when all listen with the greatest attention. Where- 
fore, when the right moment comes, one must say, 
" And give me your attention, for it concerns you 
as much as myself"; and, " I will tell you such 
a thing as you have never yet " heard of, so strange 
and wonderful. This is what Prodicus used to do ; 
whenever his hearers began to nod, he would throw 
in a dash of his fifty-drachma lecture. But it is 
clear that one does not speak thus to the hearer 
qua hearer ; '' for all in their exordia endeavour 
either to arouse prejudice or to remove their own 
apprehensions : 

O prince, I will not say that with haste [I have come 
breathless]." 

Why this preamble ? •* 

This is what those also do who have, or seem to have, 
a bad case ; for it is better to lay stress upon any- 
thing rather than the case itself. That is why slaves 
never answer questions directly but go all round 
them, and indulge in preambles. We have stated^ 
how the hearer's goodwill is to be secured and all 
other similar states of mind. And since it is rightly 
said, 

hearers often suffer from the defects referred to in § 7, for 
which certain forms of exordia are remedies. 

" Sophocles, Antigone, 223. 

'' Euripides, Iphig. Taur. 1162. * ii, 1. 7, 8. 

435 



ARISTOTLE 

So? /x' e? ^atrjKas rf>iXov iXOelv t^S' iXeecvov, 

rovrwv Set Bvo aroxo-^^odai. 

Ev Se rolg emSeiKTiKoXs oleadai Set TToielv 
crvveTTaLveladaL rov aKpoariqv , rj avrov r) yevos 
7) eTTtTT^Seu/xar' aiJrou •^ dfjucos ye ttcus"" o yap Ae'yet 
YiOtiKparrjs iv rep eTrtra^toj, dXrjdes, on ov ^^aXenov 
^ AOrjvaLOVs iv ^ Adrjvaiois eVatvett' aAA' Iv Aa/ceSat- 
/xovtot?. 
12 Ta Se rov Srjp.rjyopLKov eV TcDi' rov SiKavLKOv 
Xoyov iariv, (f)va€L S' rJKLara e^et* /cat yap /cat 7re/Jt 
ou taaCTt, /cat ovSev Setrat to Trpdyp,a Trpooip^iov , 
dXX 7) St' auTov -i^ rot's" ap-rtAe'yoi^as", "q edv piTj 
•qXiKov ^ovXei VTroXap^^dvcoaiv , dXX rj /xet^ov rj 
eXarrov. Sto t] Sia^dXXetv 7) aTToAJeo^at dvdyKrj, 
Kai -q av^fjaai 7) p,€LCoaaL. rovrwv Se eVe/ca Trpo- 
ot/xtou Setrat, -^ Koapiov x^P''^> ^^ avroKd^SaXa 
1416 a ^att'erai, eai^ /ai^ ^'xt?- roiovrov yap ro Vopyiov 
eyKoiipLLOv eLs HAetofs" ouSet" yap Trpoe^ayKojvtaas 
ovBe TTpoavaKLvrjuas €v9vs dpx^rac " '^HAt? TroAt? 
€vhaip.cov." 

15. riept Se Sta^oAify? eV p-ev rd e'^ Jjv dv ris 
VTToXruJjLv Svax^PV o.TroXvaairo- ovdev ydp Sta<^epet 
etre etTrovro? rtt'o? etre p.rj, ware rovro KadoXov. 
2 dXXog rpoTTos ware irpos rd dpb(j>ia^rjrovpieva 
dTTavrdv, 7) ws ovk eariv, rj ws ov ^Xa^epov, rj ov 
rovrw, •^ ws ov rrjXiKovrov t] ovk uSlkov tj ov p.iya 

» Odyssey, vii. 337. * See i. 9. 30. 

' Another reading is tAtoj (topic) and so throughout. 

4S6 



RHETORIC, III. XIV. 11— xv. 2 

Grant that on reaching the Phaeacians I may find friend- 
ship or compassion," 

the orator should aim at exciting these two feehngs. 

In epideictic exordia, one must make the hearer 
believe that he shares the praise, either himself, or 
his family, or his pursuits, or at any rate in some 
way or other. For Socrates says truly in his Funeral 
Oration that "it is easy to praise Athenians in the 
presence of Athenians, but not in the presence of 
Lacedaemonians." ^ 

Deliberative oratory borrows its exordia from 
forensic, but naturally they are very uncommon in 
it. For in fact the hearers are acquainted with the 
subject, so that the case needs no exordium, except 
for the orator's own sake, or on account of his 
adversaries, or if the hearers attach too much or too 
little importance to the question according to his 
idea. Wherefore he must either excite or remove 
prejudice, and magnify or minimize the importance 
of the subject. Such are the reasons for exordia ; or 
else they merely serve the purpose of ornament, since 
their absence makes the speech appear offhand. For 
such is the encomium on the Eleans, in which Gorgias, 
without any preliminary sparring or movements, 
starts off at once, " Elis, happy city." 

15. One way of removing prejudice is to make use 
of the arguments by which one may clear oneself from 
disagreeable suspicion ; for it makes no difference 
whether this suspicion has been openly expressed or 
not ; and so this may be taken as a general rule. 
Another way " consists in contesting the disputed 
points, either by denying the fact or its harmfulness, 
at least to the plaintiff; or by asserting that its 
importance is exaggerated ; or that it is not unjust 

437 



ARISTOTLE 

"q ovK alaxpov 17 ovk exov fieyedos' Trepl yap roiov- 
ro)v Tj aiJ^^ia^rprrjaLS , cooTxep ^\jiiKp6rrr]<5 rtpo's Naucrt- 
KpajTT^v e(f)T] yap TTOLrjcraL o eXeye Kal ^Xdi/jai, dAA' 
OVK dSiKelv. 7] dvTLKaraXXdrreaOai dhiKovvra, cl 
pXa^epov dXXd KaXov, el XvTrrjpov aXX ajcfieXinov 
rj TL dXXo TOLOvrov. 

3 "AAAo? rpoTTos cog iarlv ajxaprrjixa r) drv)(y)P'a 
rj avayKaZov, olov TiO(f)OKXrjs e(f>rj Tpljxeiv ov^ ct»? 
o Sia^dXXa>v €.(f>rj, "va SoKjj yipiov, aXX i^ dvdyKrjs' 
ov yap Ikovtl elvai avrw errj oySoiJKOvra. Kal 
dvTLKaraXXdrrecrdaL ro oS eVe/ca, oVt ov ^Xdipai 
i^ovXero, dXXd roSe, Kal ov rovro o Sie^dXXero 
TTOLTJcrai, avvi^Tj Se ^Xa^rjvaf " StKaiov Se pnaeiv, 
€1 OTTCos TOVTO yevrjTaL eTroiovv." 

4 "AAAos", el e/jiTrepLeiXrjTrTaL 6 Sia^dXXwv, ^ vvv 

5 rj TTporepov, rj avrog rj rcov eyyvs. dXXos, el dXXoi 
eixTTepiXaji^dvovraL, ovs ojMoXoyovcri fxrj evoxovs 
elvat TTJ Sta^oXfj, olov el on Kaddptos p.oixo'S, Kal 
6 helva Kal 6 helva dpa. 

6 "AAAos", el dXXovs Sie^aXev, 7) aAAos" avrovg, 
7) dvev Sia^oXij^ V7TeXajj,^dvovTO woTrep avro's vvv, 
oX TTe(f>rjvaaLV ovk evoxoi. 

" Sophocles had two sons, lophon and Ariston, by different 
wives ; the latter had a son named Sophocles. lophon, 
jealous of the affection shown by Sophocles to this grandson, 
summoned him before \h& pliratores (a body which had some 
jurisdiction in family affairs) on the ground that his age 
rendered him incapable of managing his affairs. In reply 
to the charge, Sophocles read the famous choric ode on 
Attica from the Oedipus Coloneus, beginning Yjviinrov, ^ive, 
TcLcdf I x^/^a? (668 If.), and was acquitted. The story in this 
form is probably derived from some comedy, which intro- 
duced the case on the stage (see Jebb's Introd. to the tragedy). 

* In the reading in the text, aiirovs must apparently refer 

438 



RHETORIC, III. XV. 2-6 

at all, or only slightly so ; or neither disgraceful nor 
important. These are the possible points of dispute : 
as Iphicrates, in answer to Nausicrates, admitted 
that he had done what the prosecutor alleged and 
inflicted damage, but denied that he had been guilty 
of wrongdoing. Again, one may strike the balance, 
when guilty of wrongdoing, by maintaining that 
although the action was injurious it was honourable, 
painful but useful, or anything else of the kind. 

Another method consists in saying that it was a 
case of error, misfortune, or necessity ; as, for ex- 
ample, Sophocles said that he trembled, not, as the 
accuser said, in order to appear old, but from neces- 
sity, for it was against his wish that he was eighty 
years of age." One may also substitute one motive 
for another, and say that one did not mean to injure 
but to do something else, not that of which one was 
accused, and that the wrongdoing was accidental : 
" I should deserve your hatred, h ad I acted so asj to 
bring this about." 

AnbtheFmetHod may be employed if the accuser, 
either himself or one closely related to him has been 
involved in a similar charge, either now or formerly ; 
or, if others are involved who are admittedly not 
exposed to the charge ; for instance, if it is argued 
that so-and-so is an adulterer, because he is a dandy, 
then so-and-so must be. 

Again, if the accuser has already similarly accused 
others, or himself been accused by others ; ** or if 
others, without being formally accused, have been 
suspected as you are now, and their innocence has 
been proved. 

to the defendant, and one would rather expect avrov. Spengel's 
suggested 7) dXXos t) ai>r6s for ^ dXXos avroiis : " if he {i.e. the 
adversary) or another has similarly accused others." 

439 



ARISTOTLE 

7 "AXXos €K rod avrihia^aWeLV rov Sia^dXAovra' 
aroTTov yap et 09 avros aTncrros, ol tovtov Xoyoi 
eaovrai ttlcxtol. 

8 "AAAoj, el yiyove Kpiais, coarrep EivpiTTLSrjs rrpos 
'Yytaivovra iv rfj dvriSoaet, KarrjyopoCvra d)s 
dae^rjs, o? y CTToi'qae KeXevcov eTnopKeiv 

Tj yXcoaa 6pi,u)p.o^ , rj Se <f)pr]v dvcofMoros. 

€(f>r) yap avrov dhiKelv rds eK rov AiovvcriaKov 
dycovos Kpiaeig els rd SLKaoTijpia dyovra- eKeZ 
yap avrcjv hehcoKevat Xoyov rj hojoeiv, el ^ovXerai 
KarrjyopeLV. 

9 "AAAo? 6/c rov Sta^oXijs Karr^yopetv, r^XiKov, /cat 
rovro on dXXas Kpiaeis TTOtel, /cat ori ov Tnarevei, 
rep TTpdypiari. 

1416 b Koivos" 8' dp,(f)olv 6 roTTOs ro avp,^oXa Xeyeiv, 
OLOV ev ru) TevKpw 6 'OSvaaevs on ot/cetos" rw 
Upidp-a)' rj yap 'Hacovrj dSeX(/)Tj- 6 Be on 6 Trarrjp 
i^dpos ro) UpLdfiw, 6 TeXafjbcLv, /cat on ov KareiTre 
rGiv KaraaKOTTOJv . 

" When a citizen was called upon to perform a " liturgy " 
or public service {e.g. the equipment of a chorus), if he 
thought that one richer than himself had been passed over he 
could summon him and compel him to exchange properties. 

* Hippolytus, 612. This well-known verse is three times 
parodied in Aristophanes {Thesmophoriazusae, 275; Frogs, 
101, 1471). In the first passage, the sense is reversed: 
Euripides has dressed up a certain Mnesilochus as a woman 
in order that he may attend the Thesmophorian assembly. 
Mnesilochus first requires Euripides to take an oath that he 
will help him out of any trouble that may arise. Euripides 
takes an oath by all the gods, whereupon Mnesilochus says 
to Euripides : " Remember that it was your mind that swore, 
but not your tongue." 

When Euripides was engaged in a lawsuit, his adversary 
quoted the line, implying that even on oath Euripides could 
440 



RHETORIC, III. XV. 7-9 

Another method consists in counter-attacking the 
accuser ; for it would be absurd to beheve the words 
of one who is himself unworthy of belief. 

Another method is to appeal to a verdict already 
given, as Euripides did in the case about the exchange 
of property ; " when Hygiaenon accused him of 
impiety as having advised perjury in the verse, 

My tongue hath sworn, but my mind is unsworn,* 
Euripides replied that his accuser did wrong in 
transferring the decisions of the court of Dionysus 
to the law courts ; for he had already rendered an 
account of what he had said there," or was still ready 
to do so, if his adversary desired to accuse him. 

Another method consists in attacking slander, 
showing how great an evil it is, and this because it 
alters the nature of judgements,** and that it does 
not rely on the real facts of the case. 

Common to both parties is the topic of tokens, as, 
in the Teucer,^ Odysseus reproaches Teucer with 
being a relative of Priam, whose sister his mother 
Hesione was ; to which Teucer replied that his 
father Telamon was the enemy of Priam, and that 
he himself did not denounce the spies.' 

not be believed ; Euripides replied that his adversary had no 
right to bring before the law courts a matter which had 
already been settled by the theatrical judges. 

* In the great Dionysiac theatre. 

^ Or, " makes extraneous points the subject of decision " 
(Cope), " raises false issues " (Jebb). 

* Of Sophocles. 

^ Who had been sent to Troy by the Greeks to spy upon 
the Trojans. It seems that he was afterwards accused of 
treachery, the token being the fact that Teucer was a near 
connexion of Priam ; to which he replied with another token 
that his father was an enemy of Priam, and further, when 
the Greek spies were in Troy, he never betrayed them. 

441 



ARISTOTLE 

10 "AAAos" Tco Sia^dXXovrL, ro eTraLvovvTi fXLKpov 
fiaKpcos i/je^ai, /x.eya avvrojxios , rj ttoAAo, ayada. 
Trpodevra, o eig to Trpay/xa irpo^epei ev i/je^at. 
TOLOVTOL 8e ol T€Xvt,Ka)TaroL Kal aSt/ccoTarot • rots' 
dyadoLS yd.p ^XaTrretv Treipcovrai, pnyvvvTes avrd 

TO) KCLKO). 

Y^OLVov Se ro) Sia^aXXovri /cat rat aTToXvopbeva) , 
irreiSrj ro avro ivhex^rat TrXeiovoiv ev€Ka npax- 
Orjvai, Tip pt,€V Sia^aXXovrt, KaKorjOiareov eTri ro 
■)(eipov €KXap,^dvovrt, rco Se d7ToXvop,iv(p inl ro 
^eXriov oiov ore 6 Aio/xrjSrjs" rov 'OSucrcrea Trpo- 
eiXero, ra> pi.kv on Sta ro dpiarov V7ToXap,^dv€tv 
rov OSvaaea, rep 8' ore ov, dXXd Sta to pbovov p,rj 
dvrayojviareiv a»? (f>avXov. /cat irepl p,kv hia^oXrjs 
elpijado) roaavra. 

16. At'qyrjais S' iv puev rols eTrtSet/CTt/cot? iarlv 
ovK i<f)€^7js aAAa Kara p,€pos' Set piev yap rds 
rrpd^eis hieXdelv i^ ojv 6 Adyos" oT^y/cetrat ydp 
e^cov d Adyo? ro p,€V dre^uov {ovdev ydp atrto? d 
Xeycov rcbv irpd^eoiv) ro S' e/c rfjs rexvrjs- rovro 
S' iarlv 7] on, eon Set^at, idv fj dinarov, rj on 
2 TTOidj^, 'q or I rroaov, r\ /cat drtavra, Sid Se rovr 
ivLore ovk i(f)€^rj^ Set StT^yeta^at ndvra, on 
8vap,vr]p,6v€vrov ro SeiKvvvat ovrios. e/c p-kv ovv 

" Jebb refers toiovtoi to the accusers, translating rexviKol 
" artistic," certainly the commoner meaning. 
* Involving a continuous succession of proofs. 

442 



RHETORIC, III. XV. 10— xvi. 2 

Another method, suitable for the accuser, is to 
praise something unimportant at great length, and 
to condemn something important concisely ; or, 
putting forward several things that are praiseworthy 
in the opponent, to condemn the one thing that has 
an important bearing upon the case. Such methods " 
are most artful and unfair ; for by their use men 
endeavour to make what is good in a man injurious 
to him, by mixing it up with what is bad. 

Another method is common to both accuser and 
defender. Since the same thing may have been 
done from several motives, the accuser must disparage 
it by taking it in the worse sense, while the defender 
must take it in the better sense. For instance, when 
Diomedes chose Odysseus for his companion, it may 
be said on the one hand that he did so because 
he considered him to be the bravest of men, on the 
other, that it was because Odysseus was the only 
man who was no possible rival for him, since he was 
a poltroon. Let this suffice for the question of 
prejudice. 

16. In the epideictic style the narrative should 
not be consecutive, but disjointed ; for it is neces- 
sary to go through the actions which form the subject 
of the speech. For a speech is made up of one part 
that is inartificial (the speaker being in no way the 
author of the actions which he relates), and of another 
that does depend upon art. The latter consists in 
showing that the action did take place, if it be 
incredible, or that it is of a certain kind, or of a 
certain importance, or all three together. This is 
why it is sometimes right not to narrate all the facts 
consecutively, because a demonstration of this kind ^ 
is difficult to remember. From some facts a man 

443 



ARISTOTLE 

TovrcDv avSpeXos, €K 8e raJvSe cro^o? t] St/caios". 
Kal aTrXovarepos 6 Xoyos ovros, eKeivos he ttolklXos 

3 Kai ov XiTos. Set Se ras" /j^ev yvcvptfiovs dva- 
p,Lp,vrjaK€LV' Sto ol TToXXol ovSev Seovrai Si-qyTJaeajg, 
OLOV €L deXcLs 'A;^iAAea eTraiveZv 'iaaai yap Trdvreg 
rag Trpd^eis, dXXd -x^prjaOai avrals Set. edv Se 

4 KpirtW, Set- ov yap noXXoX Xaaaiv. . . . vvv Se 
yeXoiojg rrjv hirjyrjalv (ftacri helv elvat, rax^lav. 
AcatTot ojarrep o tw /jlolttovti ipop,€v<x) norepov 
aKXrjpdv 7] fiaXaKrjv pbd^rj, " ri S'; " e^^^, " eu 
ahvvarov ; " /cat ivravOa o/jlolcd?- Set yap firj 
/xaK-pcDs" hi'qyelcrdai axjTrep ovhe TTpootfjud^eadaL 
pLaKpois, ovhk rds TTLareis Xeyeiv ovhe ydp ivravdd 
eoTt TO ei) rj ro ra^v r} to uvvr6p,a>s, dAAo. ro 
p,erpLco9' TOVTO S' ecrrt to Xeyetv oaa SrjXiocrei 

1417 a TO 7Tpdyp,a, 7] oCTtt TTotT^CTei VTToXa^eXv yeyovevai t] 
^e^Aa^eVat r) rjSiKTjKevaL, t] r-qXiKavra rjXLKa 

5 ^ovXei' ra> Se Ivavrico rd ivavrta. TrapaSirjyeladaL 
Se oaa els ttjv arjv dperrjv (jiepei, olov " eyoj S' 
evovderovv del rd StVata Xeycov, p,r) rd reicva 
eyKaTaXeiireiv ." r) darepov KaKiav " o S' direKpi- 
varo pbOL on ov dv fj avros, ecrrai aAAa TratSta* " 
o Tovs a(f)i<yTap,evovg AlyvTrriovs dnoKpivaaOai 
<f>r)aLv 6 'HpoSoTo?. t] oaa -qhea tols St/caorats". 

6 ArroXoyovpieva) Se eXdrrcov rj hiriyrjaLS, at S' 



" Something has been lost here, as is shown by the 
transition from epideictic to forensic Rhetoric. All the mss. 
have a gap, which in several of them is filled by introducing 
the passage iffn 5' iwaivos . . . /jieTaTedjj (i. 9. 38-37). 

'' ii. 30. The story was that a number of Egyptian 
soldiers had revolted and left in a body for Ethiopia. Their 
king Psammetichus begged them not to desert their wives 

444 



RHETORIC, III. XVI. 2-6 

may be shown to be courageous, from others wise or 
just. Besides, a speech of this kind is simpler, 
whereas the other is intricate and not plain. It is 
only necessary to recall famous actions ; wherefore 
most people have no need of narrative — for instance, 
if you wish to praise Achilles ; for everybody knows 
what he did, and it is only necessary to make use of 
it. But if you wish to praise Critias, narrative is 
necessary, for not many people know what he did. . . ." 

But at the present day it is absurdly laid down that 
the narrative should be rapid. And yet, as the man 
said to the baker when he asked whether he was to 
knead bread hard or soft, " What ! is it impossible to 
knead it well ? " so it is in this case ; for the narra- 
tive must not be long, nor the exordium, nor the 
proofs either. For in this case also propriety does 
not consist either in rapidity or conciseness, but in 
a due mean ; that is, one must say all that will make 
the facts clear, or create the belief that they have 
happened or have done injury or wrong, or that 
they are as important as you wish to make them. 
The opposite party must do the opposite. And you 
should incidentally narrate anything that tends to 
show your own virtue, for instance, " I always re- 
commended him to act rightly, not to forsake his^ 
children " ; or the wickedness of your opponent, for 
instance, " but he answered that, wherever he might ^^, 
be, he would always find other children," an answer 
attributed by Herodotus ^ to the Egyptian rebels ; 
or anything which is likely to please the dicasts. 

In defence, the narrative need not be so long ; for 

and children, to which one of them made answer {tiov 8^ 
Tiva Xeyerat de^avra to aidoiou dweiv, 'ivda hv tovto 77, ^aecrdai 
avToicn ivdavra Kal r^Kva Kal yvva^Kas). 

445 



ARISTOTLE 

a^(f)Lcr^rir'qaeis r) ixj] yeyovivai rj firj ^Xa^epov 
etvai T] firj dScKov tj firj rrjXiKovrov , ware Trepl ro 
ofMoXoyovfjievov ov SiarpLTrreov, iav p,tj ri els 
eKeivo avvreivrj, olov el TreVpa/crat, aAA' ovk 

7 ahiKov. €TL 7r€7Tpayfjb€va Set Aeyetv, oaa /jutj 
TTparrofjieva -^ olktov t) SecvaxjLV (jiipei. rrapa- 
heiyp-a 6 ^AXklvov diroXoyo^, on irpos rrjv Hr]V€- 
XoTTrjv iv i^rjKovra eVecri TreTrolrjraL. /cat o)? 
Oai/AAo? Tov kvkXov, /cat o iv rat OtVet rrpoXoyos . 

8 YidiKrjv Se xP'h '^W StTyyyyCTtv etvai. eorat Se 
Tovro, dv elScofjiev ri rjdos TTOtet* ev p,kv Sr] to 
TTpoaLpeaiv Sr^Xovv, ttolov 8e to '^dos Ttp ttololv 
Tavrrfv rj Se Trpoalpecrtg ttolo. tco reAet. Sia tovto 
OVK exovcTiv ol p,adr]p,aTtKol XoyoL rjdr], on ouSe 
TTpoaipeaiv to yap ov eVe/ca ovk exovaiv. dAA' 
ol HcoKpaTLKoi' TTepl TOLOVTcov ydp XiyovdLv. 

9 aAAa 'qdiKO, to. iirop.eva eKaaTcp yjOet, olov otl 
djjia Xeycov i^dSt,t,€V StjXoX ydp dpacrvTTjTa /cat 
dypoiKLav rjOovg. /cat purj U)S dTro Stavoia? Xcyeiv, 
warrep ol vvv, aAA' ws avro Trpoaipiaeois. " iyd) 
S' i^ovXojjirjv Kal 7Tpo€LX6p.7]v ydp tovto' dXX 
el p,rj d>vrip,iqv, ^cXtlov." to p,ev ydp (f)povLp,ov 
TO Se dyadov- <f)povip,ov fiev ydp ev tco to ci(^e'At/xov 
SnoKCLV, dyadov S' ev Tip to koXov. dv S aTTioTov 
fj. Tore TTjv atrial' eTnXeyeiv, (joarrep ^o(j)OKXrj? 
TTOiet 7rapdSe(,yp,a to e/c Trjg *AvTLy6vrjs, otl p,dXXov 

» Odyssey, xxiii. 264-284, 310-343. The title referred to 
the narrative in Books ix.-xii. It became proverbial for a 
long-winded story. 

* He apparently summarized it. 

* Of Euripides. It was apparently very compact. 

446 



RHETORIC, III. XVI. 6-9 

the points at issue are either that the fact has not 
happened or that it was neither injurious nor wrong 
nor so important as asserted, so that one should not 
waste time over what all are agreed upon, unless 
anything tends to prove that, admitting the act, it 
is not wrong. Again, one should only mention such 
past things as are likely to excite pity or indignation 
if described as actually happening ; for instance, 
the story of Alcinous, because in the presence of 
Penelope it is reduced to sixty lines," and the way 
in which Phayllus dealt with the epic cycle,* and the 
prologue to the Oeneus." 

And the narrative should be of a moral character, 
and in fact it will be so, if we know what effects 
this. One thing is to make clear our moral purpose ; 
for as is the moral purpose, so is the character, and 
as is the end, so is the moral purpose. For this 
reason mathematical treatises have no moral char- 
acter, because neither have they moral purpose ; for 
they have no moral end. But the Socratic dialogues 
have ; for they discuss such questions. Other ethical 
indications are the accompanying peculiarities of each 
individual character ; for instance, " He was talking 
and walking on at the same time," which indicates 
effrontery and boorishness. Nor should we speak as 
if from the intellect, after the manner of present-day 
orators, but from moral purpose : " But I wished it, 
and I preferred it ; and even if I profited nothing, it 
is better." The first statement indicates prudence, 
the second virtue ; for prudence consists in the 
pursuit of what is useful, virtue in that of what is 
honourable, i If anything of the kind seems incred- 
ible, then the reason must be added ; of this 
Sophocles gives an example, where his Antigone says 

447 



ARISTOTLE 

Tov aoeXcpov eKT^Sero ^ dvSpos t] tIkvcov ra [xei 
yap av yeviadai OLTToXofieva, 

fiTjTpos S iv aSov /cat Trarpos ^e^rjKorcov 
OVK ear aSeA^os" o? ris av ^Xdaroi nori. 

idv 8e fXT) exjjS alriav, dXX on ovk dyvoel'S ctTrtOTO 
Xeyojv, dXXd (jivaei roiovros er dmarovai ydf 
dXXo n TTpaTreiv cKovra ttXtjv to avfX(f)€pov. 

10 ' Ert e/c rctjv TTadrjriKiov Xeyeiv, Si-rjyovfMevoi 
Kat ra €7Top,€va /cat a 'icracn, /cat rd i8ta r) airra 
■^ e/cetVo) Trpoaovra- " o S' a>x€r6 /xe vno^Xei/jas .' 

1417 b /cat 6l»? 7re/3t KparJAoy Alaxi'Vrjs, on Stacrt^oii 
/cat Toti' ;)(e/3otv Stacretcoi^* mdavd ydp, Stort auyu,- 
^oAa yiverai ravra d 'iaaaiv eKeivcov (Lv ovk laaaiv 
77 Ae terra he roiavra Xa^elv i^ 'Op.rjpov ecrrtv. 

(x)S dp e(f)r}, yprjvs Se Karicrx^ro X^P^'' TTpoacona' 

OL ydp SaKpv€LV dp^dp-evoL iTTiXap,^dvovrai Tcai 
6(f)daXp,cov. /cat evdvs eladyaye aeavrov Trotoi 
Tiv-a, Iva cus" tolovtov deojpdJai /cat rot' dvrtSt/coF 
Xavdavcov Se ttoUi. on Se pdhiov, opdv Set e/ 
ToJv aTrayyeAAdt'Tajv Trept cSt' ya/) pL-qdev Laptev 
dp.u)s Xap,^dvop,€V VTToXrji/jLV nva. 

11 noAAa;^oy Se Set Scqyeladai, /cat iviore ovk e 

" Antigone, 911-912, where the mss. have KeKevddroi 
instead of Aristotle's /Se^Tj^irwc 

" Whereas this man makes his temperament responsibl 
for the strange things he does ; he is built that way ani 
cannot help it. 

" Supposed to be Aeschines called Socraticus from hi 
intimate friendship with Socrates. A philosopher and write 
of speeches for the law courts, he had a great reputatio 
as an orator. 

448 



RHETORIC, III. XVI. 9-11 

that she cared more for her brother than for her *' 
husband or children ; for the latter can be replaced 
after they are gone, 

but when father and mother are in the grave, no brother 
can ever be born.* 

If you have no reason, you should at least say that 
you are aware that what you assert is incredible, 
but that it is your nature ; for no one believes that 
a man ever does anything of his own free will except 
from motives of self-interest.'' 

Further, the narrative should draw upon what is 
emotional by the introduction of such of its accom- 
paniments as are well known, and of what is specially 
characteristic of either yourself or of the adversary : 
" And he went off looking grimly at me " ; and as 
Aeschines '^ says of Cratylus, that he hissed violently 
and violently shook his fists. Such details produce 
persuasion because, being known to the hearer, they 
become tokens of what he does not know. Numerous 
examples of this may be found in Homer : 

Thus she spoke, and the aged nurse covered her face with 
her hands ; "* 

for those who are beginning to weep lay hold on 
their eyes. And you should at once introduce yourself 
and your adversary as being of a certain character, 
that the hearers may regard you or him as such ; 
but do not let it be seen. That this is easy is per- 
fectly clear ^ from the example of messengers ; we 
do not yet know what they are going to say, but 
nevertheless we have an inkling of it. 

Again, the narrative should be introduced in several 

^ Odyssey, xix. 361. 
* Set (omitted by others) = " one cannot help seeing." 

2g 449 



ARISTOTLE 

o.pxfj' €V Se SrjfxrjyopLa -qKicrra SLrjyTjGrlg ioTLV, 
OTL Trepl rajv fxeXXovrcov ovdel? StT^yetrat* aAA' 
idv TTep hLrjyrjais ?y, rCov yevofMevcov ecrrai, iv^ 
dvapLvrjadevres iKeivcov ^eXriov ^ovXevaayvraL Trepl 
Tcov varepov. 7] Sia^aAAovres", t] eTraivovvres . aXXd 
Tore ov TO rod Gvp,^ovXov moiel epyov. dv S "^ 
CLTncrrov, V7na)(yeLadat [re] /cat alriav Xiyew €v9v9, 
Kal Stararretv ols ^ovXovrai, olov rj ^loKaarrj r) 
K.apKLVov iv TO) OlhiiTohi da, VTncrxyeirai nvvda- 
vop.evov Tov l,rjrovvTOS rov vlov. Kal 6 Aljjlcov 

6 laO(f)OKXeOVS . 

17. Tds Se TTLarets Set aTroSei/crt/cas' elvai' 
dTToSeLKVvvai Se XPV' ^"^^l 'n'epl rerrdpcov rj a^^t- 
cr^'^rrjcrcs, Trepl rod dp,(^ia^rjToviMivov cf)epovra rrjv 
aTToSei^LV otov el on ov yeyovev dpt,(f}ia^rjrely ev 
rfi Kpiaet, Set tovtov fJidXicrra ttjv aTroSet^iv <f)epe(,v, 
el 8' oTt ovK e^Xaifjev, tovtov, /cat otl ov ToaovSe 
iq OTL Si/caio)?, chaavTws /cat et Trept tov yeveadat 
2 TOVTO 7] djj.(f)La^'r^Trjai,s • p-rj XavdaveTCo 8' otl 
dvayKOLOv iv TavTrj ttj dp,(f)La^r]T-^aeL p-ovr) tov 



•» Omitting re. The difficulty is Stardrretj', which can 
apparently only mean " arrange." Jebb retains re, and 
reads ws for oh : " the speaker must make himself respons- 
ible for the fact . . . and marshal his reasons in a way 
acceptable to the hearers." The old Latin translation vadiare 
quibus volunt suggested to Roemer SiaiTTyrats, " to the 
arbitrators they approve." 

* According to Jebb, Jocasta tells the inquirer incredible 
things about her son, and pledges her word for the facts. 
Cope says : " promises (to do something or other to satisfy 
him)." 

* Antigone, 683-723. On this Cope remarks : '* This last 
example must be given up as hopeless ; there is nothing in 
the extant play which could be interpreted as required here." 

450 



RHETORIC, III. XVI. 11— xvii. 2 

places', sometimes not at all at the beginning. In 
deliberative oratory narrative is very rare, because 
no one can narrate things to come ; but if there is 
narrative, it will be of things past, in order that, 
being reminded of them, the hearers may take 
better counsel about the future. This may be done 
in a spirit either of blame or of praise ; but in that 
case the speaker does not perform the function of 
the deliberative orator. If there is anything in- 
credible, you should immediately promise both to 
give a reason for it at once and to submit it to the 
judgement of any whom the hearers approve ; "" as, 
for instance, Jocasta in the Oedipus of Carcinus ^ 
is always promising, when the man who is looking 
for her son makes inquiries of her ; and similarly 
Haemon in Sophocles." 

17. Proofs should be demonstrative, and as the 
disputed points are four, the demonstration should 
bear upon the particular point disputed ; for instance, 
if the fact is disputed, proof of this must be brought 
at the trial before anything else ; or if it is main- 
tained that no injury has been done ; or that the 
act was not so important as asserted ; or was just, 
then this must be proved, the three last questions 
being matters of dispute just as the question of 
fact. But do not forget that it is only in the case 
of a dispute as to this question of fact that one of 

According to Jebb, the " incredibility " consists in the fact 
that Haemon, although in love with Antigone, and strongly 
opposed to the sentence pronounced upon her by his father 
Creon, still remains loyal to the latter. Haemon explains 
the reason in lines 701-3, where he says that he prizes his 
father's welfare more than anything else, for a father's good 
name and prosperity is the greatest ornament for children, as 
is the son's for the father. 

451 



ARISTOTLE 

erepov elvai TTOvrjpov ov yap icrnv ayvoia atria, 
ojcTTTep av et rtves" Trepl rov StKatoy dfji(/)La^rjroL€v , 
war ev rovrw jj^povtcrreov, iv 8e rols a'AAots" ov. 

3 Ev Se rols imScLKrcKOLS ro ttoXv, on KaXa Kal 
<I)<f)eXLp.a, r) av^rjcrig earai- rd yap Trpdy/jiara Set 
TTLcereveadai' oXtyaKLS yap Kal rovrcov aTToSet^ets' 
<f>€povaiv, idv dmara fj rj idv aAAos" alriav ^XO- 

4 Ev Se TO ts" Srj/j.'qyopLKOL? r) cos" ou/c ear ai d[x<f)i- 
a^7]rTJa€L€v dv ris, r^ d>s earai fxev a KeXevei, dAA' 
ov St/cata rj ovk oj^eXLjJLa rj ov rrjXLKavra. Set 
oe /cat opdv et rt iJjevSerai e/crds" tou irpdypLaros' 
reKpufjpia yap ravra (jyaiverai /cat rdiv dAAcov ort 

1418 a ipevSerai. 

6 EoTt 8e rd fiev TrapaSety/xara SrjfxrjyopLKiorara, 
ra 8 evdvfn'jjjbara hiKaviKcorepa' rj /xev ydp Trepl 
ro fieXXov, war e/c ra)v yevofievcov dvdyKrj napa- 
Sety/xara Ae'yetv, -^ 8e Tre/Jt ovriov rj /xt) ovtcov, 
oj? jjidXXov aTrdSei^t's" eoTi /cat dvayKT]' e^^i ydp 

Q rd yeyovos dvdyKrjV. ov Set Se e<jie^rjg Xeyeiv rd 

" Aristotle's ari^ument is as follows. But it must not be 
forgotten that it is only in a dispute as to this question of 
fact that one of the two parties must necessarily be a rogue. 
For ignorance is not the cause (of there being a dispute 
about the fact, e.g. "you hit me," "no, I didn't," where 
both know the truth), as it might be in a dispute on what 
was right or wrong, so that this is the topic on which you 
should spend some time {i.e. because here you can prove or 
disprove that A is wouripds). 

The passage is generally taken to mean that when it is a 
question of fact it is universally true that one of the dis- 
putants must l)e a rogue. Cope alone among editors makes 
any comment. In his note he says : " all that is meant is 
that there is a certain class of cases which fall under this 

452 



RHETORIC, III. XVII. 2-6 

the two parties must necessarily " be a rogue ; for 
ignorance is not the cause, as it might be if a question 
of right or wrong were the issue ; so that in this case 
one should spend time on this topic, but not in the 
others. 

In epideictic speeches, amplification is employed, 
as a rule, to prove that things are honourable or 
useful ; for the facts must be taken on trust, since 
proofs of these are rarely given, and only if they are 
incredible or the responsibility is attributed to 
another.* 

In deliberative oratory, it may be maintained either 
that certain consequences will not happen, or that 
what the adversary recommends will happen, but 
that it will be unjust, inexpedient, or not so important 
as supposed. But one must also look to see whether 
he makes any false statements as to things outside 
the issue ; for these look like evidence that he 
makes misstatements about the issue itself as well. 
p Examples are best suited to deliberative oratory 
and enthymemes to forensic. The first is concerned 
with the future, so that its examples must be derived 
from the past ; ?the second with the question of the 
existence or non-existence of facts, in which demon- 
strative and necessary proofs are more in place [; for 
the past involves a kind of necessity." One should 
not introduce a series of enthymemes continuously 

issue, in which this topic may be safely used." For instance, 
A may on justifiable grounds charge B with theft ; B denies 
it, and he may be innocent, although the evidence is strongly 
against him. In such a case, neither of the parties is 
necessarily irovijpos. 

^ Or, reading dWus, " if there is some other reason." 
" It is irrevocable, and it is possible to discuss it with some 
degree of certainty, whereas the future is quite uncertain, 
and all that can be done is to draw inferences from the past. 

453 



ARISTOTLE 

evovfi'^fiara, aAA' dva/xiyvvpaf el 8e fjbit], Kara- 
pAaTTTei ctAAT^Aa. eari yap /cat rov ttooov opos' 

CO (f)tX , eTret roaa eiVre? ocr' av rreTrvvfievos ovrjp, 

7 aAA ov Totavra. /cat p,7j Trepl Txavrcov evdvp-rjixaTa 
^rjreiv' el 8e fMij, TTOirjaeig oirep evioi Troiovcn rojv 
<j)LXoao(f>ovvr(x)v , ol avXXoyit,ovrai ra yvcopifxcorepa 

8 /cat TTiarorepa rj ef oJv Xeyovacv. /cat orav nddos 
TTOifjs, fjir) Aeye evdvfjbrjfMa' ■^ ya/3 eKKpovaei to 
TTados r) fidrrjv elprj/jievov ear at to ivdv/jirjfMa' 
cKKpovovai yap at Kivijaet? aAAi^Aas" at afxa, /cat 
7] d^avil,ovaiv rj dadevels' TTOiovaiv. ovh orav 
rjdiKov rov Xoyov, ov Set evOvfxrjpbd tl ^rjretv a/xa* 
ov yap exeL ovre rjdos ovre Trpoaipeaiv 7] aTToSet^ts'. 

9 Tvcofiai? Se ;)^p?^OTeov /cat ev BirjyTjaei, /cat ev 
rriaref tjOlkov ydp. " /cat eycj SeScoKa, /cat ravr 
elBwg d>s ov Set 77t(TTeyetv," eav Se iradrjriKoJs , 
"/cat ov p^erafMeXei p.oi Kairrep rjSiKTjfievco' rovrcp 
fjiev ydp Trepieari ro KepSos, efjuol Se ro St/catov." 

10 To Se Sr]fj.7]yopeLV xP-Xeirayrepov rov h(,Kdl,eadai., 
elKorois, SioTt TTepl ro p^eXXov eKeZ Se irepl ro 
yeyovos, o eTncrrrjrov rjSrj /cat toi? p.dvreaiv, cos" 
e(f>rj 'KTTtfjievLSrjg 6 Kpyys" e/cetvos" ydp rrept rojv 
icrofxevcov ovk ifiavrevero , dXXd Trepl rcov yeyovo- 
454 



RHETORIC, III. XVII. 6-10 

but mix them up ; otherwise they destroy one 
another. For there is a hmit of quantity ; thus. 

Friend, since thou hast said as much as a wise man would 
say," 

where Homer does not say roLavra (such things as), 
but TofTft (as many things as). Nor should you try 
to find enthymemes about everything ; otherwise 
you will be imitating certain philosophers, who draw 
conclusions that are better known and more plausible 
than the premises from which they are drawn. ^ And 
whenever you wish to arouse emotion, do not use an 
enthymeme, for it will either drive out the emotion 
or it will be useless ; for simultaneous movements 
drive each other out, the result being their mutual 
destruction or weakening. Nor should you look for 
an enthymeme at the time when you wish to give 
the speech an ethical character ; for demonstration 
involves neither moral character nor moral purpose. 

Moral maxims, on the other hand, should be used 
in both narrative and proof ; for they express moral 
character ; for instance, " I gave him the money and 
that although I knew that one ought not to trust." 
Or, to arouse emotion : " I do not regret it, although 
I have been wronged ; his is the profit, mine the 
right." 

Deliberative speaking is more difficult than 
forensic, and naturally so, because it has to do with 
the future ; whereas forensic speaking has to do with 
the past, which is already known, even by diviners, 
as Epimenides the Cretan said ; for he used to 
divine, not the future, but only things that were past 

" Odyssey, iv. 204. 

'' For this passage see i. 2. 12-13. The meaning is that it 
is absurd to prove what every one knows already. 

455 



ARISTOTLE 

rwv fxev ahrjXoiv hi. koI 6 vofios VTToOeac? ev rots" 
SiKaviKols' e^ovra Se a.p-)(rjv paov evpelv aTToh^i^iv . 
/cat ovK e^et ttoAAo,? hiarpt^ds, olov Trpog dvrihiKOv 
T] TTcpi avTov, rj TTadrjTLKOv TToietv. oAA T^Kiara 
TTavrcov, eav purj i^LarrjTat. Set ovv airopovvra 
TOVTO TTOtelv OTTep OL ^ AdiijvrjaL prjTopes ttolovol 
/cat 'Icro/cpaTT^S" /cat yap avfjb^ovXcvwv Karrjyopel, 
olov AaKcSaiiMOVLCov fiev ev rw TravqyvpiKO) , 
^dprjTog S' €V rw avp.p.ax^KO) . 

11 'Ev- Se rols eTTtSei/CTt/cots" Set rov Xoyov eTreicr- 
oStow eTTaivois, olov ^IaoKpdrr]g 77otet* det yap 
riva cladyei. /cat o e'Aeye Fopylas, ort ov^ 
VTToXeiTTei avTov 6 Xoyos, rovro iamv ei yap 

A;)^tAAe'a Ae'yet, YlrjXca enaLveL, etra AlaKov, etra 
Tov deov, ofiotoj? Se /cat dvhpiav, rj rd /cat ra 

12 TTotet Tj TOLovhe iartv. e^ovra jj,€V odv (XTroSetfet? 
1418 b /cat tjOlkcos XeKTCov /cat aTroSet/crt/ccDs", idv Se /Lti^ 

^'X??S" ivdvp.rjpiara, -qdiKcos' /cat p,d/\Xov rep e77tet/cet 
appi^orrei xpiqarov <j>aiveadai r) tov Aoyov' aKpi^rj. 

13 Toil' Se €vdvp.rjfj,dTO}v rd iXeyKTiKa ixaXXov 
evSoKLfMel Tcov SeiKTiKUJV, OTL oaa eXeyxpv voiei, 

<» The remark of Epimenides is by many editors inter- 
preted as a sarcasm upon the fraternity of soothsayers, who 
pretended to be able to foretell the future. But how is this 
to be got out of the Greek? The point is perhaps some- 
thing like : " it is easy enough to talk about the past, for 
even soothsayers know it." What Aristotle says here is that 
Epimenides practised a different kind of divination, relating 
to the obscure phenomena of the past. The following is an 
instance. After the followers of Cylon, who tried to make 
himself tyrant of Athens (c. 632) had been put to death by 
the Alcmaeonid archon Megacles, in violation of the terms 
of surrender, a curse rested upon the city and it was de- 
vastated by a pestilence. On the advice of the oracle, 

456 



RHETORIC, III. xvii. 10-13 

but obscure.* Further, the law is the subject in 
forensic speaking ; and when one has a starting- 
point, it is easier to find a demonstrative proof. 
Dehberative speaking does not allow many oppor- 
tunities for lingering — for instance, attacks on the 
adversary, remarks about oneself, or attempts to 
arouse emotion. In this branch of Rhetoric there is 
less room for these than in any other, unless the 
speaker wanders from the subject. Therefore, when 
at a loss for topics, one must do as the orators at 
Athens, amongst them Isocrates, for even when de- 
liberating, he brings accusations against the Lace- 
daemonians, for instance, in the Panegt/ricus,^ and 
against Chares in the Symmachikos (On the Peace)." 

Epideictic speeches should be varied with laudatory 
episodes, after the manner of Isocrates, who is always 
bringing somebody in. This is what Gorgias meant 
when he said that he was never at a loss for some- 
thing to say ; for, if he is speaking of Peleus, he 
praises Achilles, then Aeacus, then the god ; similarly 
courage, which does this and that,"^ or is of such a 
kind. If you have proofs, then, your language must 
be both ethical and demonstrative ; if you have no 
enthymemes, ethical only. In fact, it is more fitting 
that a virtuous man should show himself good than 
that his speech should be painfully exact. 

Refutative enthymemes are more popular than 
demonstrative, because, in all cases of refutation, it 

Epimenides was summoned from Crete, and by certain rites 
and sacrifices purified the city and put a stop to the pestilence. 

* 110-114. ' 27. 

<* He enumerates all the deeds that proceed from courage. 
Another reading is -^ rd Kal rd, Trote? 5 Toiovde icrTiv, i.e. 
when praising courage, and this or that, he is employing a 
method of the kind mentioned. 

457 



ARISTOTLE 

/xaAAov 8t]Xov otl avXXeXoyicrraL' irapdXXrjXa yap 

14 fjidXXov rdvavria yvcopit^er at. rd 8e irpos rov 
avTihiKov ovx erepov tl et3o?, oAAa rcov rrioTeoiv 
earn rd /Mev Xvaai ivcrrdaet rd 8e cruXXoyLcrfMoi . 
Set Se Acat iv avpb^ovXfj /cat iv Slkt] dp)^6f.i,€vov p,kv 
Xiyeiv ra? iavrov Trlareig rrporepov, varepov Se 
TTpos ravavria diravrdv Xvovra /cat TrpoSiacrvpovra. 
dv Se TToXvxovs fj rj ivavricocns, rrporepov rd 
ivavrta, otov eTTolrjae K.aXXicrrparog ev rfj Mecr- 
arjviaKTJ eKKXrjcna' d ydp ipovat TrpoaveXcov ovrws 

15 rore avrog €L7T€v. varepov 8e Xiyovra irpcxnov 
ra 7Tpo£ rov evavriov Xoyov XcKreov, Xvovra /cat 
dvri,avXXoyLt,6pbevov , /cat ndXicrra dv cvSoKLpbrjKora 
rj- coaTTep ydp dvdpcoTTOv 7TpoSia^€^Xr]/j,€vov ov 
Sexerai rj 0^%^, rov avrdv rporrov ovhk Xoyov, 
idv 6 ivavrios ev SoKrj elprjKevai. Set ovv x^P^^ 
TTOLeZv iv ra> aKpoarfj ro) fxeXXovri Xoyo)' ear at 
Se, dv dveXrjs. Sto i} Trpos" rrdvra i} to. p,eyLcrra rj 
rd evSoKLjjbovvra ^ rd eveXeyKra pLaxeadp^evov 
ovro) rd avrov Tnard TTOirjreov. 



" There is no difference in form between the demonstrative 
and refutative enthymeme, but the latter draws opposite 
conclusions ; and opposites are always more striking when 
they are brought together, and a parallel drawn between 
them. It is then easy to see where the fallacy lies. Cf. ii. 
23. 30 : " Refutative enthymemes are more effective (popular) 
than demonstrative, because they bring opposites together in 
a small compass, which are more striking (clearer) to the 
hearer from being put side by side." 

458 



RHETORIC, III. XVII. 13-15 

is clearer that a logical conclusion has been reached ; 
for opposites are more noticeable when placed in 
juxtaposition." The refutation of the opponent is 
not a particular kind of proof ; his arguments should 
be refuted partly by objection, partly by counter- 
syllogism.^ ^In both deliberative and forensic 
rhetoric he who speaks first should state his own 
proofs and afterwards meet the arguments of the 
opponent, refuting or pulling them to pieces before- 
hand. But if the opposition is varied," these argu- 
ments should be dealt with first, as Callistratus did 
in the Messenian assembly ; in fact, it was only after 
he had first refuted what his opponents were likely 
to say that he put forward his own proofs. He who 
replies should first state the arguments against the 
opponent's speech, refuting and answering it by 
syllogisms, especially if his arguments have met with 
approval. For as the mind is ill-disposed towards 
one against whom prejudices have been raised before- 
hand, it is equally so towards a speech, if the adver- 
sary is thought to have spoken Avell. One must 
therefore make room in the hearer's mind for the 
speech one intends to make ; and for this purpose 
you must destroy the impression made by the adver- 
sary. Wherefore it is only after having combated 
all the arguments, or the most important, or those 
which are plausible, or most easy to refute, that you 
should substantiate your own case : 

'' In the translation tcSj' irlcTTewv is taken with c'cm : it is 
the business of, the proper function of, proofs. Others take 
it with TO. fxh . . . TO, 5e' : some . . . other (of the opponent's 
arguments). 

' If the opponent's arguments are numerous and strong, 
by reason of the varied nature of the points dealt with. 

^59 



ARISTOTLE 

TOL? deaZai TTpwra avfji,fj,a)(os yevqaofiai. 
iyco yap "Hpav . . . 

iv TOVTOLS rjiparo TTpcorov rod evrjdeardrov . 

16 riept pi.kv ovv TTLcrrecov ravra. els Se ro '^dos, 
eTTetSr) evua rrepl avrov Xeyeiv 17 eTri<j>6ovov ri 
/jiaKpoXoyiav •^ dvTLXoytav e;^ei, /cat Trepi dXXov rj 
Xoihopiav Tj dypoiKiav, erepov XPV Xeyovra TTOielv, 
onep ^laoKpdrrjs Troiel iv rw ^lXltttto) /cat iv rfj 
dvnSoaei, /cat d)? " Ap)(^LXoxos i/jdyei,' 7tol€l yap rov 
TTarepa Xeyovra TTcpl rrjs dvyarpos iv rw IdjJiPcp 

XpT]P'dTiov 8' deXTTTov ovdev iariv oi)S' dTTiopt-orov , 

Kal rov ^dpcova rov reKrova iv rw Id/ji^co oi) rj 
dpxrj 

ov fioL rd Tvyeoj. 

/cat d)s llo(f)OKXrjs rov Atfiova vnep ri]s Avriyovrjs 

17 TTpos rov TTarepa d)s Xeyovrcov erepcov. Set Se 

" Euripides, Troades, 969-971. Hecuba had advised 
Menelaus to put Helen to death ; she defends herself at 
length, and is answered by Hecuba in a reply of which these 
words form part. Her argument is that none of the three 
goddesses who contended for the prize of beauty on Mt. Ida 
would have been such fools as to allow Argos and Athens to 
become subject to Troy as the result of the contest, which 
was merely a prank. 

* 4-7. Isocrates says that his friends thought very highly 
of one of his addresses, as likely to bring peace. 

* 132-139, 141-149. Here again Isocrates puts compli- 
ments on his composition into the mouth of an imaginary 
friend. 

** Archilochus (c. 650) of Paros was engaged to Neobule, 
the daughter of Ivycambes. Her father broke off the en- 
gagement, whereupon Archilochus pursued father and 
daughter with furious and scurrilous abuse. It Is here said 

460 



RHETORIC, III. XVII. 15-17 

I will first defend the goddesses, for I [do not think] that 
Hera . . ." 

in this passage the poet has first seized upon the 
weakest argument. 

So much concerning proofs. In regard to moral 
character, since sometimes, in speaking of ourselves, 
we render ourselves liable to envy, to the charge of 
prohxity, or contradiction, or, when speaking of 
another, we may be accused of abuse or boorishness, 
we must make another speak in our place, as Isocrates 
does in the Pkilippus * and in the Antidosis.*^ Archi- 
lochus uses the same device in censure ; for in his 
iambics he introduces the father speaking as follows 
of his daughter : 

There is nothing beyond expectation, nothing that can be 
sworn impossible,'* 

and the carpenter Charon in the iambic verse be- 
ginning 

I [care not for the wealth] of Gyges ; * 

Sophocles, also,^'^ introduces Haemon, when defending 
Antigone against his father, as if quoting the opinion 

that, instead of attacking the daughter directly, he represented 
her as being attacked by her father. The meaning of 
deX-TTTov is not clear. It may be a general statement : the 
unexpected often happens ; or, there is nothing so bad that 
you may not expect it. B. St. Hilaire translates : " There is 
nothing that money cannot procure," meaning that the 
father was prepared to sell his daughter (Frag. 74). 

' The line ends : rod TroXvxpiTov yueXeu Archilochus 
represents Charon the carpenter as expressing his own 
disapproval of the desire for wealth and of the envy caused 
by others possessing it. 

^ Here again, Haemon similarly puts his own feelings as 
to Creon's cruel treatment of Antigone into the mouth of 
the people of the city, and refers to popular rumour. 

461 



ARISTOTLE 

/cat /Jber a^aXXeiv ra ivOvixxjiiara Kol yvayfias 
TTOieiv iviore, otov " XP'^ ^^ '^'ct? StaAAayds" ttolclv 
Tovs vovv e^ovras evrvxpvvr as' ovtoj yap dv 
/jbeyLcrra irXeoveKTOiev ." ivdvfji,7jfj.aTLKOJs Se " et 
yap Set, orav <ji}<f)eXLp,airaTai (La /cat TrAeoi'- 
e/CTt/ccorarat at /caraAAayat, rore KaraXXdrreadai , 
evrvxovvTas Set KaraXXdrrcadai." 

18. Hepl Se ipoiTrja€Uis , evKaipov eari TrocelcrOai 
1419 a p,dXiara fj,ev orav ro erepov elprjKOJS fj, wcrre ivos 
TTpoaepcoT'qdevros' cru/x^aiVet to droTrov olov Yiepi- 
kXtjs AdfJiTTCova eTTrjpcro Trepl tt^S" tcXcttjs tojv ttjs 
acxireipas lepdJv, cIttovtos Se otl ovx olov re 
dreXearov dKoveiv, rjpeTo et otSev avro?, (f)daKov- 

2 Tos Se "/cat ttcos dreXearros wv;" Sevrepov 8e 
orav ro p,€V (f>av€p6v fj, to Se epcoTrjaavri hrjXov fj 
OTt Scoaet* TTvdofievov yap Set t'^v fiiav TrpoTaaw 
[M7j TTpoaepcoTav to (fiavepov, dXXd to ovfJiTTepaafia 
etTretf, olov HcoKpdTrjg MeAr^rou ov ^aoKovTOS 
avTov deovs vofxt^eiv [rjp€To] et Sat/xovtov rt Ae'yot, 
ofMoXoyrjaavTos Se rjpeTO et ovx ^^ Sat/xot'es" tJtoc decov 
TralSes eter ■^ ^etov rt, ^rjoavTos Se " eortv ovv," 

3 e'^'>7> " oaTts decov fxev nalSas oterai clvac, deov? 

" The words Srau ... 77 have been variously translated: 
( 1 ) when one of the two alternatives has already been stated ; 
(3) when the opponent has stated what is different from the 
fact ; (3) when the opponent has already conceded so much, 
*'made one admission " (Jebb). 

* Reading ifpero. 

4>62 



RHETORIC, III. XVII. 17— xviii. 3 

of others. One should also sometimes change enthy- 
memes into moral maxims ; for instance, " Sensible 
men should become reconciled when they are pros- 
perous ; for in this manner they will obtain the 
greatest advantages," which is equivalent to the 
enthymeme : "If men should become reconciled 
whenever it is most useful and advantageous, they 
should be reconciled in a time of prosperity." 

18. In regard to interrogation, its employment is 
especially opportune, when the opponent has already 
stated the opposite, so that the addition of a question 
makes the result an absurdity " ; as, for instance, 
when Pericles interrogated Lampon about initiation 
into the sacred rites of the saviour goddess. On 
Lampon replying that it was not possible for one 
who was not initiated to be told about them, Pericles 
asked him if he himself was acquainted with the 
rites, and when he said yes, Pericles further asked, 
" How can that be, seeing that you are uninitiated ? " 
Again, interrogation should be employed when one 
of the two propositions is evident, and it is obvious 
that the opponent will admit the other if you ask 
him. But the interrogator, having obtained the 
second premise by putting a question, should not 
make an additional question of what is evident, but 
should state the conclusion. For instance, Socrates, 
when accused by Meletus of not believing in the 
gods, asked ^ whether he did not say that there was 
a divine something ; and when Meletus said yes, 
Socrates went on to ask if divine beings were not 
either children of the gods or something godlike. 
When Meletus again said yes, Socrates rejoined, " Is 
there a man, then, who can admit that the children 
of the gods exist without at the same time admitting 

463 



ARISTOTLE 

Se ov; " ert orav fjicXXr) r) ivavria Xeyovra SeL^eiv 

4 7] TTapdho^ov . reraprov hi, orav {jltj ivfj dAA' 7] 
ao(f>iariKCx)s OLTroKpivdfjbevov Xvaai' edv yap ovrois 
a7TOKptv7]Tai, on eari jj,ev ean 8' ov, rj rd p.ev rd 
8 ov, rj Trfj fjb€v Trfj S' ov, dopv^ovaiv cL'S diropovvros . 
aAAcos" Se p,ri iyx^tpeZv edv ydp evarfj, KeKparrjadai 
ooKel' ov ydp otov re ttoAAo, epcordv Std rrjv d- 
aOeveiav rov dKpoarov. Sto /cat rd evdvp.-qp.ara 
on /xoAicrra avarpe(f>eiv Set. 

5 ' AnoKpLvaadaL Se Set tt/oos" /xev rd dp,^i^oXa 
hiaipovvra Xoyo) kol /mtj avvr6p,a)s, rrpos Se rd 
SoKovvra ivavria rrjv Xvctlv <f)ipovra evdvs rfj 
drroKpLaei, irplv iTrepcorijaai ro imov rj avXXoyiaa- 
adai- ov ydp ■)(^aXerr6v irpoopdv iv rivi 6 Aoyos". 
(f)av€pov S' rjfjuv ecrrco iK rcbv rorriKwv kol rovro 

6 /cat at Aucreis'. /cat crufMnepacvo/jLevov , idv ipcorrjfia 
TTOifj ro avp,7ripaafjLa, rrjv alriav eLTreZv otov 
llo(f)0KXrj? ipcjorcojjievos vtto Yleicrdvhpov el eho^ev 
avro) (jjcTTTep /cat rots' aAAots" rrpo^ovXoLs, Kara- 
crrrjaai, tous" rerpaKoaiovs, i4'l- " "^^ ^^> ^^ 
TTOVTjpd aoL ravra eSo/cet elvai ; " €<f>7]. " ovkovv 

" For the first of the quibbles Sandys refers to Aristo- 
phanes, Acharnians, 396, where Cephisophon, being asked 
if Euripides was indoors, replies, " Yes and no, if you under- 
stand me " ; and he gives the explanation, his mind is outside, 
collecting scraps of poetry, while he himself is upstairs 
{dua^dSriv , unless it means " with his legs up ") composing 
a tragedy. The reference in the second instance is to the 
adversary being reduced to such a position that he cannot 
answer without having recourse to sophistical divisions and 
distinctions, which seem to imply imcertainty. Aristotle 
himself is fond of such "cautiously limited judgements" 
(Gomperz). 

The translation is that of the reading airopovvros, a con- 
jecture of Spengel's. The audience will be ready to express 

464 



RHETORIC, III. XVIII. 3-6 

that the gods exist ? " Thirdly, when it is intended 
to show that the opponent either contradicts himself 
or puts forward a paradox. Further, when the 
opponent can do nothing else but answer the question 
by a sophistical solution ; for if he answers, " Partly 
yes, and partly no," " Some are, but some are not," 
" In one sense it is so, in another not," the hearers 
cry out against him as being in a difficulty." In other 
cases interrogation should not be attempted ; for if 
the adversary raises an objection, the interrogator 
seems to be defeated ; for it is impossible to ask a 
number of questions, owing to the hearer's weakness. 
Wherefore also we should compress our enthymemes 
as much as possible. 

Ambiguous questions should be answered by de- 
fining them by a regular explanation, and not too 
concisely ; those that appear likely to make us con- 
tradict ourselves should be solved at once in the 
answer, before the adversary has time to ask the 
next question or to draw a conclusion ; for it is not 
difficult to see the drift of his argument. Both this, 
however, and the means of answering will be suffi- 
ciently clear from the Topics.^ If a conclusion is 
put in the form of a question, we should state the 
reason for our answer. For instance, Sophocles.* 
being asked by Pisander whether he, like the rest 
of the Committee of Ten, had approved the setting 
up of the Four Hundred, he admitted it. " What 
then?" asked Pisander, "did not this appear to 
you to be a wicked thing ? " Sophocles admitted it. 

its disapproval of his shuffling answers, which are evidence 
of his perplexity. The ordinary reading diropouvTes attributes 
the " perplexity " to the hearers. Or, " the hearers, thinking 
he is puzzled, applaud us [the interrogator] " (Jebb). 
» viii. 4. « Cp. i. 14. 3. 

2 H ^65 



ARISTOTLE 

ai) ravra enpa^as ra TTovrjpd;" " vai," €(f>7]- " ov 
yap rjv aAAa ^eXriat." /cat (hs 6 Aa/cajr evdvvo- 
fxevos rrjs i</)opl,as, ipcoTcofievo? et Sokovctlv avrw 
SiKaicos aTToXcoXevat drepoL, e^^y. 6 Se " ovkovv 
ai) rovrois ravra edov;" Kal os" e0?y. "ovkovv 
SiKaicos av," ^4*1 > 'k^^'' ^-^ airoXoio;" " ov 
Si]ra," €<f}rj- " ol jxkv yap p^pr^/iara Xa^ovres ravra 
errpa^av, iyco 8' ov, aAAa yvw/j^rj." Slo ovr* 
€7T€pojrdv Set puerd ro avfiTrepaafia, ovre ro avp.- 
1419 b TTcpaafia €7T€pwrdv , idv pirj ro ttoXv Trepifj rod 
dXrjdovg. 
7 riept 8e rdjv yeXoiojv, iireihrj riva So/cet XPV^^^ 
€X€iv €v rots dywuL, /cat Selv e^rj Vopyias rrjv 
fj,€V aTTOvSrjv Sta^^et/jetv rd)v ivavriojv yeXcori 
rdv Se yeXojra ottovStj, opOojs Xeycov, ciprjraL 
TToara eiSr) yeXoicov iarlv ev rols Trepl TroirjrLKrjs, 
cov ro pi€v dpfMorrei iXevdepo) ro S' ov. ottcos ovv 
ro dpp,6rrov avrco X-qifjerai. eWt 8 rj elpcovela 
rrj? ^ojpboXoxi'O.? iXevdepicxirepov 6 p-ev yap avrov 
€V€Ka TTotet ro yeXotov, 6 8e ^ajp,oX6xos irepov. 

19. '0 8' imXoyog avyKcirai e/c rcrrdpojv, e/c 
re rov irpos iavrov KaraoKevdcrai ev rdv aKpoarTjv 
Kal rov evavriov <f)avXcv9, Kal e/c rod av^fjaai Kal 
ra7T€ivdjcraL, Kal e/c rov et? to, TrdOrj rdv aKpoarrjv 
Karaarrjcrat, Kal i^ dvap,vqa€a)s • 7T€<f)VK€ ydp 
pi,€rd rd drroheL^ai avrdv fiev dXrjdij rdv 8e evavriov 
ijjevdrj, ovroj rd eTraiveZv Kal ipeyeiv Kal eTTLxaX- 
Keveiv. SvoiV 8e darepov Set aroxd^ecrdat,, tj on 
rovrois dyaSds ri on ctTrAais", o 8' ort /ca/cos" rovroLs 

"» The chapters are lost (cp. i. 11. 29). 
* Or, " mould the hearers to one's will " (L. and S.). 

466 



RHETORIC, III. xvni. 6-xix. 1 

" So then you did what was wicked ? " " Yes, for 
there was nothing better to be done." The Lacedae- 
monian, who was called to account for his ephoralty, 
being asked if he did not think that the rest of his 
colleagues had been justly put to death, answered 
yes. " But did not you pass the same measures as 
they did ? " " Yes." " Would not you, then, also 
be justly put to death ? " " No ; for my colleagues 
did this for money ; I did not, but acted according 
to my conscience." For this reason we should not 
ask any further questions after drawing the con- 
clusion, nor put the conclusion itself as a question, 
unless the balance of truth is unmistakably in our 
favour. 

As for jests, since they may sometimes be useful 
in debates, the advice of Gorgias was good — to con- 
found the opponents' earnest with jest and their jest 
Avith earnest. We have stated in the Poetics "■ how 
many kinds of jests there are, some of them becoming 
a gentleman, others not. You should therefore 
choose the kind that suits you. Irony is more 
gentlemanly than buffoonery ; for the first is em- 
ployed on one's own account, the second on that of 
another. 

19. The epilogue is composed of four parts : to 
dispose the hearer favourably towards oneself and 
unfavourably towards the adversary ; to amplify and 
depreciate ; to excite the emotions of the hearer ; 
to recapitulate. For after you have proved that you 
are truthful and that the adversary is false, the 
natural order of things is to praise ourselves, blame 
him, and put the finishing touches.* One of two 
things should be aimed at, to show that you are 
either relatively or absolutely good and the adversary 

467 



ARISTOTLE 

T] oTt aTrXcbs. ef ojv Se 8rj roiovrovs Karao-Kevd^eLV 
Set, e'iprjVTat ol rorrot rrodev aTTovBaiovs Sei /cara- 

2 aK€vd^€LV /cat (/>avXovs. to Se /i.eTa rovro SeSety- 
fjievcov rjSrj av^eiv earl Kara (f)vaiv r) TaTretvouv' 
Set ya/3 to. 7T€7Tpayfj,€va ojxoXoyeladaL, et i^eXXei 
TO TToaov epeiv /cat yap t^ rcut' arojfjidriov av^rjots 
€K TTpovTTap-)(ovTCov eoTLV. odev Se Set av^eiv Kal 

SraTTeLvovv, eWett-rat ol tottol Trporepov. /xera 
Se ravra, StJXcov ovroiv /cat oia /cat T^At'/ca, et? ra 
Tra^T^ ayetv rot' a/cpoaT-ryv ravra S' iarlv e'Aeo? 
/cat Seti'axTts" /cat 0/3717 /cat puaos /cat (f)d6vos Kal 
^•^Aos" /cat ept?. e'ipTjvrat Se /cat towtcoi' ot roTTOt 

4 Trporepov . coare Xolttov dva/jLvrjaac ra Trpoeiprj- 
fxeva. rovro Se dp/jiorrei noielv ovrcos cooTrep 
<f)aalv ev roZs TTpooiixioL?, ovk opda)^ Xeyovres' 
Lva yap evfiadrj fj, KeXevovai iroXXdKi^ etTreti^. 
e/cet pt.ev ovv Set ro 7Tpdyp,a elnelv, tra /ai^ Xavddvr) 
TTcpl ov rj Kpiaig, ivravda Se St' c5v Se'Set/crat 
/ce^aAatcoSco?. 

6 'ApxT] Se', Stort a inrecrx^TO aTroSe'Scu/cet' • ojo-re 
. a re /cat St' o XcKrcov. Xeyer at Se e^ avmrapa- 
PoXrjg rod evavriov. Trapa^aXXeiv Se -^ oo-a Trept 
TO avro a/x0a> eiTTov, rj firj KoravriKpv. " dAA' 
oSros fj,€v raSe Tre/ot toutou, iyoj Se raSi, /cat Std 
1420a Tttura," 17 e'^ elpcjveias, olov " ovros yap rdS' 
etTrev, eyco Se rdSe. /cat rt dv cttoUl, et rctSe 
eoetfev, oAAa p,r) raot; ij ef cpcoTTjaeco?- rt 

" i. 9. » ii. 19. « ii. 1-11. 

468 



RHETORIC, III. XIX. 1-5 

either relatively or absolutely bad. The topics which 
serve to represent men as good or bad have already 
been stated.** After this, when the proof has once 
been established, the natural thing is to amplify or 
depreciate ; for it is necessary that the facts should 
be admitted, if it is intended to deal with the ques- 
tion of degree ; just as the growth of the body is 
due to things previously existing. The topics of 
amplification and depreciation have been previously 
set forth. ** Next, when the nature and importance 
of the facts are clear, one should rouse the hearer to 
certain emotions — ^pity, indignation, anger, hate, 
jealousy, emulation, and quarrelsomeness. The 
topics of these also have been previously stated,^ so 
that all that remains is to recapitulate what has been 
said. This may appropriately be done at this stage 
in the way certain rhetoricians wrongly recommend 
for the exordium, when they advise frequent repeti- 
tion of the points, so that they may be easily learnt. 
In the exordium we should state the subject, in 
order that the question to be decided may not escape 
notice, but in the epilogue we should give a summary 
statement of the proofs. 

We should begin by saying that we have kept our 
promise, and then state what we have said and why. 
Our case may also be closely compared with our 
opponent's ; and we may either compare what both 
of us have said on the same point, or without direct 
comparison : " My opponent said so-and-so, and I 
said so-and-so on this point and for these reasons." 
Or ironically, as for instance, " He said this and I 
answered that ; what would he have done, if he had 
proved this, and not simply that ? " Or by interroga- 
tion : " What is there that has not been proved ? " 

469 



ARISTOTLE 

ov SeSet/crat; " rj " ovrog ri eSet^ev; " t^ 817 
ovrws e/c Trapa^oXrjs, t] Kara <f>vaLv, cog iXexOr], 
ovTio ra avrov, /cat TrdXiv, eav ^ovXjj, x^P^^ '^^ 
rod evavriov Xoyov. reXevrfj Se rrjs Xe^eojs 
apjxorrei r) davvSerog, ottojs eTriXoyos dXXd fj.r) 
Xoyos fj' " e'iprjKa, d/CTy/coare, ex^re, Kpivare." 



" Reading reXevTrj, a conjecture of Victorius. With 
TeXevTT], the sense will be : " as a conclusion, the asyndetic 
style is appropriate." 

* It is generally supposed that this example of a suitable 



470 



RHETORIC, III. XIX. 5-6 

or, " What has my opponent proved ? " We may, 
therefore, either sum up by comparison, or in the 
natural order of the statements, just as they were 
made, our own first, and then again, separately, if 
we so desire, what has been said by our opponent. 
To the conclusion of the speech " the most appropriate 
style is that which has no connecting particles, in 
order that it may be a peroration, but not an oration : 
" I have spoken ; you have heard ; you know the 
facts ; now give your decision," ^ 

peroration is an echo of the conclusion of the speech of 
Lysias Against Eratosthenes. 



471 



SELECT GLOSSARY 

OF TECHNICAL AND OTHER TERMS 

[As a rule, only the rtieanings of words in Aristotle's " Rhetoric " are noticed, 
without reference to later rhetoricians.] 

dywviffTiKSs (i. 5. 14): "fit for athletic contests " ; (iii. 12. 1) 
of style: "suited to debate" {dydji'), including both 
deliberative and forensic speeches. It is opposed to 
ypa<pLK7}, the style of compositions meant to be read. 

dKpi^eia (iii. 12. 5), dKpij:io\oyla (i. 5. 15), dKpi^rjs (iii. 17. 12): 
of style, " precise," " nicely finished," " highly correct " ; 
of statements, " exact," " closely reasoned." 

dTroir\di>7)ais (iii. 13. 5) : throwing dust in the eyes of the 
judge and diverting his attention from what is unfavour- 
able ; unless it is taken in a neuter sense, wandering from 
the subject, "digression." 

dpfjLoi'ia (iii. 1. 4): lit. joining; here, pitch or tone, accent, 
modulation of the voice. 

dpxv . . . atriov (i. 7. 12) : the latter (cause) precedes the 
former (first principle or beginning). " In a plant, the 
seed is the dpxn, the power of vegetation the ahiov. " 

&T€xi'oi (i. 2. 2; 15. 1); of proofs, those which are inde- 
pendent of art, being already in existence and ready for 
use ; ivrex^oi are those which have to be invented by the 
orator : alias esse prohailones quan extra dicendi raiionem 
acciperet orator, alias quas ex causa traheret ipse et quo- 
dammodo gigneret ; ideoque illas drixvov^, inartinciales, has 
ivrixvovi, artificiales, vocaret (Quint. Inst. Orat. v. 1. 8). 

aO^-qffis (i. 9. 39), av^-priKd (i. 9. 38), aiSfei;' (ii. 18. 4) : " ampli- 
fication." Its object is to increase the rhetorical effect 
and importance of a statement by intensifying the circum- 
stances of an object or action. 

avroKa^8d\us (iii. 7. 2) : " off-hand, lightly, at randon ; " 

472 



GLOSSARY 

avTOKa^SaXos (iii. 14. 11) is used of a hastily built ship by 
the poet Lycophron (see note on iii. 3. 1). It is said to be 
properly applied to badly kneaded meal. 

d0e\Tjs (iii. 9. 5) : " simple," the equivalent of aTrXoCj or 
fiovoKojXos as applied to the period ; that is, consisting of 
only one kwXov (member, clause) as opposed to the com- 
plex, which allowed more than one, but was not supposed 
to exceed four \tDXa. 

/SXatVwffts (ii. 23. 15) : retortion of a dilemma upon the pro- 
poser of it : a form of enthymeme in which, from each of 
two contraries, some good or evil follows, each contrary 
to the other. The adj. ^Xatffds is translated (1) bow-legged, 
or (2) bandy-legged ; but the connexion of this with the 
examples given is obscure. Cope suggests that the word 
properly means " straddling of the legs " ; " legs irregu- 
larly diverging " (Welldon). 

yXwTTa (iii. 3. 2) : an obsolete, foreign, or dialectal word, in 
any way out of the common, which needs to be explained. 

yvivfiri (ii. 21. 2): a moral maxim or sentiment; a general 
(not particular) statement relating to the conduct of life. 
Maxims are to enthymemes as premises are to syllogisms, 
not in the case of every enthymeme, but only those that 
deal with the actions and passions of ordinary life. 

ypacpiKT] Xi^is (iii. 12. 1): "suited for writing," "literary," 
opposed to ayuivicTTiKT] X. 

deiyfj.a (iii. 14. 6): "sample, pattern"; the prologue or 
proem in an epic poem or drama, so called from its 
giving a sample of what is to follow, thus making the 
hearer acquainted with the nature of the subject to be 
treated of. 

deiKTiKo. ^vdvfjLTjfxara (ii. 22. 14) : direct arguments (as opposed 
e.(/. to the reductlo ad ahsurdum), the object of which is 
to demonstrate or explain : they are opposed to iXeyKTiKo. 
i., the object of which is refutation; Set^ts (iii. 7. 6): 
" method of proof." 

Seivuffis (ii. 21. 10): "exaggeration," "intensification," de- 
fined by Longinus as a form of aiJ^r^crts ; also "indigna- 
tion," or the arousing of this feeling. Cicero (De inventions, 
i. 53. 100) describes it as a form of speech whereby 
intense hatred of a person or disgust at anything is 
aroused. 

8iaip€cris (ii. 23. 10) : distribution or division into parts or 

473 



GLOSSARY 

heads, dealing with the diiFerent bearings of the case ; in 
Poetics (1461 a 33) it is more or less equivalent to punctua- 
tion, although it includes every kind of break, diaipfiv 
Tip Xoycp (iii. 18. 5) is used of giving a detailed explanation, 
as opposed to awro/xios, one that is concise. 
diaXeKTLKTi (i. 1. 1): logical discussion, properly by way of 
question and answer ; here and elsewhere in Aristotle, the 
logic of probabilities, as opposed to strict demonstration 
or scientific proof (d7r65etfis). The premises of the latter 
being incontrovertibly true, the conclusions drawn from 
them must be equally true. The premises of the dialectic 
syllogism and the rhetorical enthymeme on the other hand 
are only probable, such as appear to be true to certain 
persons, and therefore the conclusions drawn from them 
can only be probable. 

Rhetoric is here stated to be a counterpart of, not 
absolutely identical with. Dialectic (Cicero, Orator, 114, 
quasi ex altera parte respondere dialecticae), since there 
are points of difference as well as resemblance between 
them. Elsewhere it is called an offshoot, or likeness, of 
Dialectic. Both are, theoretically, of universal application 
(although practically Rhetoric is limited to Politics in the 
widest sense, including the ethical sciences) and deal with 
material which to a certain extent is within the knowledge 
of all and belongs to no separate science. Neither has 
any special first principles, like those of a particular 
science, which cannot be transferred to another. 

Dialectic proceeds by question and answer, whereas 
Rhetoric sets forth its ideas in a continuous speech, 
addressed, not to a select audience, but to a miscellaneous 
crowd with the object of persuading them to embrace a 
certain opinion. While the dialectical syllogism leads to 
general conclusions, the rhetorical, dealing rather with 
individual questions, leads to particular conclusions ; for 
instance, whether punishment is to be inflicted in a 
particular case. 

Both take either side of a (juestion and are ready 
to prove either a negative or affirmative, whereas the 
conclusions of demonstrative proof are universal and 
necessary, and cannot be used to support one view or its 
opposite indifferently. 
Sidfoia (i. 13. 17; iii. 10. 4, 5): "meaning," "intention"; 

474 



GLOSSARY 

(ii. 26. 5; Hi. 1. 7): "thought," the logical or inventive 
part of Rhetoric; (iii. 16. 9): "intellectual capacity," 
contrasted with the moral purpose. 

Oiacri'geiv (iii. 5. 6) : " to punctuate " (see diaipecris). 

diaTpi^-q (iii. 17. 10): opportunity for dwelling on a subject 
{commorutio) ; occasion for digression. 

dLTJpTjfiivr] (iii. 9. 7) : disjointed (of style), in which the mem- 
bers or clauses of a period are marked off by a connecting 
particle. 

ovva.iJ.is: (I) power, strength, of body or authority: (2) faculty, 
natural capacity, cleverness: (3) potentiality, virtual 
existence or action, as opposed to ivip-yeia, actuality, 
actual existence or action. 

iyKd),uiov (i. 9. 33) : eulogy of achievements, bodily or mental, 
distinguished from ^waivos, praise of virtuous qualities. 

eldos: (1) form, appearance; {•2) particular kind, sort: 
(3) species, as contrasted with genus : (4) " special topics." 

dKos (i. 2. 15): probability, a proposition in contingent 
matter, which is true in the greater number of cases 
(Envious men hate those whom they envy), but not in all. 
Its relation to the conclusion to be drawn is that of the 
universal to the particular. 

elKibv (iii. 4. 3) : a metaphor with the addition of the particle 
of comparison "as," "like." Quintilian, Inst. Oral. viii. 
6. 8, 9 metaphora est hrevior similitudo, eoqwe distat, quod 
ilia comparatur ret, qvMm volumus exprimere, haec pro 
ipsa re dicitur. 

elpoixivrj \4^is (iii. 9. 1): continuous, running style (lit. strung 
together), such as that of Herodotus, in which the only 
connexion is that of the awdfa/xoi ; the sentences resemble 
straight lines which may be produced indefinitely, keeping 
an uninterrupted course. 

evddffifjLov (iii. 14. 1): the key-note in music; (iii. 14. 4) the 
key-note in a speech, almost the same as irpooifuov. 

ivip-yeia (iii. 11. 2): actualization, vividness, representing 
things inanimate as animate (see 8vvafiLs). 

€ve6fj,7]/xa (i. 2. 8): an enthymeme (lit. thought, argument) 
in the Rhetoric is a rhetorical syllogism, that is, it is 
drawn from probable premises and is therefore not a 
strictly demonstrative proof. The use of the term for a 
syllogism in which one of the premises is suppressed 
is due to a misunderstanding of the word dreX^js [unless 

475 



GLOSSARY 

this is an interpolation], "incomplete," in Anal. Priora, 
ii. 29 [27]. 2, which refers to its logical value, not to its 
form. In the same treatise Aristotle defines an enthy- 
merae as a syllogism from probabilities or signs (see R. C. 
Seaton in Classical Review, June, 1914). 

Ij/o-rao-ts (ii. 25. 1) : in logic, an objection directed not against 
an opponent's conclusion, but to the proposition advanced 
by him. This being universal if his conclusion is to be 
universal, the objection may be universal or particular. 
The establishment of the denial of one particular is 
sufficient to destroy the universal. 

'evTex^oi. Triorets (i. 2. 2): see drexi'oi wicxTeLS. 

e|ts (ii. 12. 2): a formed and permanent habit of mind, the 
result of irpa^is ; it tends to the production of certain 
actions and is bound to produce them, unless external 
circumstances prevent it. 

iiraivos (i. 9. 33) : see iyKujfxiov. 

iTTeiffodiovv (iii. 17. 11): to introduce an 67reto-65ioj' or accessory 
incident. 

€iri€iKT)s, ^irieUeia (i. 2. 4) : goodness ; (i. 13. 13) : reasonable 
treatment, equity. 

iirlderov (iii. 2. 14 ; iii. 3. 3) : not limited to adjectives, but 
used for any strengthening, descriptive, or ornamental 
addition {e.g. Tydides). 

iiriXoyos (iii. 13. 3) : peroration, winding-up of a speech, in 
which the chief points are recapitulated. 

iiriffTrifxr) (i. 1. 1), eTn<Trt)T6i (ii. 24. 10): science, that which 
can be scientifically known, opposed to Tix''V> a system or 
set of rules, and to i/xTreipia, experience, knack, without 
knowledge of principles. 

iiroiKodofietv (i. 7. 31): "building up of one phrase upon 
another, one rising above another step by step like the 
rounds of a ladder, /cXtyuat " (Cope). They are so arranged 
that the last important word of one is repeated as the first 
of the next, as in Romans, v. 3-4 Tribulation worketh 
patience, and patience experience, and experience hope. 
" Climax " is hardly a suitable rendering, which in modern 
popular language generally implies the highest point, 
culmination. 

ipun-qaii (iii. 18. 1): a question put to the adversary, which 
only requires a simple affirmative or negative answer, 
opposed to TTtOcrtj or irv<T/j.a, whic;h needs an explanation. 

476 



GLOSSARY 

eiirid7]s (ii. 12. 7) : good-natured, simple, opposed to KaKoi^dijs: ; 
(iii. 1. 9; 12. 2): of speeches and style, foolish, lacking 
force, empty. 
eiJoyKos (iii. 7. 2): lit. bulky: of style, "weighty," " im- 
portant," opposed to evreXris, " cheap," " poor," " meagre." 
€V(pvrii (i. 6. 29): possessed of good natural gifts, as distinct 

from powers that are the result of practice and study. 
^Oos : originally, a man's natural bent, his habitual temper 
or disposition, moral character; it furnishes an indirect 
proof (1) from the character of the speaker, who wants to 
convince his hearers of his own virtue (i. 2. 3) ; (2) from 
the characters of the different forms of government (i. 8. 6) 
and the various conditions of men (ii. 12-17), to which 
different language and methods of conciliation are suitable ; 
in style (iii. 7. 6 ; 16. 8, 9), from exhibiting a knowledge 
of and due regard for the characteristics of individuals. 
laTpev/xcLTo. (iii. 14.. 7): "correctives," "antidotes" to the 
listlessness and indifference of the hearer, of general 
application, capable of being used in any part of a 
speech. 
tdia ovofiara (iii. 5. 3) : " specific," opposed to wtpiixovTa, 

" general " terms. 
KaraaKevd^eLv (ii. 24. 4): "to construct" an argument, 
opposed to a.va(TKev6.'geLv, dvaipelv, " to demoHsh "; (ii. 2. 27 ; 
iii. 19. 1) "to put into a certain frame of mind"; /cara- 
(T/ceuao-Tt/cos (ii. 26. 3): "constructive." 
KareffTpafx/xivT) Xe^ij (iii. 9. 3): " close " or periodic style, in 
which the period, as distinguished from sentences in the 
eipofievri X., resembles a circular line, which returns and 
ends at a certain point. 
Kvpios (i. 1. 1 1 ; i. 8. 1, 2 ; 15. 9, 21) : " authoritative," " effec- 
tive " ; (i. 3. 4) " opportune," " appropriate " ; (iii. 2. 2) 
of words, " established," " vernacular," used in their 
natural sense, opposed to " foreign," figurative, or archaic 
words, in fact, to any that are unusual or out of the 
common. 
kQ'Kov (iii. 9. 5): "member," "clause," a subdivision of the 

period. 
Xe/cTt/c6s (iii. 8. 4): belonging to the language of ordinary 

life and conversation. 
\lt6s (iii. 16. 2) : lit. smooth ; of style, " plain," " unadorned." 
X670S : " speech," " oration " ; (iii. 6. 1) " description," " de- 

477 



GLOSSARY 

finition," opposed to tvoixa, the noun or term ; (iii. 2. 7) 

prose; (ii. 20. 2) " story, "" fable " ; (ii. 2. 18) "account," 

"consideration " {\o-yi^ iv firiSivi elvai). 
fiaXaKos (i. 10. 4): "effeminate"; (ii. 17. 4) "mild," " unim- 

passioned"; (ii. 22. 10) of reasoning, "slack," "loose." 
IJ-eyedos (i. 5. 13) : " stature," ; (iii. 1. 4) of style, " grandeur." 
fieiovv (ii. 18. 4): "to extenuate," "depreciate," opposed to 

fjLeiovpoi, fjLvovpos (iii. 9. 6): "docked," "curtailed," of a 
clause or period which seems to end too soon. 

fiiipaKiwSrjs (iii. 11. 16): of style, characterized by youthful 
force and vehemence and therefore not becoming to the 
old. In other rhetorical writers, "puerile." 

jxeiwais {fieLovv, ii. 18. 4; 26. 1): "depreciation," "extenua- 
tion," opposed to a(j^T](XLS, aC^eiv. 

fier ava<7T7]s (ii. 2. 6) : " immigrant," " vagrant," opposed to a 
native. It appears to be the same as the later /x^tolkos 
(resident alien) : cp. Politics, iii. 5. 9, where dTtfjLrjTos is 
explained as "having no share of office." It might also 
mean "of no value," one whom anybody could kill with 
impunity (see Leaf on Iliad, ix. 648). 

;tteTa^o/)(i (iii. 10. 7): " transference," " metaphor." "Meta- 
phor is the application to a thing of a name that belongs 
to something else, the transference taking place from 
genus to species, from species to genus, from species to 
species, or proportionally " {Poetics, 21). 

fiirpov : " metre," " measure " : see pv6fj.6s. 

fjLoi>6Ku\oi (iii. 9. 5) : of a period, consisting of only one 
clause or member. 

fd/xos : sometimes used in the sense of " convention," as 
opposed to 4>v(ni. 

6yKo% (iii. 6. 1): "weight," "importance," "dignity." It 
also has the sense of " bombast" (I^onginus, iii. 4). 

oiKeios (i. 5. 7) : " one's own," that which one can dispose of 
as one wisnes ; (i. 4. 12), that which is peculiar to some- 
thing, as to a form of government ; (iii. 2. 6 ; 7. 4) : of 
style and the use of words, " appropriate," much the same 
as Kijpio^. 

ofiuvvfiia (ii. 24. 2 ; iii. 2. 7) : the use of words in an equivocal 
sense and such words tnemselves, i.e. those that have the 
same sound but a different sense. 

6vona : as a general term, includes nouns, adjectives, articles, 

478 



GLOSSARY 

and pronouns; as a special term, "noun" opposed to 
" verb." 

■n-dOo^, Trdtrxetr (ii. 16. 1, 2): mental condition or affection 
generally; (ii. 1. 8; iii. 17. 8), "passion," "emotion"; 
(i. 2. 1) "quality," "property" of things; (i. 9. 15) 
"suifering"; (iii. 7.3) a pathetic style ; so irad-qTiKr} Xe'^ts 
and iraO-qri.KCis Xeyeiv. 

Tvapa^oKri (iii. 19. 5) : " placing side by side," " comparison " ; 
(ii. 20. 4) "illustration." 

irapdSeiyna (ii. 20. 1, 2): "example," " instance," including 
both the historical (irapa^o'Kri) and the fictitious (\070s) ; 
(i. 2. 8) proof from example, " rhetorical induction," con- 
trasted with ^vdvfjL7]iJ.a. 

TrapdXoyos (i. 13. 16) : " beyond calculation," " unexpected ; " 
TrapaXoyi^eadai. (i. 14. 1), " to cheat," " defraud " ; (ii. 24. 4) 
"to reason falsely, or be led astray by false reasoning" 
(also in an active sense) ; irapaXoyicxTiKos (i. 9. 29), 
"fallacious," irapaXoyicrfios (iii. 12. 4), " fallacy." 

iraplcTujffLS (iii. 9. 9) : " balancing of clauses ; " 7rdpt(ros, of a 
clause, "exactly balanced." 

irapofjioiuKxis (iii. 9. 9): "making like," "assimilation" of 
sounds at the beginning or end of clauses. 

ireTron]fj.evop dvo/xa (iii. 2. 5) : a word coined or invented for 
the occasion. 

wepiodos (iii. 9. 3) : a complete sentence, composed of several 
clauses, from one full stop to another ; tt. t^s 7^s (i. 4. 13) : 
a traveller's description of the countries visited by him. 

TTeptire'reia (i. 11. 24): sudden change or reverse of fortune 
In tragedy, the word implies "a complete change or 
reversal of situation within the limits of a single scene or 
act" (Bywater on Poetics, 10). 

Tricms (i. 14. 5): pledge of good faith, distinguished from 
opKos and de^id; (i. 1. 11. and elsewhere): means of 
persuasion, "probable" opposed to "demonstrative" 
proof. 

irpaKTiKbs (i. 6. 11) : "able to do," followed by the genitive, 
unless here it be translated "efficient," "practical," not 
connected grammatically with tSiv dyadQv. 

TTpodeais (iii. 13. 2): "setting forth," "statement of the 
case," like a problem (irpd^XTjiJ.a) in geometry. 

irpooifMLov (i. 1. 9; iii. 14. 1): "preamble," " exordium," com- 
pared to the wpoXoyoi in tragedy and comedy, "all that 

479 



GLOSSARY 

part of the play which comes before the first song of the 
chorus " (Poetics, 12. 4). 

vpiTaais (i. 3. 7): "proposition," "premise" of a syllogism; 
combined with dd^a, "notion," "popular opinion" as 
useful for producing persuasion (ii. 1. 1). 

■wtQctis (i. 7. 27) : used by Aristotle as a general term for the 
inflexions, not only of a noun, but also of a verb, generally 
marked by a difference of form; thus, the adjective 
Xa.\Kovs from xaAK6s (iii. 9. 9) and the adverb dvdpeluys from 
dvdpia. (i. 7. 27) are instances of " inflexions " (Bywater 
on Poetics, 20. 10). 

prjua : (1) generally, that which is spoken ; (2) grammaticallj', 
a verb as opposed to a noun (S^o^tca). The term also 
appears to be applied to an adjective when used as a 
predicate. 

priTopiKj) : see diaXeKTiKrj. 

pvdixos (iii. 1. 4, 8. 2): "time"; in general, any regular, 
harmonious movement, in sound or motion, which can be 
measured by number ; thus, it may be applied to the 
tramp of a body of soldiers, the flapping of birds' wings, 
the dance, music, and writing, in the last expressed in 
long and short syllables. " Rhythm consists of certain 
lengths of time, while metre is determined by the order 
in which these lengths are placed. Consequently, the 
one seems to be concerned with quantity, the other with 
quality [the syllables must be in a certain order] . , . 
rhythm has unlimited space over which it may range, 
whereas the spaces of metre are confined ; . . . further, 
metre is concerned with words alone, while rhythm extends 
also to the motion of the body " (Quintilian, Inst. Orat. 
ix. 4. 45, Loeb Series translation). 

(ra(/)r]s X^^ts (iii. 2. 1): "clear," "perspicuous," defined (iii. 
13. 6) as the mean between adoXeax^"- (garrulity, prolixity) 
and (TvvTopiLa (excessive conciseness). 

uepiVT] Xi^Ls (iii. 2. 2): "noble," " majestic," " dignified." 

(T-qfieiov (i. 2. 16) : " sign," a probable argument as proof of 
a conclusion. Signs are of two kinds, one having the 
relation of particular to universal, the other that of 
universal to particular. reK/xrjpiov, on the other hand, is 
a necessary sign, and such signs can be made into a 
demonstrative syllogism, which cannot be refuted. Thus, 
" sign " is both a general and special term. As a general 

480 



GLOSSARY 

term, it embraces the reKix-qpia ; as a special term, the two 
kinds of signs, which are capable of refutation. 

a6\oiKos (ii. 16. 3): "one who offends against good taste or 
manners " ; also one who speaks incorrectly {(roXoiKi^eiv, 
iii. .5. 7). 

(rrevos (iii. 13. 2): of style, "thin," "meagre," "jejune." 

(TTOixe'iov {ii. 22. 13; 26. 1): "element" of an enthymeme, 
identified by Aristotle with tSttos. 

ffTpoyyvXos (ii. 21. 7) : " rounded " ; of style, " terse," " com- 
pact." 

ffvKO(pavTia (ii. 24. 10): "false accusation," here used for 
" sophism," a specious but fallacious argument. 

(Ti'fx§o\ov (iii. 15. 9, 16. 10): "sign," "token"; not to be 
confused with iru/u/SoXi^ (i. 4. 11), "contract." avfifioKov 
itself elsewhere — mutual covenant. 

cvvayeiv (i. 2. 13; ii. 22. 3, 15): "to conclude," "draw an 
inference": (iii. 11. 12) " draw together," " contract." 

avvdeafios (iii. 5. 2): "connecting particle": it includes the 
preposition, the copulative conjunctions, and certain 
particles. 

(n've(TTpa/jLixivu}s (ii. 24. 2): "twisted up," "compactly" (cp. 
(TV(TTp€(p€iv, iii. 18. 4). 

avaroLxa (i. 7. 27): "conjugates," "co-ordinates": Xeyerai 
8i avaTOix<^ f^^" to- roidSe olov to. BiKaia Kal 6 diKaios Ty diKaio- 
crvvrj Kal rd dvSpela Kal 6 dvdpeToi rrj dv5plg. {Topics, ii. 9. 1). 

(rxeT\iacr/u6s (ii. 21. 10): "passionate complaint" of injustice 
or ill-fortune : one of the parts of the peroration, in which 
we endeavour to secure the commiseration of the hearer, 
the first thing necessary being to put him into a sympa- 
thetic and pitying frame of mind (Forcellini, s.v. con- 
questio). 

(Txvi^c- (ii- 24. 2; iii. 8. 1): "form," "figure" of a speech. 
It does not correspond to the modern expression " figure of 
speech," but is an " attitude " or " turn of meaning given 
to the language when it comes to be actually spoken " 
... "a difference of sense resulting from a difference 
of some kind in the mode of enunciation " (Bywater, 
Poetics, 19. 7). 

rd^is (iii. 13-19) : the arrangement or distribution of the 
parts of a speech. 

Ta-mivT] X^^ts (iii. 2. 1) : " low," " poor," " mean " ; in a moral 
sense, "base," "vile" {raireivoTrji, ii. 6. 10). 

2 I 481 



GLOSSARY 

TeKfirjpiov (i. 2. 16, 17): see drifieiov. 

rex^n (i- 1- 3) : set of rules, " handbook " of Rhetoric : else- 
where of the " tricks " of rhetoricians ; TexvoXoyeiv (i. 1.9): 
to bring under the rules of art, reduce to a system. 

Tonos (ii. 26. 1) : lit., a place to look for a store of something, 
and the store itself ; a heading or department, containing 
a number of rhetorical arguments cf the same kind {rbiros 
els 6 TToXXd. evdv/j.Ti/j.aTa ifnriiTTeL). These are all classified 
and placed where they can be easily found ready for use. 
t6wol are of two kinds : (1) kolvoI rdiroi (" commonplaces ") 
or simply rdiroi, the topics common to the three kinds of 
Rhetoric (i. 2. 21 ; ii. 18. 3-5); (2) etdrj or idia (i. 2. 21), 
specific topics, propositions of limited applicability, chiefly 
derived from Ethics and Politics. 

viroKpiffis (iii. 1. 3): "delivery" of a speech, under which 
declamation, gesticulation, expression, and everything 
connected with acting are included ; viroKpniKT) Xefis (iii. 
12. 2), "style suited for deUvery," "lending itself to 
acting " ; [t^x'''?] ("'• !• 7) : " the art of acting." 

xwpa (iii. 17. 15): "room" for our own arguments as well 
as those of the adversary in the hearer's mind, "to get a 
footing " for what we are going to say ; (ii. 2\. 2) : the 
proper place, province. 

\}/l\6s (iii. 2. 3): "bare," "bald," of prose as opposed to 
poetry. 

\j/vxp6s (iii. 3. 1) : " cold," " frigid," " insipid." As a noun, 
rb \pvxpov means generally any defect of style as opposed 
to dperr] X^fcws. 



482 



INDEX OF NAMES 



Achilles, i. 3. 6 ; ii. 22. 12, 24. 6 ; iii. 

17. 11 
Aegina, iii. 10. 7 ; Aeginetau.s, ii. 

22. 7 
Aenesidenius, i. 12. 30 
Aeschines (Socraticus), iii. 16. 10 
Aesion, iii. 10. 7 
Aesop, ii. 20. 5, 6 
Aesopian (fables), ii. 20. 2 
Agathon, ii. 19. 13, 24. 10 
Agesipolis, ii. 23. 12 
Ajax (tragedy), ii. 23. 20, 24 
Alcaeus, i. 9. 20. 

Alcibiades (descendants), ii. 15. 3 
Alcidamas, i. 13. 2; ii. 23. 11 ; iii. 

3. 1, 2, 4 
Alcinous, iii. 16. 7 
Alcmaeon (tragedy), ii. 23. 3 
Alexander (Paris), ii. 23. 12; iii. 14. 

8 
Alexander (oration), ii. 23. 8, 24. 7 
Alphesiboea, ii. 23. 3 
Amasis, ii. 8. 12 
Aniphiaraus, ii. 12. 6 
Auaxagoras, ii. 23. 11 
Anaxandrides, iii. 10. 7, 11. 8, 12. 3 
Androcles, ii. 23. 22 
Androtion, iii. 4. 3 
Antigone, iii. 16. 9 
Antimachus, iii. 6. 7 
Antiphon, ii. 2. 19, 6. 27, 23. 20 
Antisthenes, iii. 4. 3 
Archelaus, ii. 23. 8 
Archibius, i. 15. 15 
Archidamus, iii. 4. 3 
Archilochns, ii. 23. 11 ; iii. 17. 16 
Archytas, iii. 11. 5 
Areopagus, i. 1. 5 ; ii. 23. 12 
Ares, iii. 4. 4, 11. 11 
Argos (Argives), 1. 14. 4 
Aristides, iii. 14. 3 
Aristippus, ii. 23. 12 



Aristogiton, i. 9. 38 ; ii. 24. 5 
Aristophanes, iii. 2. 15 
Aristophon, ii. 23. 7 
Athenians, i. 15. 13 ; ii. 22. 5, 23. 

11 ; iii. 10. 7, 14. 11 
Athens, ii. 23. 11 
Athos, iii. 9. 7 
Attic (neighbour), ii. 21. 12 ; 

(orators) iii. 11. 16 ; phiditia, iii. 

10. 7 
Autocles, ii. 23. 12 

Babylonians (comedy), iii. 2. 15 
Bias, ii. 13. 4 
Boeotians, iii. 4. 3 
Bryson, iii. 2. 13 

Callias, iii. 2. 10 

Calliope, iii. 2. 11 

Callippus, i. 12. 29; (Art of rhetoric), 

ii. 23. 14, 21 
Oallistlienes, ii. 3. 18 
Callistratus, i. 7. 13, 14. 1 ; iii. 17. 

14 
Calydon, iii. 9. 4 
Carcinus, ii. 23. 28 ; iii. 16. 11 
Carthaginians, i. 12. 18 
Cephisodotus, iii. 4. 3, 10. 7 
Chabrias, i. 7. 13; iii. 10. 7 
Chaeremon, ii. 23. 29 ; iii. 12. 2 
Chares, i. 15. 15 ; iii. 10. 7, 17. 10 
Charidemus, ii. 23. 17 
Charon (black.sniith), iii. 17. 16 
Chians, ii. 23. 11 
Chilon, ii. 12. 14, 21. 13, 23. 11 
Choerilus, iii. 14. 4 
Cimon (descendants), ii. 15. 3 
Cleon, iii. 5. 2, 8. 1 
Cleophon, i. 15. 13 ; iii. 7. 2 
Conon, ii. 23. 12, 29 
Corax, ii. 24. 11 
Corinthians, i. 6. 24 

483 



INDEX OF NAMES 



Cratylus, iii. 16. 10 
Critias, i. 15. 13; iii. 16. 3 
Croesu-s, iii. 5. 4 
CycnuH, ii. 22. 12 
Cydias, ii. 6. 24 

Darius, ii. 20, 8 
Delphi, ii. 23. 12 
Demades, ii. 24. 8 
Democrates, iii. 4. 3 
Democritus, iii. 9. 6 
Demosthenes (? general), iii. 4. 3 
Demosthenes (orator), ii. 23. 3 
Diogenes (the Cynic), iii. 10. 7 
Diomedes, ii. 23. 20 ; iii. 15. 10 
Diomedon, ii. 23. 3 
Dion, i. 12. 29 
Dionysius (of Syracuse), i. 2. 19 ; ii. 

6. 27 ; ii. 15. 3 
Dionysius (orator and poet), iii. 2. 

11 
Dionysius (general name), ii. 24. 5 
Dionysus, iii. 4. 4 
Diopithes, ii. 8. 11 
Dorieus, i. 2. 13 
Draco, ii. 23. 29 

Egypt, ii. 20. 3 

Egyptian (rebels), iii. 16. 5 

Eleans, ii. 23. 27 

Blis, iii. 14. 11 

Bmpedocles, i. 13. 2 ; iii. 5. 4 

Epicharmus, i. 7. 31 ; iii. 9. 10 

Bpidaurus, iii. 10. 7 

Epimenides, iii. 17. 10 

Ergophilus, ii. 3. 13 

Eubulus, i. 15. 15 

Buripides(HecM6a), ii. 21.2; (Hippo- 
hytiis), ii. 22. 3 ; iii. 15. 8 ; (Iplug. 
Aul.), iii. 11. 2; (iphig. Taur.), 
iii. 6. 4, 14. 10 ; (Medea), ii. 21. 2, 
6; (Oresies), i. 11. 20; (Troades), 
ii. 21. 5, 23. 29 ; iii. 17, 10 ; 
Fragments {Andromeda), i. 11. 8 ; 
{Antiope), i. 11. 28 ; (Meleager), 
iii. 9. 4 ; (Oeneus), iii. 16. 7 ; 
(Stherieboea), ii. 21. 2; (Telephus), 
iii. 2. 10 ; (unknown play), ii. 23. 
1 ; (reply to the Syracnsans), ii. C. 
20 ; (his choice of words), iii. 2. 5 

Euthydemns, ii. 24. 8 

Kuthynus, ii. 19. 14 

Enxenus, iii. 4, 3 



Kvagoras, ii. 23. 12 

Golon, i, 12. 30 

Glaucon (of Teos), iii. 1. 3 

Gorgias, iii. 1. 9, 3. 4, 7. 11, 14. 2, 

15. 11, 14. 11, 18. 7 
Gyges, iii. 17. 16 

Haemon, iii. 16. 11, 17. 16 
Halys, iii. 5. 4 

Harmodius, i. 9. 38; ii, 24. 5 
Hecuba, ii. 23. 29 
Hegesippus, see Agesipolis 
Helen, ii. 23, 12, 24. 9 
Heraclidae, ii. 22. 6 
Heraclitus, iii. 5, 6 
Hercules (Pillars of), ii- 10. 5 
Hermes, ii. 24. 2 
Herodicus, i. 5. 10; ii, 23, 281 
Herodotus, iii. 9. 2, 16. 5 
Hesiod, ii. 4. 21, 10. 6 
Hftsione, iii. 15. 9 
Hieron (wife oO, ii. 16. 2 
Himera (people), ii. 20. 5 
Hipparclius, ii. 24. 5 
Hippolochus, i. 9. 38 
Homer, i. 15. 13 ; ii. 23. 11 ; iii. 11. 
2; (Iliad) I., iii. 14.6; ii. 9. 6 ; i. 

6. 20; ii. 2. 6; II., i. 6. 22; ii. 2. 
; iii. 12. 4 ; i. 15. 13 ; IV., iii. 
11. 3; IX., i. 7. 31; iii. 9. 9, 11, 
16; ii. 2, 6; XI., ii. 9. 11; iii. 11. 
3; XII., ii. 21. 11; XIII., iii. U. 
3; XV„ iii, 11, 3; XVIII., i. 11, 
9; ii. 2. 2, 21. 11; XX., iii. 4, 1; 
XXIIL, i. 11. 12; XXIV,, ii. 3. 
16; (Odyssey)!., iii. 14. 6; IV., iii. 
17. 6; VI., iii. 14. 11; IX., ii. 3. 
16 ; XL, iii. 11. 3; XIV,, iii. 10. 2 ; 
XV., i. 11, 8; XIX., iii. 16. 10; 
XXII., i, 7. 33; XXIII., iii. 10.7 

Hygiaenon, iii. 15. 8 

Ida, ii. 24. 7 

Idrieus, iii, 4. 3 

Iphicrates, i, 7, 82, 9, 31 ; ii. 23. 6, 

7, S, 17 ; iii. 2, 10, 10, 7 
Isnienias, ii, 23, 11 

Isocrates, i, 9, 88; ii, 28. 12; iii. 
17. 10, 11; ii, 19. 14, 23, 12; iii. 
14. 1, 17. 16 (speeches) (i)e pace), 
iii. 11. 7, 17. 10; (Panegyricus), 
iii. 7. 11,9. 7, 10. 7, 14.2, 17. 10; 



484 



1 In both these passages it is proposed to read Frotlicm. 



INDEX OF NAMES 



(Ad Philipimm) iii. 10. 5, 7, 11. 
2, 5, 7 
Italiotes, ii. 23. 11 

Jason (the Thessalian) i. 12. 31 ; 

(hero), ii. 23. 28 
Jocasta, iii. 16. 11 

Lacedaemonians, i. ii. 6, 9. 26; ii. 

23. 11 
Laconian (apophthegms), ii. 21. 8 
Lampon, iii. 18. 1 
Lampsacus (people of), ii. 2^. 11 
Leodamas, i. 7. 13 ; ii. 23. 25 
Leptines, iii. 10. 7 
Leucothea, ii. 23. 27 
Libyan (fables), ii. 20. 2 
Licyninius, iii. 2. 13, 12. 2, 13. 5 
Locrians, ii. 21. 8 
Lycoleon, iii. 10. 7 
Lycophron, iii. 3. 1, 9. 7 
Lycurgus, ii. 23. 11 
Lysias (frag.), ii. 23. 19 ; (Funeral 

Oration), iii. 10. 7 

Mantias, ii. 23. 11 
Marathon, ii. 22. 6 
Medea (play), ii. 23. 28 
Megara, i. 2. 19 
Melanippides, iii. 9. 6 
Melanopus, i. 14. 1 
Meleager (play), ii. 2. 19, 23. 20 
Meletus, iii. 18. 2 
Miltiades (decree of), iii. 10. 7 
Mixidemides, ii. 23. 12 
Moerocles, iii. 10. 7 
Mysia, iii. 2. 10 
Mytilenaeans, ii. 23. 11 

Nausicrates, iii. 15. 2 
Nicanor, ii. 23. 3 
Nicon, iii. 11. 6 
Niceratus, iii. 11. 13 
Nireus, iii. 12. 4 

Odysseus, ii. 23. 24 ; iii. 15. 9 
Odyssey, iii. 3. 4 
Oedipus (lost play), iii. 16. 7 
Olympian (victor), i. 7. 32, 9. 31 ; 

(prize), i. 2. 13 
Olynthian (war), iii. 10. 7 
Orestes (lost tragedy), ii. 24. 3 

Palamedes, iii. 12. 3 
Pamphilus, ii. 23. 21 



Paralus, iii. 10. 7 

Paros (inhabitants), ii. 23. 11 

Penelope, iii. 16. 7 

Pentheus, ii. 23. 29 

Peparethus (speech on), ii. 23. U 

Periander, i. 15. l.S 

Pericles, i. 7. 34; iii. 4. 3, 10. 7, 18. 
1 ; (descendants), ii. 15. 3 

Phalaris, ii. 20. 5 

Phayllus, iii. 16. 7 

Philammon, iii. 11. 13 

Philemon, iii. 12. 3 

Philip (of Macedon), ii. 23. f, 

Pliilocrates, ii. 3. 13 

Philoctetes, iii. 11. 13 

Philomela, iii. 3. 4 

Pindar (quoted), i. 7. 14 ; ii. 24. 2 

Piraeus, ii. 24. 3 

Pisander, iii. 18. 6 

Pisistratus, i. 2. 19 

Pitholaus, iii. 9. 7, 10. 7 

Pittacus, ii. 12. 6, 25. 7 

Plato (comic poet), i. 15. 15 

Plato (philosopher), ii. 23. 12 ; 
(Apologia), iii. IS. 2 ; (Menexenus), 
i. 9. 30 ; iii. 14. 11 ; (Phaedras), 
iii. 7. 11 ; (Revuhlic), iii. 4. 3 

Polus, ii. 23, 29" 

Polybus, iii. 14. 6 

Polycrates, ii. 24. 3, 6 

Polyeuctus, iii. 10. 7 

Potidaea (people), ii. 22. 7 i 

Pratys, iii. 11. 13 

Prodicus, iii. 14. 9 

Protagoras, ii. 24. 11 ; iii. 5. 5 

Pythagoras, ii. 23. 11 

Rhadamanthus, iii. 12. 3 

Salamis, i. 15. 3, ii. 22. 6, iii. 10. 7 
Samians, iii. 4. 3 
Sappho, ii. 23. 11, 12 
Sestus, iii. 10. 7 
Sigeum (people), i. 15. 18 
Simonides, i. 6. 24 ; i. 7. 32 ; i. 9. 

31 ; ii. 16. 2 ; iii. 2. 14 
Sisyphus, iii. 11. 3 
Socrates, i. 9. 30 ; ii. 15. 3 ; ii. 23. 

8; iii. 14. 11, 18. 2; (oration by 

Theodectes), ii. 23. 13 
Socratic (comparisons), ii. 20. 4 ; 

(discourses), iii. 16. 8 
Solon, i. 15. 13 ; ii. 23. 11 
Sophocles, iii. 15. 3 ; (Antigone), i. 

13. 2, 15. 6 ; iii. 16. 9, 11, 17. 16 ; 

485 



INDEX OF NAMES 



(Oed. Tyr.), iii. 14. 6 ; (Teitcer), iii. 

15. 9 ; {Tyro), ii. 23. 92 
Sophocles, (orator and politician), 

i. 14. 3 ; iii. 18. 6 
Speusippus, iii. 10. 7 
Stesichorus, ii. 20. 5, 21. 8 ; iii. 11, 

6 
Stilbon, ii. 23. 11 
Strabax, ii. 23. 17 
Syracuse (people), ii. 6. 21 

Telephus (lost play), iii. 2. 10 
Tenedos (people), i. 15. 13 
Teucer (lost play), ii. 23. 7; iii. 15. 9 
Teumessus, iii. C. 7 
Theagenes, i. 2. 19 
Thebes, ii. 23. 11 
Themistocles, i. 15. 14 
Theodamas, iii. 4. 3 



Theodeetes, iii. 9. 9 ; (Ajax), ii. 23. 

24 ; (Alemteon), ii. 23. 3 ; (Orestes), 

ii. 24. 8; {Socrates), ii. 23. 13; 

{Tmw), ii. 23. 11, 17 
Theodorus (rhetorician), ii. 23. 28 ; 

iii. 11. 6, 13. 5 
Theodorus (tragic actor), iii. 2. 4 
Theseus, i. 6. 25 ; ii. 23. 5, 12 
Thettalisciis, ii. 23. 11 
Thrasybulus, ii. 23. 29 
Thrasyraachus, ii. 23. 29 ; iii. 1. 7, 

8. 4, 11. 13 

Xenophanes, i. 15, 30; ii. 23. 18, 

27 
Xenophon (Hellenica) ii. 23. 12 
Xerxes, ii. 20. 3 

Zeno, i. 12. 10 



486 



GENERAL INDEX 



Aberration, iii. 13. 5 
Aborigines, i. 5. 5 
Accident ((allacy of), ii. 24. 6 
Account (rendered on leaving 

office), iii. 10. 7, 18. 6 
Accumulation (of enthymemes), ii. 

24. 2 
Accusation and defence, i. 8. 3, 

10. 1 

Actions (voluntary and involun- 
tary), i. 10. 7 

Actors and acting, iii. 1. 3. 4, 7, 
12. 2 ; see also Delivery 

Actualization, see Vividnes.s 

Ages and their characteristics, ii. 
12-14 

Agonistic style, iii. 12. 1 

Aim, see End 

Alliteration, iii. 9. 9 

Ambiguous terms, ii. 23. 9 ; (topic 
of) 24. 2 ; iii. 5. 4, 18. 5 

Amplification, i. 9. 38, 14. 5 ; ii. 
18. 4, 19. 26, 26. 1 : iii. 6. 7, 12. 4 

Amusements, i. 11. 15, 29 

Analotty (in enthymemes), ii. 23. 

5, 17 
Analytic, i. 4. 5 

Anger, ii. 2. 1 ; (and hatred), ii. 

4. 31 
Antecedent and consequent, ii. 19. 

6, 20. 21 
Antistrophic Odes, iii. 9. 1 
Antithesis, iii. 9. 7, 10, 10. 5 
Apophthegms, ii. 12. 6, 21. 8 ; iii. 

11. 6 

Appetite, Appetition, see Longing 
Approp riate (diction),see Propriety 
Arbitration, i. 13. 19 
Arguments (refutation of), ii. 25. 

1 ; (comparison of), iii. 13. 8, 19. 

5 ; (four classes of), ii. 18 
Aristocracy, i. 8. 4, 5 



Arrangement (of speech), iii. 13-19 
Arrogance, i. 2. 7 ; ii. 6. 11 
Article, the (use of), iii. 6. 5 
Artificial proofs, i. 2. 2 
" Arts " of Rhetoric, i. 2. 4, 5 
Assault (and battery), i. 12. 5 ; ii. 

24. 11 
Asyndeta, iii. 6. 5, 6, 12. 2, 4. 19, 6 

Balancing (of clauses), iii. 9. 9, 

11. 10 
Ball (playing at), i. 11. 15 
Beautiful, or Noble, the, i. 0. 7, 

9. 3, 14, 15 
Beauty (personal), i. 5. 11 ; (of 

words and style), iii. 2. 13, 10. 1 
Benevolence, see Favour 
Better method (topic oO, ii- 23. 26 
Birth (nobility of), i. 5. 5 ; ii. 15. 2 
Blame, i. 11. 27 
Body (excellences of), i. 5. 10 
Bodyguards and tyrants, i. 2. 19 

(argument from Example) 
Boorish(ness), ii. 21. 9 ; iii. 16. 9 
Boxer, i. 5. 14 

Branch (of a speech), iii. 13. 5 
Building up (Climax), i. 7^ 31 ; see 

Glossary, s.v. eiroiKoSofneZv 

Calumny, see Prejudice 

Categories, ii. 7. 6 

Cause (topic of), ii. 23. 18, 25; 

(and effect, fallacy oO, ii- 24. 8 
Censure, i. 9. 41 
Challenge (legal), i. 15. 29 
Chance, see Fortune 
Change, i. 11. 20; (of mind), ii. 

23. 19 
Character (moral), see Bthos 
Children (blessing of), i. 5. 4, 6 
Choice (deliberate moral), i. 1. 14, 

487 



GENERAL INDEX 



8. 6 ; (things deliberately chosen), 

i. 6. 26 
Circle (defined), iii. 6. 1 
Clause, see Member 
Clearness (of style), iii. 2. 1 
Cleruchies, ii. c. 24 
Climax, i. 7. 31 ; see Building up 
Comic poets, ii. 6. 20 
Commonplaces, i. 2. 21 ; see also 

Topics 
Community (wrongs against the), 

i. 13. 3 
Comparison, ii. 20. 2, 5 ; iii. 19. 5 
Compound words, iii. 2. 5, 3. 1, 

7. 11 
Compulsion (acts oO, i. 10. 14 
Conciseness, iii. 6. 1, 6, 15. 10 
Confidence, ii. 5. 16-18, 14. 1 
Conjunctions (connecting par- 
ticles), iii. 5. 2, 6. 6, 12. 4 
ousequents (topic oH, ii. 23. 14, 

24. 7 
Constructive (enthymemes), ii. 

26. 3 
Contempt, ii. 2. 4, 11. 7 
Continuous style, iii. 9. 1 
Contracts, i. 1. 10, 2. 2, 15. 20 
Contraries (topic of), ii. 19. 1 
Contumely, ii. 2. 3-5, 4. 30 
Co-ordinates, i. 7. 27 
Cordax (rhythm of the), iii. 8. 4 
Counter-syllogism, ii. 25. 2 ; iii. 

17. 15 
Courage, i. 9. 8 
Covetousness, ii. 6. 5 
Cowardice, i. 9. 8 ; ii. 0. 3 
Cupping-glass (riddle), iii. 2. 12 
Customary things, i. 10. 18 

Danger, ii. 5. 2 
Definition (topic of), ii. 23. 8 
Degenerate descendants, ii. 15. 3 
Degree, see Greater and Less 
Deliberative rhetoric, i. 3. 3-6, 6-8 ; 

(its style), iii. 12. 5 ; (harder than 

forensic), iii. 17. 10 ; (least admits 

narrative), iii. 16. 11 
Delivery (declamation) iii. 1. 7, 

12. 2, 5 
Democracy, i. 8. 4 
Demon {Saiixoviov), ii. 23. 8 ; iii. 

18. 2 

Demonstration, iii. 13. 2 ; (rhetori- 
cal), i. 1. 11 
Depreciation see Extenuation 

48« 



Description (substituted for the 

name), iii. 6. 1 
Description («7ri'ypo;[xu.a) of a charge, 

i. 13. 9 
Desire (iiriBviJiCa), i. 10. 18 ; (rational 

and irrational), i. 11. 5 
Dialectic, i. 1. 1 
Dicast, i. 3. 2 
Diction (fallacies of), ii. 24. 2 ; 

(prose and poetical), iii. 1. 9 ; see 

also Style 
Difficult (things), i. 6. 27, 7. 15 
Dignity (of style), iii. 6. 1 (oyitoO ; 

ii. 17. 4 ; iii. 8. 4l(<re/u.voT7/?) 
Digression (aberration), iii. 13. 5 
Dilemma, ii. 23. 15 
Diminutives (use of), iii. 2. 15 
Dithyrambic (preludes), iii. 14. 5 ; 

(poets), iii. 3. 3, 12. 2 
Division (topic of), ii. 23. 10 
Dog (praise of), ii. 24. 2 
Draughts (game), i. 11. 15 

Easy (things), i. 6. 27 

Effect and cause (fallacy of), ii. 
24. 8 

Elegances (of style), iii. 10 

Element (a-Toixelou), i. 6. 1 ; ii. 
22. 13, 26. 1 ( = T07ros) 

Emotions, see Passions 

Emulation, ii. 6. 24, 11. 1 

Encomium (distinguished fnom 
praise), i. 9. 33 

End (Tf'Ao?), i. 7. 3 

Enigma, see Riddle 

Enjoyable (thing.s), i. 5. 7 

Enmity, ii. 4. 30 

Enthymeme (a kind of syllogism), 
i. 1. 11, 2. 8; (two kinds), i. 2. 
20, 22 ; (nature and use oQ, ii- 
22. 1, 25. 8 ; (elements oQ, ii. 23 ; 
(apparent, false), ii. 24 ; (destruc- 
tive and constructive), ii. 26. 3 ; 
(use of in proof), iii. 17. 6 

Envy, ii. 9. 3, 10. 1 

Epic cycle, iii. 16. 7 

Epic poets, iii. 8. 3 

Epideictic rhetoric, i. 8. 3-6, 9. 1 ; 
(points of agreement with deliber- 
ative), i. 9. 35 ; (amplification use- 
ful in), i. 9. 38 ; (nature oO, ii- 
22. 6 ; (best for written composi- 
tions), iii. 12. 5 ; (narrative in), 
iii. 16. 1 ; (less important in 
proof), iii.l 7. 3 



GENERAL INDEX 



Epilogue, see Peroration 

Episodes, iii. 17. 11 

Epithets, iii. 2. 14, 3. 3, 6. 3, 7 

Equity, i. 13. 12-19 

Eristic, ii. 24. 10, 11 

Error, i. 13. 16 ; iii. 15. 3 

Ethos (moral character) (of the 
speaker), i. 2. 3 ; (what produces 
it), iii. 16. 8 ; (of different stages 
of life), ii. 12-14 ; (its accompani- 
ments), iii. 16. ; ethical (proof), 
i. 2. 3, ii. 1-18; (.style), iii. 7. 1; 
(speeches), ii. 18. 1, 21. 16; (used 
in amplification), i. 9. 38 

Eupliemism, i. 9. 28 ; iii. 2. 10 

Euphony, iii. 2. 11 

Exaggeration (SetVuo-is), ii- 21. 10, 
24. 4 

Example, i. 2. 8; ii. 20; (best for 
deliberative rhetoric), i. 9. 40 ; 
(from history), ii. 20. 3 ; (reason- 
ing from), ii. 25. 8 ; (refutation 
of), ii. 25. 13 

Excess and the exceeded, i. 7. 2 ; 
(as a virtue), i. 9. 29 

Exchange of properDies (avriSoim), 
iii. 15. 8 

Exhortation (npoTpoini, opposed to 
awoTpoTnj), i. 3. 3 

Exordium, i. 1. 9 ; iii. 13. 3 ; 14 

Expedi ent, -ency, i. 6. 1, 7. 1 

Extenuation, ii. 26. 1 

Eyes (the seat of shame), ii. G. 18 ; 
( = the .seat of light or wisdom), 
iii. 10. 7 ; setting before the eyes, 
see Vividness 

Fable, ii. 20. 2, 5 

Fact (question of), »• 19. 16-25 

Fallacies (paralogisms), ii. 24. 25, 

10 ; iii. 12. 4 
Favour, ii. 4. 20 ; 7 
Fear, ii. 5. 1-15 
Flattery, i. 11. 18 ; ii. 6. 8 
" Foreign " (words and style), iii. 2. 

5, 3. 3 
Forensic rhetoric, i. 1. 10, 11, 3. 3-6 ; 

10-15 ; (style), iii. 12. 5 
P'orm (of diction), ii. 24. 2 ; iii. 8. 1 
Fortunate (people), ii. 17. 5 
Fortune (chance, good luck), i. 5. 

17, 10. 12 ; ii. 12. 2, 17. 5 
Foul language, iii. 2. 13, 6. 2 
Friends, i. 5. 16 
Friendship, ii. 4. 1-29 



" Frigidity " (of style), iii. 3 

Garrulity, ii. 13. 12 

Genders, iii. 5. 5 

Generalities, ii. 22. 12 

Gift, i. 5. 9 

Good fortune, i.'5. 17; ii. 17. 5 ; good 
old age, i. 5. 15 ; good qualities 
(real and apparent), i. 9. 28 

Good, the, i. 9. 3, 14 ; (and the ex- 
pedient), i. 6 ; (greater good and 
expediency), i. 7 

Goods (internal and external), i. 5. 
4 ; (indisputable and disputable), 
i. 6. 17, 18 

Goodwill, ii. 1. 8 

Government (forms of), i. 4. 12 ; 8 

Gratitude, ii. 7 

Great and Small, ii. 19. 26 

Greater and Less, i. 7 ; i. 14 ; (topic 
of), ii. 23. 4 

Guard-houses, i. 4. 9 

Guilt, see Injustice 

Habit, i. 10. 15 ; (moral), ii. 12. 2 ; 
iii. 7. 7 

Hair (worn long in Sparta), i. 9. 26 

Happiness, i. 5. 1-18 

Harmony, iii. 1. 4, 8. 4 

Hatred and anger, ii. 4. 30, 31 

Health, i. 5. 10-14 ' 

Hearers (number of), i. 3. 1 ; (char- 
acter oO, ii. 12. 2 

Heroic rhythm, iii. 8. 4 

Hexametric rhythm, iii. 8. 4 

Homoeoteleuton, iii. 9. 9 

Homonymy (fallacy of), ii. 24. 2 ; 
(useful to the sophist), iii. 2. 7 

Honour, i. 5. 9, 7. 30 ; (is pleasant), 
i. 11. 16 

Hope, i. 11. 6 

Horror, ii. 8. 13 

Hunting, i. 11. 15 

Hyperbole, iii. 11. 15, 16 

Iambic (metre), iii. 1. 9 ; (rhythm), 

iii. 8. 4 
Ill-doing, ii. 12. 15, 13. 14, 16. 4 
Imagination {<j)avTaa-Ca), i. 11. 6 ; ii. 

2. 2, 6. 14 
Imitation, i. 11. 23 
Imports and exports, i. 4. 11 
Impossible things, ii. 19 
Inartificial proofs, i. 2. 2 ; 15 
Inconsistency (topic of), ii. 23. 19 

489 



GENERAL INDEX 



Incontinence, i. 9. 9 (iKoKaaU) ; i. 

10. 4 (aKpaa-Ca) 
Incredibility (topic of), ii. 23. 22 
Indifference, i. 11. 4 ; ii. 2. 20 
Indignation («>€o-t?), ii. 9(5etVw(ris); 

see Exaggeration 
Induction (rhetorical), i. 2. 8, 19 ■ 

ii. 20. 2; (topicoO, ii. 23. 11 
Inflexions, i. 7. 27; ii. 23. 2; iii. 

9. 9 
Injury, i. 13. 6 
Injustice (causes and motives of), 

i. 10. 4-6; (state of mind that 

prompts it), i. 12; (acts of), i. 

13. 1, 3, 16 ; (degrees oO, i. 14 ; 

(definitions of), i. 9. 7, 10. 3 
Insult, see Outrage 
Interrogation, ii. 2. 24 ; iii. 7. li. 

18. 7 
Irony, ii. 2. 24 ; iii. 18. 7, 19. 5 
Irrefutable arguments, i. 2. 18 ; ii. 

25. 14 

Jokes (smart sayings), iii. 11. 6, 
18. 7 

Justice (a component of virtue), i. 
9. 7 ; (spurious), i. 15. 7 ; (un- 
written), i. 13. 11, 14. 7 

Key-note (ivSop-i/jLov), iii. 14. 1 
Kindness, i. 5. 9 (euepyccrta) ; 9. 19 

(evepyirriiJLa) 
Knuckle-bones (dice), i. 11. 15 

Laconian apophthegms, ii. 21. 8 
Ijand (grants ot), i. 5. 9 
Laughter, i. 11. 29; (laughable 

things), iii. 18. 7 
Law, i. 4. 12, 13 ; (special and 

general), i. 10. 3, 13. 2 ; (written 

and unwritten), i. 10. 3, 13. 2 ; 

(violation oQ, i. 14. 7 ; (in proofs), 

i. 15. 3-12 ; (ambiguous), i. 15. 10 ; 

sometimes = convention 
Learning (causes pleasure), i. 11. 21 
Legislation, i. 4. 13 
Liberality, i. 9. 10 
Libyan fables, ii. 20. 2 
Literary (written) style, iii. 12. 2 
Little-mindedness, .see Meanness 
Liturgy (public service), ii. 23. 17 
Logographers, ii. 11. 7 ; iii. 7. 7, 

12. 2 
Longing (opefiO, i. 10. 8 

490 



Lot, offices by, ii. 20. 4 
Love, i. 11. 11,17; see also Friend- 
shiji 

Magnanimity (/KyaXoJ/vyCa), i. 9. 

11 ; ii. 12. 11 
Magnificence (fieyaXoTrpeneia), i. 

9. 12 
Malice, ii. 13. 3 ; (prepense), i. 14. 5 
Manhood, ii. 14 
Marginal note, iii. 8. 6 
Maxims, ii. 21 ; (when to use), iii. 

17. 9 
Meanings (topic of difl^erent), ii. 

23. 9 
Meanness (^iKpoxjivxia.), i. 9. 11 ; 

(t^-iKpoTrpeTTfia), i. 9. 12 ; (ai/eAeu- 

Oepia), i. 9. 10 ; (of language), iii. 

Member ( = clause), iii. 9. 5,19 
Memory, i. 11. 6 
Messes ((|)i5iTia), iii. 10. 7 
Metaphors, iii. i. 6-15 ; (improper 

use oO, iii. 3. 4 ; (and .simile), iii. 

4. 1 ; (four kinds of), iii. 10. 7 ; 

(produce vividness), iii. 11. 5 
Metrical style, iii. 8. 1 
Mildness, ii. 3 

Misfortune, i. 13. 16; iii. LI. 3 
Mistake, see Error 
Monarchy, i. 8. 4 _ 
Moral character ; see Ethos 
Motives, ii. 23. 16, 21 ; iii. 15. 11 
Mysteries, ii. 24. 2 

Name (topic of the), ii. 23. 29 ; 
(used instead of description), 
iii. 6. 1 

Names (nouns), see Words 

Narrative, iii. 13. 3, 5 ; 16. 

Nature, natural things, i. 10. 13. 
11. 25 

Necessary sign (tekmerion), i. 2. 
16, 17 

Necessity (acts of), i. 11. 4 

Negations (in producing amplifica- 
tion), iii. 6. 7 

Noble (of birth), i. 5. 5 ; ii. 1.^. 3 

(eiiyei/jis, contrasted with yevi-alo^, 
generosiis, which connotes high- 
miniiedness) ; see al.so Beautiful 
Nouns and verbs, see Words 
Novelties (of language), iii. 11. 
Number, iii. 5. 6 



GENERAL INDEX 



Oaths, i. 15. 27 ; (dicasts' oath), i. 

15. 5, 12 ; ii. 25. 10 
Objection.s (logical), ii. 25. 3, 26. 4 
Obscurity of style, iii. 5. 7 
Odd and even (game), iii. 5. 4 
Old age, i. 5. 15 ; ii. 13 
Oligarchy, i. 8. 4 
Opinion, i. 7. 36 
Opposites, see Contraries 
Oracles, iii. 5. 4 
Outrage, ii. 2. 3, 5 

Paean (rhythm), iii. 8. 4-6 

Pain and painful things, i. 11. 29 

Pancratiast, i. 5. 14 

Paradox, ii. 23. 16 ; iii. 11. 6 

Parenthesis, iii. o. 7 

Parisosis, iii. 9. 9, 11. 10 

Paromoiosis, iii. 9. 9 

Particles (connecting), iii. 5. 2, 12. 4 

Parts (topic of), ii. 23. 13 

Parvenus, ii. 9. 9, 16. 4 

Passions, ii. 1-17 

Pathetic style, iii. 7. 3, 11 

Pathos, iii. 1. 7 

Pentathleie, i. 5. 11 

Period, iii. 9. 5-7 

Peroration, iii. 13. 3 ; 19 

Personification, see Vividness 

Perspicuity (of style), iii. 2. 2 

Piov^, The (comedy by Auaxan- 

drides), iii. 12. 3 
Pity, ii. 8. 2, 12. 15 ; (opposed to 

envy and indignation), ii. 9. 3 ; 

(pitiful and terrible contrasted), 

ii. 8. 12 
Pleasure, i. 11. 1, 6-8 
Poetiy (a kind of imitation), i. 11. 

23 
Politics (science of), i. 2. 7 
Possible and impossible things, i. 

6. 27 ; ii. 19 
Poverty (motive of crime), i. 12. 15 
Power (is pleasant), i. 11. 7; (men 

in power), ii. 17 
Praise, i. 9. 33 
Prejudice i. 1. 4 ; ii. 23. 24 ; iii. 

14. 7 ; 15. 
Prelude (dithyrambic), iii. 9. 6 ; 

(on the flute), iii. 14. 1 
Prime of life, i. 5. 11 ; ii. 14 
Probability, i. 2. 15, 15. 17; ii. 

25. 8-11 
Prologue, see Exordium 
Proof (inartificial), i. 15 ; (ethical), 



i. 2. 3 ; (general or common), i. 1. 

12 ; ii. 20. 1 ; (generally), iii. 17 
Proportion (analogy), i. 7. 4 ; iii. 4. 

3, 6. 7, 7. 10 ; (topic of), ii. 23. 17; 

(in metaphor), iii. 2. 9 
Propositions (rhetorical), i. 3. 7 
Propriety (of styled, iii. 2. 1, 7. 1 
Proverbs and proverbial sayings, i. 

6. 20, 22 ; i. 11. 25 ; i. 12. 20, 23 ; 

i. 15. 14 ; ii. 4. 21, 10. 6 ; ii. 6. 5, 

18 ; ii. 10. 5 ; ii. 21. 11, 12 ; ii. 23. 

15, 22; ii. 24. 2 ; ii. 25. 4; iii. 11, 

14 ; (are evidence), i. 15. 4 ; (are 

metaphors from species to 

species), iii. 11. 14 
Punctuation, iii. 5. 6 
Punishment (xdAatrts, differs from 

TiixoipCa), i. 10. 17, 14. 2 
Puns, iii. 11. 7 
Purity (of style), iii. 5 
Purveyors (euphemism for robbers), 

iii. 2. 10 

Rare words (ykCxrcrai), iii. 2. 5, 8. 3 
Reason (arguments from), ii. 23. 

20, 24 
Recrimination, iii. 15. 7 
Refutation, ii. 22. 14, 25 ; iii. 9. 8 ; 
(topic of), ii. 23. 23 ;• refutative 
enthymemes, ii. 23. 30 ; iii. 17. 13 
Relatives (topic oO, 'i. 23. 3 
Reply (to an adversary), iii. 18. 5, 6 
Reputation (defined), i. 5. 8 
Retortion (of a dilemma), ii. 23. 15 
Revenge, i. 9. 24, 10. 17, 11. 9 
Revenues (State), i. 4. 8 
Rhapsody, iii. 1. 3, 8 
Rhetoric (definition), i. 2. 1 ; (off- 
shoot of Politics and Dialectic), 
i. 2. 7, 4. 5 ; (three kinds), i. 3 ; 
(three parts oO, iii- 1 ; (style 
suited to each kind), iii. 12 
Rhythm, iii. 1. 4, 8. 2-7 
Ribaldry (buffoonery), iii. 18. 7 
Riddles, ii. 21. 8 ; iii. 2. 12 
Ridicule, iii. 18. 7 
Rivals (to be feared and envied), ii. 

5. 9, 10. 6 

Salutary things, ii. 5. 16 

Science (cTrio-TTJ/aij, opposed to 

Svvaixii, faculty), i. 4. 6 
Scoffing and scoffers, ii. 2. 12, 3. 9, 

6. 20 
Sculpture, i. 11. 23 

491 



GENERAL INDEX 



Selection (topic oO, ii- 23. 12 
Self-control, see Temperance 
Selfishness, i. 11. 26 
Shame and sliamelessness, ii. (i 
Sign, i. 2. 14, 16 ; ii. 24. 5, 25. 8 
Similarity (objection from), ii. 25. 6 
Simile, iii. 4 ; 10. 3 ; (a kind of 

metaphor), iii. 11. 11 
Slander, see Prejudice 
Slight (three kinds of), ii. 2. 3 
Smart sayings, iii. 10 
Solecism, iii. 5. 7 
Solution, see Refutation 
Soothsayers, i. 15. 14; iii. 5. 4 
Sophists (and dialecticians), i. 1. 14 
SoiTOw (sometimes pleasant), i. 

11. 12 

Soul (a kind of motion), ii. 23. 13 

Special terms (better than general), 
iii. 5. 3 

Speech (its three point.s and re- 
quisites), iii. 1. 1, 4 ; (its parts), 
iii. 13-l!t 

Spite, ii. 2. 3, 4. 30 

Statement (of a case), iii. 13. 2 

Stature, i. 5. 13 

Strength, i. 5. 12 

Style (excellence of), iii. 1. 5 ; 2 ; 
(frigidity), iii. 3 ; (purity), iii. 5 ; 
(dignity), iii. 6. 1 ; (propriety), 
iii. 7 ; (continuous), iii. 9. 1 ; 
(periodic), iii. 9. 3 ; (wittiness), 
iii. 10. 1 ; (three things desirable), 
iii. 10. 6 ; (which kind suited to 
each kind of rhetoric), iii. 12 ; 
(style of debate and the written 
style), iii. 12. 1 ; (of public speak- 
ing), iii. 12. 5 ; (ethical), ii. 18. 1, 
21. 10 ; iii. 16. 8 ; (of acting), iii. 

12. 2 ; ("foreign"), iii. 2. 3, 8, 3. 
3: (pathetic), iii. 7. 3, 11; (simple), 
iii. 16. 2 

Superiority, i. 7. 2, 31, 9. 25 
Supi)ression (of the how and when, 

fallacy oO, ii. 24. 7, 8 
Syllogism, i. 2. 9, 13 
Synonyms, iii. 2. 7 

Talent (natural), i. G. 15, 29; iii. 

10. 1 
Tekmerion, i. 2. 16, 17 
Temperance (self-control), i. 9. 9 
Temple-builders, i. 14. 1 



Ten, The (legislative committee), 

iii. 18. 6 
Tetrameter, iii. 1. 9, 8. 4 
Tlieft, i. 13. 10 
Time (topic of), ii. 23. 6 
Tokens (indications), iii. 15. 9, 

16. 10 
Tones, iii. 1. 4 
Topic, i. 2. 21 ; ii. 22. 13 ; 23-24 ; 

(of degree), ii. 19. 26 ; iii. 19. 2 
Torch-bearer (at Bleusis), iii. 2. 10 
Torture, i. 15. 26 

Tragedy, tragic poets, iii. 1. 3, 14. 6 
Travel, books of, i. 4. 13 
Trophies, iii. 10. 7 
Tyranny, i. 8. 4-5 
Tyrants and body-guards, i. 2. 19 

(argument from Example) 

Universal arguments, ii. 18 
Unrhythmical (style), iii. 8. 1, 7 
Unselfishness, i. 9. 16 
Useful (things), i. 5. 7 

Vanity, see Arrogance; 
Vehemence, iii. 11. 16 
Vice and virtue, i. 9. 1-31 
Victory (a kind of superiority), ii. 

12. 6 
Vividness, iii. 10. 6, 11. 1-4 
Voice, iii. 1. 4, 7. 10 
Voluntary acts, i. 10. 8 

War and peace, i. 4. 9 

Ways and means, i. 4. 8 

Wealth, i. 5. 7 ; (etfect on char- 
acter), ii. 16. 1 

Will, i. 10. 8 

Wines (mixed), iii. 2. 4 

Wisdom (jjhilosophical and practi- 
cal, <ro<f>ia, (j>p6vr)<T^i), i. 9. 5, 13, 
11. 27 

Witnesses, i. 15. 13, 18 ; ii. 20. 9 ; 
(false), i. 14. 6 

Wittiness (euTpa7r«Aio), ii. 12. 16, 
1.3. 15 

Words (kinds and uses of), iii. 2. 
,')-7, 3. 2, 8 ; (teauty of), iii. 2. 13 ; 
(topic from different meanings 
oO, ii. 23. 9 

Wrongdoing, see Injustice 

Youth (character oOi ii- 12 



Printed in Great Britain by R. & R. Clark, Limited, Edinburgh. 



THE LOEB CLASSICAL 
LIBRARY. 



VOLUMES ALREADY PUBLISHED. 



Latin Authors. 



APULEIUS. THE GOLDEN ASS (METAMORPHOSES). Trans, by W. 

Adlington (1566). Revised by S. Gaselee. (3rd Impression.) 
AUSONIUS. Trans, by H. G. Evelyn White. 2 Vols. 
BOETHIUS: TRACTS and DB CONSOLATIONB PHILOSOPHIAE. 

Trans, by Rev. H. P. Stewart and E. K. Rand. 
CAESAR : CIVIL WARS. Trans, by A. G. Peskett. (2?id Impression.) 
CAESAR : GALLIC WAR. Trans, by H. J. Edwards, (ith Impression.) 
CATULLUS. Trans, by F. W. Cornish; TIBULLUS. Trans, by J. P. 

Postgate ; and PERVIGILIUM VENERIS. Trans, by J. W. Mackail. 

(7th Impression.) 
CICERO : DE FINIBUS. Trans, by H. Rackhani. (2nd Impression.) 
CICERO : DE OFFICIIS. Trans, by Walter Miller. (2nd Impression.) 
CICERO: DE SENBCTUTE, DE AMICITIA, DB DiVlNATlONB. 

Trans, by W. A. Falconer. 
CICERO: LETTERS TO ATTICUS. Trans, by E. O. Winstedt. 

3 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Impression. Vol. II. 2nd Impression.) 
CICERO: PRO ARGHIA POETA, POST REDITUM IN SENATU, 

POST REDITUM AD QUIRITES, DB DOMO SUA, DE HARUS- 

PICUM RESPONSIS, PRO PLANCIO. Trans, by N. H. Watts. 
CLAUDIAN. Trans, by M. Platnaner. 2 Vols. 
CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE. Trans, by W. Watts (1631). 

2 Vols. (3rd Impression.) 
FRONTINUS: STRATAGEMS and AQUEDUCTS. Trans, by C. E. 

Bennett. 
FRONTO : CORRESPONDENCE. Trans, by C. R. Haines. 2 Vols. 
HORACE : ODES and BPODES. Trans, by C. B. Bennett, (mh Imp.) 
JUVENAL and PERSIUS. Trans, by G. G. Ramsay. (2nd Impression.) 
LIVY. Trans, by B. O. Foster. 13 Vols. Vols. I.-UI. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.) 
LUCRETIUS. Trans, by W. H. D. Rouse. 
MARTIAL. Trans, by W. C. A. Ker. 2 Vols. 
OVID : HEROIDES AND AM0RB8. Trans, by Grant Showerman. (2nd 

Impression.) 
OVID : METAMORPHOSES. Trans, by F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. (2nd 

Edition.) 
OVID : TRISTIA and BX PONTO. Trans, by A. L. W^heeler. 
PETR0NIU8. Trans, by M. Heseltine ; SENECA : APOCOLOCYN- 

T0SI8. Trans, by W. H. D. Rouse, ('jth Impression.) 
PLAUTUS. Trans, by Paul Nixon. 5 Vols. Vols. L-III. (Vol. I. 

2nd Impression.) 
PLINY: LETTERS. Melmoth's Translation revised by W. M. L. 

Hutchinson. 2 Vols. (2nd Impression.) 
PROPERTIUS. Trans, by H. E. Butler. (Srd Impression.) 
QUINTILIAN. Trans, by H. E. Butler. 4 Vols. 
SALLUST. Trans, by J. C. Rolfe. 

1 



THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY. 

SCRIPTORES HISTORIAE AUGUSTAE. Trans, by D. Magie. 4 Vols. 

Vols. I. and II. 
SENECA: EPISTULAB MORALES. Trans, by R. M. Gummere. 

3 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Impression.) 
SENECA : TRAGEDIES. Trans, by F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. (2«rf Imp.) 
SUETONIUS. Trans, by J. C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. (3rd Imjn-ession.) 
TACITUS .• DIALOGUS. Trans, by Sir Wm. Peterson ; and AGRICOLA 

AND GERMANIA. Trans, by Maurice Hutton. (3rd Impression.) 
TACITUS : HISTORIES. Trans, by 0. H. Moore. 2 Vols. Vol. I. 
TERENCE. Trans, by John Sargeaunt. 2 Vols. (5th Impression.) 
VBLLEIUS PATEROULUS and RES GESTAE DIVI AUGUSTI- 

Trans. by F. W. Shipley. 
VIRGIL. Trans, by H. R. Fairclough. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 4th Impression. 

Vol. II. 3rd Impression.) 

Greek Authors. 

ACHILLES TATIUS. Trans, by S. Gaselee. 

AENEAS TACTICU8, ASCLEPIODOTUS and ONASANDER. Trans. 

by The Illinois Greek Club. 
AESCHINBS. Trans, by C. D. Adams. 
AESCHYLUS. Trans, by H. Weir Smyth. 2 Vols. 
APOLLODORUS. Trans, by Sir James G. Frazer. 2 Vols. 
APOLLONIUS RHODIUS. Tran.s. by R. C. Seaton. (3rd /jdjMessJon. ) 
THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS. Trans, by Kirsopp Lake. 2 Vols. 

(Vol. I. 4th Impression. Vol. II. 3rd Impression.) 
APPIAN'S ROMAN HISTORY. Trans, by Horace White. 4 Vols. 
ARISTOPHANES. Trans, by Ben.jamin Bickley Rogers. 3 Vols. 
ARISTOTLE: THE "ART" OF RHETORIC. Trans, by J. H. Freese. 
CALLIMACHUS and LYCOPIIRON. Trans, by A. W. Mair, and 

ARATUS, trans, by G. R. Mair. 
CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Trans, by Rev. G. W. Buttorworth. 
DAPHNIS AND CHLOE. Tliornley's Translation revised by J. M. 

Edmonds; and PARTHBNIUS. Trans, by 8. Gaselee. (2nd Impression.) 
DEMOSTHENES: DE CORONA and DE FALSA LBGATIONE. 

Trans, by C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince. 
DIO CASSIUS: ROMAN HISTORY. Trans, by B. Gary. 9 Vols. 

Vols. I.-VIII. 
DIOGENES LABRTIUS. Trans, by R. D. Hicks. 2 Vols. 
EPICTETUS. Trans, by W. A. Oldfather. 2 Vols. Vol. I. 
EURIPIDES. Trans, by A. S. Way. 4 Vols. (Vols. I. and IV., 3rd, 

Vol. II. 4th, Vol. III., 2nd Impression.) 
EUSEBIUS : ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY. Trans, by Kirsopp Lake. 

2 Vols. Vol. I. 
GALEN : ON THE NATURAL FACULTIES. Tran.s. by A. J. Brock. 
THE GREEK ANTHOLOGY. Trans, by W. R. Paton. 5 Vols. (Vols. 

I. and II. 2»id Impression.) 
THE GREEK BUCOLIC POETS (THEOCRITUS, BION, MOSCHUS). 

Trans, by J. M. Edmonds. (4th Impression.) 
HERODOTUS. Trans, by A. 1). Go<lley. 4 Vols. 
HESIOD AND THE HOMERIC HYMNS. Trans, by H. G. Evelyn 

White. (2nd Impression.) 
HIPPOCRATES. Trans, by W. II. S. Jones. 4 Vols. Vols. I. -II. 
HOMER : ILIAD. Trans, by A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. 
HOMER : ODYSSEY. Trans, by A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (2nd Impression.) 
2 



THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY. 

JOSBPHUS: THE LIFE and AGAINST APION. Trans, by H. 8t. J. 

Thackeray. 
JULIAN. Trans, by Wilmer Cave AViight. 3 Vols. 
LUCIAN. Trans, by A. M. Harmon. 8 Vols. Vols. I.-IV. (Vols. I, 

and II. 2nd Impression.) 
LYRA GRABCA. Tran.s. by J. M. Edmonds. 3 Vols. Vols. I.-II. 
MARCUS AURBLIU8. Trans, by C. R. Haines. (2nd Impression.) 
MBNANDER. Trans, by F. G. AUinson. 
PAUSANIAS: DESCRIPTION OP GREECE. Trans, by W. H. S. 

Jones. 5 Vols, and Companion Vol. Vols. I. and II. 
PHILOSTRATUS : THE LIFE OF APOLLONIUS OF TYANA. Trans. 

by F. C. Conybeare. 2 Vols. {2nd Imyiression.) 
PHILOSTRATUS and BUNAPIUS : LIVES OF THE SOPHISTS. 

Trans, bv Wilmer Cave Wriglit. 
PINDAR. " Trans, by Sir J. E. Sandys. (3rd Edition.) 
PLATO: CRATYLUS, PARMBNIDES, GREATER and LESSER 

HIPPIAS. Trans, by H. N. Fowler. 
PLATO : EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, PHAEDO, PHAEDRUS. 

Trans, by H. N. Fowler, {ith Impression.) 
PLATO : LACHES, PROTAGORAS, MENO, EUTHYDBMUS. Trans. 

by W. R. M. Lamb. 
PLATO : LAWS. Trans, by Rev. R. G. Bury. 2 Vols. 
PLATO: LYSIS, SYMPOSIUM, GORGIAS, Trans, by W. R. M. Lamb. 
PLATO : STATESMAN, PHILEBUS. Trans, by H. N. Fowler ; ION. 

Trans, by W. R. M. Lamb. 
PLATO : THEABTETUS, SOPHIST. Trans, by H. N. Fowler. 
PLUTARCH : THE PARALLEL lilVBS. Trans, by B. Perrin. 11 Vols. 
POLYBIUS. Trans, by W. R. Paton. 6 Vols. Vols. L-IV. 
PROCOPIUS; HISTORY OF THE WARS. Trans, by H. B. Dewing. 

7 Vols. Vols. I.-IV. 
QUTNTUS SMYRNAEUS. Trans, by A. S. Way. 
SOPHOCLES. Trans, by F. Storr. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 4(7i Impression. 

Vol. II. ird Impression.) 
ST. JOHN DAMASCENE : BARLAAM AND lOASAPH. Trans, by the 

Rev. G. R. Woodward and Harold Mafctingly. 
STRABO: GEOGRAPHY. Trans, by Horace L. Jones. 8Vols. Vols.I.-IlL 
THEOPHRASTUS : ENQUIRY INTO PLANTS. Trans, by Sir Arthur 

Hort, Bart. 2 Vols. 
THUCYDIDES. Trans, by C. F. Smith. 4 Vols. 
XENOPHON : CYROPABDIA. Trans, by Walter Miller. 2 Vols. 
XENOPHON: HELLENICA, ANABASIS, APOLOGY, and SYM- 
POSIUM. Trans, by C. L. Brownson and O. J. Todd. 3 Vols. 
XENOPHON : MEMORABILIA and OECONOMICUS. Trans, by B. C. 

Marchant. 
XENOPHON : SCRIPTA MINORA. Trans, by E. C. Marchant. 



IN PREPARATION. 

Greek Authors. 



ARISTOTLE : NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, H. Rackham. 
ARISTOTLE : ORGANON, W. M. L. Hutchinson. 
ARISTOTLE : PHYSICS, Rev. P. Wicksteed. 
8 



THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY 

ARISTOTLE: POETICS; "LONGINUS": ON THE SUBLIME, W. 

Hamilton Fyfe; DEMETRIUS: ON STYLE, W. Rhys Roberts. 
ARISTOTLE : POLITICS and ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, Edward 

Oapps. 
ATHENAEUS, C. B. Guliclc. 
DEMOSTHENES : OLYNTHIACS, PHILIPPICS, LEPTINES, MINOR 

SPEECHES, J. H. Vince. 
DEMOSTHENES: PRIVATE ORATIONS, G. M.Calhoun. 
DIO CHRYSOSTOM, W. E. Waters. 

GREEK IAMBIC AND ELEGIAC POETS, E. D. Perry. 
I8ARUS, E. W. Forster. 
ISOCRATES, G. Norlin. 

JOSBPHUS: THE JEWISH WAR, H. St. J. Thackeray. 
MANETHO, S. de Ricoi. 

OPPIAN, COLLUTHUS, TRYPHIODORUS, A. W. Mair. 
PAPYRI, A. S. Hunt. 

PHILOSTRATUS : IMAGINES, Arthur Fairbank.s. 
PLATO : MENEXENUS, ALCIBIADESI.and 11., ERASTAI, THEAGES, 

CHARMIDES, MINOS, BPINOMIS, W. R. M. Lamb. 
PLATO: REPUBLIC, Paul Shorey. 
PLUTARCH : MORALIA, F. C. Babbitt. 
ST. BASIL : LETTERS, Prof. R. J. Deferrari. 
SBXTUS EMPIRICUS, A. C. Pear.son. 
THEOPHRASTUS : CHARACTERS, J. H. Edmonds; HERODAS ; 

CBRCIDAS, etc. ; HIBR0CLB8, PHILOGEI.OS, A. D. Knox. 

Latin Authors. 



AULUS GELLIUS, J. C. Rolfe. 

BBDE: ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY, Rev. H. F. Stewart. 

CICERO: AD FAMILIARBS, W. Glyn Williams. 

CICERO : CATILINE ORATIONS, B. L. Ullman. 

CICERO : DB NATURA DEORUM, H. Rackham. 

CICERO : DB ORATORB, ORATOR, BRUTUS, Charles Stuttaford. 

CICERO: DE REPUBLICA and DE LEGIBUS, Clinton Keyes. 

CICERO: PHILIPPICS, W. C. A. Ker. 

CICERO: PRO CABCINA, PRO LEGE MANILIA, PRO CLUBNTIO, 

PRO RABIRIO, H. Grose Hodge. 
CICERO : VERRINE ORATIONS, L. H. G. Greenwood. 
HORACE, EPISTLES and SATIRES, H. R. Fairclougli. 
LUCAN, J. D. Duff'. 
OVID : FASTI, Sir J. G. Frazer. 

PLINY: NATURAL HISTORY, W. H. S. Jones and L. F. Newman. 
ST. AUGUSTINE: MINOR WORKS, Rev. P. Wicksteed. 
SENECA : MORAL ESSAYS, J. W. Basore. 
8TATIUS, I. A. Mozeley. 
TACITUS : ANNALS, John Jackson. 
VALERIUS FLACCUS, A. F. Sohofield. 

DESCRIPTIVE PROSPECTUS ON APPLICATION. 



London . WILLIAM HEINEMANN 

New York . G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

4 






A 



''■'■: 0- 



108609213090 



PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE 
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET 

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY 



«f 



PA Aristotles 
3893 Aristotle 
R3 
1926 



Sigfiam. 



SIGMUND SAMUEL ULBilAilX